高盛-印度经济2023展望-更慢的增长更高的弹性

A(growth)taleoftwohalves:Weexpect2023GDPgrowthinIndiatoslowto5.9%yoyfrom6.9%in2022.Growthwilllikelybeataleoftwohalves,withaslowerfirsthalfasthereopeningboostfades,andmonetarytighteningweighsondomesticdemand.Inthesecondhalf,growthislikelytore-accelerateasglobalgrowthrecovers,dragfromnetexportsdiminishes,andinvestmentcyclepicksup.odecreasetoyoyin2023from6.8%yoyin2022,asactivegovernmentinterventionislikelytocapfoodinflation.Wethinkcoregoodsinflationhaspeaked,butupsideriskstoservicesinflationarelikelytokeepcoreinflationstickyaround6%yoy.forecastat5-5.25%in2023,theRBIislikelytohikethereporateby50bp/35bpintheDecember2022/February2023policymeetings,takingthereporateto6.75%einabpreporatecutinQifinationpansoutyoyaveragebyQnsehasbeentoaabsorbfoodpriceshocksthroughsubsidiesandbprovidecountercyclicalstimulusthroughcapexWeexpectthispolicyresponsetocontinuenextyearwiththegeneralelectioncomingupin2024.rentaccountdecitislikelytoremainwidegivenexportdragfromtheglobalslowdown,thoughresilientservicesexportsarelikelytoprovidesomecushion.However,growthcapitalmaycontinuetochaseIndia,asglobalfirmsarelookingtodiversifysourcesofsupply(“China+1”),andIndiapresentsanattractiveopportunityoverthelongterm.Policymakersarelikelytoeasebarrierstoforeignportfolioinflows,inourview,togyearsGivenourviewofanimpendingdollarpeak,weforecastUSD/INRat84/83/82over3M/6M/12Mhorizons.nuSengupta+91(22)6616-9042|santanu.sengupta@GoldmanSachsIndiaSPLDeepakNarendranath+91(22)6616-9043|deepak.narendranath@GoldmanSachsIndiaSPLAndrewTilton+852-2978-1802|andrew.tilton@GoldmanSachs(Asia)L.L.C.derthisreportasonlyasinglefactorinmakingtheirinvestmentdecisionForRegACcertificationandotherimportantdisclosures,seetheDisclosureAppendix,orgoto/research/hedge.html.November2nomyPolicymakersfacedadifficultcombinationofa)ahawkishFed,b)risingdomesticinflation,andc)widetwindeficitsonboththecurrentaccountandfiscalbalances,asdomesticgrowthslowed.Toabsorbthesemacroshocks,theRBIhikedpolicyrates,kickingoffthetighteningcyclewithanoff-cyclehikeinMay2022,andjudiciouslyusedapartoftheFXreservesthatithadaccumulatedfromcurrentaccountsurplusesandcapitalflowsduringthepandemic.Intheend,despitesomedepreciationvs.theUSdollar,theINRwasoneofthebestperformingcurrenciesintheregion.In2023,weexpectGDPgrowthinIndiatoslowto5.9%yoy(Exhibit1),fromanestimated6.9%growthin2022.Weexpectgrowthtobeataleoftwohalvesin2023,withaslowdowninthefirsthalfasthereopeningboostfadesandmonetarytighteningweighsondomesticdemand.Inthesecondhalfweexpectgrowthtore-accelerateasglobalgrowthrecovers,thenetexportdragdeclinesandtheinvestmentcyclepicksup.Wealsoexpectthegovernmenttocontinueitsfocusoncapitalspending,andareseeingsignsofthenascentinvestmentrecoverycontinuing.Weforecastaround7%yoygrowthinbothconsumptionandinvestmentwiththeriskstoinvestmentgrowthtiltedtotheupside,ifmanufacturinginIndiapicksup,as‘MakeinIndia’effortscometofruition.RealGDP%%%%%2020-6.6CalendarYear2022F2022F32023F20216.6FiscalYear*2023F2023F2024FPrivateconsumerexpenditureGrossfixedinvestmentyoyyoy.3.010.4lationCPIinflationCoreCPIinflation^CoreexPDGS^^yoyyoy4.7OtherRepoRate^CentralGovtFiscalDeficitendofperiod,%%GDP4.004.006.40.504.05.4-ternalCurrentaccount%GDP1.3-1.1-3.4-3.5^CoreCPIinflationisHeadlineexcludingfood,fuelandlightinflation^^CoreexPDGSisCoreCPIinflationexcludingpetrol,diesel,goldandsilver.