国际粮食政策研究所-利用卫星数据监测苏丹在持续冲突中的经济活动指标

1

MONTHYEAR

WORKINGPAPER

STRATEGYSUPPORTPROGRAM|WORKINGPAPER7MAY2023

MonitoringindicatorsofeconomicactivityinSudanamidstongoingconflictusingsatellitedata

HalaAbushama,ZheGuo,KhalidSiddig,OliverKirui,KibromAbay,LiangzhiYou

ABSTRACT

TheconfrontationinSudanbetweentheSudaneseArmedForces(SAF)andRapidSupportForces(RSF)hadpersistedformonthsbeforeescalatingintoanarmedconflictonApril15th,2023.Besidestheseverehumanitariancatastrophe,thewarhasdisruptedaccesstopower,water,healthservices,andbankingserviceswhilealsodisruptingaccesstomarketstriggeringconsiderablescarcityofgoodsandservices.Theconflicthasdestroyedkeyinfrastructure,constrainingdomesticandinternationaltradeanddisruptingproductionactivitiesandsupplychains.Inthispaper,weutilizesatellitedatatoprovideaswiftanalysisofhowtheconflicthaschangedpatternsofeconomicactivity,whichareboundtohavesevereimplicationsonfoodsecurityinSudan.Wealsodescribehowremotesensinganddatacollection

methodscanbedeployedtomonitoreconomicactivitiesamidstarmedconflicts.

Keywords:SAF,RSF,conflict,economicactivities,NO2concentration.

2

Contents

Abstract 1

Background 3

thePoliticalEconomyofconflictsinSudan:Historyrenewed 3

ConflictandEconomicActivity 5

Satellitedataanalysis:Troposphericnitrogendioxideemissions 6

NO2concentrationsandtrendsinSudan 8

NO2changesattheonsetoftheconflict 8

Town-levelNO2changesinApril2023 11

Conclusion 13

AbouttheAuthors 15

Acknowledgments 15

References 15

3

BACKGROUND

OnApril15th,2023,anarmedconflictbrokeoutinKhartoumbetweentheSudanArmedForces(SAF)andtheRapidSupportForces(RSF),concludinga3-yearpartnershipintheTransitionalMilitaryCouncil(TMC).Despiterepeatedannouncementsofceasefiretoallowforhumanitariancorridorsandevacuations,theconflictcontinuestodate.

TheongoingconflicthasdisruptedeconomicactivityinKhartoum,constrainedaccesstopublicservices,anddecimatedlivelihoods.Mediareportsindicatethathospitalscannotprovideservice,bankshavecloseddoors,andaccesstofoodisscarceduetotheviolentconflict.AsofMay13th,2023,fewerthan20percentofhealthfacilitiesinKhartoumremainfullyfunctionaland60percentarenotoperating,severelylimitingaccesstourgentmedicalservicesformillionsofpeople(UN-OCHA,2023a).Thedisplacementofpeoplefromconflictareashasputadditionalpressureonserviceprovision,foodresources,publichealthcaresystemsinotherstatesacrossSudan.AsofMay23rd,2023,overonemillionpeoplehavebeeninternallydisplaced,whileatleast345,000havecrossedintoneighboringcountries,asaresultoftheongoingfighting(ACLED2023;UN-OCHA,2023b).MostpeoplewhocrossedtheborderwenttoEgypt(126,000people)followedbySouthSudan(71,000),Chad(60,000),CentralAfricanRepublic(9,700),andEthiopia(5,000)accordingtotheUNHCR.Thenumbersofinternalandcross-borderdisplacementaresurgingbytheday(UN-OCHA,2023b).

