IMF-通过临时贸易壁垒进行报复（英）

Retaliationthrough

TemporaryTradeBarriers

DavideFurceri,JonathanD.Ostry,ChrisPapageorgiou,Pauline

Wibaux

WP/23/99

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2023

MAY

N

Ar

R

*WethankChadBown,FredCampano,MeredithCrowley,LionelFontagn´e,J´erˆomeH´ericourt,RobertKoopman,Philippe

Martin,DominickSalvatoreaswellasparticipantsofthe2021ASSAsessionon“InternationalTrade:CrucialforWorldEconomicRecoveryandGrowth”,andattheCEPII’sinternalseminar.

©2023InternationalMonetaryFund

WP/23/99

IMFWorkingPaper

ResearchDepartment

RetaliationthroughTemporaryTradeBarriers

PreparedbyDavideFurceri,JonathanD.Ostry,ChrisPapageorgiou,PaulineWibaux*

AuthorizedfordistributionbyChrisPapageorgiou

May2023

IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(s)andarepublishedtoelicit

commentsandtoencouragedebate.TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseofthe

author(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.

ABSTRACT:AreTemporaryTradeBarriers(TTBs)introducedforstrategicreasons?Toanswerthisquestion,weconstructanovelsectoralmeasureofretaliationusingdailybilateraldataonTTBresponsesin1220subsectorsacrossapanelof25advancedandemergingmarketeconomiesover1989-2019.Stylizedfactsandeconometricanalysissuggestthatwithin-yearresponsesaremoreimportantintermsofintensityandfrequencythancommonlyunderstoodfromtheexistingliterature,whichhastendedtoignorethem.Wefindthatretaliationoftenconsistsofresponsesacrossmanysectorsandthatsame-sectorretaliationisfarfrombeingthenorm.Inaddition,wefindthatlargercountriestendtoretaliatemore,andthatretaliationislargerduringperiodsofhigherunemploymentandwhenthetradingpartnertargetedadomesticcomparativeadvantagesector.

RECOMMENDEDCITATION:Furceri,Davide,J.Ostry,C.Papageorgiou,andP.Wibaux,2023,“RetaliationthroughTemporaryTradeBarriers,”IMFWorkingPaper23/99.

JELClassificationNumbers:F13;F14;F15

Keywords:

Traderetaliation;Protectionism;Antidumping;TemporaryTradeBarriers.

Author’sE-MailAddress:

