企业并购外文翻译-并购基础知识：一切你需要知道的节选

3200单词，1.7万英文字符，5300汉字出处：DonaldDePamphilis.Mergersandacquisitionsbasics:AllyouneedtoknowAmerica:AcademicPress.Oct,2010,P1-10外文文献MergersandAcquisitionsBasics:AllYouNeedToKnowDonaldDePamphilisIntroductiontoMergersandAcquisitionsThefirstdecadeofthenewmillenniumheraldedaneraofglobalmega-mergers.Likethemergersandacquisitions(M&As)frenzyofthe1980sand1990s,severalfactorsfueledactivitythroughmid-2007:readilyavailablecredit,historicallylowinterestrates,risingequitymarkets,technologicalchange,globalcompetition,andindustryconsolidation.Intermsofdollarvolume,M&Atransactionsreachedarecordlevelworldwidein2007.Butextendedturbulenceintheglobalcreditmarketssoonfollowed.ThespeculativehousingbubbleintheUnitedStatesandelsewhere,largelyfinancedbydebt,burstduringthesecondhalfoftheyear.Banks,concernedaboutthevalueofmanyoftheirownassets,becameexceedinglyselectiveandlargelywithdrewfromfinancingthehighlyleveragedtransactionsthathadbecomecommonplacethepreviousyear.ThequalityofassetsheldbybanksthroughoutEuropeandAsiaalsobecamesuspect,reflectingtheglobalnatureofthecreditmarkets.Ascreditdriedup,amalaisespreadworldwideinthemarketforhighlyleveragedM&Atransactions.By2008,acombinationofrecordhighoilpricesandareducedavailabilityofcreditsentmostoftheworld,seconomiesintorecession,reducingglobalM&Aactivitybymorethanone-thirdfromitsprevioushigh.Thisglobalrecessiondeepenedduringthefirsthalfof2009-despiteadramaticdropinenergypricesandhighlystimulativemonetaryandfiscalpolicies-extendingtheslumpinM&Aactivity.Inrecentyears,governmentsworldwidehaveintervenedaggressivelyinglobalcreditmarkets(aswellasinmanufacturingandothersectorsoftheeconomy)inanefforttorestorebusinessandconsumerconfidence,restorecreditmarketfunctioning,andoffsetdeflationarypressures.Whatimpacthavesuchactionshadonmergersandacquisitions?Itistooearlytotell,buttheimplicationsmaybesignificant.M&Asareanimportantmeansoftransferringresourcestowheretheyaremostneededandofremovingunderperformingmanagers.Governmentdecisionstosavesomefirmswhileallowingotherstofailarelikelytodisruptthisprocess.Suchdecisionsareoftenbasedonthenotionthatsomefirmsaresimplytoobigtofailbecauseoftheirpotentialimpactontheeconomy—considerAIGintheUnitedStates.Othersareclearlymotivatedbypolitics.Suchactionsdisruptthesmoothfunctioningofmarkets,whichrewardsgooddecisionsandpenalizespoorones.Allowingabusinesstobelievethatitcanachieveasize—toobigtofhil”maycreateperverseincentives.Plus,thereisverylittlehistoricalevidencethatgovernmentsarebetterthanmarketsatdecidingwhoshouldfailandwhoshouldsurvive.Inthischapter,youwillgainanunderstandingoftheunderlyingdynamicsofM&Asinthecontextofanincreasinglyinterconnectedworld.ThechapterbeginswithadiscussionofM&Asaschangeagentsinthecontextofcorporaterestructuring.ThefocusisonM&Asandwhytheyhappen,withbriefconsiderationgiventoalternativewaysofincreasingshareholdervalue.Youwillalsobeintroducedtoavarietyoflegalstructuresandstrategiesthatareemployedtorestructurecorporations.Throughoutthisbook,afirmthatattemptstoacquireormergewithanothercompanyiscalledanacquiringcompany,acquirer,orbidder.Thetargetcompanyortargetisthefirmbeingsolicitedbytheacquiringcompany.Takeoversorbuyoutsaregenerictermsforachangeinthecontrollingownershipinterestofacorporation.Wordsinbolditalicsaretheonesmostimportantforyoutounderstandfully;theyareallincludedinaglossaryattheendofthebook.MergersandAcquisitionsasChangeAgentsBusinessescomeandgoinacontinuingchurn,perhapsbestillustratedbytheever-changingcompositionoftheso-calledFortune500—the500largestU.S.corporations.Only70ofthefirmsontheoriginal1955listof500areontoday,slist,andsome2,000firmshaveappearedonthelistatonetimeoranother.Mosthavedroppedoffthelisteitherthroughmerger,acquisition,bankruptcy,downsizing,orsomeotherformofcorporaterestructuring.Considerafewexamples:Chrysler,BethlehemSteel,ScottPaper,Zenith,Rubbermaid,WarnerLambert.Thepopularmediatendstousethetermcorporaterestructuringtodescribeactionstakentoexpandorcontractafirm,sbasicoperationsorfundamentallychangeitsassetorfinancialstructure.SynergySynergyistherathersimplisticnotionthattwo(ormore)businessesincombinationwillcreategreatershareholdervaluethaniftheyareoperatedseparately.Itmaybemeasuredastheincrementalcashflowthatcanberealizedthroughcombinationinexcessofwhatwouldberealizedwerethefirmstoremainseparate.Therearetwobasictypesofsynergy:operatingandfinancial.OperatingSynergy(EconomiesofScaleandScope)Operatingsynergycomprisesbotheconomiesofscaleandeconomiesofscope,whichcanbeimportantdeterminantsofshareholderwealthcreation.Gainsinefficiencycancomefromeitherfactorandfromimprovedmanagerialpractices.Spreadingfixedcostsoverincreasingproductionlevelsrealizeseconomiesofscale,withscaledefinedbysuchfixedcostsasdepreciationofequipmentandamortizationofcapitalizedsoftware;normalmaintenancespending;obligationssuchasinterestexpense,leasepayments,andlong-termunion,customer,andvendorcontracts;andtaxes.Thesecostsarefixednthattheycannotbealteredintheshortrun.Bycontrast,variablecostsarethosethatchangewithoutputlevels.Consequently,foragivenscaleoramountoffixedexpenses,thedollarvalueoffixedexpensesperunitofoutputandperdollarofrevenuedecreasesasoutputandsalesincrease.Toillustratethepotentialprofitimprovementfromeconomiesofscale,let,sconsideranautomobileplantthatcanassemble10carsperhourandrunsaroundtheclock-whichmeanstheplantproduces240carsperday.Theplant,sfixedexpensesperdayare$1million,sotheaveragefixedcostpercarproducedis$4,167(i.e.,$1,000,000/240).Nowimagineanimprovedassemblylinethatallowstheplanttoassemble20carsperhour,or480perday.Theaveragefixedcostpercarperdayfallsto$2,083(i.e.,$1,000,000/480).Ifvariablecosts(e.g.,directlabor)percardonotincrease,andthesellingpricepercarremainsthesameforeachcar,theprofitimprovementpercarduetothedeclineinaveragefixedcostspercarperdayis$2,084(i.e.,$4,167-$2,083).Afirmwithhighfixedcostsasapercentageoftotalcostswillhavegreaterearningsvariabilitythanonewithalowerratiooffixedtototalcosts.Let,sconsidertwofirmswithannualrevenuesof$1billionandoperatingprofitsof$50million.Thefixedcostsatthefirstfirmrepresent100percentoftotalcosts,butatthesecondfixedcostsareonlyhalfofallcosts.Ifrevenuesatbothfirmsincreasedby$50million,thefirstfirmwouldseeincomeincreaseto$100million,preciselybecauseallofitscostsarefixed.Incomeatthesecondfirmwouldriseonlyto$75million,becausehalfofthe$50millionincreasedrevenuewouldhavetogotopayforincreasedvariablecosts.Usingaspecificsetofskillsoranassetcurrentlyemployedtoproduceagivenproductorservicetoproducesomethingelserealizeseconomiesofscope,whicharefoundmostoftenwhenitischeapertocombinemultipleproductlinesinonefirmthantoproducetheminseparatefirms.Procter&Gamble,theconsumerproductsgiant,usesitshighlyregardedconsumermarketingskillstosellafullrangeofpersonalcareaswellaspharmaceuticalproducts.Hondaknowshowtoenhanceinternalcombustionengines,soinadditiontocars,thefirmdevelopsmotorcycles,lawnmowers,andsnowblowers.SequentTechnologyletscustomersrunapplicationsonUNIXandNToperatingsystemsonasinglecomputersystem.Citigroupusesthesamecomputercentertoprocessloanapplications,deposits,trustservices,andmutualfundaccountsforitsbank,scustomers.Eachisanexampleofeconomiesofscope,whereafirmisapplyingaspecificsetofskillsorassetstoproduceorsellmultipleproducts,thusgeneratingmorerevenue.FinancialSynergy(LoweringtheCostofCapital)Financialsynergyreferstotheimpactofmergersandacquisitionsonthecostofcapitaloftheacquiringfirmornewlyformedfirmresultingfromamergeroracquisition.Thecostofcapitalistheminimumreturnrequiredbyinvestorsandlenderstoinducethemtobuyafirm,sstockortolendtothefirm.Intheory,thecostofcapitalcouldbereducedifthemergedfirmshavecashflowsthatdonotmoveupanddownintandem(i.e.,so-calledco-insurance),realizefinancialeconomiesofscalefromlowersecuritiesissuanceandtransactionscosts,orresultinabettermatchingofinvestmentopportunitieswithinternallygeneratedfunds.Combiningafirmthathasexcesscashflowswithonewhoseinternallygeneratedcashflowisinsufficienttofunditsinvestmentopportunitiesmayalsoresultinalowercostofborrowing.Afirminamatureindustryexperiencingslowinggrowthmayproducecashflowswellinexcessofavailableinvestmentopportunities.Anotherfirminahigh-growthindustrymaynothaveenoughcashtorealizeitsinvestmentopportunities.Reflectingtheirdifferentgrowthratesandrisklevels,thefirminthematureindustrymayhavealowercostofcapitalthantheoneinthehigh-growthindustry,andcombiningthetwofirmscouldlowertheaveragecostofcapitalofthecombinedfirms.DiversificationBuyingfirmsoutsideacompany,scurrentprimarylinesofbusinessiscalleddiversification,andistypicallyjustifiedinoneoftwoways.Diversificationmaycreatefinancialsynergythatreducesthecostofcapital,oritmayallowafirmtoshiftitscoreproductlinesormarketsintoonesthathavehighergrowthprospects,evenonesthatareunrelatedtothefirm,scurrentproductsormarkets.Theextenttowhichdiversificationisunrelatedtoanacquirer,scurrentlinesofbusinesscanhavesignificantimplicationsforhoweffectivemanagementisinoperatingthecombinedfirms.Afirmfacingslowergrowthinitscurrentmarketsmaybeabletoaccelerategrowththroughrelateddiversificationbysellingitscurrentproductsinnewmarketsthataresomewhatunfamiliarand,therefore,morrisky.SuchwasthecasewhenpharmaceuticalgiantJohnson&JohnsonannounceditsultimatelyunsuccessfultakeoverattemptofGuidantCorporationinlate2004.J&Jwasseekinganentrypointforitsmedicaldevicesbusinessinthefast-growingmarketforimplantabledevices,inwhichitdidnotthenparticipate.Afirmmayattempttoachievehighergrowthratesbydevelopingoracquiringnewproductswithwhichitisrelativelyunfamiliarandthensellingtheminfamiliarandlessriskycurrentmarkets.RetailerJCPenney,sacquisitionoftheEckerdDrugstorechainorJ&J,s$16billionacquisitionofPfizer,sconsumerhealthcareproductslinein2006aretwoexamplesofrelateddiversification.Ineachinstance,thefirmassumedadditionalrisk,butlesssothanunrelateddiversificationifithaddevelopednewproductsforsaleinnewmarkets.Thereisconsiderableevidencethatinvestorsdonotbenefitfromunrelateddiversification.Firmsthatoperateinanumberoflargelyunrelatedindustries,suchasGeneralElectric,arecalledconglomerates.Thesharepricesofconglomeratesoftentradeatadiscount-asmuchas10to15percent-comparedtosharesoffocusedfirmsortotheirvalueweretheybrokenup.Thisdiscountiscalledtheconglomeratediscountordiversificationdiscount.Investorsoftenperceivecompaniesdiversifiedinunrelatedareas(i.e.,thoseindifferentstandardindustrialclassifications)asriskierbecause managementhas difficultyunderstandingthesecompaniesandoftenfailstoprovidefullfundingforthemostattractiveinvestmentopportunities.Moreover,outsideinvestorsmayhaveadifficulttimeunderstandinghowtovaluethevariouspartsofhighlydiversifiedbusinesses.Researchersdifferonwhethertheconglomeratediscountisoverstated.Still,althoughtheevidencesuggeststhatfirmspursuingamorefocusedcorporatestrategyarelikelytoperformbest,therearealwaysexceptions.StrategicRealignmentThestrategicrealignmenttheorysuggeststhatfirmsuseM&Astomakerapidadjustmentstochangesintheirexternalenvironments.Althoughchangecancomefrommanydifferentsources,thistheoryconsidersonlychangesintheregulatoryenvironmentandtechnologicalinnovation-twofactorsthat,overthepast20years,havebeenmajorforcesincreatingnewopportunitiesforgrowth,andthreatening,ormakingobsolete,firms’primarylinesofbusiness.RegulatoryChangeThoseindustriesthathavebeensubjecttosignificantderegulationinrecent years—financialservices,healthcare,utilities,media,telecommunications,defense-havebeenatthecenterofM&Aactivitybecausederegulationbreaksdownartificialbarriersandstimulatescompetition.Duringthefirsthalfofthe1990s,forinstance,theU.S.DepartmentofDefenseactivelyencouragedconsolidationofthenation'smajordefensecontractorstoimprovetheiroveralloperatingefficiency.Utilitiesnowrequiredinsomestatestosellpowertocompetitorsthatcanresellthepowerintheutility,sownmarketplacerespondwithM&Astoachievegreateroperatingefficiency.CommercialbanksthathavemovedbeyondtheirhistoricalroleofacceptingdepositsandgrantingloansaremergingwithsecuritiesfirmsandinsurancecompaniesthankstotheFinancialServicesModernizationActof1999,whichrepealedlegislationdatingbacktotheGreatDepression.TheCiticorp-Travelersmergerayearearlieranticipatedthischange,anditisprobablethattheirrepresentativeswerelobbyingforthenewlegislation.Thefinalchapterhasyettobewritten:thistrendtowardhugefinancialservicescompaniesmayyetbestymiedbynewregulationpassedin2010inresponsetoexcessiverisktaking.Thetelecommunicationsindustryoffersastrikingillustration.Historically,localandlong-distancephonecompanieswerenotallowedtocompeteagainsteachother,andcablecompanieswereessentiallymonopolies.SincetheTelecommunicationsActof1996,localandlong-distancecompaniesareactivelyencouragedtocompeteineachother,smarkets,andcablecompaniesareofferingbothInternetaccessandlocaltelephoneservice.Whenafederalappealscourtin2002struckdownaFederalCommunicationsCommissionregulationprohibitingacompanyfromowningacabletelevisionsystemandabroadcastTVstationinthesamecity,andthrewouttherulethatbarredacompanyfromowningTVstationsthatreachmorethan35percentofU.S.households,itencouragednewcombinationsamongthelargestmediacompaniesorpurchasesofsmallerbroadcasters.TechnologicalChangeTechnologicaladvancescreatenewproductsandindustries.Thedevelopmentoftheairplanecreatedthepassengerairline,avionics,andsatelliteindustries.Theemergenceofsatellitedeliveryofcablenetworkstoregionalandlocalstationsignitedexplosivegrowthinthecableindustry.Today,withtheexpansionofbroadbandtechnology,wearewitnessingtheconvergenceofvoice,data,andvideotechnologiesontheInternet.TheemergenceofdigitalcameratechnologyhasreduceddramaticallythedemandforanalogcamerasandfilmandsenthouseholdnamessuchasKodakandPolaroidscramblingtoadapt.Thegrowthofsatelliteradioisincreasingitsshareoftheradioadvertisingmarketattheexpenseoftraditionalradiostations.Smaller,morenimbleplayersexhibitspeedandcreativitymanylarger,morebureaucraticfirmscannotachieve.Withengineeringtalentofteninshortsupplyandproductlifecyclesshortening,theselargerfirmsmaynothavetheluxuryoftimeortheresourcestoinnovate.So,theymaylooktoM&Asasafastandsometimeslessexpensivewaytoacquirenewtechnologiesandproprietaryknow-howtofillgapsintheircurrentproductportfoliosortoenterentirelynewbusinesses.Acquiringtechnologiescanalsobeadefensiveweapontokeepimportantnewtechnologiesoutofthehandsofcompetitors.In2006,eBayacquiredSkypeTechnologies,theInternetphoneprovider,for$3.1billionincash,stock,andperformancepayments,hopingthatthemovewouldboosttradingonitsonlineauctionsiteandlimitcompetitors,accesstothenewtechnology.BySeptember2009,eBayhadtoadmitthatithadbeenunabletorealizethebenefitsofowningSkypeandwassellingthebusinesstoaprivateinvestorgroupfor$2.75billion.Hubrisandthe“Winner’sCurse”Managerssometimesbelievethattheirownvaluationofatargetfirmissuperiortothemarket,svaluation.Thus,theacquiringcompanytendstooverpayforthetarget,havingbeenoveroptimisticwhenevaluatingsynergies.Competitionamongbiddersalsoislikelytoresultinthewinneroverpayingbecauseofhubrisevenifsignificantsynergiesarepresent.Inanauctionenvironmentwithbidders,therangeofbidsforatargetcompanyislikelytobequitewide,becauseseniormanagerstendtobeverycompetitiveandsometimesself-important.Theirdesirenottolosecandrivethepurchasepriceofanacquisitionwellinexcessofitsactualeconomicvalue(i.e.,cash-generatingcapability).Thewinnerpaysmorethanthecompanyisworthandmayultimatelyfeelremorseathavingdoneso-hencewhathascometobecalledthewinner'scurseBuyingUndervaluedAssets(TheQ-Ratio)Theq-ratioistheratioofthemarketvalueoftheacquiringfirm’sstocktothereplacementcostofitsassets.Firmsinterestedinexpansioncanchoosetoinvestinnewplantsandequipmentorobtaintheassetsbyacquiringacompanywithamarketvaluelessthanwhatitwouldcosttoreplacetheassets(i.e.,q-ratiov1).ThistheorywasveryusefulinexplainingM&Aactivityduringthe1970s,whenhighinflationandinterestratesdepressedstockpriceswellbelowthebookvalueofmanyfirms.Highinflationalsocausedthereplacementcostofassetstobemuchhigherthanthebookvalueofassets.Bookvaluereferstothevalueofassetslistedonafirm,sbalancesheetandgenerallyreflectsthehistoricalcostofacquiringsuchassetsratherthantheircurrentcost.WhengasolinerefinerValeroEnergyCorp.acquiredPremcorInc.in2005,the$8billiontransactioncreatedthelargestrefinerinNorthAmerica.Itwouldhavecostanestimated40percentmoreforValerotobuildanewrefinerywithequivalentcapacity.Mismanagement(AgencyProblems)Agencyproblemsarisewhenthereisadifferencebetweentheinterestsofincumbentmanagers(i.e.,thosecurrentlymanagingthefirm)andthefirm'sshareholders.Thishappenswhenmanagementownsasmallfractionoftheoutstandingsharesofthefirm.Thesemanagers,whoserveasagentsoftheshareholder,maybemoreinclinedtofocusontheirownjobsecurityandlavishlifestylesthanonmaximizingshareholdervalue.Whenthesharesofacompanyarewidelyheld,thecostofsuchmismanagementisspreadacrossalargenumberofshareholders,eachofwhombearsonlyasmallportion.Thisallowsfortolerationofthemismanagementoverlongperiods.Mergersoftentakeplacetocorrectsituationsinwhichthereisaseparationbetweenwhatmanagersandowners(shareholders)want.Lowstockpricesputpressureonmanagerstotakeactionstoraisethesharepriceorbecomethetargetofacquirers,whoperceivethestocktobeundervaluedandwhoareusuallyintentonremovingtheunderperformingmanagementofthetargetfirm.Agencyproblemsalsocontributetomanagement-initiatedbuyouts,particularlywhenmanagersandshareholdersdisagreeoverhowexcesscashflowshouldbeused.Managersmayhaveaccesstoinformationnotreadilyavailabletoshareholdersandmaythereforebeabletoconvincelenderstoprovidefundstobuyoutshareholdersandconcentrateownershipinthehandsofmanagement.中文翻译并购基础知识：一切你需要知道的DonaldDePamphilis介绍合并和收购新千年的第一个十年,预示着全球大规模并购时代的到来。如同在20世纪80年代和90年代的并购狂热，有几个因素推动着这一活动持续至2007年中期：容易获得信贷，利率处于历史低位，股市兴起，技术变革，全球竞争和行业整合。