TheunfoldingconflicthasmajorimplicationsonthedifferentdomainsoftheSudaneseeconomy.Besidesthepoliticalandhumanitariancrises,thescarcityofgoodsandpublicservices,inadditiontoreducedpurchasingpowerandsurginginflationhavecollectivelycontributedtoeconomiccontraction(Elamin,2023).Thelossofkeyinfrastructureanddisruptionstodomesticandinternationaltradehavealsodisruptedproductionandreducedagriculturalactivities.Thispaperprovidesanearlyandtentativeanalysisofhowtheconflicthaschangedthepatternsofeconomicactivity,whichwillhavesevereimplicationsonfoodsecurityandlivelihoodsinSudan.Intheabsenceofdetailedanddisaggregatedsurveydataoneconomicactivities,remotesensingdataandremotedatacollectionmethodsprovidesecond-bestoptionstoinformresponsestocrises,includinghumanitarianoperations.

THEPOLITICALECONOMYOFCONFLICTSINSUDAN:HISTORYRENEWED

Sudan’spoliticalturbulencehashadsevereimplicationsonagriculturalproductionandfoodsecurityacrossthedecades.Thevariousformsofconflictinthecountry’sdifferentregionshaveledtofoodshortages,agriculturalproductivitydecline,andloweredcontributionstoGDPgrowth(Alheloetal.,2023).Criticalinfrastructure,suchasroads,bridges,irrigationsystems,andpowersupplynetworkshavebeenseverelydamagedordestroyedbyconflicts.Thishashinderedtransportation,marketaccess,andthedeliveryofessentialservices,furtherimpedingeconomicactivities(UNEP,2007).Priortotheoutbreakofthecurrentconflict,estimatesindicatedthatthecostofinfrastructuredamagecausedbyconflictsinSudanexceedsbillionsofdollars(WorldBank,2020).Itisexpectedthattheinfrastructuredamageandlossesduetothecurrentconflict,mostlyinthecapitalKhartoum,willlargelyamplifytheseestimates.

TheSecondCivilWarbetween1983-2005betweentheSudaneseGovernmentandtheSudanPeople’sLiberationMovement/Army(SPLM-A)resultedinsignificantdisplacementofpeople,lossoflives,anddestructionofinfrastructureinregionssuchasSouthKordofan’sNubaMountains(Johnson,2003).It

4

wasestimatedthatSudanlostmillionsofdollarsannuallyinagriculturalexportsduringthewarandtheconflictledtoadisruptioninagriculturalvaluechains,exacerbatingthefoodinsecuritycrisisandimpedingeconomicdevelopment(Ahmed,2006).

Similarly,theDarfurConflictwhicharosefromcomplexfactorsincludingcompetitionforlandandwaterresourcescombinedwithapowerstrugglebuiltonethnictensions(DeWaal,2019),hadsevereconsequencesonthewelfareoftheregions’population.Itisestimatedthatthisconflictdirectlyaffectedaround2.7millionfarmersandpastoralists(FlintandDeWaal,2008).Moreover,thedisruptionintraderoutesandinsecurityintheregionhamperedtheexportofagriculturalproducts,suchaslivestock,leadingtosignificantlossesinrevenue(EbaidallaandAbdalla,2015).

ThemilitaryinSudanhashistoricallyplayedadominantroleineconomicdevelopment(D’Silvaet.al,2022).Acombinationoffactorssuchaspower,economicdominance,andrent-capturedrovethegradualascendanceofthemilitarytoforma‘militarykleptocracy’(Woodward,2019).Businessnetworksworkingintandemwiththemilitarywerealsohistoricallyinvolvedintheunevendistributionofwealthformingasystemofstateclientelism.

FollowingtheDecember2018revolutionandtheformationofatransitionalgovernmentin2019composedofmilitaryandcivilianleaders,ledbyformerPrimeMinisterAbdallahHamdok,Sudan’shopesofreformingthedistributionofpoliticalpowerandeconomicrentswerehigh.However,duetotheunderlyingtensionsbetweenthemilitaryandciviliancomponentsofthetransitionalgovernment,theTMCtiltedpowerintheirfavorduringtheOctober2021coup.AkeyelementofthetensionswasthereviewofmilitaryandparamilitaryownedenterprisesandtheirincorporationundertheMinistryofFinanceandEconomicPlanning(D’Silvaet.al,2023).Althoughanoverarchingframeworkforpower-sharingwassignedbetweencivilianbodiesandtheTMConDecember5th2022,itwasnotimplemented.Withoutacleargovernanceframeworkforthetransitionalgovernment,andtheeliminationoftheciviliancomponentfrompowerthroughthecoup,themilitaryandparamilitaryincreasinglyfoundthemselvesinfurtherdisagreementandcompetitionforpowerandeconomicdominanceinSudan.

