竞争市场中产品组合管理博弈模型讲义课件

Agametheory-basedmodelforproductportfoliomanagementinacompetitivemarket

A.Sadeghi,M.Zandieh

ExpertSystemswithApplications,2010Agametheory-basedmodelforStructureIntroductionLiteraturereviewDescriptionofthePPMproblemProblemformulationExampleConclusionsandfutureworkStructureIntroduction1.IntroductionConsumers,industrialmanagers,andsalesandmarketingpeople,alldemandproductsthatimprovetheirlifestylesortogainanedgeoverthecompetition.So,productportfolios

areinterestingformanypeople.Butunlimitedproductvarietyisnotawaytobesuccessful;therehastobeanoptimum.ItistrueformostcompaniesthattheParetoruleapplies:80%ofthesalesand/orprofits

comefrom20%oftheproducts.Itisevidentthatasingleproductcannot1.IntroductionConsumers,indu

fulfillthemanufacturerneedsandonthe

otherhand,fordiversitythereexistslimitation.Intoday’shighlycompetitiveenvironment,determiningan

optimalproductportfolioisveryimportantforthesurvivalofafirm.Optimalproductportfoliohasreceivedconsiderableattention,becausetheratesoffailureofnewproductportfolioandtheirassociatedlossesareveryhigh.Thewhole

product

component

information（产品构建信息）,

engineeringfulfillthemanufacturerne

portfoliodecision（工程组合决策）isverycrucialfortheprogressofafirm

,becauseitisverycostlyanddifficulttochange.Thekeyquestionsare,whatthebestproductportfoliois,andhowmanufacturercan

findit.Productportfoliomanagement(PPM)is

ageneralbusinessconceptthatanalyzetheproductionability（生产能力）

andmarketpotential,simultaneously,andthendeterminethebestsetofproductsto

offer.PPMisdevelopedtodirectaproductanditsdiversityportfoliodecision（工程组合决策

includingnotonlyattributes（属性）,levels,andprice’s,butalsoanalysisresults,environmental

requirements（环保需求）,manufacturingprocedures（生产流程）,productperformanceinformation（产品性能信息）,and

etc.ThereforePPMhasbeenclassifiedasacombinatorialoptimizationproblem.Eachcompanystrivesfortheoptimalityofitsproductofferingsthroughvariouscombinationsofproducts.ThePPMproblemmaydevelopfromtwoperspectives:(I)For

attracttheopinionofcustomersincludingnotonlyattribu

intargetmarkets.(II)Forreduce

themanufactureengineeringcosts.Firstistheproblemofmarketingmanagers,andsecondistheproblemofproducer.Whenbothofthemcomposewitheachotherasreflecttoutilityofcostumersandengineeringcosts,thisproblembecomestomisslinkbetweensaleandproductionchain.JiaoandZhang(2005)considerthecustomer–engineering

interactioninproductportfolioplanning,whichaims

tocreateproduct

familyintargetmarkets.(II)Fospecifications(产品族/系列规格)foratargetmarketsegment,andproposedamaximizingsurplussharemodel（最大剩余份额模型）.Incompetitiveenvironment,wedetermineourproductportfoliowithregardtoproductsthatofferbycompetitors,whilethecompetitorsmanagetheirproductportfoliosinregardtoourproducts.Gametheorycanbeusedtomodelthisproblem.Theproposed

modelconstructsproductportfoliospecifications(产品族/系列规格)fo

basedoncustomer–engineeringinteractionmodelinproductportfolioplanningwhichis

developedbyJiaoandZhang.PresentpaperextendspreviousworksinPPMwithregardtocustomer–engineeringconcerns

andcompetitiveenvironment.Itisnotforany

specificproduct,anditcanbeappliedtoadiversityofproductsorservices.objective:developagametheory-basedmodelasaprocedureoffindingoptimalproductportfolio.basedoncustomer–engineer2.LiteraturereviewAPPMisdefinedasadecisionmakingthatoptimizessomecriteria,suchas

marketshare.Themaincontributionofthemostresearchesin

PPMissummarizedinfollowingissues:

1)Generatingdesign

alternativesviamulti-objective

optimization（通过多目标优化生成设计方案）.

