英国皇家国际事务研究所-俄罗斯论战中的神话与误解（英文）-2021.5正式版

Report

RussiaandEurasiaProgramme |May2021

Mythsand

misconceptionsinthe

debateonRussia

HowtheyaffectWesternpolicy,andwhatcanbedone

DuncanAllan,AnnetteBohr,MathieuBoulègue,KeirGiles,NigelGould-Davies,PhilipHanson,JohnLough,OrysiaLutsevych,KateMallinson,AnaïsMarin,JamesNixey,BenNoble,NikolaiPetrov,EkaterinaSchulmann,JamesSherr,KatarynaWolczukandAndrewWood

ChathamHouse,theRoyalInstituteofInternationalAffairs,isaworld-leadingpolicyinstitutebasedinLondon.Ourmissionistohelpgovernmentsandsocietiesbuildasustainablysecure,prosperousandjustworld.

Contents

Summary

3

Introduction

14

JamesNixey

01

‘RussiaandtheWestareas“bad”aseachother’

18

JamesSherr

02

‘RussiaandtheWestwantthesamething’

23

KeirGiles

03

‘RussiawaspromisedthatNATOwouldnotenlarge’

28

JohnLough

04

‘RussiaisnotinaconflictwiththeWest’

33

MathieuBoulègue

05

‘Weneedanewpan-Europeansecurityarchitecture

38

thatincludesRussia’

DuncanAllan

06

‘WemustimprovetherelationshipwithRussia,even

42

withoutRussianconcessions,asitistooimportant’

AndrewWood

07

‘Russiaisentitledtoadefensiveperimeter–asphere

47

of“privilegedinterests”includingtheterritoryofotherstates’

KateMallinson

08

‘WemustdriveawedgebetweenRussiaandChinatoimpede

51

theirabilitytoactintandemagainstWesterninterests’

AnnetteBohr

09

‘TheWest’srelationswithRussiamustbenormalized

57

inordertocountertheriseofChina’

JamesNixey

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10

‘TheEurasianEconomicUnionisagenuineandmeaningful

63

counterparttotheEU’

KatarynaWolczuk

11

‘ThepeoplesofUkraine,BelarusandRussiaareonenation’

70

AnaïsMarin

12

‘CrimeawasalwaysRussian’

75

OrysiaLutsevych

13

‘Liberalmarketreforminthe1990swasbadforRussia’

82

PhilipHanson

14

‘Sanctionsarethewrongapproach’

86

NigelGould-Davies

15

‘It’sallaboutPutin–Russiaisamanuallyrun,

91

centralizedautocracy’

BenNobleandEkaterinaSchulmann

16

‘WhatcomesafterPutinmustbebetterthanPutin’

96

NikolaiPetrov

Conclusion

101

KeirGilesandJamesNixey

Abouttheauthors

104

Acknowledgments

109

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Summary

Thisreportdeconstructs16ofthemostprevalentmythsthatshapecontemporaryWesternthinkingonRussia,andexplainstheirdetrimentalimpactonthedesignandexecutionofpolicy.

WesternpoliciestowardsRussiahavefailedtoachievetheirbasicgoalofestablishingastableandmanageablerelationshipwithMoscowbecausethethinkingbehindthemhasoftenbeenunrealisticorsimplyflawed.ThisstudyencouragesWesterngovernmentsandinstitutionstoreassesstheirassumptionsaboutRussiainordertodevelopmoreeffectiveresponsestotheincreasingchallengesthecountrypresents.‘Effective’inthiscontextmeans,inparticular,deterringRussianaggressionabroadandultimatelysecuringalessadversarialrelationshipwithRussiawithoutcompromisingprinciplesofsovereigntyandsecurityandthevaluesonwhichtheyarebased.