InApril2023,fightingbrokeoutbetweentheSAFundertheleadershipofGeneralAbdel-FattahAl-BurhanandhisformerdeputychiefofTMCandleaderoftheRSFGeneralMohamedHamdanDagalo,alsoknownasHemedti.BothsidesoftheconflicthavetradedaccusationsaboutwhostartedtheclashesinKhartoum,buttheweeksleadinguptoApril15thwitnessedpreparationsanddeploymentofpersonnelandheavyequipmentintoKhartoumbybothsides(USIP,2023).

Thewarringfactionshavethreatenedpeople’slivelihoodsandwell-being.AlthoughonApril29ththeCentralReservePolicewasdeployedforciviliansecurity,lootingandterrorizationofcivilianshascontinued.Figure1highlightsthechronologyofSudan’spoliticalandfightingdevelopmentssinceApril15thuntiltheendofMay2023.Followingaweek-longnegotiationledbySaudiArabiaandTheUnitedStates,theSAFandRSFsignedtheJeddahDeclarationofCommitmenttoProtecttheCiviliansofSudanonMay11th.Followingthesigningofthedeclaration,warringintensifiedinEl-GeneinaandNyala,withatleast565killed(ACLED,2023),andthearmedconflictcontinuedinKhartoum.OnMay22nd,2023,thetenthceasefirewasagreedinJeddahandonMay29thanextensionwasagreed.However,theviolenceislikelytopersist.

5

Fightingdevelopments

FightingbetweentheSAF

andRSFerupted.

TribalclashesinvolvingRSF

eruptedinElGeneina.At

least90killed.

ClashedbetweenMisseriya

andMaaliyainBabanussa,

WestKordofan.Dozens

killed.

Tribalclashesbetween

HausaandNubatribesin

Kosti,WhiteNile.Atleast28

peoplekilled.

SAFkillsabout100RSF

soldiersanddestroys,60

RSFmilitaryvehiclesin

Khartoum.

Fightingintensifiesin

ElGeneina.Atleast565

killed.

345kpeoplecrossedinto

neighboringcountriesasof

26May,toEgypt,South

Sudan,Chad,CAR,and

Ethiopia.

7weeksofawarwithat

least730peoplekilled,

5,500injuredand1.4million

fledtheirhomes.

Politicaldevelopments

TheSAFdesignatesthe

RSFasarebelentityand

ordersitsdissolution.

Fivearmedsignatoriesto

theJubaPeaceAgreement

deployfightersinElFasher

toprotectcivilians.

CentralReservePoliceis

deployedinthecapitalto

maintainsecurity.

TheSAFandRSFbegin

talksinJeddah,Saudi

Arabia,todiscuss

humanitarianissuesanda

ceasefire.

Minnawi-ledfaction

withdrawsforcesfrom

KhartoumtoNorthDarfur.

JeddahDeclarationof

CommitmenttoProtectthe

CiviliansofSudansigned.

Thetenthceasefire

negotiatedinJeddah;SA

wentintoeffect.

Anextensionofthetenth

ceasefireissigned.None

hasbeeneffective.

Figure1:Chronologyoffightingandpoliticalevents.

15April

7-9May

12May

12-15May

26May

29May

7May

24-27April

17April

27April

6May

8May

11

22May

29May

May

29April

Source:Authors’compilationbasedonACLED(2023)anddatafromUN-OCHA(2023b).

TherenewedconflictisthefirstofitskindinSudan’shistorytotakeplaceinthecapitalcity(Khartoum),however,theconsequencestofoodinsecurityandlivelihoodsoftheSAFandRSFconflict,albeitacute,donotseemdifferentfromthepreviousconflicts.