2)Accountingforuncertaintyandcompetitionwhenestimatingtheachievementofbusinessgoals.

3)Applyingmeta-heuristicalgorithms（元启发式算法）

2.LiteraturereviewAPPMisd

tosolveacombinatorial

problemduringtheproductlinedesign.ThedevelopmentofalgorithmsHeuristic(identifyproductprofileproductlinedesign)

algorithms

improvedheuristicalgorithms

geneticalgorithms.Thedevelopmentofmodels1)JiaoandZhangproposedamodelto

addresstheproductportfolioplanningproblem,itconsiderscustomerpreferences,choiceprobabilitiesandtosolveacombinatorialp

platformbasedproductcosting.Also,ageneticalgorithmprocedureisapplied.

2)AiyoshiandMaki

proposedagameproblemundertheconstraintsofallocationofproductandmarketsharesimultaneously.Theirresearchisconsideredseveralmanufacturersinoligopolymarket（寡头垄断市场）.Thisproposedmodel,ontheonehandhadthecompetitivecircumstance,butontheotherhand,didnothas

detailssuchaslargevarietyofcustomers'preferences,customer–engineeringconcerns,etc.platformbasedproductcos

3)modelinthispaper

considersbothdetailsandcompetitivecircumstance.3)modelinthispapercon3.DescriptionofthePPMproblemConsideringthefirmcapabilitiestoproduceproducts,asetofproductportfolioshavebeenidentified.Eachproducthascertaindesirabilitybetweencustomers.Morespecifically,weconsiderascenarioinwhichasetofproducts,havebeenidentified,giventhatthemanufacturer(m)hasthecapabilities(bothdesignandproduction)toproducealltheseproducts,..Aproductportfolio,,isasetconsistingofsomeselectedproduct.Combined

withtheproducts,asetofproductportfoliosarecreated,.

相关参数3.DescriptionofthePPMprobForexample,ifmanufacturermcanproduce3product,7productportfolioareavailable:（=7）

Everyproduct,

,isassociatedwithcertainengineeringcosts,denotedas.Therearemultiplemarketsegments,S={s1,...,sg,...,sG},eachcontaininghomogeneouscustomers,withadefinitesize,Qg.Thecustomer–engineeringinteractionisForexample,ifmanufacturermembodiedinthedecisionsassociatedwithcustomers’choicesofdifferentproducts.Variouscustomerpreferencesondiverseproductsarerepresentedbyrespectiveutilities,(utilityofthegthsegmentforthenthproductofmthmanufacturer).Productdemandsormarketshares,(marketshareofthegthsegment

forthenthproductofmthmanufacturer),aredescribedbytheprobabilitiesofcustomers’choosingproducts.Customerschooseaproductbasedonthesurplusembodiedinthedecisions

buyerrule.Theyhave

theoptionofnotbuyinganyproductsorbuyingcompetitors’products.Weassumethatcompetitorsrespondtothemanufacturer’smoves,meaningthat,thecompetitionreactbyintroducingnewproducts.buyerrule.Theyhavetheo4.ProblemformulationThepresentpaperconsidersamarketwithGsegments,