Tothisend,thereportpresents16ofthemostprevalent‘myths’–inabroadlydefinedsense–thatdistorttheWesternpolicydebateonRussia.Itoutlineshowspecificmisconceptionshavegainedunwarrantedtractioninpolicymakingcirclesinthe‘West’(understoodhereprincipallyasWesternEuropeandNorthAmerica).ItdescribestheimpactofthesemisconceptionsonWesternpolicytowardsRussia,andineachcasesuggestswhatbetter-informedpolicywouldlooklike.

Theoriginsandcausesofthesemythscanbedividedintoseveralbroadcategories.SomeoriginateintheWest,basedonthedefaultassumptionsofpoliticiansandpolicymakerswhoseformativeexperiencehasbeenrestrictedtooperatinginWesterndemocraticsystemsandinteractingwithlike-mindedcountries.Thebelief,forexample,thatRussiaandtheWesthavethesamedesiredendstatefortheirrelationshipariseswhenweprojectourownvaluesontoMoscowandassumethatweshareadefaultcommonunderstandingofbasicprinciples.So,too,doestheargumentthatitisnecessaryordesirablefortheWesttomakeconcessionstowinRussiancooperationonparticularissues.Similarly,thenotionthattheprobleminrelationswithRussiaisalackofdialoguepresupposesthatmoredialoguewillnarrowdifferences,wheninfactRussia’scurrentleadershipisstronglymotivatedtomaintainconfrontationasameansofforcingconcessionsfromtheWest.

OtherprevalentmythssimplyreflectinadequateknowledgeofRussia.Forexample,thewidespreadimpressionthattheregimeiseffectivelyaone-manshowcontrolledbyVladimirPutinisaconsequenceofinsufficientunderstandingofhowthecountryisreallygoverned,andofthesignificantrolesplayedbyotherindividualofficialsandtheinstitutionstheycontrolinshaping,negotiatinganddelivering

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policy.Similarly,theassumptionthatwhatcomesafterPutinmustnecessarilybebetterthanthecurrentleadershipderivesfromanentirelyhumaninclinationtowardsoptimismwhichhasnotbeentemperedbyexposuretotherealitiesofRussianpoliticsandhistory.

Afurther,distinctcategoryofmythrelatestoRussia’srelationshipwithChina.Forexample,theideathattheWestasawholecanfindcommoncausewithRussiaagainstChina,orcontriveameanstosetRussiaandChinaagainsteachother,isaconfectionofmultiplemyths–mostnotablyregardingthecomplexnatureoftheSino-Russianrelationshipitself,andRussia’slong-termobjectivesforitsownrelationshipswithEuro-Atlanticstatesandinstitutions.

However,themajorityofthemythspresentedherehavebecomeembedded

inWesternpolicydiscourseasadirectresultofdeliberateRussianlobbyinganddisinformation.Severalofthemythsareprevalentnotonlybecausetheyarisespontaneouslyandoutofgoodfaith,butalsobecauseitisintheKremlin’sinteresttocultivatethem.Somereflectlong-standingaspirationsonthepartofRussia:itsquestforapan-EuropeansecuritysystemonaRussiandesignhaspersisted

invariousformssincethe1950s.Equally,certainmythsreflectbroaderstrategicnarrativesthatprovideaframeworkforlegitimizingRussianforeignpolicygoals:forexample,thenotionthatRussiacanrightfullylayclaimtoasphereofprivilegedinterests;orthesuggestionthatUkrainiansandBelarusianstogetherwithRussiansareoneSlavicpeopleratherthanhavingtheirownidentitiesandseparateformsofstatehood.Atothertimes,Russia’saiminpropagatingamythcanbelinked

toadiscreteforeignpolicyoutcomesuchaspromotingtheEurasianEconomicUnionasaneconomicintegrationprojectequivalenttotheEU.

Manyofthesemyths,whetherdeliberatelypromotedandpromulgatedbyRussiaornot,findawillingaudienceintheWestbecausetheysitcomfortablywithaudiencesnotattunedtoRussia’sunderstandingofhistoryanditscurrentleaders’definitionofnationalinterests.Adherencetomythscansometimesprovideconvenientexcusesforinaction–orcopingstrategiesinthefaceoffearanddiscomfortovertheideaofRussiaasastrategicadversary,andinthefaceofRussianactionsthatshouldotherwisebeunacceptable.Assuch,themythsexertaperniciousinfluenceonWesternpolicy,distortingittofavourorpermitoutcomesdesirableforRussiabutnotfortheWest.