CONFLICTANDECONOMICACTIVITY

Thenatureofconflictvariesfromcontexttocontext;however,acommondenominatoristhedifficultyofmonitoringeconomicchallengesatbothmicroeconomicandmacroeconomiclevels.Duetotheoutbreakofarmedconflictsandthedisruptionoftraditionaldatacollectioneffortsandmethods,quantifyingtheimmediateimpactsofanactivearmedconflictprovesdifficult.Intheabsenceofconventionalsurveydata,remotesensingtoolsandremotedatacollectionmethodsholdsignificantpotentialtofillcriticaldatagapsinfragilestates(Dabalenetal.,2016;HoogeveenandPape,2020).

BecausemanypublicandprivateinstitutionshavenotbeenoperatinginKhartoumsinceApril2023,nation-widemonthlyreportshavenotbeenpublishedforMarchandApril.Therefore,theavailabilityofdataoninflation,exchangerates,andcommoditypriceshasbeenlimited.Inaddition,thelackofrecentdisaggregateddatainSudan,necessitatestheuseofremotesensingmethodsthatcanprovideindicationsontheimplicationsontheeconomy.

6

Inflationisexpectedtoreacha3-digitfigurebyendofMay(WFP,2023).Anexpectedeconomiccontractionislikely,triggeredbythedisruptionstoproduction(mainlyinagricultureandgoldmining),trade(mainlyimportsoffoodandexportsofgoldandlivestock),jobloss(mainlyinKhartoumstate),investments,andhumancapitallossasaresultofhumancapitalflight.Thewarhasalreadyresultedindecreasedavailabilityofessentialfooditemsinlocalmarkets,causingasurgeinfoodprices.SinceApril15th,pricesofbasiccommoditiessuchasbottledwater,food,andfuelhaveincreasedby40-60percentinconflict-affectedareas(WFP2023).

AgriculturalandindustrialproductioninKhartoumandotherconflictareasisexpectedtodropsignificantly.ThemovementofproductioninputsfromKhartoumandPort-Sudantootherareasaroundthecountrywillbeconstrained.SmallholderfarmersarelikelytofacelimitedaccesstoinputmaterialsduetothecentralizedoperationofmanyinstitutionssuchastheAgriculturalBankandcustoms,whichcannotoperateinKhartoum.Furthermore,inregionslikeDarfurandKordofan,whereconflictbetweentheSAFandtheRSFisescalating,farmers’plantingseasonandpastoralists’grazingrouteswillbeaffected.

Theprivatesectorhasalsobeenhitbytheon-goingconflict.AccordingtoAsharqAlaawsat(2023),Maersk,oneofthebiggestshippingcompaniesinSudanhasstoppedtakingbookingsuntilfurthernotice.WithouttheabilitytoexportgumArabic,livestock,groundnuts,andotheragriculturalproducts,Sudan’stradebalanceandoverallbudgetdeficitwillsuffer.DALgroup,oneoftheleadingcompaniesinthefoodsector,isnotoperatingbecauseoflootingandburningofitsfactoriesattheonsetoftheconflict.OtherprivatesectorcompaniesthataremajorsuppliersoffoodsuchasSAMILoftheSAY(SalihAbdelrahmanYagoub)Group,whichworkswithWFPandUNICEFtoprovideschoolmealsforseverelymalnourishedchildrenacrossSudanhasalsobeendestroyedinKhartoum.AccordingtoUN-OCHA(2023a),24.7millionpeopleneedhumanitarianassistanceduetoconflict,whichcomesonthetopofotherongoingfoodsecuritychallenges.

Giventherapidescalationoftheongoingconflict,accurateandreliableinformationonhoweconomicactivityhasbeenimpactedinKhartoumandotherregionsofconflictremainsblurred.Thenextsectionutilizesremotesensingtoolsandtroposphericnitrogendioxideemissions,asaproxyforeconomicactivityinthedifferentregions,toassesshowtheongoingconflictimpactsSudan’seconomy,beforeandaftertheeruptionoftheSAFandRSFconflict.