^^^Weexpect50bphikeinDec2022takingthereporateto6.40%,and35bpinFeb2023takingthereporatetoapeakof6.75%.Weexpecta25bpcutinQ42023takingthereporateto6.50%.*FiscalYear2023referstoApril2022toMarch2023November3Percent,yoyPercent,yoy4.5-6.68.3-ConConsumptionFixedInvestmentGovernmentspendingOthersNetExportsRealGDPGrowthForecast2017201820192020202120222023505NOTE:Otherisinventory,valuablesandstatisticaldiscrepancyestimated6.8%in2022,asweexpectfoodpricestoremaincontainedonthebackofactiveinterventionbythegovernmentthroughsubsidiesandothermeasures.OurPDGSorheadlineCPIexfoodfuelpetrolragein2022.Thiswasdrivenbytheriseincoregoodsinflation,whichweexpecttopeakanddeclinein2023.However,servicesinflation,whichismorerepresentativeofwagesanddemandconditionsintheeconomy,hasstartedinchinghigherinrecentmonths,andweexpectthistrendtocontinuein2023.Overall,weexpectCPIinflationtodeclineto5.6%nHiskstocoreservicesinationandIndiarunningnegativerealrateswethinktheRBIislikelytohikethereporateby50bpintheDecember2022policymeeting,followedby35bpintheFebruarymeetingwhichwouldtakethereporatetoapeakof6.75%byFebruary2023.Ifinflationpansoutasperourforecasts,decliningto5.3%yoy(average)byQ42023,weforecasttheRBItocutthepolicyreporateby25bpthatquarter.Ourcommoditystrategistsexpectoilpricestoriseto$110/bblin2023vs.$103/bblindrelativelyresilientdomesticgrowthinIndiaislikelytokeepthecurrentaccountdeficitat3.5%ofGDP($1WeightinCPIbasket:Food:45.9%;CoreGoods:20.7%;Coreservices:23.0%;Fuel:6.8%;Petrol,Diesel,ilverNovember4Indiagotastrongreopeningboostfromconsumptionin2.WecomparedourGSCurrentActivityIndicator(CAI)–amonthlymeasureofthesequentialpaceofeconomicgrowth–relativetothedateofreopeningafterCovidacrossmajoreconomies2(withatleastsevenmonthsofdatapostre-opening).ForIndia,thedateofreopeningconsideredwasMarch2022,aftertheOmicronwave.Exhibit3showsthatsevenmonthsafterthereopeningpostOmicron,CAIgrewatafasterrateinIndia,thanmostotherEMs.Privateconsumptionexpenditureaccountedfor7.5ppoutofthe8.8%yoyGDPgrowthin1H2022.Weexpectconsumptiongrowthcontributiontodeclineto4.7ppin2H2022(outof5.6%yoygrowth)and4.1ppoutof5.9%yoygrowthin2023asthereopeningboostfadesandfinancialconditionstighten.Weexpectsequentialmomentuminqoqsain1H2022,beforebouncingbackto3%+in2H2023.Indextime00)Indextime=100)CAICAIattimeofreopening*EMinter-quartilerange-7-6-5-4-3-2-101234567Monthsbefore/afterthereopening*ForEMeconomieswithatleastsevenmonthsofdatapost-reopeningconditionsforaninvestmentcyclerecoveryTherearefourfactorsnthecorporatecapexcycleWelookedatauniverseofnon-financialcorporatesconsistingof~10,000manufacturingand~11,000servicescompanies3andcomparedthedebt/equityratiosacrossthesefirms.CompaniesintheservicessectorinIndiacontinuedtoincreasedebtontheirbookspostGFCuntilthenonperformingassetsNPAcrisisthatfollowedinuentyearsDuringthesameperiodmanufacturingcompaniesdeleveragedoonaggregatenowatafteenyearlowBalancesheetstressofthesecompanieshavereducedmaterially,andshouldsetthemupforacapitalexpenditurecyclegoingforward.Source:CMIENovember5Capacityutilizationhasasignicantimpactonxedinvestmentandhistoricalonshipsuggeststhatappincreaseincapacityutilizationincreasesxedinvestmentby1.3%.AccordingtothelatestRBIsurvey,manufacturingcapacitycapacityutilizationtoincreaseasoutputgapsclosefurther,whichshouldpromptfurtherfixedinvestmentincreasebycompanies.DebttoEquityRatioDebtDebttoEquityRatio0.60.6Non-financialManufacturing0.60.6Non-financialManufacturing 