Oneoftheaimsofthisreportistocalloutthesemythsandencourage

areappraisalbyWesternpolicymakerswhohavemisconstruedthenatureoftherelationshipwithRussiafortoolong.BychallengingincorrectassumptionsaboutRussia,andtheflawedpolicyargumentsthatarebasedonthem,thisreporturgesWesternpoliticiansandofficialstore-examinetheirpositionsonRussiaandtheeffectsoftheirassumptionsonpolicy.

InApril2021,USPresidentJoeBidenstatedadesirefor‘predictableandstablerelations’withRussia.Thiswasnotanaivecallforareset.Theexplicitinvitationtode-escalate,accompanyingacarefullycalibratedpackageofnewsanctions,showedaclearintenttoinfluenceRussia’srisk–benefitcalculusandofferRussiaaroutetoabetterandlessfraughtrelationshipwiththeUSandtheWestmorebroadly.

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Russia’simmediateandemphaticrejectionofthisoffermeansthattherelationshipseemstohavereturnedtoitsusualunstablepath.Thatsaid,inonerespecttherelationshipwithRussiaispredictable:theanalysespresentedinthisreportstronglysuggestthatRussia,fortheforeseeablefuture,willcontinuetotrampleoninternationallyacceptedprinciplesofbehaviourandcommitfurtheraggressionsundeterred,usingsomeofthemythsbelowasjustification.

TheRussianleadershipwill,ofcourse,alsocontinueitseffortstoredefine

thebalanceofglobalpowerandnegotiatewithWashingtoninacontextmorefavourabletoRussia.ForUSpolicymakersandtheirallies,aswellastheirrespectivepublics,unravellingmythfromrealityindealingwithRussiahasarguablyneverbeenmoreimportant.

Themyths

Myth01:‘RussiaandtheWestareas“bad”aseachother’

Thispervasiveviewignoressignificantdifferencesinpolicyandconduct.‘TheWest’isacommunityofsharedinterestsandvalues;NATOandEUenlargementshavebeendemand-driven.Russiainsteadseekstoimpose‘firmgoodneighbourliness’onotherstateswhethertheyagreeornot,andregardsa‘sphereofprivilegedinterests’asanentitlement.ControversiesoverWesternmilitaryinterventionsbearnocomparisontotheduplicity,theabsenceofdiplomacyandthewholesaleabrogationoftreatiesthatprecededRussia’sinterventionsinGeorgiaandUkraine.TheWestrequiresgreaterclarityinpresentingitsownpolicies,butthereisnoequivalencetoacknowledge.

Myth02:‘RussiaandtheWestwantthesamething’

WesternpoliciesthataimtoengagewithRussiafailiftheyarefoundedon

thenotionthatatsomelevelRussianandWesterninterestsmustalignoratleastoverlap.Thedrivetonormalizerelationswithoutaddressingthefundamentalcausesofdiscordmakesthingsworsenotbetter.Bothstrategicallyandindetailonspecificissues,RussianobjectivesandunderlyingassumptionsaboutrelationsbetweenstatesareincompatiblewithwhatWesternstatesandsocietiesfindacceptable.RecognizingthatWesternandRussianvaluesandinterestsarenotreconcilable,andadjustingforthatrealityinthelong-termconductoftherelationship,iskeytomanagingtheseconflictsandcontradictions.