IMFWORKINGPAPERS

RetaliationthroughTemporaryTradeBarriers

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

3

WORKINGPAPERS

RetaliationthroughTemporaryTradeBarriers

PreparedbyDavideFurceri

1

,JonathanD.Ostry

2

,ChrisPapageorgiou

3

,PaulineWibaux

4

1InternationalMonetaryFund,RCEA

2GeorgetownUniversityandCEPR

3InternationalMonetaryFund

4CEPII

IMFWORKINGPAPERS

RetaliationthroughTemporaryTradeBarriers

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

4

TABLEOFCONTENT

1.Introduction

3

2.Literaturereview

6

3.Data

8

3.1.TemporarytradebarrierswithintheWTOframework

8

3.2.Temporarytradebarriersdata

9

3.3.Constructinganewmeasureoftraderetaliation

10

3.4.Factsandpatternsoftraderetaliation

1

4

4.Empiricalframework

16

5.Results

19

5.1.Baselineresults

19

5.2.Robustnesschecks

23

5.3.Nonlinearities

23

6.Conclusion

26

References

31

AAdditionalfigures

3

3

BAdditionaltables

4

0

FIGURES

1.Distributionofresponses

10

2.TimelineforChina-USin2016-2017

11

3.Distributionofshareofretaliatorymeasuresacrosscountries

15

4.Shareofretaliatorymeasuresacrosstime

15

5.SameHS4sectorretaliation

16

TABLES

1.Country-specificmedianofnumberofdaysbetweentwoopposingmeasures

12

2.Probabilitiesofadomesticmeasure

13

3.DescriptiveStatistics

19

4.Baselinespecification

20

5.Specificationincludingonlysector-timeandcountry-pairfixedeffects

22

6.Robustnesstests

24

7.Alternativesamples

27

8.Allforeignmeasures

28

9.Tradepolicycooperation

29

10.Non-linearities

30

3

1Introduction

TheGATT/WTOmultilateralprocesseshavesucceededinreducingworldaveragetar-iffsbelow3%,whileleavingcountriesspacetoadapttradebarrierstoexternalshocks.However,ascountriessoughttouseWTO-compliantinstrumentstoprotectfirmsfromforeigncompetitionthroughTemporaryTradeBarriers(TTBs)—seeFigures

A1

and

A2

fortheuseofTTBsacrosscountries—tensions,involvingretaliationthreats,begantoemergeatthebeginningofthe2000s.Retaliationislikelytoamplifythetradecostof

thefirstprotectionistmove.

Temporarytradebarriersarelegitimatewhenappliedinexceptionalcircumstancestocompensatespecificindustriesandcompaniesforunfairpracticesfromtradingpart-ners.TheWTOallowsgovernmentsto:(i)actagainstdumpingwherethereisgenuine(“material”)injurytothecompetingdomesticindustry;(ii)launchitsowninvestigationandultimatelychargeextraduty(knownas“countervailingduty”)onsubsidizedimportsthatarefoundtobehurtingdomesticproducers;and(iii)restrictimportsofaprod-ucttemporarily(take“safeguard”actions)ifitsdomesticindustryisseriouslyinjuredor

threatenedwithinjurycausedbyasurgeinimports.

Empiricalevidence,however,castsdoubtthatTTBsareusedexclusivelyforthesepurposes:

BownandCrowley

(2013a)showthatthesetradebarriersrespondtomacroe

-conomicconditionsinexportingandimportingcountries,underscoringthattheyareusedatleastinpartformacroeconomicreasons,whichmayormaynotbecorrelatedwiththedamagetoparticularsectorsfromunfairpractices.CountriesalsouseTTBsasasafetyvalve.Becauseoftheirtemporarynature,TTBscanbeusedtocompensateforanofficialtariffdecrease,whichwouldtranslateintoagradualdecreaseintradebarriers,asshownby

BownandTovar

(2011).Inthissense,

Kuenzel

(2020)providesevidencethatthereis

asubstitutionbetweenWTOrequirementsandTTBs:whentheboundtariffdecreases,moreTTBsareused.PerhapsofmoreconcernisifTTBsareusedtoretaliateagainstforeigngovernmentpolicyratherthantomitigateaspecificsectoralinjury,asthiswouldrunagainstthegrainofmultilateraltradecooperationpromotedbytheWTO.Inthiscontext,

Bown

(2022)describeshowTTBshavebeendisproportionatelytargetingChina

. However,theresponseofacountrytoanewforeigntradebarriercannotalwaysbelabeledasnon-cooperative.Whenacountryfaceswhatisperceivedasunfairtrade

barriers,severaloptionsexist.First,itcandonothing,perhapsoutofconcernthatthe

4

imposingcountrycouldretaliatefurther.Second,itcanfileanofficialdisputewiththeWTOdisputesettlementbody,andengageinnegotiationswiththeimposingcountry.Inthecasewherenoagreementisreachedbetweenthepartiesandinjuryisproven,thetargetedcountrywouldhavetherighttoretaliate.Finally,forcountriesunwillingtoengageinWTOlitigation,athirdwayistodecidetoretaliatedirectlybylaunchinganewTTBinvestigation,anoptionwhich

Bown

(2005)calls”vigilantejustice”

.Whilerules-consistentretaliationcanbelabeledasacooperativeuseofTTBs(see

BownandCrowley,

2013b

),becauseitstandswithinWTOrules,rules-inconsistentretaliationisequivalenttoanon-cooperativeuseofTTBs.Thefocusofthispaperisthenon-cooperativeuseof

TTBs,asweseektoprovideevidenceofrules-inconsistentretaliation.

