微观经济学 Chapter-10-助教张翔_第1页
微观经济学 Chapter-10-助教张翔_第2页
微观经济学 Chapter-10-助教张翔_第3页
微观经济学 Chapter-10-助教张翔_第4页
微观经济学 Chapter-10-助教张翔_第5页
已阅读5页,还剩46页未读 继续免费阅读

下载本文档

版权说明:本文档由用户提供并上传,收益归属内容提供方,若内容存在侵权,请进行举报或认领

文档简介

Chapter10

OligopolyandMonopolisticCompetition

黄新飞

InternationalBusinessSchoolSun-YatSenUniversity2MarketPowerMarketpowersignifiesthedegreeofcontrolthatafirmorasmallnumberoffirmshasoverthepriceandproductiondecisionsinanindustry.Themostcommonmeasureofmarketpoweristhefour-firmconcentrationratio.3FirmOutputFirm1 25Firm2 20Firm3 15Firm4 10Firm5 8Firm6 7Firm7 5Firm8 5Firm9 3Firm10 2=70Four-FirmConcentrationRatioConcentrationRatios:

c4=

q1+q2+q3+q425+20+15+10100Q==70%4CigarettesHouseholdrefrigeratorsElectriclightbulbsMotorvehiclesGreetingcardsBlastfurnacesScrewproducts5%_4%Tools,dies,andjigs3%_2%93%82%86%84%84%37%7%16%8%7%4%21%4largestcompaniesNext4largestcompanies5WarningonConcentrationConventionalconcentrationmeasuresincludeonlydomesticproductionandexcludeimports.Conventionalconcentrationmeasuresalsoignorethegrowingimpactofcompetitionfromotherindustries.6TheNatureofImperfectCompetitionEconomistshavefoundthatthreemajorfactorsarepresentinimperfectlycompetitivemarkets:CostsBarrierstocompetitionStrategicinteraction

(策略互动)7 Percentageofindustry outputproducedbythe

Industry fourlargestfirms.ChewingGum 96% Householdlaundryequipment 93Cigarettes 92Electriclamps(bulbs) 91Motorvehicles 90Smallarmsammunition 88Primarycopper 87Breakfastcereals 87Beerandmaltbeverages 87Householdrefrigerators 85Greetingcardpublishing 85Bookpublishing 24% Upholsteredfurniture 24Woodfurniture 20Metalhousefurniture 18Paperboardboxes 16Bolts,nuts,andrivets 16Furgoods 16Women’sandmisses’suitsandcoats 13Metaldoors 13Women’sandmisses’dresses 6OligopolyMonopolisticCompetition8StrategicInteractionDescribeshoweachfirm’sbusinessstrategydependsontheirrivals’strategies.Asthenumberoffirmsinanindustryshrinksandindustryconcentrationgrows,eachfirmismorelikelytobasepricingandoutputdecisionsonhowotherfirmsintheindustryarelikelytorespond.9TheoriesofImperfectCompetitionThreeofthemostimportantcasesofimperfectcompetition:Collusiveoligopoly(合谋寡头)MonopolisticcompetitionSmall-numberoligopoly10CooperativeandNoncooperativeBehaviorWhenthereareonlyasmallnumberoffirmsinamarket,theyhaveachoicebetweencooperative

(合作)andnoncooperative

(非合作)behavior.中国案例分析:华为侵权案7月28日,华为公司、思科公司、3COM公司向得克萨斯州东区法院马歇尔分院提交了终止诉讼的申请,法院遂签发法令,终止了思科对华为的诉讼。一个是全球最大的网络设备制造商,一个是中国年轻的网络设备制造商。思科占据着全球垄断性地位,市值1000多亿美元,年收入近200亿美元。在这场全球化的残酷对决中,华为孤军作战且创造了“神话”,和解其实就已经是胜利。12CollusionCollusionoccurswhenoneormorefirmsjointly(共同地)setpricesoroutputs,dividethemarketamongthemselves,ormakeotherbusinessdecisionsjointly.Suchcollusioncanbeeitherexplicitortacit(公开的或默许的).13ExplicitCollusiveOneexampleofexplicit(清楚的,公开的)collusionwouldbethatoftheGildedAgeoligopolists(市场供应垄断者)intheearlyyearsofAmericancapitalism.Theseoligopolistsformedtrustsorcartels(托拉斯或卡特尔)tosetprices.TheAntitrustLaws14In1960,someexecutivesatGeneralElectric,Westinghouse,andAllis-Chalmers,amongothers,cookedupaschemetofixpricesinthemarketforheavyelectricalequipmentsuchastransformers,turbines,andcircuitbreakers.PhasesoftheMoonConspiracy15MorePricingFixingIn1993,Borden,Incorporatedpaid$8millioninfinesforfixingbidsonmilksoldtoschools.Bristol-MeyersSquibbandAmericanHomeProductspaid$5millionin1992tosettlechargesthattheyhadfixedpricesonbabyformulas.16ColaAndFaxPaperInacolawarmeltdown,localexecutivesforbothCocaColaandPepsiCowenttoprisonforconspiringtofixsoft-drinkpricesinVirginia.Mitsubishipledguiltyandpaida$1.8millionfineforconspiringtoraisethepriceoffaxpaper.17PriceLeaderTacitCollusionThebroaderproblemiswithimplicitortacitcollusionthatarisespreciselybecauseexplicitcollusionisillegal.Thewordtacitmeansto“expressorcarryonwithoutwordsorspeech.”

