亚开行-新兴和发展中经济体的气候变化、环境和创新金融概述（英）-2022.12-49正式版

ADBIWorkingPaperSeriesANOVERVIEWONCLIMATECHANGE,ENVIRONMENT,ANDINNOVATIVEFINANCEINEMERGINGANDDEVELOPINGECONOMIESSayuriShiraiNo.1347December2022AsianDevelopmentBankInstituteSayuriShiraiisavisitingfellowandadvisorforsustainablepoliciesattheAsianDevelopmentBankInstituteandaprofessorattheFacultyofPolicyManagement,KeioUniversity.TheviewsexpressedinthispaperaretheviewsoftheauthoranddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsorpoliciesofADBI,ADB,itsBoardofDirectors,orthegovernmentstheyrepresent.ADBIdoesnotguaranteetheaccuracyofthedataincludedinthispaperandacceptsnoresponsibilityforanyconsequencesoftheiruse.TerminologyusedmaynotnecessarilybeconsistentwithADBofficialterms.Discussionpapersaresubjecttoformalrevisionandcorrectionbeforetheyarefinalizedandconsideredpublished.TheWorkingPaperseriesisacontinuationoftheformerlynamedDiscussionPaperseries;thenumberingofthepaperscontinuedwithoutinterruptionorchange.ADBI’sworkingpapersreflectinitialideasonatopicandarepostedonlinefordiscussion.Someworkingpapersmaydevelopintootherformsofpublication.ThispaperbenefitedsignificantlyfrompresentationsmadebythespeakersandassociateddiscussionsrelatedtomypresentationattheADBI–ADBJointConferenceonDevelopmentandInnovativeFinanceheldfrom20–21September2022.Also,thepaperbenefitedfromdiscussionswithseveralexpertsfromtheJapaneseODAanddevelopmentfinanceinstitutionsandassociatedministries.TheAsianDevelopmentBankrefersto“China”asthePeople’sRepublicofChina.Suggestedcitation:Shirai,S.2022.AnOverviewonClimateChange,Environment,andInnovativeFinanceinEmergingandDevelopingEconomies.ADBIWorkingPaper1347.Tokyo:AsianDevelopmentBankInstitute.Available:/10.56506/DRTF8552Pleasecontacttheauthorsforinformationaboutthispaper.Email:sayurishirai@,sshirai@AsianDevelopmentBankInstituteKasumigasekiBuilding,8thFloor3-2-5Kasumigaseki,Chiyoda-kuTokyo100-6008,JapanTel: +81-3-3593-5500Fax: +81-3-3593-5571URL: E-mail: info@©2022AsianDevelopmentBankInstituteADBIWorkingPaper1347 S.ShiraiAbstractTheglobaleconomyhasbeenfacingaseriesofadverseshocksinrecentyearsincludingtheCOVID-19pandemic,climatecrisis,theRussianinvasionofUkraine,highinflation,andinterestrateshocksdrivenbyglobalmonetarypolicynormalization.Thehighcostoffossilfuelssince2021,moreover,hasremindedtheworldthatinvestmentforcleanenergyprojectshasbeenseverelyinadequateduetolimitedimplementationofclimatepoliciesandlimitedcapitalinflowstofinancingdecarbonizationefforts.Whileoverdependenceonfossilfuelsmightbeinevitablecurrently,theworldneedstoacceleratetransitiontocarbonneutralityandalsobegintocopewithnaturecapitalstockandbiodiversitylosses,whicharehappeningatanalarmingpace.Inparticular,morefinancialsupportshouldbeprovidedtoemerginganddevelopingeconomies(EMDEs)tohelpachieveclimateandenvironmentalgoalsandothersustainabledevelopmentgoals(SDGs).ThispapertakesanoverviewofsomeinnovativefinanceschemesapplicabletoEMDEs,includingblendedfinancetomobilizemoreprivatecapitaltoclimateandenvironmentalprojectsanddebt-for-climateswaps(ordebt-for-natureswaps),toprovidedefactograntstosmallhigh-debteconomiesinexchangeforclimateprojects(ornatureprotection).ThepaperalsoprovidessomesuggestionsforfurtheractionsthroughbettercoordinationamongdonorandrecipientnationsledbyG7andG20nations.Keywords:public–privatepartnership;blendedfinance;debt-for-natureswaps;performance-basedgrantsJELClassification:F34,F35,F64,G23ADBIWorkingPaper1347 