S={s1,...,sg,...,sG},and2manufacturersthateachofthemcan

offerNmproducts,

andJmproductportfolios,

.Thisgivesthebimatrix-game（双矩阵对策）

problemwith2playersandJmstrategyforeach,(m=1or2).Thepayoffforeachplayerwillofcoursedependonthecombinedactionsofbothplayers.Apayoffmatrixshowswhatpayoff

eachplayerwillreceiveat4.ProblemformulationThepres

theoutcomeofthegame.Forplayer

m(m=1or2),thepayoffmatrix,Fm,isasfollows:theoutcomeofthegame.FInsummary,aJ1

×J2–bimatrixgameisplayedbytwoplayers,player1andplayer2.Player1hasafinitesetandplayer2hasafinite

set

of

purestrategies.Thepayoffmatrixes[f1(

)],

ofplayer1

and

ofplayer2aredenotedbyF1andF2respectively.Thisgameisdenotedby(F1,F2).Nowthegame(F1,F2)isplayedasfollows.Players1and2choose,independentofeachother,astrategyInsummary,aJ1×J2–bimatr

andrespectively.Here

canbeseenastheprobabilitythatplayer1(2)chooseshis–throw(–thcolumn).The(expected)payoffforplayer1isx1F1x2andtheexpectedpayofftoplayer2isx1F2x2.Astrategypair()isanequilibriumforthegame(F1,F2)ifandThesetofallequilibriaforthegame(F1,F2)isdenotedbyE(F1,F2).ByatheoremofNashthissetisnon-emptyforallbimatrix-games(Nash,1950).Somemethodsforcalculatingpayoffmatrixarrays,,arethere(seeSection2).WeusedthefunctionthatproposedbyJiaoandZhang(2005).Thisfunctionisbasedoncustomer-engineeringinteractionmodelinPPM.Thisisasfollows:ThesetofallequilibriaforEq.(3)istheexpectedsharedsurplusbyofferingaproductportfolio,consistingofproducts,tocustomersegments,sg,eachwithsizeQg.Themarketpotentials,Qg,canbegivenexogenouslyattheoutsetorestimatedthroughavarietyoftechniquesbasedonhistoricaldataortestmarkets.Theutilityofthegthsegmentforthenthproductofmthmanufacturerisdenotedas.ThismodelassumesthatcustomersonlychooseaEq.(3)istheexpectedshared

productwithapositivesurplus.Thechoiceprobability,,

thatacustomerorasegment,sg,choosesaproduct,,withNcomcompetingproducts,isdefinedasfollows:whereuisascalingparameter（尺度参数）.Accordingtomatrix(1)andEq.(3),letthefunctionbedefinedbyproductwithapositivesu竞争市场中产品组合管理博弈模型讲义5.ExampleInthissection,asimpleexampletousetheproposedmodelispresented.Forsimplicity,weconsideramarketwithtwocompetitor(M=2),andfourdifferentproducts(Nm=4)foreach.Feasiblestrategies,isdefinedasfollows:5.ExampleInthissection,as产品组合数=24-1=15???产品组合数=24-1=15???Threesegmentsareidentified,i.e.,s1,s2,ands3.Q1,Q2,andQ3areassumed0.2,0.3and0.5,respectively.Table1showstheutilitiesofthreesegmentstoeveryproduct()andcostofeach().Also,scalingparameter(u)issupposed0.8.Therefore,2payoffmatrixesF1andF2formedformanufacturer1and2,separately.Thisgameandobtaineddatafromexpectedsharedsurplusvalues(Eq.(5))aresummarizedinFig.1.Threesegmentsareidentified,返回返回竞争市场中产品组合管理博弈模型讲义TheoptimalresultforeachmanufacturerisderivedfromtheNashequilibriumpointofthegame.Astrategypairisanaloneequilibriumforthegame.Therelatedpayoffpairis(0.74,0.83).Theoptimalresultforeachma6.ConclusionsandfutureworkThispaperproposedagametheory-basedmodelthatisusedtomaximizetheexpectedsharedsurplusforaproductportfoliomanaged.Theproductportfoliomanagement(PPM)isanimportantoptimizationproblemthatincludesthelargesetofconstraintsandcharacteristics.Therefore,itisveryhelpfulforamanagertouseamarketingdecisionsupportsystemwhichprovideshimtheacceptablesolutionswithconsideringmoreterms.Accordingtothisgoal,a6.Conclusionsandfutureworkgametheory-basedmodelisproposedandappliedtosolvetheproblemsinvolvedinPPM.TherearepotentiallyunlimitedopportunitiesforresearchinPPM.Futurestudiescanfocusonothercharacteristicstoachievemoreidealresults.Othernotabledirectionsforfutureresearchesincludeallowingforsequentialentrystrategies,timevaryingutilitiesandchangingcustomerbehaviors.gametheory-basedmodelisTheEnd!TheEnd!返回返回相关概念纳什定理：在一个有n个博弈方的博弈G=﹛S1,…,Sn：u1,…,un}中，如果n是有限的，且Si都是有限集（对i=1，…，n），则该博弈至少存在一个纳什均衡，但可能包含混合策略。