Andtacitcollusionissaidtooccurwhenfirmsinanindustryrefrainfromcompetitionwithoutexplicitagreements.18BarriersFirst,collusionisillegal.Second,firmsmay“cheat”ontheagreementbycuttingtheirpricetoselectedcustomers.Third,manycompaniesfaceintensivecompetitionfromforeignfirmsaswellasdomesticcompanies.19ThreeBasicModelsCartelPriceLeaderKinkedDemandDQPTheKinkedDemandTheory元/数量数量MRD如果厂商降低价格,其他厂商也会跟着降低价格,结果,需求相对缺乏弹性。如果厂商将价格提高到P*之上,其他厂商不会提高价格,则需求变得富有弹性。P*AE美元/数量DP1Q1MCMC’只要MC仍然在MR的垂直区域内,那么,价格与产量仍保持不变。MR数量AEBN折弯的需求曲线22ANegotiatedPriceTheythennegotiatewhatpriceshouldbechargedfortheproduct.And,ofcourse,aspartoftheirsecretcartelagreement,eachfirmwillalsohavetoagreetorestrictitsoutputsothepricecanbemaintainedinthemarket.23AQuestionSowheredoyouthinktheseoligopolistswillsetprice?

a)Theoligopolywillsetpriceequaltomarginalcost.b)Theoligopolywillsetmarginalrevenueequaltomarginalcost.c)Thisisanincrediblyobscurequestion.24TheAnswerSowheredoyouthinktheseoligopolistswillsetprice?

a)Theoligopolywillsetpriceequaltomarginalcost.b)Theoligopolywillsetmarginalrevenueequaltomarginalcost.c)Thisisanincrediblyobscurequestion.Iftheoligopolistscantrulycoordinatetheiractivities,theobviouspricetosetisthesameasthatwhichwouldbesetbyamonopolist.25CheatingValue产量如果其他人保持价格不变搞欺骗的企业的好处价格如果所有企业价格同时变化课堂测试:古诺模型双寡头模型假设市场需求曲线P=30–Q,并且Q=Q1+Q2MC1=MC2=0如何推导厂商1和2的反应曲线27MonopolisticCompetitionMonopolisticcompetitionresemblesperfectcompetitioninthreeways:1.Theremanybuyersandsellers,2.Entryandexitareeasy,3.Firmstakeotherfirms’pricesasgiven.28ProductDifferentiationThedifferencefromperfectcompetitionisproductdifferentiation