0.30.300020072009201120132015201720192021NOTE:*YearsareinFiscalyear.Fiscalyear2021referstoApril2020toMarch2021.Debttoequityratioiscalculatedbydividingaggregatedebtofcompaniesinthesamplebyaggregateshareholder'sequityofthesecompanies.PercentPercent908070605040CapacityUtilization-SA9080706050402010201220142016201020122014201620182020entisfocusedoncapitalexpenditureandinthecurrentscalyeargovernmentcapitalspendingincreasedby25%yoyto2.9%inFY23from2.6%ofGDPrcapitalexpenditurethegovernmentisparticularlyfocusedonroadsonallystateswereallocatedalmostppofGDPturebythegovernmenthasaGDPgrowthmultiplierof2.5X4,andmayhelpcrowdinfurtherprivateinvestment.resolutionthroughthebankruptcyregulation,aswellasconservativelendingpracticesapitaladequacypositionofbanksalongwithhealthyprovisionsforbadloanscanfurthersupportanyfuturecapex-relatedcreditrequirementsofthesystem.inexcessofthe9.5%regulatorynormswhichcouldenablebankstogrowbalanceenthatassetqualityisalreadyecoveringpostCovidweseeadequatecapitalbufferandenoughheadroomtostartalendingcyclein2023,asindustrialcreditdemandrecovers.rkingPaperNovember6%ofNominalGDP%%ofNominalGDP43210RoadsandHighwaysGrossGrossBudgetarySupportforCapitalSpending:RailwaysDefenceTransfertoStatesOtherbudgetarysupport4220162017201820192020202120222023NOTE:Yearsareinfiscalyears.FY2023runsfromApril2022toMarch2023.BeforeFY16,transfertostatesiscapturedinotherbudgetarysupportPercentPPercent25205050TierTier1CapitalRatio*:Pre-GFC(FY07)Pre-'tapertantrum'(FY13)Pre-NPApeakinIndia(FY17)Current(2QFY23)252050KotakICICIHDFCAxisStateBankofIndiaNOTE:YearsareinFiscalyear.Fiscalyear2023referstoApril2022toMarch2023.NPAstandsfornon-performingassets.*Tier1capitalratioreferstosharecapitalandothercorereservesasaproportionoftherisk-weightedassetsofabank,andisusedasafairrepresentationofbalancesheetstrengthandtheabilitytocoverloanlosses.Thesefavorableconditionsarelikelytoaidinvestmentgrowthoverthenextseveralyears.However,inthenear-term,asglobalgrowthweakensandtheimpactofmonetarytighteningplaysout,weexpectinvestmentgrowthtobottom-outin1H2023at+1.4%qoqsavsqoqsainHandrecoverinHto.3%qoqsa.Overall,weestimateinvestmenttocontribute2.4ppto5.9%yoyGDPgrowthover2023.AtaleoftwohalvesPuttogetherweexpectGDPgrowthtobelacklusterin1H2023andpickupin2H2023,oqsaaraverageinHvsgrowthdragof2.2ppfromnetexportsin2H2023comparedtoadragof3.0ppin1HPercent,yoyPercent,yoy25-25-35ForeForecastNetExports DomesticDemandRealGDPGrowth255-25-35Jan-20Oct-20Jul-21Apr-22Jan-23Oct-23Thepandemichasuncoveredthefragilityofsupplychainsacrosstheworld,firstforpharmaproducts,telecom,electronics,andcars,andthereafterfornecessitieslikefood5Averageof1H2023seasonallyadjustedsequentialgrowthNovember7lcompaniesarelikelytoredrawtheirsupplychainsformoreufacturingDuetogeopoliticaltensionsbetweentheUSandmsarealsolookingatnewdestinationsforapotentiallyattractiveconsumermarketoverthelongterm,afavorablebackdropforPMModi’s“MakeinIndia”initiative.ThebiggestopportunityforIndiatospureconomicgrowthandjobcreationinthisdecade,istodevelopgloballycompetitivemanufacturinghubsastheworldrestructureswindowislikelygoingtobelargestinthenextseveralyearsasmanufacturinglocations).IfIndiaisabletocapitalizeonthisopportunity,itwillbeabletofglobalinboundmanufacturingFDIPLIschemeisintendedtoencouragemanufacturingthroughexportsubsidies.Witharound1%ofGDPinincentivesunderthePLIschemes,ndeventuallyacturinghubcapableofexportinghighdomesticvalueaddedgoodsHowever,toreallybecomeamanufacturingpowerhousewillrequireacoordinatedstrategyacrossallrelatedgovernmentdepartmentstotrulymakeiteasyforglobalmanufacturingtosetupshopsinIndia.Overthemediumterm,ifIndiacancontinueeconomicreform,ithasagoldenopportunitytoattractforeigninvestmentandboostpotentialgrowthbeyondthe6%weestimatecurrently.efoodinedrelativelymutedExhibitonthebackofactiveinterventionbythegovernment(Exhibit9).Thecentralgovernmentundertooktwomainmeasurestoabsorbthecommoditysupplyshockwhichfollowedthepandemicshock:aIncreasedfoodsubsidybyINRtn(0.5%ofGDP)fromthebudgetestimateofINR2.1tn(0.8%ofGDP)anddistributedatotalof20.2mntonsofriceand12.2mntonsofwheatsinceMarch2022underthepublicdistributionsystematsubsidizedprices.ofGDPfromthebudgetestimateofarrestingpass-throughoffarminputcoststofoodinflation(Exhibit11).ThecombinedeffectofthiswasthatfoodpricesinIndiaremainedcontainedrelativetomostothercountries.IndiaIndia:November845352555-545352555-5Food45352555-545352555-5FoodInflationtemWeightinCPIateMeasuresFoodce4.4Sep9,2022Restrictedexportsandimposedexportdutyof20%oncertainkindsofrice.EdibleOil2.9May24,2022Exemptedcustomsdutyandagricultureinfrastructuredevelopmentcessonimportofcrudesoyabeanandsunfloweroilupto2mntonnesperannum.Reducedbasiccustomsdutyoncrudepalmoilto10%.Wheat2.6May13,2022ProhibitedexportsofallkindsofwheatAug27,2022ProhibitedexportsofcertainkindsofwheatflourandrelateditemsSugarJun1,2022Restrictedsugarexportsto10mntonnes(13%ofpreviousyearexports)inthecurrentmarketingyearwhichendsinSeptemeber.Oct31,2022ExtendedtherestrictionsuptoOct31,2023.OthersPetrolandDiesel2.3May21,2022ExcisetaxcutofRs8perlitreonpetrolandRs6perlitreondiesel.CookingGasMay21,2022AnnouncedasubsidyofINR200/cylinderofcookinggastoeligiblebenficiariesunderthegovernment'saffordablecookingfuelprogram(UjjwalaYojna)Iron,steelandplasticsMay21,2022Waivedimportdutyonkeyrawmaterialsandinputsforthesteelandplasticindustry.Hikedtheexportdutyonironoreto50%from30%andimposeda15%dutyonsteelintermediaries.FertilizersApr27,2022ApprovedasubsidyofINR0.6tnfornutrientbasedfertilizersforkharif(summer)season.Nov2,2022ApprovedasubsidyofINR0.5tnfornutrientbasedfertilizersforrabi(winter)season.Percentchange,yoyPercentPercentchange,yoy806040200-20WheatInflation:IndiaCPIS&PGSCIWheatInflation:IndiaCPIS&PGSCI806040200-202018201920202018201920202021Percentchange,yoyPercentPercentchange,yoyIndiaIndia:Farminputinflation201420152016201720182019202020212022NOTE:Farminputistheweightedaverageofwholesalepricesoffodder,highspeeddiesel,electricity,fertilizers,pesticides,andagricultural&forestrymachinery,weightedbyrespectiveIndiaWPIbasketweights.FoodinflationisbasedonfoodandbeveragesinIndiaCPIbasket.Goingforward,weseesomeupsiderisktocerealsinflationduetoestimateddeclineinproduction,anddepletionofinventories.Similarly,sowingofpulsesinKharif(summer)seasonwas6%lesscomparedtolastyearandislikelytoaffectitsproduction