Myth03:‘RussiawaspromisedthatNATOwouldnotenlarge’

ContrarytothebetrayalnarrativecultivatedbyRussiatoday,theUSSRwasneverofferedaformalguaranteeonthelimitsofNATOexpansionpost-1990.Moscowmerelydistortshistorytohelppreserveananti-Westernconsensusathome.In1990,whenMikhailGorbachevagreedtoaunitedGermany’sincorporationintoNATO,heneitheraskedfornorreceivedanyformalguaranteesthattherewouldbenofurtherexpansionofNATObeyondtheterritoryof

aunitedGermany.ThedissolutionoftheWarsawPactandthecollapseoftheUSSRtransformedthesecuritysituationinEurope.Russia’snewleadersdid

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notquestiontheprinciplethatcountriesinEuropewerecompletelyfreetomaketheirownsecurityarrangements.Similarly,theNATO–RussiaFoundingActsignedin1997recognizedthe‘inherentright’ofallstates‘tochoosethemeanstoensuretheirownsecurity’.

Myth04:‘RussiaisnotinaconflictwiththeWest’

Euro-Atlanticpolicymakersmaybereluctanttoadmitit,butMoscow’snaturalstateisoneofconfrontationwiththeWest.Akeyfeatureoftheconflictistheuseofunconventionalhostilemeasuresthatremainabovethethresholdofacceptedpeacetimeactivitiesbutbelowthatofwarfare.TheKremlinseekstoundermineWesternintereststhroughawell-establishedtoolkit,suchaselectioninterference,targetedstate-sanctionedassassinations,andinformationwarfare.Crucially,unconventionalhostilemeasuresandindirectactionsarenotjustfeaturesofthisconflict,butcontributetothe(mistaken)perceptionoftherebeingnoconflict.

Myth05:‘Weneedanewpan-EuropeansecurityarchitecturethatincludesRussia’

Russianleadersadvocateatreaty-basedandcontinent-wideEuropeansecurity

systemthatwouldreplaceexisting‘Euro-Atlantic’structures,particularlyNATO.

Thisproposalisproblematic:itignoresbasicdifferencesbetweenRussiaand

Westerncountriesovertheissueofsovereignty.Russiawants‘greatpower’

privilegesforitself,limitsonthesovereigntyofneighbouringcountries,and

agreementthatstatesshouldnotbecriticizediftheyruntheirdomesticaffairsin

waysinconsistentwiththevaluesofdemocracy,humanrightsandtheruleoflaw.

ThisperspectiveclasheswithcoreWesterninterestsandvalues.Assuch,evenif

anewpan-Europeansecurityarchitectureweretobeestablished,thefundamental

differencesinoutlookbetweenthetwosideswouldstopsuchasystemfrom

functioning.Westernpolicymakersshouldbeclearthatdisagreementswith

RussiaovertheEuropeansecurityarchitectureareprofoundandunlikely

tobereconciledsoon.

Myth06:‘WemustimprovetherelationshipwithRussia,evenwithoutRussianconcessions,asitistooimportant’

Thismythrestsonthepremisethatacombinationofsupposedlyself-evidentgeopoliticalweight,mutualeconomicinterestsandcompensationforlosingtheColdWarareoverridingimperativesforasuccessfulresetwithRussia–leadingtoanecessarilyfullyfunctionalrelationship.Thatthismayleave‘lesserpowers’morevulnerabletointimidationorinfluenceis,accordingtothosewhosubscribetothemyth,anunfortunatesideeffectand/orapriceworthpaying.Yetquiteapartfromthedeepethicalambiguitiessuchanaccommodationimplies,thearrangementsimplywouldnotwork.

Partly,thisisbecausethepresentationoftheWest,andtheUSinparticular,

asathreatto‘FortressRussia’isanessentialsupporttotheKremlin’sincreasinglyauthoritariandomesticrule.FewareasshowpromiseforcooperationwithRussia.Effortsinthosemostfrequentlymooted–cybersecurity,theMiddleEastand

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NorthAfrica,trade–haveallfailedsofarbecauseofRussia’silliberalapproachtoeachsubject.ItisalsoworthrememberingthatMoscowitselfisnotputtingforwardcooperationwishlists;theyareinvariablytheworkofWesternpoliticiansanddiplomats.WesternpolicymakersmustexpectthattheKremlin’svisionofRussiaasafortressentitledtoacommandingroleintheworldyetthreatenedbyoutsidepowers,andbytheUSinparticular,willremainattheheartofitsbeliefs.