S.ShiraiContents1.INTRODUCTIONANDOVERVIEWOFRECENTTRENDS11.1TwoImportantGlobalCommonGoals:SDGsandCarbonNeutrality11.2GrowingFocusonNatureStockandBiodiversityLoss21.3FinancialandOfficialDevelopmentAssistance(ODA)FlowstoEmergingandDevelopingEconomies31.4G20InitiativetoCopewithGrowingDebtProblemsinDevelopingEconomies81.5ESGInvestmentandEffectiveUtilizationofPublic–PrivatePartnership11BLENDEDFINANCESCHEMESTOMOBILIZECLIMATEANDENVIRONMENTALPROJECTS132.1DevelopedEconomies’CommitmentonClimateFinance132.2BlendedFinancetoCorrecttheTwoTypesofMarketFailures152.3DefinitionofBlendedFinanceandEligibleProjects162.4BlendedFinance,CreditRating,andQuality172.5MechanismsandTypesofBlendedFinanceSchemes193.ACTUALIMPLEMENTATIONOFBLENDEDFINANCESCHEMES213.1PromotorofBlendedFinance:TheEU,MDBs,andBilateralDevelopmentInstitutions213.2GreenClimateFundEstablishedbytheUNFCCC233.3ExamplesofBlendedFinanceSchemesSupportedbyBilateralDevelopmentInstitutionsandPrivateCapital263.4ExamplesoftheFundofFunds:GlobalEnergyEfficiencyandRenewableFund29PROMOTINGDEBTSWAPS,PERFORMANCE-BASEDFINANCEANDSUSTAINABILITY-LINKEDBONDS 304.1 NatureConservationandDebtSwapsincethe1980s 304.2 ANewEraofNaturalCapitalandDebtSwaps 344.3 Performance-BasedGrantsforDebt-StressedEconomies 364.4 Sustainability-LinkedSovereignDebtHub 38FINALREMARKSANDSUGGESTEDACTIONSFORDONORSTOPROMOTECLIMATEANDENVIRONMENTALFINANCEINEMERGINGANDDEVELOPINGECONOMIES 39REFERENCES 43ADBIWorkingPaper1347 S.ShiraiINTRODUCTIONANDOVERVIEWOFRECENTTRENDSTheglobaleconomyhasbeenfacingaseriesofadverseshocksinrecentyearsincludingtheCOVID-19pandemic,cross-bordersupplychaindisruptions,risingclimatephysicalrisk,theRussianinvasionofUkraine,andenergyandfoodcrises.Theinterestrateshocksdrivenbyglobaltrendsonmonetarypolicynormalizationalsoaddedtodifficultiesacrosstheglobe.Meanwhile,thehighcostoffossilfuelssince2021hasremindedtheworldthatinvestmentforcleanorlowemissionenergyprojectsneededtoachievenet-zerogreenhousegas(GHG)emissionsintheworldinlinewithamaximumtemperatureriseof1.5degreesbytheendofthiscentury(relativetopre-industriallevels)hasbeeninadequateformanyyearsbecauseofalimitedscaleofclimateandenergypoliciesadoptedbybothdevelopedandemerginganddevelopingeconomies(EMDEs).Asaresult,theplanetfacestheclimaterisksposedbyoverdependenceonfossilfuelssuchascoal,whichhasbeenexacerbatedfurtherbytheRussianinvasionofUkraine,reflectingtheshortageofrenewableenergyandsevereshortageof(lesscarbon-intensive)naturalgas.Whileanincreaseinoverdependenceonfossilfuelsmightbeinevitableforsometime,theworldneedstoacceleratetransitionstrategiestothenet-zeroGHGemissionstargetinthenearfuturetocontainanticipatedexcessiveglobalwarming.Thissectiontakesanoverviewofgloballyagreedcommongoals(SDGsandcarbonneutrality),thegrowingfocusonnaturestockandbiodiversitylossissues