风险社会视角下的灾害损失柳尝体系研究 中英文摘要,司法制度论文

风险社会视角下的灾害损失柳尝体系研究中英文内容摘要,司法制度论文摘要灾祸损失补偿是一个古老的话题。政治经济学家们从文明和福利责任的视角，研究对灾祸损失所应承当的职责，而市场经济学家们从风险损失转移和分散的视角，对灾祸损失融资机制进行不断创新。但是，当代化社会的时代特征是风险社会，与工业化、全球化、技术革新等相伴而生的灾祸风险呈现出越来越频发的趋势，灾祸风险所带来的经济、社会和人口损失也在不断放大。风险社会不仅改变了人类所面临灾祸风险的形态，也改变了灾祸损失补偿机制所依靠的传统法则。本文试图围绕灾祸风险的这些改变，讨论灾祸损失补偿在和市场的博弈关系上应做出的新选择，以构建一个灾祸损失补偿的新体系。风险社会改变了人类面临的灾祸风险的性质和状态，使得灾祸风险呈现出突变性、弥散性、模糊性和巨损性的新特征，小概率的巨灾风险越来越多地发生，自然灾祸与工业灾祸、环境灾祸、恐惧袭击等社会性灾祸交织发生，界线越来越模糊，灾祸在区际间、在国际范围内的扩散也呈趋势。这些突出的新特征使传统意义上的职责显得乏力，也使传统意义上的风险转移和分摊机制失效。我们重新审视灾祸风险的性质，将灾祸定义为不可抗力造成对相当大的一部分人口范围〔公共体〕构成严重剥夺的经过和现象。当灾祸造成公共体共同面临的巨额损失时，不可能用完全的私人市场机制来分担风险损失，因而我们提出建立一个公共部门〔P)-市场(M)-公众〔P)为一体的灾祸损失补偿形式，这也是一个将灾祸风险的可保性极大延展的灾祸损失融资形式。提出这种设想的根据是灾祸风险是一种公共风险，这种公共风险不仅有着私人的影响，更有着对国家安全和公信力的影响。灾祸是对公共体的严重剥夺，这种剥夺不仅仅是资源的剥夺，还是资源配置关系〔主要表现为交换权利关系〕的剥夺，因而灾祸的本质是对资源及资源配置机制的毁坏。那么当剥夺发生之后，既要对灾祸承受公共体的资源进行修复，也要对公共体资源配置关系进行重置，这就是我们所要研究的灾祸损失补偿的任务。它是一个广义的概念，不仅仅是对被毁坏的公共体进行损失度量和经济补偿，对原有资源被剥夺后构成的洼地进行填平，更重要的是施行一系列的经济、政治、环境、人文措施，恢复和社会组织的市场主体功能，重建经济运行的机制，重构资源配置机能。灾祸损失补偿不仅要实现效率和公平的目的，还要实现系统补偿的目的，即对资源环境系统的损失补偿。从国家安全的角度考虑，针对灾祸风险的变化趋势，以及灾祸本身所具有的公共风险性质，建立新的灾祸风险管理制度，已是国家经济社会发展必须解决、不宜久拖的重要事情。我们主张重新认识风险可保性和大数法则这些灾祸损失补偿的传统法则，以当代技术和当代思维的变革延展可保风险和大数法则，实现灾祸损失补偿的架构设置。在这种设置里，将不仅仅是充当管理者的职能，而且充当灾祸风险的最终保险人的角色，并以扩展的市场法则介入到保险、再保险以及整个资本市场，构成一个宏观、开放的保险公共体。在这个一体化的公共体里：从公众的角度来看，公众是私人产品的需求者，也是私人风险的承当者，与公众的联络，以公众的介入为纽带，而公众与市场的联络，则是以风险合同为纽带；从市场的角度来看，市场是公众风险的集合机制，是一个以保险合同为纽带集结起来的公共体；从的角度来看，是公众的另一种集合机制，它是以法律和伦理〔社会契约〕为纽带建立起来公共体。能够而且应该在应对灾祸风险这样非私人风险时，为公众提供公共产品，这是公共选择的需要，也是系统构成的本源。能够以保险、再保险、灾祸风险基金、巨灾债券等方式参与市场，成为损失融资的市场主体。这里面临的一个问题是，的角色是双重的，即不仅仅是制度的提供者，是市场的监管者，是裁判员，同时也是某些保险产品、担保产品、债券产品的供应者，是市场的主体，是运发动。同时承当着裁判员与运发动的双重角色，身份不明确，职责不清楚，往往会使其该履行的职责没有履行，而不该干涉的事情又太多地干涉。但是，这并非作为两种主体而必然产生的矛盾，而恰恰是两类主体的角色不明晰所带来的矛盾。论文可能的创新之处和缺乏1、对灾祸损失补偿的研究，通常是从保险学的角度研究损失融资机制在市场上的运用，公共管理学也从管理的视角研究灾祸性公共危机的应急，而本文以具有前瞻性的风险社会理论考察灾祸的时代特征，并从国家风险管理层面来考虑构建与市场一体化的灾祸损失补偿体系；2、经济学意义上的灾祸损失补偿通常以对自然灾祸的研究为主，本文则着力描绘叙述在风险社会的背景下，自然灾祸与社会性灾祸的模糊性加强，因此主张不对灾祸的自然性和社会性进行严格区分，而将灾祸损失补偿定义为对包括工业灾祸、环境灾祸等在内的各种当代化灾祸风险的损失补偿。3、传统意义上的灾祸损失补偿主要关注对灾祸直接经济损失的补偿，本文将灾祸损失定义为公共体资源剥夺以及资源配置关系的毁坏，将灾祸损失补偿的内涵从经济损失补偿拓展到系统恢复力的层面，并试图建立一个系统的、兼顾公平和效率的损失补偿模型。但是，由于本人学术能力和识见的局限，上述一体化灾祸损失补偿模型仅从框架上进行了界定和定性的分析，没有用计量的方式方法进行充分论证和分析；P-M-P形式在实际操作中怎样实现系统化的补偿，十分是应用到中国所面临的地震、台风、洪水、干旱等频发灾祸风险，怎样实现方案的量化设计，还有待进一步明确。这些问题尚需进一步的研究，在今后的工作和学习中，我将继续不断修正、完善本文的一些想法。本文关键词语：风险社会；灾祸；公共体；损失补偿；宏观保险AbstractHazardlosscompensationisanoldtopic.Theplutonomists,fromtheperspectiveofcivilizationandbenefit，haveresearchedtheresponsibilitiesofthegovernmentonhazardloss，wholethemarketeconomistsinnovatethehazardlossfinancingmechanismfromtheperspectiveofrisklosstransferlossanddiversification.However,themodernsocietyischaracterizedbyrisksociety,withhazardrisksaccompanyingwiththeindustrialization,globalizationandtechnicalreformhavebeenmoreandmorefrequently,theeconomic,socialandpopulationlossesbroughtbythehazardriskarealsobeingmagnifiedcontinuously.Risksocietydoesnotonlychangethemorphologyofrisksfacedbypeople，butalsochangesthetraditionalruleonwhichthehazardlosscompensationmechanismrelies.Thispaperstrivestodiscussthenewselectionforthehazardlosscompensationinthegamerelationofgovernmentandmarketaroundthesechangesofhazardrisk,soastoconstructanewsystemofhazardlosscompensationsystem.Risksocietychangesthenatureandstateofhazardrisksfacedbypeople,makingthehazardriskscharacterizedbymutation,dispersivity，fussinessandmassiveloss,thecatastropherisksofsmallprobabilityhavebeenoccurringmoreandmore,thenaturalhazardandindustrialhazard,environmentalhazardandsocialhazardliketerroristattackoccuralternately,withafuzzierandfuzzierrisk，hazardsarealsospreadingregionallyandinternationally.Thesehighlightingnewcharacteristicsmakethetraditionalgovernmentfunctionsweakandalsoinvalidthetraditionalrisktransferandsharingmechanism.Were-examinetherisknatureanddefinehazardasaprocessofphenomenonconstitutingseriousdeprivaltoagreatportionofpopulation(publicbodies)byforcemajeure.Whenhazardcausethepublicbodiestofacemassivelossesjointly,itispossibletouseacompletelyprivatemarketmechanismtosharetheriskloss，therefore,weproposetoestablishahazardlosscompensationmodelintegratingpublicdepartment(P)，market(M)andthepublic(P)，whichisalsoahazardlossfinancingmodetogreatlyexpandtheinsurabilityofhazardrisk.Thebasistoputforwardthisideaisapublicrisk，whichdoesnotonlyinfluencetheprivate,butalsoinfluencesthenationalsecurityandgovernmentcredibility.Hazardisseriousdeprivalofpublicbodies、suchdeprivalisnotonlylimitedtoresources,butalsotheresourceallocationrelation(mainlymanifestedinexchangeentitlementrelation).Therefore,thenatureofhazardistodestroytheresourceandresourceallocationmechanism.Thenwhendeprivaloccurs,itisnotonlyrequiredtorepairtheresourcesofthepublicbodiesbornebythehazard,butalsoreallocatetheresourceallocationrelationofthepublicbodies，andthisisthetaskofhazardlosscompensationthatwewillresearch.Itisabroadconcept，notonlytomeasurethelossofandmakecompensationforthepublicbodiesdestroyed,levelthelowlandaftertheoriginalresourcesaredeprived,butmoreimportantly,toimplementaseriesofeconomic,political,environmentalandhumanisticmeasures,restorethemarketsubjectfunctionofthegovernmentandsocialorganization,reconstructtheeconomicoperationmechanismandrestructuretheresourceallocationmechanism.Hazardlosscompensationisnotonlytorealizetheobjectiveofefficiencyandfairness,butalsotheobjectiveofsystemcompensation,i.e.thecompensationforthelossofresourceenvironmentsystem.Consideredfromtheaspectofnationalsecurity,changetrendofhazardriskandthepublicrisknatureofthehazarditself,ithasbeenanimportantthingthatmustbesolvedandshouldnotdelayedintheeconomyandsocietyofanationtoestablishanewhazardriskmanagementsystem.Weproposetore-recognizeriskinsurabilityandthetraditionallawsofthehazardlosscompensationlikelawoflargenumbers,expandtheinsurablerisksandthelawoflargenumberswiththereformofmoderntechnologyandmodernthinkingtorealizethestructuralsettingofhazardlosscompensation.Thegovernmentwillnotonlyplaytheroleofmanager,butalsotheroleoffinalinsurerofhazardriskandparticipatesintheinsurance,reinsuranceandtheoverallcapitalmarketwiththeexpmdedlawofmarkettoformamacroandopeninsurancepublicbody.Inthisintegratedpublicbody，fromtheaspectofthepublic,publicisthedemanderofprivateproducts，butalsotheundertakerofprivaterisk,theconnectionbetweenthegovernmentandpubliccanbelinkedbythepublicparticipation,whiletheconnectionbetweenpublicandmarketislinkedbytheriskcontract;fromtheaspectofmarket,marketisacollectivemechanismofpublicrisk，andanotherpublicbodygatheredwithinsurancecontractasthelink;fromtheaspectofgovernment,governmentisanothergatheringmechanismofthepublic,whichisapublicbodyestablishedwithlawandmorality(socialdeed).Thegovernmentcanandshouldprovidepublicproductsforthepublicwhendealingwiththenon-privateriskslikehazardrisk,whichisthedemandofpublicselectionandalsothesourceofformationofgovernmentsystem.Thegovernmentcaninterferewiththemarketintheformofinsurance,reinsurance,hazardriskfundandcat^trophebondstobecomethemarketsubjectorlossfinancing.Aproblemhereisthatthegovernmentplaysdoubleroles，i.e.thegovernmentisnotonlytheestablisherofsystem,supervisorofmarket,ajudge，butalsotheproviderofsomeinsuranceproducts，insuredproducts,bondsupplier,marketsubjectandplayer.Thegovernmentalsoplaysthedoublerolesofjudgeandplayersimultaneouslywithanunclearidentityandresponsibilitiesandwilloftennotperformthedueresponsibilities,whileinterferewiththosethatshouldnotbeinterferedwithtoomuch.However，thisistheinevitablecontradictionoccurringtotiiegovernmentastwosubjects,butonthecontrary,itisthecontradictionbytheambiguousoftwosubjectrolesofthegovernment.Thepossibleinnovationsandshortcomingsinthispaper1.Intermsofresearchondisasterlosscompensation,thegeneralapproachistostudytheoperationoflossfinancingmechanisminthemarket,andthescienceofpublicmanagementalsofocusesontheresearchonthemanagementandresponsefromtheperspectiveofgovernmentmanagement.Inthispaper,weinvestigatedthechangeofdisasterswithtimesfromtheperspectiveofrisksociety，andconsideredbuildingthegovernment-market-integrateddisasterlosscompensationmethods;2.Ininsurance,theresearchondisasterlosscompensationisfocusedonthenaturaldisasters.Inthepaper,wemainlydescribedtheambiguityofnaturaldisastersandnaturaldisasters,andproposednottostrictlydistinguishthedisastersinnaturalityandsociality,butdefinedthedisasterlosscompensationasalosscompensationforvariousmoderndisasterhazardsincludingindustrialandenvironmentaldisasters.3.Thedisasterlosscompensationresearchintheconventionalsensemainlyfocusesonthecompensationforthedirecteconomiclosscausedbydisasters.Inthispaper,wedefinedthedisasterlosscompensationasacompensationforresourcesandresourcesallocationmechanism,hopingtoestablishasystematiclosscompensationmodelstressingbothefficiencyandjustice,toextendtheinnovationofdisasterlosscompensationfromthelevelofeconomiclosstothelevelofsystematicresilience.However,duetothelimitationsinmyacademicability,knowledgeandexperience,theintegrateddisasterlosscompensationmodelabovewasonlydefinedandanalyzedqualitativelyfromtheframework，butnotdemonstratedfullyandanalyzedwithaquantitativemethod.ItneedsaclearsolutiononhowtomakeP=M-Pmodelrealizesystematiccompensationinactualoperation，andespeciallyrealizethequantitativedesignofprogramswhenitisappliedinthefrequentdisasterslikeearthquake,typhoon,flooranddroughtinChina.Theseproblemsneedtobefurtherresearched.Inmyfutureworkandstudy,IwillkeepcorrectingandperfectingsomeideasIproposedinthispaper.Keywords:risksociety,disaster,publicbody,losscom