TheempiricalevidencearoundtheuseofTTBsforstrategicmotivesislargelyin-conclusive,firstbecauseoneneedstodisentangletherationalefortheuseofTTBsinthefirstplace(whichischallengingforreasonsdiscussedabove),andsecondbecauseoffundamentalidentificationproblems.Afirstissuerelatestothedefinitionofretaliation.Toestimatetheprobabilityofacountryjtoretaliateinyeart,foreignmeasuresimposedoncountryjareincludedasexplanatoryvariables—typicallytheliteratureconsidersadummyvariablethattakesthevalueofoneifcountryifiledaTTBagainstjpriortoyeart(e.g.,

PrusaandSkeath,

2005

;

BoffaandOlarreaga,

2012

;

FeinbergandReynolds

,

2006

).Akeyproblemwiththisapproachisthatretaliatorymeasuresthattakeplacewithinayear—asweshowlaterthelargemajority—willnotbecapturedandnorwillbe

theintensityofretaliation(howmanyTTBsareintroducedinresponse).

Anothersetofissuesconcernstheuseofcountry-leveldata.TTBsareinitiatedattheproduct(industry)level,soanunderstandingofthefactorsaffectingsuchdecisionsshouldrelyonindustry-leveldata.Moreover,country-levelanalysisisvulnerabletothecriticismthatimpactsattributedtoretaliationmayreflectotherunobservedmacroeconomicshocks,

suchaschangesineconomicconditionsasfoundin

BownandCrowley

(2013a)

.

Inthispaperwetrytoaddresstheseissues.Ourdefinitionofretaliationencompassesthoseactions(TTBs)takenbycountryjthatarenottoodistantfromTTBstakenbyatradingpartneri,wherenottoodistantisformalizedbynotmorethanxdays,wherexisthemedianresponsetime(indays)betweenj’sactionsandthoseofallitstradingpartners.Inparticular,weestimatetheintensityofretaliationbycountryjasthenumber

ofcountryj’sTTBmeasuresfollowingaTTBmeasureimposedbycountryiwithinan

5

intervalofxdays.Inthisfirststep,weusedailydataonTTBsfromtheWorldBank’sTTBDatabase(

Bown,

2015

)atthe6-digitHarmonizedSystem(HS6)productlevel.ThehighfrequencyofthedataiskeytocapturetheTTBactionsbycountriesjandi,andthusreducingtheconcernthatTTBactionsimplementedbycountryiareendogenous.Regardingtheeconometricanalysis,oursamplecovers1220subsectors(HS4digits)across25advancedandemergingeconomiesover1989-2019.Useofsectoraldataallowsustodisentanglesame-sectorversuscross-sectorretaliatorymeasures.ThisisimportantasstrategicbehaviorsarelikelytoberelevantwhencountriesrespondbyimposingTTBsacrossmanysectors.Inaddition,thefour-dimensionalpanel(domesticcountryj,partnercountryi,timetandksectors)ofourdataallowsustocontrolforcountry-andsector-shocksthroughcountry–timeandsector–timefixedeffects,whichobviouslywouldnotbe

feasibleusinganaggregatecountry-levelpanel

.1

Weshowthatwhileretaliationiscommon,thereiswidedispersionacrosscountriesintherecoursetosuchpolicy,withsmallercountriesandemergingmarketeconomiesretaliatinglessthanlargerorrichercountries.WealsoshowthatrecoursetoretaliatoryTTBshasincreasedovertime,peakingintheearly2000sandaftertheGlobalFinancialCrisis(GFC).Retaliationseemsmorefocusedonprotectingnon-injuredsectorsthantheinjuredsectorandseekstoprotectmanysectorssimultaneously.Thissuggeststhatretaliationmaybedrivenmorebyperceptionsofunfairforeignpoliciesthanspecific

sectoralinjuries.