Satellitedataanalysis:Troposphericnitrogendioxideemissions

ByanalyzingthespatialandtemporaldistributionofNO2,itbecomespossibletoidentifyareaswithhighlevelsofpollution,whichcanbeindicativeofspecifichumanandeconomicactivities.DenselypopulatedurbanareaswithheavytrafficandindustrialzonesoftenexhibitelevatedNO2concentrations.Bymappingandmonitoringthesehotspotsovertime,policymakersandurbanplannerscanmakeinformeddecisionsregardinglanduse,transportationinfrastructure,andemissioncontrolmeasurestomitigatetheimpactofhumanactivitiesonairquality.

TheSentinel-5POFFLNO2productrepresentsasignificantadvancementinthefieldofatmosphericmonitoringandEarthobservation.ItisapartoftheSentinel-5Precursor(S5P)mission,acollaborativeeffortbetweentheEuropeanSpaceAgency(ESA)andtheEuropeanCommission.TheSentinel-5PsatellitecarriestheTroposphericMonitoringInstrument(TROPOMI),astate-of-the-artimagingspectrometerthatprovideshighlyaccurateanddetailedmeasurementsofatmosphericgases,includingnitrogendioxide(NO2andNO)(Goldbergetal.,2020).

7

Nitrogenoxides(NO2andNO)areimportanttracegasesintheEarth'satmosphere,presentinboththetroposphereandthestratosphere.TheSentinel-5POFFLNO2productutilizesthedataacquiredbyTROPOMItogeneratecomprehensiveandreliablemeasurementsofNO2levelsintheEarth'satmosphere.Itoffersarangeofessentialinformation,includinghigh-resolutionmaps,near-real-time,verticalprofiles,andtimeseriesdata,enablingscientists,policymakers,andenvironmentalorganizationstoanalyzeandaddressthecomplexdynamicsofNO2pollution.

NO2andNOareharmfulairpollutantsprimarilyemittedfromanthropogenicactivitiesincludingindustrialprocesses,powerplants,andvehicles,andnaturalprocessessuchaswildfires,lightning,andmicrobiologicalprocessesinsoils.MonitoringandunderstandingthedistributionandconcentrationofNO2iscrucialforassessingairquality,identifyingpollutionsources,andimplementingeffectiveenvironmentalpolicies.TheSentinel-5POFFLNO2productisalsovaluableforassessingairqualityandunderstandingatmosphericdynamicsbutalsoformonitoringhumanandeconomicactivitiesthatcontributetoNO2emissions.

Furthermore,theSentinel-5POFFLNO2productenablesthenear-real-timetrackingofchangesinNO2emissionsassociatedwithspecifichumanandeconomicactivities(e.g.,implementationofenvironmentalregulationsorconflicts)(Cooper,2022).Inregionsaffectedbyarmedconflictsorcivilunrest,thedisruptionofindustrialactivities,thedisplacementofpopulations,andthereducedmovementofvehiclesoftenleadtoadecreaseinNO2emissions.ByanalyzingthespatialandtemporaldistributionofNO2,thisproductcanprovidevaluableinsightsintotheextentanddurationofconflicts,helpingresearchers,humanitarianorganizations,andpolicymakersunderstandtheeconomicconsequencesofsuchevents.MonitoringthedecreaseinNO2emissionscanbeindicativeofdisruptedeconomicactivitiesandrestrictedmobility,contributingtotheoverallassessmentofconflictdynamics.ByutilizingtheSentinel-5POFFLNO2productforconflictmonitoringinSudan,stakeholderscangainabetterunderstandingoftheenvironmentalimplicationsofconflictsandmakeinformeddecisionstopromotesustainablerecoveryandstability.