(产品差异).Productdifferentiationleadstoadownwardslopeineachseller’sdemandcurve.29MonopolisticCompetitionVSoligopolyTherearethreekeydifferencesbetweenoligopolyandmonopolisticcompetition.1.Amonopolisticallycompetitiveindustryisrelativelyunconcentrated.2.Collusionsareimpossible.3.Thereisnofeelingofmutualinterdependenceamongfirms.30PriceMCACWhatisthepriceandquantityinthisindustryandwhataretheeconomicprofits?a)PriceisP1,quantityisQ1andeconomicprofitsareBHG.PriceissetwhereMCintersectsdd.b)PriceisP2,quantityisQ2,andeconomicprofitsareP1P2GB.PriceissetwhereMRequalsMC.c)IfIhadacomputer,Icouldfigureitout.MonopolisticcompetitionbeforeentryP2P1GdBMRHd31PriceMCACWhatisthepriceandquantityinthisindustryandwhataretheeconomicprofits?a)PriceisP1,quantityisQ1andeconomicprofitsareBHG.PriceissetwhereMCintersectsdd.b)PriceisP2,quantityisQ2,andeconomicprofitsareP1P2GB.PriceissetwhereMRequalsMC.c)IfIhadacomputer,Icouldfigureitout.MonopolisticcompetitionbeforeentryP2P1GdBMRHd32ACd'd'MCdPriceAtwhatpointwillentrycease?a)Entrywillceasewheneachsellerhasbeenforcedintoalong-run,no-profittangencysuchasatG'.b)EntrywillceasewhereMCequalsAC.c)EntrywillceasewhenBillGatessaysitwill.MonopolisticcompetitionafterentryddG’MR33ACd'd'MCdPriceAtwhatpointwillentrycease?a)Entrywillceasewheneachsellerhasbeenforcedintoalong-run,no-profittangencysuchasatG'.b)EntrywillceasewhereMCequalsAC.c)EntrywillceasewhenBillGatessaysitwill.MonopolisticcompetitionafterentryddG’MR34ACd'd'MCdPriceMonopolisticcompetitionafterentryddG’MRP1P=MCEachproducerisontheleft-handdecliningbranchofitslongrunaveragecostcurve.Whatdoyouthinkthismeansformarketperformance.35ACd'd'MCdPriceMonopolisticcompetitionafterentryddG’MRP1P=MCAInthelongrun,monopolisticcompetitionisneitherallocativelyorproductivelyefficient.Anunderallocationofresourcesoccursintheindustrybecausetheproductpriceexceedsmarginalcost.ProductiveefficiencyisnotrealizedbecauseproductionoccursatpointG'wheretheaveragetotalcostexceedstheminimumattainablecostatPointA.36Non-PriceandAggressiveAdvertisingThefactthatthatmonopolisticcompetitionisbothallocativelyandproductivelyinefficientrelativetotheperfectcompetitionresultisnottheonlyproblemwithmarketperformance.AtleastsomeeconomistsarguethatmonopolisticcompetitionleadstobothexcessiveadvertisingandneedlessbrandproliferationReducingthenumberofmonopolisticcompetitors,whilecuttingcosts,mightwellenduploweringconsumerwelfarebecauseitwouldreducethediversity(多样性)ofavailablegoodsandservices.37GameTheoriesCompetitionamongthefewforcesfirmstotakeintoaccountcompetitors’reactionstopriceandoutputdeviations(背离)andbringsstrategic(战略的)considerationsintotheirmarkets.Thisanalysisistheprovinceofgametheory(博弈论).38DivorceofOwnershipandControlIn1996,morethan2.3millionpeopleownedAT&T’sshares.Becausethestockoflargecompaniesissowidelydispersed(被分散的),ownershipistypicallydivorcedfromcontrol.ThreeConflictsofInterest39RationalityandRulesofThumbIntherealworld,peoplehavelimitedresourcesandinformationtomakedecisions,sofirmsorconsumersoftenexhibitboundedrationality(有限理性).Thismeansthattheyusuallystrivetomakeagooddecision,ratherthanwasteresourceshuntingfor(追逐)thebestdecision.40TheEconomicsofInformationBecauseinformationiscostlytoproducebutcheaptoreproduce,marketsininformationaresubjecttoseveremarketfailures(市场失灵).Theinabilityoffirmstocapturethefullmonetaryvalueoftheirinventions(发明)iscalledinappropriability(非专用性).IntellectualPropertyRight41AreMonopoliesBad?ThequestionfirstraisedbyHarvardeconomistJosephSchumpeteriswhethermonopoliesarelikelytooutperformcompetitiveindustriesinthedynamicefficiencydimension.Iftheanswerisyes,thenperhapsweshouldjustleavemonopoliesalone.JosephSchumpeter1883-195042IndustrialR&DPerformanceBySizeofCompanySizeofCompanyR&D-SalesRatio(%)TotalCompanyR&D($,billions)

1999(employees)19831999Fewerthan5002.28.931.3500to999na4.06.41,000to4,9992.03.123.95,000to9,9910,000to24,9992.32.824.525,000ormore3.42.059.9课堂测试假设(1)只有A、B寡头厂商出售同质且生产成本为零的产品;(2)市场对该产品的需求函数为Q=240-10P;(3)厂商A先进入市场,随着B进入。各厂商确定产量时认为另一厂商会保持产量不变。试求:a.均

温馨提示

  • 1. 本站所有资源如无特殊说明,都需要本地电脑安装OFFICE2007和PDF阅读器。图纸软件为CAD,CAXA,PROE,UG,SolidWorks等.压缩文件请下载最新的WinRAR软件解压。
  • 2. 本站的文档不包含任何第三方提供的附件图纸等,如果需要附件,请联系上传者。文件的所有权益归上传用户所有。
  • 3. 本站RAR压缩包中若带图纸,网页内容里面会有图纸预览,若没有图纸预览就没有图纸。
  • 4. 未经权益所有人同意不得将文件中的内容挪作商业或盈利用途。
  • 5. 人人文库网仅提供信息存储空间,仅对用户上传内容的表现方式做保护处理,对用户上传分享的文档内容本身不做任何修改或编辑,并不能对任何下载内容负责。
  • 6. 下载文件中如有侵权或不适当内容,请与我们联系,我们立即纠正。
  • 7. 本站不保证下载资源的准确性、安全性和完整性, 同时也不承担用户因使用这些下载资源对自己和他人造成任何形式的伤害或损失。

评论

0/150

提交评论