Ourestimatessuggestthataonestandard-deviationincreaseinthenumberofnewTTBinagivenHS4sectorbycountryioncountryjincreasesthenumberofnewlytargetedproductsbyjoniby1%bothinthesamesectorandinothersectors.Thisresultisrobusttocontrollingforothertradepolicyinstruments,suchastariffvariationsandtradedisputes.Inaddition,suchretaliatoryactionsarelargerwhentariffscannotbeused,hepresenceofatradeagreement,whenbothcountriesareinatradedispute,orwhenthedomesticeconomyisforeseeingfurtherretaliation.Theyarealso

largerinperiodsofhigherunemployment.

Theremainderofthepaperisorganizedasfollows.SectionIIpresentsabrieflitera-turereviewonimportprotectionwithfocusonTTBsandtraderetaliation.SectionIII

discussesthedatausedintheanalysis,presentsourproposeddefinitionofretaliation,and

1Asarobustnesscheck,wealsoshowthattheresultsarerobustwhencontrollingforcountry-pair-timefixedeffects.

6

highlightstraderetaliationfactsandpatterns.SectionIVdiscussestheempiricalstrategy.

SectionVpresentsthebaselineresultsandrobustnesschecks.SectionVIconcludes.

2Literaturereview

Thereisanextensiveliteraturehighlightingthetheoreticaldeterminantsofimportprotec-tionfromapolitical-economyperspective(e.g.,

GrossmanandHelpman,

1994

,

Grossman

andHelpman

,

1995

;

Nicitaetal.

,

2018),formacroeconomicreasons(e.g.,

Bagwelland

Staiger

,

2003)orstrategicones(e.g.

BagwellandStaiger,

1990

;

HarrisonandRutstrom,

1991

;

BlonigenandBown,

2003

;

MartinandVergote,

2008)

.

GrossmanandHelpman

(1994)developamodelinwhichspecial-interestgroupsmake

politicalcontributionstoinfluenceagovernment’schoiceoftradepolicy.Themodelshowsthat“protectionisforsale”aspoliticiansmaximizetheirownwelfare,whichdependsontotalcontributionscollectedinadditiontothewelfareofvoters.Insubsequentwork,

GrossmanandHelpman

(1995)showthatpoliticalpressuresongovernmentscaninduce

countriestoincreasetheirlevelofimportprotection,whichwouldinturnleadtoretal-iation.Morerecently,

Nicitaetal.

(2018)buildapolitical-economymodelhighlighting

that,intheabsenceofcooperation,thereisapositiverelationshipbetweenimporters’marketpowerandtheirimporttariffs.

BagwellandStaiger

(2003)proposeatheoretical

frameworkthatisconsistentwithempiricalstudiesdocumentingthecountercyclicalna-tureoftradebarriers(seee.g.

BoharaandKaempfer,

1991):rapidtradegrowthduring

boomsunderpinsrelativelyliberaltrade.

BagwellandStaiger

(1990)developatheoryof

“managedtrade”thatcorrelatesperiodsofunusuallyhightradevolumeswithincreasedprotection:tradeprotectionemergesastheendogenousoutcomeofcountries’attempttodampenfluctuationsintradevolumesthroughrecoursetoprotection.

Harrisonand

Rutstrom

(1991)presentedanalternativeapproachtothequantitativeanalysisoftrade

policyevaluationbasedonnotionsofnon-cooperativetradewarsandcooperativetradenegotiations.ItwasshownthatitisindeedpossibletorationalizeafreetradeagreementbetweentheUnitedStatesandCanadaifthealternativetosuchanegotiatedoutcomeisaretaliatorytradewar.

BlonigenandBown

(2003)developatriggerpricemodelwhich

allowsforthethreatofanantidumping(AD)actiontorestrainADactivity.

Whilethetheoreticalliteratureonimportprotectionisextensive,empiricalevidence

7

onthestrategicuseoftradebarriersremainsscarce.

BlonigenandBown

(2003)useAD

datafortheUStotesttheimpactofretaliationthreats.Usingdatafor645decisionsbytheUSADauthority,theyfindthatanindustryismorelikelytofileanADpetitionthegreatertheimportpenetrationandthelowertheexposuretoretaliation.