IntheSudancasestudy,weutilizeNO2datafromtwoperspectives.Firstly,wecreateabaselinemapofNO2of2022,indicatingthelocationsofhumanandeconomicactivityareas.WeprocessthetimeseriesofNO2dataforSudanin2022andcalculatetheannualaverageNO2concentrationatpixellevel.ThishelpsusassesswhetherNO2levelscanreflectthespatialdistributionofhumaneconomiccenters,servingasabaselinestudy.Secondly,weanalyzethetrendofNO2concentrationinselectedcitiesbothbeforeandafterperiodsofconflict.AsthewarbeganonApril15,2023,wegeneratea5-daycompositeofNO2forApril2023.ThisallowsustoexaminethedifferentialtrendsofNO2inselectedcitiesorregionsbeforeandaftertheconflicts.WecalculatetheaverageNO2concentrationforeachofthe5daysintheentireadministrativeunit,enablingustoidentifyvariationsintrendsbetweencitiesaffectedbywarandthoseunaffected.Finally,wecreateNO2nationalmapsbeforeandafterthewartovisualizethespatialheterogeneityandpatterns.

ItisworthmentioningthattheNO2productprimarilyservesasatoolformonitoringairquality,andalthoughitcanprovideinsightsintohumanandeconomicactivities,itismorecommonlyusedasanindicatorratherthanadirectmeasureofsuchactivities.TheutilizationofNO2dataoffersacreativeapproachtounderstandingtheseaspects.However,itisimportanttoconsiderthelimitationsandcaveatsassociatedwiththisproduct.Aspreviouslymentioned,NO2levelscanbesignificantlyinfluencedbyotherfactors,includingactivitiessuchasfertilizerapplication,aswellasclimateconditionslikerainfallandwind,particularlyinregionswithlowNO2concentrations.Thedaily,weekly,andevenmonthlyvariationsinNO2canbeheavilyinfluencedbynaturalprocessesandcannotcorrectlycapturethedynamicsof

8

humanandeconomicactivitiesontheground.Therefore,wheninterpretingthedata,itiscrucialtoaccountfortheseexternalfactorsthatcanimpactNO2concentrations.Byacknowledgingthesecaveatsandlimitations,wecanensureamorecomprehensiveunderstandingoftheNO2dataanditsimplicationsformonitoringhumanandeconomicactivities.

NO2concentrationsandtrendsinSudan

TheannualmeanTROPOMI-derivedground-levelNO2concentrationsfor2022provideaninitialbaseline(Figure2).Withanexcellentresolution(about1×1km2)ofground-levelNO2concentrations,weobserveclearheterogeneityacrossthecountry.NO2concentrationispronouncedoverurbanareasresultingfromindustrialactivitiesandheavyvehiclemovementasopposedtoruralareaswithlessemissions.

Figure2:AverageofNO2concentration(mol/m2)in2022.

Source:Authors’depictionbasedonSentinel-5POFFLTROPOMI-derivedNO2

NO2changesattheonsetoftheconflict

ThestudylooksatdifferentregionsinSudan,inconflictzonesandthosenotinconflictzones,todepictNO2changesandtoassesstheimplicationsoftheensuingconflictsoneconomicactivities.TheintensityoftheconfrontationwasthehighestinKhartoumState,especiallyinKhartoumCitywherethemilitaryheadquartersandmanypublicinstitutionsarebased.Theintensityofconfrontationisalsoevident,albeittoalesserextent,intheothertwincitiesofOmdurmanandKhartoumNorth.

9

InFigure3wecompareNO2levelsinSudanbeforethewar(i.e.,panelA:duringApril1-7,2023)andaftertheeruptionoftheconflict(i.e.,panelB:duringApril14-21st,2023).TheNO2concentrationonpanelA,whileshowinghigherintensityonthecapitalstateandPortSudanareaspreadwidelyinmostofthecentral,eastern,andsouthernregionsofthecountry.ThisconcentrationismuchmoremutedinpanelB,especiallyintheAtbaraareaoftheRiverNilestate,ElGadarifState,ElGezirastateandthecentralregionsofthecountry.