.Further,costsandincidenceofcattlediseasehavealreadyaffectedmilkproductionandledtoanincreaseinmilkprices.Bakinginupsideriskstofoodinflationfromthesecomponents,weforecastfoodinflationat6.5%yoyin1H2023andexpectittodeclineto5.3%yoyin2H2023.Overall,weforecastfoodinflationtobeat5.9%yoyin3.IntwoearlierreportsAugust2021andMarch2022)wehavenotedourconcernsontioninIndiadespiteanegativeoutputgapThiswasdrivenbyourviewonrisingcoregoodsinflation,wherehighcommoditypricesresultininputcostNovember9pressuresformanufacturingfirms,whichpassonthepriceincreasestoretailcustomerswithalag6.saveragedyoyExhibitoverthelasttwofuelpetroldieselgoldandsilverhasdoubledfrompre-pandemictonow(Exhibit13).Thiswasrstdrivenbytheriseincoregoodsinflationfromaround4%yoy(average)nandinbroadlyaswehadexpected.Withcommoditypriceinflationhavingpeakedalready,weexpectcoregoodsinationtopeakinQ42022andstartdecliningin2023(Exhibit14).PercentagePoints8765432PercentagePoints876543210GoldandSilverRBICore^YoYContributions:CoreGoldandSilverRBICore^YoYContributions:CoreGoodsPetrolandDieselRBICoreCoreServicesJan-19Jun-19Nov-19Apr-20Sep-20Feb-21Jul-21Dec-21May-22Oct-22NOTE:RBIcoreinflationreferstoheadlineinflationexcludingfood,fuelandlight,butincludespetrolanddiesel(undertransportationinflation).Fuelinflationreferstocookingfuel,gasandkerosene.876543210Percentchange,yoyPercentPercentchange,yoy86420ConsumerpriceIndexConsumerpriceIndex:HeadlineCPICoreexPDGS^8642020152016201720182019202020212022^CoreexPDGSinflationisheadlineinflationexcludingfood,fuel,petrol,diesel,goldandsilverinflation.*Shadedareadenotestheofficialinflationtargetof4%+/-2%Comparatively,servicesinflation,whichismorerepresentativeofwagesanddemandbleaveragingyoyinHowevermonthscoreserviceshasincreasedbypptoyoyWeexpectcoreservicestoincreasefurtherExhibitasoutputgapscloseandinationexpectationsgetentrenched.Overall,wecontinuetoseeupsideriskstocoreservicesinflationwhiletherisksaroundallheadlineRBIcoreinationatyoyandfuelinationat5%yoy(Exhibit15).Ourcoregoodsinflationmodelestimatesthatall-elseconstant,a1ppchangeinWPInon-foodmanufacturinginflationimpactscoregoodsinflationbyalmostone-fourthppwithatwo-quarterlagRBICoreinationHeadlineinationexcludingfoodfuelandlightFuelinflation:cookingfuel,gasandkeroseneRBIcoreinflationincludespetrolanddiesel(undertransportationinflation).WeightinCPIbasket:Food-45.9%;CoreGoods-20.7%;Coreservices-23.0%;Fuel-6.8%;Petrol,Percentchange,yoyPercentPercentchange,yoy876543210GSGSforecastCoreServicesCoreGoodsConsumerce87654320Mar-20Sep-20Mar-21Sep-21Mar-22Sep-22Mar-23Sep-23NOTE:Shadedareadenotestheofficialinflationtargetof4%+/-2%ntnt9876543210CoreGoodsFoodPDGSForecastCoreServicesFuelCoreGoodsFoodPDGSForecastHeadlineCY22Q1CY22Q2CY22Q3CY22Q4CY23Q1CY23Q2CY23Q3CY23Q4987654320Inourview,theRBIwillbelikelyconfrontedwithfourmainissueswithrespecttothinkingaboutterminalmonetarypolicyasweheadinto2023:a)persistentlyhighIndiacoreCPIinationaround6%,b)Fedfundsrateat5.25%byMay2023,c)aweakstarttogrowthin2023givenfadingpostCovidreopeningboost,andlaggedimpactoftightening,andd)anelevatedcurrentaccountdeficitasglobalgrowthslows.Ourviewofanear-termpeakinthedollarwillgivetheRBImoredegreesoffreedomtooperatemonetarypolicywithoutaggravatingexternalrisks.GivenupsideriskstocoreservicesinflationasconfirmedinthemostrecentinflationdataandIndiarunningnegativerealrateswethinktheRBIislikelytohikethereporateby50bpintheDecember2022policymeeting,followedby35bpintheFebruarymeeting.Weexpectonly35bpofratehikesin2023whichwouldtakethereporatetobyFebruaryIfinationpansoutasperourforecastsandreach5.3%yoyaveragebyQweforecasttheRBItocutthepolicyreporateby25bpinQ42023rPercentPercent4policyreporate:FittedTaylorruleActualGSForecast07080910111213141516171819202122232498765432Shadedareadenotes+/-1standarddeviationbandsWithrecentdivergenceinviewsamongMPCmembers,wedon’tthinkfurtherpolicytighteningwillbeaconsensusdecisionTwoexternalMPCmembershaveadvocatedapauseortaperingofhikesattheDecembermeetingastheyrecommendedseeingtheimpactofpasttighteningontheeconomybeforefurthermonetarypolicyaction.WeexpectexternalMPCmemberstodissentattheDecemberandFebruarymeetings,butexpecttheMPCmembersfromtheRBItocontinueonthehikingpath,givenpersistentcoreinflationpressure.kingsystemliquidityisamonetarypolicytoolShortendrateshavetightenedandyieldcurveshaveflattenedwithrisingpolicyratesreducingliquiditysurplusesaswehavewrittenearlieratheweightedaveragecallceededthereporatetotradeneartheupperendofthepolicycorridorginalstandingfacilityMSFoverthelastmonthExhibitbtheAAAcorporatebondtermpremium,measuredasthedifferencebetweenyieldsontherExhibitPercentPPercentPolicyPolicyrateWeightedaveragecallmoneyrateJan-19Oct-19Jul-20Apr-21Jan-22Oct-22NOTE:Theshadedarearepresentsthepolicycorridor,wheretheupperendrepresentstheMSFandthelowerendrepresentstheReverseRepoorSDFrate.Thecorridorwasincreasedduringthepandemic.Weightedaveragecallmoneyrateistheeffectiverate.PercentPePercent.00.50.0-0.5SlopeofIndianinterestratecurves^:AAAAAANBFCOffshoreOISGSecAug-21Nov-21Feb-22May-22Aug-22Nov-.00.50.0-0.5^Differencebetweenmonthlyaverageoftheyieldson5yearand1yeartenuresforeachcategory.IftheRBIkeepsthesystemliquiditytightsuchthatovernightratestradeclosetotheMSFthenitcouldeffectivelydelivera110bphike(85bpfromrepo+25bpfromliquiditytightening)overthenextfewmonths,evenasithikesthereporatebyonly85bp.Thefiscalpolicyresponseofthegovernmenthasservedtwopurposesinthiscycle,asgthefoodpriceshocksfortheaffected2)Itprovidedacountercyclicalgrowthstimulusthroughhighercapitalexpenditure,duringthepandemic(refertoExhibit6).Thiswaspossibleastaxcollectionsthisyearhavesurprisedaheadofbudgetestimates(Exhibit19),effortstoimplementtaxreforms(GST)andformalizationoftheeconomydthegovernmentabsorbtheadditionalsubsidyexpenditure,withoutanymaterialdeteriorationinthefiscalbalances,inourview(Exhibit19).%ofNominalGDP%%ofNominalGDP32109TaxesTaxesinFY23**:Buoyancyeffect^GDPgrowtheffect^^9BudgetIncomeTaxCorporateTaxGSTCustomsGSEstimates*Estimates**GDPforFY23isasperGSestimates.**FY23runsfromApril2022toMarch2023.^Buoyancyeffectreferstotheupside/downsidetotaxesfromhigher/lowerGStaxbuoyancyestimatescomparedtobudgetestimates.^^GDPgrowtheffectreferstoupsidetotaxesfromhigherGSnominalGDPgrowthestimatescomparedtobudgetestimates.%ofNominalGDP%%ofNominalGDP432109AdditionalexpenditureinFY239BudgetEstimatesFoodFertilizeBudgetEstimatesFoodFertilizerPetroleumrevenueexpNOTE:FY23runsfromApril2022toMarch2023.GDPforFY23isasperGSestimates.ervebufferinthepastseveralyears,whichin2022sofarhasgiventheRBIcomforttocarryoutFXinterventionsandprevental