在成交金额方面，2007年在全球范围内并购交易达到创纪录的水平。但是，持续的全球信贷市场动荡随后而来。今年下半年，在美国和其他地方，主要依靠债务融资的投机性住房泡沫破灭。银行由于担心自己的多种资产价值，变的非常有选择性，基本上取消了高杠杆交易的融资，而前一年此融资行为已经司空见惯。银行在欧洲和亚洲持有的资产的质量也开始遭到质疑。反映了信贷市场的全球性质。由于信贷枯竭，萎靡不振蔓延在全球高杠杆的并购交易的市场中。到2008年，创纪录的高油价和减少信贷供应量让世界上大多数国家的经济陷入了衰退，全球并购活动从以前的高量减少了三分之一以上。在2009年上半年，尽管能源价格大幅下降以及高刺激性的货币和财政政策出台，全球衰退更加严重，使得并购活动持续低迷。近年来，世界各国政府已积极介入全球信贷市场（以及在制造业和其他经济领域），努力恢复行业和消费者信心，恢复信贷市场的运作，并抵消通缩压力。这些措施对并购有什么影响，尚言之过早，但其影响可能是显着的。并购是一种将资源转移到最需要的地方以及去除表现不佳的经理人的重要的手段。然而政府决定拯救一些企业，同时允许一些企业破产可能会破坏这一过程。这样的决定往往是基于一些企业仅仅是太大而不能倒闭的观念，因其对美国经济的潜在影响（如美国的AIG）。而其他人显然是出于政治动机。这些措施扰乱市场优胜劣汰的平稳运作。让企业相信，它可以达到“太大而不能倒闭”规模，可能会造成反常的动机。此外，很少有历史证据表明，政府比市场能更好的决定谁应该失败，谁应该生存。在本章中，您将了解在相互联系日益紧密的世界的背景下的并购的基本动态。本章首先讨论了在企业重组背景下并购作为变革推动者的议题。重点是并购活动以及他们发生原因，简要考虑其他增加股东价值的替代方法。还将向您介绍各种用于重组公司的法律结构和策略。在这本书中，一个公司试图收购或与另一家公司合并称为收购公司，收购方或投标方。目标公司或目标公司是被收购公司请求收购的公司。接管或收购是改变控制一家公司的所有权的通用术语。粗体斜体字是你需充分了解的最重要的部分，他们都包含本书结尾部分的词汇表里。企业并购作为变革的推动者各企业你方唱罢我登场，所谓的“财富”500强（美国500家最大公司）的构成变化也许是最好的说明。只有70家在1955年500强名单上的公司仍出现在名单上，大约2000家企业在曾经在名单上出现过。大部分公司通过兼并，收购，破产，裁员，或一些其他形式的企业重组已经不在名单上。例如：克莱斯勒，伯利恒钢铁公司，斯科特纸业，天顶，乐伯美，华纳兰伯特。大众媒体倾向于使用企业重组这个词来描述企业为扩大或缩小企业的基本业务或从根本上改变其资产或金融结构而采取的措施。协同效应协同效应是相当简单的概念，即两个（或更多）企业组合会创造比他们分开经营的更大的股东价值。它可以通过资金流量净增额衡量，资金流量净增额为合并后的资金流量超出独立经营的资金流量的量。有两种基本类型的协同效应：经营性的和财务性的。经营协同效益（规模经济）经营协同效应包括规模经济和范围经济，这是可以为股东创造财富的重要决定因素。效率的提高可以来自任何一个因素以及管理的改善。将固定成本分摊到更大的产量上，则实现规模经济，规模由固定费用界定如设备的折旧，资本化软件的摊销，正常维护费用；其他义务如利息，租赁费，以及长期协会，客户，供应商合同和税收。这些成本是固定的，在短期内不会改变。与此相反，可变成本是指那些随产量变化而变化的成本。因此，对于特定规模和数量的固定成本，每单位产量和每单位收益的固定成本费用随着产量和销售的增加而降低。为了说明从规模经济的潜在利润改善，让我们考虑一个每小时可生产10辆车、且昼夜不停运转的汽车厂，这意味着该工厂每天生产240辆汽车。工厂每天的固定费用是100万美元，因此，生产每辆汽车的平均固定成本为$4,167（即$1,000,000/240）。现在想象一个改进的组装生产线，可以使工厂每小时组装20辆，或每天480辆。每天每车的平均固定成本下降为2083美元（即$1,000,000/480）。如果每车可变成本（如，直接劳工）不增加，每辆汽车的售价相同，由于平均固定成本降低，每天每车的效益增加为2084美元（即，$4,167-$2,083）。固定成本占总成本百分比高的企业将比低的企业将会有更大的盈利变化。让我们考虑年收入10亿美元和年营业利润5000万美元的两家公司。在第一家公司的固定成本占总成本的100%,但在第二家公司的固定费用只占总成本的一半。如果在这两家公司的收入增加了5000万美元，第一家收入将增加到1亿美元，正是因为所有费用都是固定的。在第二家公司的收入将仅增加到7500万美元，因为增加的5000万美元的收入的一半用于支付增加的可变成本。使用特定的技能或现有的资产生产特定产品或服务来生产其他的产品，则实现了范围经济。当在同一公司内综合具备多种生产线比在不同公司生产更为经济时，这种方式最为常见。消费产品生产巨头，宝洁公司，利用其高度重视消费者的营销技巧销售全系列的个人护理产品和医药产品。本田知道如何提升内燃机性能，所以在除了汽车，该公司开发了摩托车，割草机和吹雪机。Sequent科技公司可以使客户在同一电脑系统上运行UNIX和NT操作系统的应用程序。花旗集团使用同一计算机中心处理其银行客户的贷款申请，存款，信托服务，和共同基金帐户。每一个例子都是范围经济，公司使用特定的技能或资产来生产或销售多种产品，从而获得更多的收入。财务协同效应（降低资本成本）财务协同效应是兼并和收购对收购公司或对由兼并或收购而成立的新公司的资本成本的影响。资本成本是促使投资者或借贷方购买公司股票或借款给公司的必要最低回报。从理论上讲，，如果合并后的公司的现金流量未接连上下波动（即，所谓的共同保险），就可以降低资金成本，可从较低有价证券保险和交易成本实现金融规模经济或，或实现投资机会与内部资金之间的更好匹配。存在过多现金流的公司与内部现金流不足以为投资机会融资的公司合并会产生较低的借贷成本。成熟行业内的工资经历缓慢的增长会产生过多的现金流，超过其有效投资机会需求。高速发展的行业内的公司可能不具备足够的现金来捕捉投资机会。考虑到其不同的增长率和风险等级，成熟行业内的公司的资本成本比高速增长行业的低，合并这两个公司会降低合并后公司的平均资本成本。多元化收购本公司主要业务范围外的公司称为多元化，由两种方式之一证明合理的。多元化可能会产生减少资本成本的金融效应或允许公司转变其核心生产线或者市场，从而具备更高增长前景，这些生产线或市场甚至与公司当前产品和市场没有联系。与收购方当前业务范围无关的多元化的范围可明显折射出合并后的公司的运营如何有效的管理。公司在当前市场中发展缓慢，可能会通过相关的多元化在有些陌生的市场中销售新产品加速发展，由此也带来更多风险。2004年制药巨头强生公司宣布其试图收购佳腾公司最终未果，就是这种情形。强生公司为其医疗设备在快速增长的植入设备的市场中寻求切入点，最终未能进入。公司可通过开发或获得其