,andrecentfinanceflows.Moreover,G7andG20initiativestosupportEMDEswillbediscussed.1.1TwoImportantGlobalCommonGoals:SDGsandCarbonNeutralityItisincreasinglyclearthatthetwoimportantinternationalcommongoalspledgedbytheworldin2015arebecomingdifficulttoachievewithoutadditionalactions.OneistheUnitedNationsSDGs—comprising17goalsincludingsustainableeconomicgrowth,climatechangeandconservationoftheenvironment/naturalresources,povertyreductionandinequality,aswellasgenderandhumanrightstobeachievedby2030.TheSDGscovergoalsassociatedwithenergy,climatechange,andotherenvironmentalissues.TheCOVID-19pandemicandtheRussianinvasionofUkrainehaveexacerbatedextremepoverty,inequality,andshortagesofsocialandphysicalinfrastructureintheseeconomies.Oneinfivedevelopingeconomiesisprojectedtoremainbelowitspre-crisis2019levelbytheendof2023inpercapitaincome(UnitedNations2022).Ifthecurrentsituationcontinuesandnoadditionalactionsareadopted,theachievementoftheSDGsatthegloballevelislikelytofallsignificantlybehind,andrefugeesandconflictsarelikelytooccurfrequentlyinmanypartsoftheworld.AnothercommonglobalgoalwastheParisAgreementagreedatthe21stUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC)ConferenceoftheParties(COP26)in2015.COP26decidedonalong-termgoalofreducingGHGemissionsto“wellbelow2degrees”andpreferablyto“1.5degrees”bytheendofthiscentury(comparedtothepre-industriallevels)andthiswasagreedjointlybymembereconomies.TheParisAgreementwassubsequentlysupplementedwiththeSpecialReportonGlobalWarmingof1.5degreespublishedbytheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)in2018.ThereportdemonstratedthatglobalGHGemissions1ADBIWorkingPaper1347 S.Shiraishoulddeclineby45%from2010levelsby2030andreachnetzerobyaround2050accordingtothe1.5degreesmodelpathways(IPCC2018).Theglobalaveragetemperaturehasalreadyreached1.1degrees~1.2degreescomparedtothepre-industriallevels.In2020,GHGemissionsdecreasedtemporarilyduetotheimpactoftheCOVID-19crisisandassociatedlockdownandrestrictionsofmobilityandactivities,butsincethentheyhavestartedtoincreaseagain.Inthefaceofseriousenergyshortagesgloballysince2021andexacerbatedbytheRussianinvasionofUkraine,fossilfuelproductionisexpandingbeyondexpectations,andthusglobalwarmingcontinuesatanacceleratedpace.EnergydemandisexpectedtorisefurtherasthetotalglobalpopulationisexpandingandmanyEMDEsneedreliable,affordable,sustainableenergytosupporttheireconomicgrowth.InEMDEs,domesticpublicresourcesareinsufficienttomeettheinvestmentgapsrequiredtoachievethesegoalsduetothegrowingpublicdebt,repeatedcreditratingdowngrades,andfragileeconomicandsocialconditionsworsenedsincetheCOVID-19pandemic.1.2GrowingFocusonNatureStockandBiodiversityLossAroundtheworld,includingattheG7summit,thereisarapidincreaseinrecognitionthatfocusshouldbeextendedtonaturalcapitalstockandbiodiversitylossbeyondclimatechange.Naturalcapitalstockreferstotheecosystemincludingplants,animals,air,water,soil,minerals,biodiversity,etc.Theservicesthatnaturalcapitalstockprovidestohumanbeingsarelargelyunpaidandaretakenforgrantedbycompaniesandindividuals.Ashumandemandfornaturecapitalstockcontinuestogrowandoutstripitssupply,thestockofnaturalcapitalhasbeendecliningatanunsustainablepace.In2010,theUnitedNationsConferenceofthePartiesoftheConventiononBiologicalDiversity(CBD)heldinAichi,Japanagreedonsetting20biodiversitytargetsfor2020(so-calledAICHIbiodiversitytargets)basedonfivestrategicgoals—(A)addressingtheunderlyingcausesofbiodiversitylossbymainstreamingbiodiversityacrossgovernmentandsociety;(B)reducingthedirectpressuresonbiodiversityandpromotingsustainableuse;(C)improvingthestatusofbiodiversitybysafeguardingecosystems,species,andgeneticdiversity;(D)enhancingthebenefitstoallfrombiodiversityandecosystemservices;and(E)enhancingimplementationthroughparticipatoryplanning,knowledgemanagement,andcapacitybuilding.Forexample,StrategyCincludedTarget11,whichstatesthatnationsshouldconserveatleast17%ofterrestrialandinlandwater,and10%ofcoastalandmarineareasby2020.However,theresultsweredisappointing,andthereportcalledGlobalBiodiversityOutlook5compiledbytheSecretariatoftheCBDfoundthatnoneofthe20targetswerefullyachievedatthegloballevelby2020(SecretariatoftheCBD2020).Onrelatedissues,theIntergovernmentalPlatformforScienceandPolicyonBiodiversityandEcosystemServices(IPBES),comprisingagroupofscientists,releasedakeyreportin2019(IPBES,2019).Thereportwarnedthatbiodiversityisdecliningatanunprecedentedrateinhumanhistoryduetohumanactivities,withnearlyonemillionspeciesthreatenedwithextinction,manyofwhicharelikelytobecomeextinctwithinthenextfewdecades.Anaverageofaround20%ofspeciesinassessedanimalandplantgroupsarethreatened,unlessdrasticactionistakentoreducetheintensityofdriversofbiodiversityloss.Withoutsuchaction,therewillbeafurtheraccelerationintheglobalrateofspeciesextinction,whichisalreadyatleasttenstohundredsoftimeshigherthanithasaveragedoverthepast10millionyears.Globally,localvarietiesandbreedsofdomesticatedplantsandanimalsaredisappearing.Thislossofdiversity,includinggeneticdiversity,posesaseriousriskto2ADBIWorkingPaper1347 S.Shiraiglobalfoodsecuritybyunderminingtheresilienceofmanyagriculturalsystemstothreatssuchaspests,pathogens,andclimatechange.Climatechangeandnaturalcapitalareinterrelated.Forexample,promotingafforestationandreforestationcanleadtothereductionofGHGemissionsandatthesametimehaveasynergisticeffectofincreasingbiodiversity.Ontheotherhand,climatechangeandnaturalcapitalmayfaceatrade-offrelationship.Forexample,biomasspowergenerationmayreduceGHGemissionsbutacceleratethelossofbiodiversityifbiomasspowergenerationleadstodeforestation.Therefore,focusingsolelyonclimatechangerisksmaygiverisetotheriskofoverestimatingtheenvironmentalimpact.Variousinitiativeshavebeenlaunchedtoencouragemajorcompaniesaroundtheworldtodiscloseinformationonbiodiversityandchangetheirbehavior.Environmental,social,andgovernance(ESG)investorsandcivilsocietyarealsoextendingtheirfocusonawiderangeofenvironmentalissuesfromclimatechangetobiodiversity.Atthegovernmentlevelaroundtheworld,includingtheG7summit,thereisarapidincreaseinthemovementtofocusonnaturalcapitalincludingbiodiversitybeyondclimatechange.Theworldnowneedstoworkcollectivelytotackletheintertwinedcrisisofpollution,natureloss,andclimatechangegiventhatbothbiodiversitylossandGHGemissionscontinuetoriseatanalarmingrate.1.3FinancialandOfficialDevelopmentAssistance(ODA)FlowstoEmergingandDevelopingEconomiesTheworldmustworktogethertoachievetheSDGsandcopewithclimatechangeandbiodiversitylossandshiftmorefocusonfinancingEMDEstomeetthesegoals.TheInternationalDebtStatistics2022,compiledbytheWorldBankGroup,coverprivateandpublicstockandflowdatafor123EMDEsandshowthatnetdebtandequityflowtoEMDEsdroppedin2020fortwoconsecutiveyears(Table1).In2020,thesharpdeclineinnetdebtinflowsbyforeignprivatecreditors(especiallyintheformofthewithdrawalofbanksandotherflows)wasmorethanoffsetbynetdebtinflowsledbyofficialcreditors,includingtheWorldBankGroup(InternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment[IBRD]andInternationalDevelopmentAssociation[IDA]),andtheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF).Thetotalequityfinancialflowsalsodroppedduetoasharpdeclineinnetforeigndirectinvestment(FDI)andtoalesserextenttoadeclineinportfolioequityinflows.Overall,bondandequityflowswererelativelymorestablethanflowsofbanksandFDI(WorldBankGroup2021).1.3.1 GrowingPresenceofthePRCbothasLargestRecipientandCreditorofFinanceInaddition,morethanhalfofnetfinancialflowstoEMDEsin2020concentratedonthePeople’sRepublicofChina(thePRC)asthelargestrecipient.NetfinancialflowstothePRCrose33%in2020to$466billionofwhichnetdebtflowsrose62%to$233billionandnetequityinflowsrose12%to$233billion.Insharpcontrast,netfinancialinflowstoEMDEsexcludingthePRCfell26%in2020to$443billion,ofwhichnetdebtinflowsfell21%to$202billionandnetequityinflowsfell31%to$240billion.Withinnetequityflows,FDIfell23%andportfolioequityflowsturnednegativewithanoutflowof$24billioncomparedtoasmall,$3billoninflowin2019.3ADBIWorkingPaper1347 S.ShiraiTable1:AggregateNetFinancialFlowstoEmergingandDevelopmentEconomies(Unit:BillionsofUSDollars)2011201220132014201520162017201820192020Netfinancialflows,debtandequity1,324.91,223.81,457.71,136.3207.6721.01,289.91,108.2953.8908.6PercentofGNI(%)5.75.03.13.0Netdebtinflows717.2587.7814.8539.8–316.1208.4755.4574.5400.1435.4Long-term405.0468.5447.6394.7171.6243.3433.4352.4372.3419.4Officialcreditors39.134.330.747.849.262.356.281.364.0128.6WorldBank(IBRDandIDA)6.412.013.513.114.719.127.2IMF0.5–8.4–17.7–3.630.921.646.5Privatecreditors365.9434.2416.8346.9122.4181.0377.2271.1308.3290.8Bonds150.5225.7172.7174.874.9120.1289.1203.6255.2280.1Banksandotherprivate215.4208.6244.2172.147.560.988.167.553.110.7Short-term312.2119.1367.2145.1–487.7–34.9322.0222.227.816.0Netequityflows607.6636.1642.9596.5523.6512.6534.5533.6553.7473.2Netforeigndirectinvestment603.8538.8572.8512.7502.4467.9467.7496.5505.7434.5inflowsNetportfolioequityinflows3.897.470.183.821.244.766.737.248.038.7Changeinreserves(–=increase)–457.4–284.1–523.396.9607.1274.9–313.584.1–189.3–330.4MemorandumitemWorkers’remittances337.2362.8384.0414.8416.9408.0444.2481.9501.7499.5Source:WorldBankGroup(2021).TheWorldBankGrouphighlightedthePRC’suniquepositionasthelargestrecipientandthelargestcreditor(WorldBankGroup2021).Overthepastdecade,almost60%ofnettotalfinancialflowstoEMDEsfromexternalcreditorsandinvestors,namelyaboutcloseto$4trillion,wenttothePRC.Ofthenear$4trillionamount,about40%wereallocatedtodebtinflowsand60%wereallocatedtoFDIandportfolioequityflows.Consequently,thePRC’sexternaldebtstockrose11%in2020to$2.3trillion,includingbothdomesticandforeigncurrency-denominatedexternaldebt,butthisdebtsizeremainedmoderateinrelationtothegrossdomesticproduct(GDP)at16%.Short-termdebt,ofwhichaboutathirdwastrade-related,accountedfor53%oftheexternaldebtstock,butshort-termdebtdeclinedfrom57%in2019.Instead,long-termdebtrose22%in2020to$1.1trillion,mainlyduetoalargeincreaseinrenminbibondissuancesbypublicandprivateentitiesintheChinaInterbankBondMarket(CIBM)purchasedbynonresidents.Thesharpriseinnonresidentinvestors’demandforrenminbi-denominatedbondsnotonlyreflectedthePRC’searlyeconomicrecoveryfromtheCOVID-19pandemicin2020butalsothePRCgovernment’sconcertedeffortstoliberalizetheirfinancialaccountssince2016—includingaremovalofinvestmentquotasorrepatriationrestrictionsforforeigninstitutionalinvestorsundertheCIBMDirectAccessProgram;theBondConnectprogramin2017enablinginvestorstoregisterandsettletradesonshoreinresponsetoinvestors’concernsoverrepatriationandcapitalaccountriskasaresultofholdingassetsandsettlingoffshore;andtheremovalofrepatriation,holdingperiod,andquotarestrictionsin2018–2020.Asaresult,nonresidentparticipationintheonshorebondmarkethasrisensteadilyandthePRC’sbondsheldbynonresidentstotaledabout$635billionandaccountedfor58%ofitslong-termexternaldebtin2020.Inclusionofrenminbi-denominatedbondsintheBloombergBarclaysGlobalAggregateIndexandChina-AsharesintheFTSERussellemergingmarketindexalsocontributedtogrowingdemandforrenminbi-denominatedbondsbyforeigninvestors.4ADBIWorkingPaper1347 S.ShiraiAtthesametime,thePRCbecameoneofthelargestbilateralcreditorsintheworld,reflectingitshigheconomicgrowthaveragingover9%overthepasttwodecades.Low-andmiddle-incomecountries’combineddebtownedbythePRChasbeenrisingsharply,reaching$170billionin2020(Figure1).ThistotalsizeisratherlargewhencomparedwithEMDEs’combineddebtownedbytheIBRD($204billion)andIDA($177billion).MostofthedebtsowedtothePRCarerelatedtolarge-scaleinfrastructureprojectsandoperationsintheextractiveindustries.ThisdebtisdefinedasfinancingthathasbeendisbursedbythePRC,minusanyprincipalpaymentsmadebytheborrower.Thus,thedebtdatadonotincludeloancommitmentsandundisbursedamountsandonlycoverpublic-andpubliclyguaranteeddebt.Thedatadonotincludeborrowingbystate-ownedenterprisesandtheprivatesectornotguaranteedbythegovernment.TheWorldBankGroupindicatedthatthedataarereportedinaggregateandthuscreditorscannotbeseparatelyidentified.LendingtoEMDEsinclude:(i)concessionalrenminbi-denominatedloansprovidedbythegovernmentofthePRCthroughtheInternationalDevelopmentCooperationAgency;concessional(renminbi-andUSdollar-denominated)loansfromtheExport–ImportBankofChinamanagedbythePreferentialLoansDepartment;(iii)nonconcessionalUSdollar-denominatedloansextendedbypolicybanksincludingtheExport–ImportBankofChina,theChinaDevelopmentBank,andtheAgriculturalDevelopmentBankofChina;and(iv)loansfromcommercialbanksandsuppliersinsuredbythePRC’sofficialexportcreditagency,SINOSURE.Figure1:EmergingandDevelopingEconomies’DebttothePeople’sRepublicofChina(Unit:BillionsofUSDollars)Source:WorldBankGroup(2021).1.3.2 