产品组合：由不同的产品线构成，而产品线又是由不同的产品项目构成。产品组合策略：在产品组合的深度、广度和相关性方面做的筹划和安排。产品组合的广度：产品线的数量。产品组合的广度：产品项目（规格或品种）的数量相关概念纳什定理：在一个有n个博弈方的博弈G=﹛S1,…,S遗传算法（GeneticAlgorithm）是一类借鉴生物界的进化规律（适者生存，优胜劣汰遗传机制）演化而来的随机化搜索方法。其主要特点是直接对结构对象进行操作，不存在求导和函数连续性的限定；具有内在的隐并行性和更好的全局寻优能力；采用概率化的寻优方法，能自动获取和指导优化的搜索空间，自适应地调整搜索方向，不需要确定的规则。遗传算法（GeneticAlgorithm）是一类借鉴生物

单一产品策划

单一产品策划程序策划目标环境分析市场细分目标市场市场定位概念产品营销组合返回

单一产品策划

单一产品策划程序策划目标环境分析市场细分目标Agametheory-basedmodelforproductportfoliomanagementinacompetitivemarket

A.Sadeghi,M.Zandieh

ExpertSystemswithApplications,2010Agametheory-basedmodelforStructureIntroductionLiteraturereviewDescriptionofthePPMproblemProblemformulationExampleConclusionsandfutureworkStructureIntroduction1.IntroductionConsumers,industrialmanagers,andsalesandmarketingpeople,alldemandproductsthatimprovetheirlifestylesortogainanedgeoverthecompetition.So,productportfolios

areinterestingformanypeople.Butunlimitedproductvarietyisnotawaytobesuccessful;therehastobeanoptimum.ItistrueformostcompaniesthattheParetoruleapplies:80%ofthesalesand/orprofits

comefrom20%oftheproducts.Itisevidentthatasingleproductcannot1.IntroductionConsumers,indu

fulfillthemanufacturerneedsandonthe

otherhand,fordiversitythereexistslimitation.Intoday’shighlycompetitiveenvironment,determiningan

optimalproductportfolioisveryimportantforthesurvivalofafirm.Optimalproductportfoliohasreceivedconsiderableattention,becausetheratesoffailureofnewproductportfolioandtheirassociatedlossesareveryhigh.Thewhole

product

component

information（产品构建信息）,

engineeringfulfillthemanufacturerne

portfoliodecision（工程组合决策）isverycrucialfortheprogressofafirm

,becauseitisverycostlyanddifficulttochange.Thekeyquestionsare,whatthebestproductportfoliois,andhowmanufacturercan

findit.Productportfoliomanagement(PPM)is

ageneralbusinessconceptthatanalyzetheproductionability（生产能力）

andmarketpotential,simultaneously,andthendeterminethebestsetofproductsto

offer.PPMisdevelopedtodirectaproductanditsdiversityportfoliodecision（工程组合决策

includingnotonlyattributes（属性）,levels,andprice’s,butalsoanalysisresults,environmental

requirements（环保需求）,manufacturingprocedures（生产流程）,productperformanceinformation（产品性能信息）,and

