国际法律委员会述评-情势变迁问题 外文翻译

文献翻译原文：IntlLawCommissionCommentary---TheQuestionofRebusSicStantibus.-----TheInternationalLawCommissionCommentary.[ondraftofeventualArt.SeeViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,Article62]EuropeanCourtofJusticeholdsthatcontinuedfightinginformerYugoslaviafundamentallyundermined1980preferentialcustomsagreementwithSerbiathatjustifiedECCouncilinsuspendingitunderinternationallawprincipleofrebussicstantibusBetweenNovember1990andApril1992,A.RackeGmbH&Co.,aGermanfirm,hadimportedwinesintoGermanyfromSerbiaandhadclearedthemwithcustomsforstorageinitsprivatecustomswarehouse.WhenthewineswentintocirculationinMay1992,Rackeinvokedtheprogramofpreferentialcustomsratessetupbya1980Co-operationAgreementbetweentheMemberStatesoftheEuropeanCommunityandtheSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(the"Agreement").ByRegulation314/83,theEChadalsoapprovedit.TheGermancustomsauthorities,however,calleduponRacketopaythedifferencebetweenthethirdcountryrateandthelowerrateundertheAgreement.TheycontendedthatthetradeconcessionsonwhichRacketriedtorelynolongerappliedsinceRegulation3300/91(theRegulation)hadsuspendedtheAgreementinNovember1991.TherecitalstotheRegulationexplainedthat,despiteanappealbytheECanditsMemberStatesforobediencetotheHaguecease-fireagreementofOctober4,1991,thepartieskeptonfighting.Rackebroughtsuitagainstthecustomsagency,challengingitsdenialofpreferentialtreatmentundertheAgreement.AstoanywineRackehadimportedafterNovember1991,thecourtdismissedtheaction.RackeappealedtotheGermanfederalcourt.Itarguedthattheinternationallawdoctrineofrebussicstantibusor"fundamentalchangeofcircumstances"asformulatedinArticle62(1)oftheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties[May23,1969,U.N.Doc.A/CONF.39/27]didnotjustifytheunilateralsuspensionoftheAgreement.TheGermanfederalcourt,however,ruledthatthedisintegrationofYugoslaviaintoseveralnewstatesplustheviolenthostilitiesthatfollowedcouldamounttoafundamentalchange.Ontheotherhand,thisdidnot,inthecourt'sview,radicallyaltertheextentoftheparties'obligationstowardseachotherunderArticle62(1).ThecourtthenreferredthequestionoftheArticle177.TheECJfirstupholdsitsjurisdictiontorespondtothereference.TheCourthasthepowertoreviewallchallengestothevalidityofECmeasuresincludingthosebasedonincompatibilitywithinternationallaw.TheEChastorespectinternationallawwhenitexercisesitspowersundertheRomeTreaty,asamended.ThisclearlyincludesthepresentchallengetotheRegulation.TheCourtthenpointsoutthattheViennaConventiononTreatiesdoesnotitselfbindtheECorallofitsMemberStates.