Myth07:‘Russiaisentitledtoadefensiveperimeter–asphereof“privilegedinterests”includingtheterritoryofotherstates’

TheideathatRussiashouldbeentitledtoanexclusivesphereofinfluenceinotherstates,notablyinEasternEuropeandCentralAsia,isdeeplyproblematic.ItisincompatiblewithprofessedEuro-Atlanticvaluesaroundstates’sovereigntyandrightstoself-determination.Itisdetrimentaltogeopoliticalorderandinternationalsecurity,asitimplicitlygiveslicencetoRussianactions–territorialaggression,annexation,evenoutrightwar–thatriskcreatinginstabilityinRussia’sneighboursandEuropemorewidely.IteffectivelyentitlesRussiatodominateneighbouringstatesandviolatetheirterritorialintegrity.Anditmisconstruescontemporarygeopoliticalrealities,suchasRussia’sgrudgingacceptanceof

asecondplayerinitsvicinity–China(specifically,inrelationtotheexpansionofChina’sinfluenceinCentralAsia).Betrayalaside,itisdoubtfulthatitisevenwithinthegiftoftheWesttoconcedeasphereofinfluencetoRussia–orthatsuchanunderstandingwouldworkifsomehowestablished.Failuretocriticallyre-examinegeopoliticaldoctrinesonthissubjectrisksreproducingreductiveColdWar-erapostures.Andwhilesomepost-SovietandEasternEuropeanstates–andeventheirpopulations–maydesirecloserrelationswithRussia,noneofthemwanttosacrificetheirsovereignrights.

Myth08:‘WemustdriveawedgebetweenRussiaandChinatoimpedetheirabilitytoactintandemagainstWesterninterests’

ThenotionthattheWestcanexploittensionsbetweenRussiaandChinabothmisunderstandsthenatureoftherelationshipbetweenthetwocountriesandoverestimatesitssusceptibilitytoexternalleverage.AcorollaryofthemythistheassumptionthatRussiaandChinaformasinglestrategicentitythatwassomehow‘allowed’todevelopbynegligentWesternpolicymakers.YetjustastheWestdidnotjoinRussiaandChinatogether,itcannotputthemasunder.Thetwopowershaveanaturalideologicalcompatibilityaswellascomplementaryeconomiesandinterestsinarangeofspheres,includingtechnology,cybercooperation

anddefence.Atthesametime,themythdistortsthenatureoftheSino-Russianrelationshipbyascribingtoitabehaviouralconvergenceandagrandconspiratorialcharacter,whileoverlookingeachstate’scommandingimperativetoretainfullautonomyindecision-making.Giventhatthetwopowerscurrentlyhavemore

togainfromcooperationthancompetition,bothRussiaandChinahavechosentopushtheirdifferencestothebackgroundfortheforeseeablefuture.ButlatentbilateraltensionscouldcometotheforeinthefutureasChina’sascendancycontinues.Theemergenceofan‘axisofauthoritarianism’isthusnotinprospect.

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Myth09:‘TheWest’srelationswithRussiamustbenormalizedinordertocountertheriseofChina’

RapprochementwithRussiaasastrategicmeansofcounteringChinawouldlikelytakeplaceontheKremlin’sterms,andwouldmeansacrificingthehard‑wonsovereigntyofotherpost-Sovietstates.Moreover,tosubscribetothismythistoassumethattheKremlinevenwantsnormalizedrelationswiththeWest,andtoforgetthatabetterrelationshipwithRussia,whateveritsprice,woulddolittletopreventChina’sreachandcapabilitiesfromcontinuingtogrow.Mostimportantly,whileChina’stransgressionsofinternationallawandviolationsofhumanrightsarenomoretobeexcusedthanthoseofRussia,analliancewiththeKremlinimplicitlyremovesthepossibilityofChinaandtheWesthavingsustainablerelationsinthelongerterm.WesternnationsdonothavetheluxuryoffocusingsolelyonthechallengesposedbyChinawhilesomehowglossingoverRussia’saggressivebehaviour.