Prusaand

Skeath

(2002)findevidencetosupportbotheconomicandstrategicmotivesforADfilings

.

Usingindustry-leveldata,

FeinbergandReynolds

(2006)findthatthelikelihoodof

acountryfilingacaseishigheragainstcountriesthattargeteditinthepreviousyear.

MooreandZanardi

(2011)showthatretaliationvariableshelpexplaintheprobability

ofobservinganADpetitionexceptfordevelopingcountriesthathavebecomeheavyusersofAD.

BoffaandOlarreaga

(2012)findnoevidenceofretaliatorymotivesdriving

protectionismduringtheGFCandshowthataprotectionistmeasureimposedbyatradingpartnerreducestheprobabilityofameasureimposedbythehomecountry.

Tabakisand

Zanardi

(2017)developadynamicgamewheretwocompetingimporterscanimpose

ADmeasuresonathirdcountry,anddocumentthatADechoing—differentcountriessequentiallyimposingADmeasuresonthesameproductandexporter—iscommonamong

usersofAD.

Anotherstrandoftheliteratureaimsatanalyzingthecostoftradeconflicts.

Crozet

andHinz

(2020)evaluatethecostsofinternationalsanctionsforthediplomaticconflict

betweentheRussianFederationandtheEuropeanunion.Resultsindicatethatbothcountriessufferedfrombothforeignanddomestictradesanctions.Inparticular,Westerncountriessufferedfromanunintended,largelyself-inflictedcost.Usingfirm-leveldata,

Crozetetal.

(2021)studyexportingfirms’behaviortotradesanctions,showingstrong

heterogeneityalongthefirmdimensions,withunpredictableresultsonwhichfirmskeep

exportingtothesanctionedcountry.

Finally,thereisaliteraturethatfocusesoncasestudies.Forexample,athoroughlystudiedcasewastheoutbreakofatradewaraftertheUnitedStatesadoptedtheSmoot-HawleytariffinJune1930.

Irwin

(1998)firstexaminedcloselytwoyearsaftertheimposi

-tionoftheSmoot-Hawleytariff,andfoundthatthevolumeofU.S.importsfellover40%.Usingpartialandgeneralequilibriumassessments,itwasalsoshownthattheSmoot-Hawleytariffitselfreducedimportsby4-8percent.Recently,

Mitcheneretal.

(2022)

usenewquarterlydataonbilateraltradeforninety-ninecountriesandshowthatU.S.

exportstoretaliatorsfellby28%–32%andtheretaliators’welfaregainsfromtradefell

8

by8%–16%.

3Data

3.1TemporarytradebarrierswithintheWTOframework

TheWTOdelegatestheauthorityofimplementingtemporarytradebarrierstonationalgovernments.Forexample,theUnitedStatesInternationalTradeCommission(USITC)andtheEuropeanCommissionhaveauthorityinthismatterfortheUSAandtheEuro-peanUnionrespectively.Theprocesstakesplaceintwosteps.First,afirm,oragroupoffirmsformingalobby,filesacomplaintwiththenationaltradeauthority,whichlaunchesaninvestigation.LetusconsiderthecasewhereaEuropeanfirmsuspectsaU.S.firmtodumpitsexportsatbelow-marketprices.OnerecoursefortheEuropeanfirmistofileadumpingcomplaint,demandingananti-dumpingtarifftobeimposedontheproductcomingfortheU.S.Atthisdate,aninvestigationislaunched,todeterminewhethertheEuropeanfirmisfacinganinjury.Duringtheinvestigation,atemporaryadditionaltariff

maybeapplied,makingtheinvestigationcostlyfortheforeigneconomy.23

Second,bytheendoftheinvestigation,thetradeauthoritymakesadecision:iftheinjuryisproven,

atemporarytradebarrier(inourcaseananti-dumpingduty)isimplemented.