[EditorialNote:AsofNovember1998,France,Ireland,LuxembourgandPortugalwerenotparties].Article62,however,doesembodyabindingruleofcustomaryinternationallawonsuspensionoftreaties.HencetheprincipleofrebussicstantibusbindsECinstitutionsaspartoftheCommunitylegalorder.Thenextquestionwaswhetherthisprovisionofatreaty,althoughwithanon-memberstate,isdirectlyapplicablewithintheEClegalorder.Inotherwords,mayanECcitizenbringaprivatelawsuitinaMemberStatecourtbasedonrightsconferredbythetreatyprovision?Thisinturndependsonwhetherthetreatysetsforthaclearandconcisedutythatwasnotcontingentontheadoptionofanysubsequentmeasure.Article22(4)oftheAgreementrequiredtheECtopreciselycomputecustomdutiespursuanttodetailedruleswithnodiscretioninvolved.HencetheAgreementwasdirectlyapplicable.Onpreliminaryreference,thetestforvalidatingaregulationasagainstrulesofcustomaryinternationallaw,iswhethertheCouncilmadeclearerrorsofassessmentastotheconditionsforapplyingthoserules.Article62setsforthtwoessentials.ThefirstiswhethertheprevailingcircumstancesatthetimeoftheAgreementconstitutedanessentialbasisfortheparties'assent.TheAgreementdeclaredthatitaimedtocontributetotheeconomicandsocialdevelopmentofformerYugoslavia.Thefailuretokeepthecease-fireagreementandthecontinuedwarfaremadeitimpossibletomeetthiscondition.Thesecondconditioniswhetherthechangehadradicallyalteredtheparties'obligations.WhentheCouncilrecitedintheRegulationthatthecontinuedpursuitofhostilitieshadunderminedtheobservanceoftheAgreement,itdidnotmakeamanifesterrorofassessment.IntlLawCommissionCommentary：(1)Almostallmodernjurists,howeverreluctantly,admittheexistenceininternationallawoftheprinciplewithwhichthisarticleisconcernedandwhichiscommonlyspokenofasthedoctrineofrebussicstantibus.Justasmanysystemsofmunicipallawrecognizethat,quiteapartfromanyactualimpossibilityofperformance,contractsmaybecomeinapplicablethroughafundamentalchangeofcircumstances,soalsotreatiesmaybecomeinapplicableforthesamereason.Mostjurists,however,atthesametimeenterastrongcaveatastotheneedtoconfinethescopeofthedoctrinewithinnarrowlimitsandtoregulatestrictlytheconditionsunderwhichitmaybeinvoked;fortheriskstothesecurityoftreatieswhichthisdoctrinepresentsintheabsenceofanygeneralsystemofcompulsoryjurisdictionareobvious.Thecircumstancesofinternationallifearealwayschanginganditiseasytoallegethatthechangesrenderthetreatyinapplicable.(2)TheCommissionconcludedthattheprinciple,ifitsapplicationwerecarefullydelimitedandregulated,shouldfindaplaceinthemodernlawoftreaties.Atreatymayremaininforceforalongtimeanditsstipulationscometoplaceanundueburdenononeofthepartiesasaresultofafundamentalchangeofcircumstances.Then,iftheotherpartywereobdurateinopposinganychange,thefactthatinternationallawrecognizednolegalmeansofterminatingormodifyingthetreatyotherwisethanthroughafurtheragreementbetweenthesamepartiesmightimposeaseriousstrainontherelationsbetweenthestatesconcerned;andthedissatisfiedstatemightultimatelybedriventotakeactionoutsidethelaw.Thenumberofcasescallingfortheapplicationoftheruleislikelytobecomparativelysmall.AspointedoutinthecommentarytoArticle,themajorityofmoderntreatiesareexpressedtobeofshortduration,orareenteredintoforrecurrenttermsofyearswitharighttodenouncethetreatyattheendofeachterm,orareexpresslyorimplicitlyterminableuponnotice.