Myth10:‘TheEurasianEconomicUnionisagenuineandmeaningfulcounterparttotheEU’

RussiapresentstheEurasianEconomicUnion(EAEU)asapartnerfortheEUinaproposedfree-tradeareastretching‘fromLisbontoVladivostok’.Inreality,theEAEUisapoliticalprojectlackingthefeaturesofatruecommonmarket.Russiadisregardstherulesoftheveryorganizationthroughwhichitseekstoreassertitspower,andwithwhichitwantstheEUtocooperate.Tradepolicydoesnotconstituteaseparate,non-politicizedtrackinRussia’sforeignpolicy;itissubordinatedtoit.Duetothisinstrumentaluseanddeeppoliticizationofeconomicdiplomacy,theEAEUisfunctionallyunabletoactasanintegrationbodyinEurasia,notleastbecauseRussiahasnoeconomicinterestincomprehensivetradeliberalizationeitherinsidetheEAEUorviaafree-tradeareawiththeEU.

Myth11:‘ThepeoplesofUkraine,BelarusandRussiaareonenation’

TheKremlinmisrepresentstheregion’shistoryinordertolegitimizetheideathatUkraineandBelarusarepartofRussia’s‘natural’sphereofinfluence.Infact,bothcountrieshavestrongerEuropeanrootsthantheKremlincarestoadmit.

ItishistoricallyinaccuratetoclaimthatRussia,UkraineandBelaruseverformedasinglenationalentity(indeed,thelattertwocountriesalsohavepoliticalandculturalrootsinintrinsicallyEuropeanstructuressuchastheGrandDuchyofLithuania).TheKremlin’snarrative,whichservedtojustifyRussia’sclaimtothestatusofprimusinterparesamongpost-Sovietrepublics,acknowledgesRussia’srighttointerfereintheinternalaffairsofitsneighbourstothisday.Theidea

ofa‘triune’Russiannationdowngradestheuniquenessofhistoricindigenouscultures.Moreover,inquestioningtheauthenticityofUkrainianidentityandtheviabilityof‘Belarusianness’asnationalbuilding-blocks,itseekstoentrenchininternationalpublicopinionstereotypesthatwouldmakeitharderforthetwocountriestopursuegreaterintegrationwithEurope.

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Myth12:‘CrimeawasalwaysRussian’

TheKremlinpropagatesthefictionthatCrimealegitimatelyandwillingly‘seceded’fromUkraineand‘rejoined’Russiain2014.Ifunchallenged,thismythrisksfurtherunderminingUkraine’sterritorialintegrityandencouragingexpansionistpowerselsewhere.ThesubsequentdrasticmilitarizationofCrimeabyRussia,andthelatter’sunlawfulrestrictionsonnavigationintheSeaofAzov,increasethevulnerabilitybothoftheBlackSeaandtheMediterraneantoRussiansecuritythreats.

YettherealityisthatCrimeahasbeeninRussianhandsforonlyafractionofitshistory.Historically(before2014),CrimeabelongedtoRussiafor

atotalofonly168years,orlessthan6percentofitswrittenhistory.SinceUkraine’sindependencein1991,nomajorseparatistmovementhasexistedinCrimea.Ukrainians,RussiansandCrimeanTatarsco-existedpeacefully,withwide‑rangingautonomyprovidedbytheconstitutionoftheAutonomousRepublicofCrimea.The‘referendum’organizedbyRussiaandheldunderduresson16March2014wasinfactmerelyasmokescreentoformalizeRussia’smilitarytakeoverofthepeninsula.