TheprocessofTTBimplementationreliesontwoactors:thefirmdecidingtofileacomplaintandthenationaltradeauthoritydecidingwhethertoimplementanewTTB.ThepublicrecordsprovideuswiththedatesofeachstepofaTTBinvestigation.Theempiricalliteratureprovidesevidencethataninvestigationinitselfcanbedamagingfortheforeigneconomy,andcanthusprovokearesponse(

Staigeretal.,

1994)

.However,toinvestigatethetimingofretaliatoryTTBs,wefocusonthetradeauthority’sdecision,andconsideronlythedeterminationdate.Whileanindividualfirmwouldnotnecessarilybeconcernedbyaforeignmeasureimposedinanotherdomesticsector,itismorethanpossiblethatthedomestictradeauthoritywouldconsiderstrategicreasonstoimplementTTBsasameasureofretaliation.Inotherwords,thetradeauthoritymaybemore

inclinedtoimplementanewTTB(basedonapetitionfiledbyafirm)targetingaforeign

2Investigationsarepublic,andrecordscanbefoundonline.InthecaseofEU,theCommissionopensananti-dumpinginvestigationbypublishinganoticeintheEU’sOfficialJournal.Seethefollowingwebsite:

https://tron.trade.ec.europa.eu/investigations/ongoing.

3Thedurationofinvestigationsvariesfromtimetotime:inourdatasetwefindthattheaveragetimebetweenthestartoftheinvestigationandthedeterminationdateisof12months(seeFigure

A3)

.

9

economywhichhasjustimplementedanewTTBagainstthedomesticeconomy.

TheWTOlitigationframeworkgivestheforeigneconomy,heretheU.S.,threewaystorespond.First,itcanfileacomplaintthroughtheDisputeSettlementBody:ifthemeasureisproventobeunfair,theU.S.maybeauthorizedtoimplementatradebarriertocompensatethetradeloss.Second,itcandonothing,forfearoffurtherretaliation.Finally,itcanimplementanewTTBagainsttheEUtoretaliateillegally,bypassingWTOrules.Thistypeofrules-inconsistentretaliation,dubbedasnon-cooperative,isthefocus

ofthispaper.

3.2Temporarytradebarriersdata

Weuseapaneldatasetofbilateralmeasuresofimportprotectionfor25advancedandemergingmarketeconomiesfortheperiod1989-2019(seeTable

B1

inAppendixforthelistofcountriesincludedintheanalysis)

.4

Thedailydataontemporarytradebarriers(TTBs)isdrawnfromtheWorldBank’sTTBDatabase(basedon

Bown

,

2015

).Thisdatabaseprovidesbilateraltradepolicyactionsatthe6-digitHarmonizedSystem(HS6)productlevelfortheperiod1989-2019,classifiedinthreecategories:anti-dumping(AD),countervailing(CVD)andglobalsafeguards(GS).Asdiscussedby

BownandCrowley

(2013a),inclusionofallformsoftemporaryimportrestrictionsisimportantbecause

recentmeasures,suchasthe2009China-specificsafeguardimposedbytheUSontireimports,havefocusedmoreonCSandGSTTBsratherthanADones,andthusitis

criticalnottorestricttheanalysistoantidumping.

Theadvantageofthisdatasetisthreefold.First,thedailyfrequencyallowsustocon-structwithin-yearmeasuresofretaliation.Second,havingafour-dimensional(ksectors,jdomesticcountry,ipartnercountry,andttimeperiods)datasetallowsustocontrolforaggregate(country-time)andcountry-sectorshocksbyincludingcountry–timeandsec-tor–timefixedeffects.Theinclusionofthecountry–timefixedeffectsiscriticaltoabsorbanyunobservedcross-countryheterogeneityinthemacroeconomicshocksaffectingdeci-sionstointroduceaTTB,aswellastradedeflectionatthecountry-levelandtheindirectimpactsofTTBsthroughothertradingpartners.Inacountry-levelanalysis,thiswouldnotbepossibleastheimpactthatwouldhavebeenattributedtoretaliationcouldhave

beenduetootherunobservedmacroeconomicshocks.Third,thesectoraldisaggregation

4Dataandpartofthestylizedfactswerefirstpresentedin

Furcerietal.

(2021

).

10

Figure1:Distributi