博弈论英文文献

Qualitycontrolgamemodelinlogisticsservicesupplychainbasedondifferentcombinationsofriskattitude

基于不同风险态度组合的物流服务供应链质量控制博弈WeihuaLiu,YijiaWangProductionEconomics2015ArticlestructureIntroductionLiteraturereviewThebasicsofthemodelQualitycoordinationwithriskattitudesNumericalanalysisConclusionsandmangagementimplimentIntroduction&Literaturereview

Whatkindofriskattitudecombinationisreasonable?Whetherthereexistsafeasiblerangefortheriskattitudecombination?Whatkindofriskattitudecombinationcanleadtothebestcoordinationefficiency(i.e.thesmallestsupervisionprobabilityofLSIandthelargestcomplianceprobabilityofFLSP)inLSSC?Inthecaseofriskattitudecombination,isthereanequilibriuminthequalitycontrolgame?QualitycoordinationmodelwithoutriskattitudeLSIFLSPThelogisticscapacitythatLSIrequiresiscompletelyprovidedbyFLSP,andFLSPhastheabilitytocompleteLSI'soutsourcedtasks.FLSP'seffortleveldeterminesitsservicequality,anditsservicequalitydirectlydeterminesthetotalrevenueofLSSC.SomeimportantassumptionsAssumption1.FLSPprovideslogisticsservicestoLSI.Assumption2.AnFLSPcooperatingwithLSIhastwochoices:complyingwithornotcomplyingwiththecontract.Assumption3.LSIalsohastwochoices:superviseornot.Assumption4.WeassumethatLSIprovidesamixedpaymentcontracttoFLSP.TherevenueofFLSPinthecontractcanbedividedintotwoparts.Oneisafixedpayment,andtheotherisaspecificpercentageofLSSC'stotalnetincome.ModelsolvingTheexpectedrevenueofLSIcanbewrittenas：InordertoobtainthemaximumexpectedrevenueofLSI：TheexpectedrevenueofFLSPis：InordertoobtainthemaximumexpectedrevenueofFLSP；QualitycoordinationmodelwithriskattitudesTheriskattitudesofLSIandFLSPwillchangethesupervisionprobabilityofLSI,complianceprobabilityofFLSPandtheexpectedrevenueforboth,sinceLSIandFLSPnowneedconsidermarketrisksinsupplychaincooperation.TheparticipantsofLSSC(suchasLSIorFLSP)areassumedtohaverisklossorgain.LSIFLSPSomeimportantassumptionsAssumption1.Risk-averseattitudewillleadtoriskloss,whereasrisk-seekingattitudewillleadtoriskgain.risk-averseriskattitudeispositiverisk-seekingriskattitudeisnegativeAssumption2.Risklossincreasesasthedegreeofrisk-aversionincreases.Riskgainincreasesasthedegreeofrisk-seekingincreases.Assumption3.GiventhattheparticipantsofLSSCinteractwitheachother,riskgain(loss)dependsonboththeparticipant'sownriskattitudeandotherLSSCpartners'riskattitude.Revenueincreaseswithincrea-singdegreeofparticipant'ownrisk-seekingaswellasothermembers'risk-seekingAssumption4.Thevalueofriskloss(gain)isrelatedtotheexternalenvironment.Assumption5.TherevenueofLSIisdeterminedbythetotalincomeandsupervisioncost.Therefore,thechangeinloss(gain)ofLSIisrelatedto.Similarly,thechangeinloss(gain)ofFLSPisrelatedtoAssumption6.Becausetheriskloss(gain)iscomefromthecooperation,theriskloss(gain)ofLSIandFLSParebothrelatedtoLSI'ssupervisionprobabilityxandFLSP'scomplianceprobabilityy.theexpectedriskrevenuefunctionsofLSItheexpectedriskrevenuefunctionsofFLSP

indicatesexpectedrisklossindicatesexpectedriskincomeWhenriskattitudesareconsidered,theexpectedrevenuefunctionofLSIis；Whenriskattitudesareconsidered,theexpectedrevenuefunctionofFLSPisWhenriskattitudecombinationisconsidered,theoptimalcombinationofLSI'ssupervisionprobabilityandFLSP'scompli-anceprobabilityisThefigureshowsfourintersections,namely,Impactsofriskattitudecombinationsonthesupervision

probabilityandcomplianceprobabilityNumericalanalysis(-0.5,0.02)(-0.5,0.40)