etc.ThereforePPMhasbeenclassifiedasacombinatorialoptimizationproblem.Eachcompanystrivesfortheoptimalityofitsproductofferingsthroughvariouscombinationsofproducts.ThePPMproblemmaydevelopfromtwoperspectives:(I)For

attracttheopinionofcustomersincludingnotonlyattribu

intargetmarkets.(II)Forreduce

themanufactureengineeringcosts.Firstistheproblemofmarketingmanagers,andsecondistheproblemofproducer.Whenbothofthemcomposewitheachotherasreflecttoutilityofcostumersandengineeringcosts,thisproblembecomestomisslinkbetweensaleandproductionchain.JiaoandZhang(2005)considerthecustomer–engineering

interactioninproductportfolioplanning,whichaims

tocreateproduct

familyintargetmarkets.(II)Fospecifications(产品族/系列规格)foratargetmarketsegment,andproposedamaximizingsurplussharemodel（最大剩余份额模型）.Incompetitiveenvironment,wedetermineourproductportfoliowithregardtoproductsthatofferbycompetitors,whilethecompetitorsmanagetheirproductportfoliosinregardtoourproducts.Gametheorycanbeusedtomodelthisproblem.Theproposed

modelconstructsproductportfoliospecifications(产品族/系列规格)fo

basedoncustomer–engineeringinteractionmodelinproductportfolioplanningwhichis

developedbyJiaoandZhang.PresentpaperextendspreviousworksinPPMwithregardtocustomer–engineeringconcerns

andcompetitiveenvironment.Itisnotforany

specificproduct,anditcanbeappliedtoadiversityofproductsorservices.objective:developagametheory-basedmodelasaprocedureoffindingoptimalproductportfolio.basedoncustomer–engineer2.LiteraturereviewAPPMisdefinedasadecisionmakingthatoptimizessomecriteria,suchas

marketshare.Themaincontributionofthemostresearchesin

PPMissummarizedinfollowingissues:

1)Generatingdesign

alternativesviamulti-objective

optimization（通过多目标优化生成设计方案）.

2)Accountingforuncertaintyandcompetitionwhenestimatingtheachievementofbusinessgoals.

3)Applyingmeta-heuristicalgorithms（元启发式算法）

2.LiteraturereviewAPPMisd

tosolveacombinatorial

problemduringtheproductlinedesign.ThedevelopmentofalgorithmsHeuristic(identifyproductprofileproductlinedesign)

algorithms

improvedheuristicalgorithms

geneticalgorithms.Thedevelopmentofmodels1)JiaoandZhangproposedamodelto

addresstheproductportfolioplanningproblem,itconsiderscustomerpreferences,choiceprobabilitiesandtosolveacombinatorialp

platformbasedproductcosting.Also,ageneticalgorithmprocedureisapplied.

2)AiyoshiandMaki

proposedagameproblemundertheconstraintsofallocationofproductandmarketsharesimultaneously.Theirresearchisconsideredseveralmanufacturersinoligopolymarket（寡头垄断市场）.Thisproposedmodel,ontheonehandhadthecompetitivecircumstance,butontheotherhand,didnothas

detailssuchaslargevarietyofcustomers'preferences,customer–engineeringconcerns,etc.platformbasedproductcos

3)modelinthispaper

considersbothdetailsandcompetitivecircumstance.3)modelinthispapercon3.DescriptionofthePPMproblemConsideringthefirmcapabilitiestoproduceproducts,asetofproductportfolioshavebeenidentified.Eachproducthascertaindesirabilitybetweencustomers.Morespecifically,weconsiderascenarioinwhichasetofproducts,havebeenidentified,giventhatthemanufacturer(m)hasthecapabilities(bothdesignandproduction)toproducealltheseproducts,..Aproductportfolio,,isasetconsistingofsomeselectedproduct.Combined

withtheproducts,asetofproductportfoliosarecreated,.

相关参数3.DescriptionofthePPMprobForexample,ifmanufacturermcanproduce3product,7productportfolioareavailable:（=7）

Everyproduct,

,isassociatedwithcertainengineeringcosts,denotedas.Therearemultiplemarketsegments,S={s1,...,sg,...,sG},eachcontaininghomogeneouscustomers,withadefinitesize,Qg.Thecustomer–engineeringinteractionisForexample,ifmanufacturermembodiedinthedecisionsassociatedwithcustomers’choicesofdifferentproducts.Variouscustomerpreferencesondiverseproductsarerepresentedbyrespectiveutilities,(utilityofthegthsegmentforthenthproductofmthmanufacturer).Productdemandsormarketshares,(marketshareofthegthsegment

forthenthproductofmthmanufacturer),aredescribedbytheprobabilitiesofcustomers’choosingproducts.Customerschooseaproductbasedonthesurplusembodiedinthedecisions

buyerrule.Theyhave

theoptionofnotbuyinganyproductsorbuyingcompetitors’products.Weassumethatcompetitorsrespondtothemanufacturer’smoves,meaningthat,thecompetitionreactbyintroducingnewproducts.buyerrule.Theyhavetheo4.ProblemformulationThepresentpaperconsidersamarketwithGsegments,

S={s1,...,sg,...,sG},and2manufacturersthateachofthemcan

offerNmproducts,

andJmproductportfolios,

.Thisgivesthebimatrix-game（双矩阵对策）

problemwith2playersandJmstrategyforeach,(m=1or2).Thepayoffforeachplayerwillofcoursedependonthecombinedactionsofbothplayers.Apayoffmatrixshowswhatpayoff

eachplayerwillreceiveat4.ProblemformulationThepres

theoutcomeofthegame.Forplayer

m(m=1or2),thepayoffmatrix,Fm,isasfollows:theoutcomeofthegame.FInsummary,aJ1

×J2–bimatrixgameisplayedbytwoplayers,player1andplayer2.Player1hasafinitesetandplayer2hasafinite

set

of

purestrategies.Thepayoffmatrixes[f1(

)],

ofplayer1

and

ofplayer2aredenotedbyF1andF2respectively.Thisgameisdenotedby(F1,F2).Nowthegame(F1,F2)isplayedasfollows.Players1and2choose,independentofeachother,astrategyInsummary,aJ1×J2–bimatr

andrespectively.Here

canbeseenastheprobabilitythatplayer1(2)chooseshis–throw(–thcolumn).The(expected)payoffforplayer1isx1F1x2andtheexpectedpayofftoplayer2isx1F2x2.Astrategypair()isanequilibriumforthegame(F1,F2)ifandThesetofallequilibriaforthegame(F1,F2)isdenotedbyE(F1,F2).ByatheoremofNashthissetisnon-emptyforallbimatrix-games(Nash,1950).Somemethodsforcalculatingpayoffmatrixarrays,,arethere(seeSection2).WeusedthefunctionthatproposedbyJiaoandZhang(2005).Thisfunctionisbasedoncustomer-engineeringinteractionmodelinPPM.Thisisasfollows:ThesetofallequilibriaforEq.(3)istheexpectedsharedsurplusbyofferingaproductportfolio,consistingofproducts,tocustomersegments,sg,eachwithsizeQg.Themarketpotentials,Qg,canbegivenexogenouslyattheoutsetorestimatedthroughavarietyoftechniquesbasedonhistoricaldataortestmarkets.Theutilityofthegthsegmentforthenthproductofmthmanufacturerisdenotedas.ThismodelassumesthatcustomersonlychooseaEq.(3)istheexpectedshared

productwithapositivesurplus.Thechoiceprobability,,

thatacustomerorasegment,sg,choosesaproduct,,withNcomcompetingproducts,isdefinedasfollows:whereuisascalingparameter（尺度参数）.Accordingtomatrix(1)andEq.(3),letthefunctionbedefined