Figure3:NO2levels(mol/m2)inSudanbeforeandduringconflict

A:Beforetheconflict,April1-7th,2023B:Duringtheconflict,April14-21st,2023

Source:Authors’depictionbasedonSentinel-5POFFLTROPOMI-derivedNO2

10

Khartoum

0.000200

0.000150

0.000100

0.000050

0.000000

April1-April6-AprilAprilAprilApril

51011-1516-2020-2525-30

ThefollowingFigure4andFigure5zoominslightlyfurtherandshowthemeanground-levelNO2concentrationsderivedfromTROPOMIobservationsfortheentiremonthofApril2023forselectedregionsexperiencingconflictandthosenotexperiencingconflict,respectively.ThedatashowsthattheNO2changesinaroundgreaterKhartoumarequiteevident.ThetrendofNO2concentrationsisonadeclineinthetworegionsofKhartoum(KhartoumandKhartoumNorth)soonaftertheconflicteruptedonApril15,2023.TheabruptstoppageofmovementofpeopleinandaroundKhartoumimpliesreducedNO2emissionsandreducedeconomicactivities.WhiletheepicenteroftheconflictisinKhartoum,manypeopleescapedorsoughtrefugeinOmdurmanandthenorthernareasofKhartoumNorth.ThismayexplaintherelativelyflattrendsinNO2concentrationinOmdurmanandKhartoumNorthtowardstheendofApril2023(Figure4).

Figure4:NO2levels(mol/m2)inthetrioKhartoumcitiesexperiencingconflict.

KhartounNorth

0.000264

0.000256

0.000248

0.000240

0.000232

0.000224

April1-April6-AprilAprilAprilApril

51011-1516-2020-2525-30

0.0000840.0000800.0000760.0000720.000068

Omdurman

April1-April6-AprilAprilAprilApril

51011-1516-2020-2525-30

Source:Authors’depictionbasedonSentinel-5POFFLTROPOMI-derivedNO2

Ontheotherhand,theNO2concentrationinregionslessaffectedbyconflictcomparedtoKhartoumstate,namelyEdDamazin,KadugliandKassalashowedpositiveupwardtrendsintheentireperiodofApril(Figure5).Theseareasarefartherfromtheconflictzoneandexperiencedrelativelymoremovementthanusual.MostpeoplethatfinallyescapedoutofKhartoumheadedtosafelocationslikeKassalaandnorthtowardPortSudanintheRedSeaState,explainingtheincreaseinNO2emissionsintheweeksofApril16-30,followingthebreakoutoftheconflictinKhartoum.Thesecitiesarenotnecessarilyfinaldestinationsofthepeoplefleeingthewar,butinsteadtransitionarylocationsbeforefurthermovementacrossborderstoneighboringcountries(e.g.,toSaudiArabiaviaKassala-PortSudanrouteortoSouth

11

0.0001020.0000950.0000880.0000810.0000740.000067

0.000060

SawakinTown(PortSudan)

0.0000900.0000850.0000800.0000750.0000700.0000650.000060

EdDamazin

April1-5

April6-10

April11-15

April16-20

April20-25

April25-30

SudanviaKadugliorEdDamzeenroutedependingonwherethejourneystarts).1TheescalationoftheconflictandrelativereductionofeconomicactivitiesinKhartoumalsosawreducedmovementofgoodsfromandtoPortSudan(importsandexports).ThismayexplainthedeclineinNO2concentrationinSawakinthoughitwasfartherawayfromKhartoum.PortSudanisasignificantpointofentryforimportsandpointexitforexports.

Figure5:NO2levels(mol/m2)intheotherregionsofSudannotexperiencingconflict.

Kassala

0.000075

0.000072

0.000069

0.000066

0.000063

0.000060

0.0000950.0000900.0000850.0000800.0000750.0000700.0000650.000060

Kadugli

April1-5

April6-10

April11-15

April16-20

April20-25

April25-30

Source:Authors’depictionbasedonSentinel-5POFFLTROPOMI-derivedNO2

Town-levelNO2changesinApril2023

Thefineresolutionofthesatel