Myth13:‘Liberalmarketreforminthe1990swasbadforRussia’

ThemythisthatinRussiainthe1990sliberalmarketreformcreatedaprolongedrecession.Itistruethatliberalreformwasattemptedandthatoutputfellheavilyoversixyears,buttheformerdidnotcausethelatter.LiberalreformasoriginallyconceivedwasneverfullyoradequatelyimplementedinRussia.InPoland,incontrast,wherereformwascarriedout,thedeclineinoutputwasbriefandmodest.InRussia,politicallyweakauthoritiesfailedtofollowthroughonstabilizingtheeconomy(includinggettinginflationundercontrolandmanagingthepublicfinances),whileanotherkeystrandofreform,privatization,wasmarredbycorruption.Thefalsebeliefthatawell-functioningmarketeconomyissomehowincompatiblewithRussiaweakensWesternpolicy.

Myth14:‘Sanctionsarethewrongapproach’

EconomicsanctionshavealreadydemonstratedpracticalandnormativevalueasresponsestounacceptableRussianbehaviour–buttheyneedtobeallowedtimetowork,andtheireffectivenessshouldnotbejudgedagainstimpossibletests.Despiteclaimstothecontrary,sanctionshaveinfluencedRussianactionsandhavetakeneffectdespitethechallengesoftheiruseonalargeandresilienttarget.Sanctionsalsodemonstrativelycondemnunacceptablebehaviourandreaffirmcollectivecommitmenttothenormsandprinciplesofinternationalorder.

Myth15:‘It’sallaboutPutin–Russiaisamanuallyrun,centralizedautocracy’

GovernanceinRussiaisnotaone-manshow.Contrarytowidespread

thinking,manydifferentactorsandinstitutionscanplayameaningfulrole

indecision‑makingandpolicyimplementationinthecountry.Thepresident’s

personalroleisoftenexaggerated,withexternalobserversoverlookingor

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misunderstandingtherolesofcollectivebodies(forexample,thePresidentialAdministrationandtheSecurityCouncil),overestimatingthedegreeofmanagerialcompetenceanddiscipline(presidentialordersare,forinstance,frequentlynotfulfilled),orfailingtotakeintoaccounttheself-interestedbehaviourofactorsbeyondPutin.AlthoughPutinmayhavetheabilitytointerveneinalltypesofdecision-making,thatdoesnotmeanthathealwaysdoesorwantsto.Tounderstandhowgovernanceactuallyworksinthecountry,weneedtotakeintoaccountthepowerandcomplexityoftheRussianbureaucracy–whichwillonlycontinuetogrowinimportance.

Myth16:‘WhatcomesafterPutinmustbebetterthanPutin’

Thismythagainreflectsthetriumphofhopeoverexperienceandanalysis.RussiahasstructuralissuesthatgobeyondthedifficultiesassociatedwithPutin’srule.Asaresult,thelikelihoodofapost-PutinRussiabuildingaviabledemocraticpoliticalsystemisnowlowerthanitwasduringthe1990s.Inparticular,thecountrywillneedanewprofessionalcadreofelitebureaucratsandpolicymakersifitistodeliveraccountableandeffectivegovernance.Yetconditionsforthecultivationofsuchacadredonotexistintoday’sRussia.IrrespectiveofwhoeventuallysucceedsPutin,Russia’spoliticalcultureiscertaintocontinuetoimpedethedevelopmentofmoreconstructiverelationswiththeWest.

Recommendations

Eachoftheauthorsinthisvolumehasaccompaniedtheiranalysisofaparticularmythwithrecommendationsforbetterpolicythatismoregroundedinreality.Theserecommendationsmakefulluseofthecombineddecadesofexperienceoftheanalystsrepresentedhere–experiencewhich,unlikethatofpoliticians,hasnotbeenlimitedorconstrainedbyelectoraltermsorthecyclesofpoliticalfashion.Foreaseofpresentation,thecollectedrecommendationsaredistilledhere,andgroupedbytheme.(Acondensedsetof10principlesfordealingmoreeffectivelyandrationallywithRussia,drawingonaselectionoftheauthors’specificrecommendationsandthepointsbelow,isalsopresentedinthe‘Conclusion’chapterofthisreport.)

Theauthor