GrowingODAfromDevelopedEconomiesbutFailingtoMeettheGrossNationalIncome(GNI)TargetRatiosAsignificantamountofnetODAhasbeenprovidedfromtheOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment’s(OECDDevelopmentAssistanceCommittee(DAC)membereconomicstoEMDEsovermanyyears.ThenetODAamounthasbeenprovidingastablesourceofdevelopmentfinancingandcushionedtheadverseimpactsofthevariouseconomicandfinancialcrisesfacedbyEMDEsinthepast.TheamountofnetODAhasbeensteadilyrisingandincreasedby118%from5ADBIWorkingPaper1347 S.Shirai2000to2020inrealtermsandrose20%sincetheSDGswereadoptedin2015(Figure2).DespitethefactthatDACmembersfacedeconomiclossesin2020,theamountofnetODArosefurtherby4%to$162billionfrom2019whileallothermajorexternalresourceflows,includingtheprivatesector,toEMDEsfell.DespitetheCOVID-19pandemicin2020,mostdonorshadalreadyapprovedtheirODAbudgetsandthusmaintainedtheircommitments,withsomemembersmobilizingadditionalfundingstosupportseverelydistresseddevelopingcountries.Figure2:DACMemberEconomies’NetOfficialDevelopmentAssistanceinRealTerms(Unit:BillionsofUSDollars)Note:Datarefertotheconstant2020price.Source:OECD(2022b).TheamountofnettotalODArosefurtherin2021by4.4%inrealterms,reachingitshighestleveleverrecordedat$179billion(OECD2022b).TheincreasewasmostlyduetoDACmembereconomies’supportfortheCOVID-19response,particularlydonationsaimedataddressingglobalvaccineinequities.Excludingcostspaidforvaccines,netODAgrewonlyby0.6%in2021,mostlyarisingfromincreasesinmultilateralfundings.TheamountofnetODAinrealtermsrosesignificantlyinItaly(34.5%),theRepublicofKorea(21%),Slovenia(19%),Ireland(15%),theUnitedStates(14%),NewZealand(14%),Spain(12.5%),Japan(12%percent),andIceland(12%),whiletheamountdroppedintheUnitedKingdom,Sweden,Norway,andtheNetherlands.AlthoughtheabsoluteamountofnetODAroseinaggregate,theratiotocombinedGNIwasjust0.33%,failingtomeettheUnitedNations0.7%target.OnlyfiveDACmembers(Denmark,Germany,Luxembourg,Norway,andSweden)metthe0.7%target.The0.7%targetwasfirstagreedin1970andsincethenhasbeenrepeatedlystressedathigh-levelinternationalaidanddevelopmentconferences.DACmembereconomiesincreasednewandadditionalassistanceforUkraineandtheUkrainianrefugeecrisisaswellasformitigatingdeepeningfoodinsecurity,hunger,andextremepovertyintheworld.6ADBIWorkingPaper1347 S.ShiraiWhileDACmembereconomics,includingtheEU,theUnitedStates,theUnitedKingdom,andJapan,increasedODAin2020,theirotherofficialdevelopmentfinanceflowsalsoincreasedsignificantlyin2020,particularlytoAsia,andLatinAmericanregions,andespeciallythroughtheWorldBank,theIMF,regionaldevelopmentbanks,EUinstitutions,theUnitedNations,etc.Bycontrast,non-DACeconomies,includingabout19economies(excludingthePRC),reducedODAin2020fortwoconsecutiveyearsandotherofficialdevelopmentfinancealsodroppedin2020.Thus,developmentfinancefromnon-DACmembereconomiesandprivatefinanceshouldmakeeffortstoincreasetheircontributionstomeetthemagnitudeoffinancingneedsinEMDEs.1.3.3 G7Initiat