Inallthesecaseseitherthetreatyexpiresautomaticallyoreachparty,havingthepowertoterminatethetreaty,hasthepoweralsotoapplypressureupontheotherpartytoreviseitsprovisions.Nevertheless,theremayremainaresidueofcasesinwhich,failinganyagreement,onepartymaybeleftpowerlessunderthetreatytoobtainanylegalrelieffromoutmodedandburdensomeprovisions.Itisinthesecasesthattherebussicstantibusdoctrinecouldserveapurposeasalevertoinduceaspiritofcompromiseintheotherparty.Moreover,despitethestrongreservationsoftenexpressedwithregardtoit,theevidenceoftheacceptanceofthedoctrineininternationallawissoconsiderablethatitseemstoindicatearecognitionofaneedforthissafety-valveinthelawoftreaties.(3)TheCommissionalsorecognizedthatjuristshaveinthepastoftenlimitedtheapplicationoftheprincipletoso-calledperpetualtreaties,thatis,totreatiesnotmakinganyprovisionfortheirtermination.Thereasoningbywhichthislimitationoftheprinciplewassupportedbytheseauthoritiesdidnot,however,appeartotheCommissiontobeconvincing.Whenatreatyhadbeengivenadurationoften,twenty,fifty,orninety-nineyears,itcouldnotbeexcludedthatafundamentalchangeofcircumstancesmightoccurwhichradicallyaffectedthebasisofthetreaty.Thecataclysmiceventsofthepresentcenturyshowedhowfundamentallycircumstancesmaychangewithinaperiodofonlytenortwentyyears.Ifthedoctrinewereregardedasanobjectiveruleoflawfoundedupontheequityandjusticeofthematter,theredidnotseemtobeanyreasontodrawadistinctionbetween“perpetual”and“longterm”treaties.Moreover,practicedidnotaltogethersupporttheviewthattheprinciplewasconfinedto“perpetual”treaties.出处:Treaties.IntlLawCommissionCommentary---TheQuestionofRebusSicStantibus.[J]InternationalLawUpdate,Jun99,Vol.5,p71译文：国际法律委员会述评---情势变迁问题-----国际法委员会述评[关于艺术的最终草案。见维也纳公约条约法第62条]欧洲法院认为,在前南斯拉夫的继续争论从根本上破坏了1980年关税优惠协定，塞尔维亚欧盟委员会有理由根据国际法在暂停使用情势变迁原则。在1990年11月和1992年4月之间,A.拉克有限公司---一家德国公司,已经清除了为德国从塞尔维亚进口葡萄酒和他们海关的其私人海关储存仓库。在1992年5月当葡萄酒进入流通,拉克的优惠关税税率程序援引了欧洲社会和社会主义联邦共和国成员国之间的1980年合作协定(“协议”)。欧盟委员会已经批准的第314卷83号。然而,德国海关当局根据该协要求拉克支付与第三国之间的率和低费率差别。他们认为,,拉克试图靠贸易让步不再适用自1991年11月已暂停第330091(监管)协议。委员会的规例解释说,尽管呼吁欧共体及其成员国,顺从1991年10月4日的海牙停火协议的,但是各方仍然保持着战斗。拉克公司提起诉讼海关机构,挑战其拒绝的优惠待遇协议。法院驳回拉克在1991年11月后任何进口酒的诉讼。拉克呼吁德国联邦法院,在国际法情势变迁理论的根本改变的情况下制定的《维也纳公约》的第62（1）条约法[1969年5月23日,联合国doc.A/39/27]，单方面并没有理由暂停该协定。但是,德国联邦法院裁定,南斯拉夫解体加上几个新国家暴力敌对行动,可能造成一个根本的改变。另一方面,法院认为,根据第62(1)从对每一个根本上改变各方的义务的程度，就是法院所指的177条的问题。第一,欧洲法院坚持参考其管辖权的回应。法院有权审查所有有效性挑战的EC措施,包括那些不符合国际法的。欧盟委员会遵守国际法的罗马条约条来行使它的权力。这显然挑战了目前的规例。法院指出,《维也纳公约》条约本身并不受EC或其所有成员国的约束。[编者按:截至11月1998年,法国、爱尔兰、卢森堡和葡萄牙非缔约国]。但是,第62,暂停了体现有约束力的国际法习惯规则的条约。因此,情势变迁的原则作为社会的一部分法律秩序来约束EC机构。下一个问题是虽然有一个非成员国提供一个这种条约,直接适用于欧盟法律秩序。换言之,可使欧盟公民根据所赋予的权利的条约的规定在成员国法院私人诉讼。这又反过来取决于该条约提出了明确的责任,并不取决于随后进行的任何措施。第22(4)的协议要求选举委员会,根据详细规则准确地计算关税,而没有决定权。因此,该协议是直接适用的。就初步参考测试证实了一条国际法的习惯规则,是安理会明确作出了实施这些规则的评估错误的条件。第62条规定了两个必要条件:第一是当前的情况下的当时协议,通过双方的批准是一个重要基础。《协定》宣布,它旨在促进前南斯拉夫的经济和社会发展。未能保持停火协定和续战,无法满足这一条件。第二个条件是能否从根本上改变了各方的义务。当安理会遵守协议的规定,损害了继续追求的敌对行动,并没有明显的评估错误。国际法律委员会述评：（1）几乎所有的现代法学家，承认存在此