萨缪尔森经济学Economics第十八版 18th 课后概念、习题答案17-图文

CHAPTEROVERVIEWANDTEACHINGTIPSChapter17presentshistoricalandtheoreticalportraitsofregulatoryandantitrustactivitiesintheUnitedStates.Bothareevolving,andyourstudentsneedtounderstandthat.Itmaybehelpfultoreviewboththecompetitivebenchmarkofefficiencyandthevariouswaysthatmarketscanfallshortofthisideal.Evolutioncanthenbecastintermsofjudgingthesocialwelfareimplicationsofvarioustypesanddegreesofmarketfailure.Thischapterconcentratesononeofgovernment’sprimarychallengesinexercisingitsefficiencyrole:performingawatchdogfunctiontopreventexcessiveabuseofmarketpower.Also,thechapterfocusesyourattentiononthetwomajortoolsemployedbytheU.S.governmenttoputsome“teeth”intoitscarefulmonitoringofbusinessactivity:regulationandantitrustactivity.Regulationisoftenemployedwheneconomiesofscalearesosignificantinaproductionprocessthatamonopolyistheonlyefficientsolution.Governmentagenciesareorganizedtomonitorthebehaviorofthemonopolistandtoprotecttheinterestsofconsumers.Antitrustlegislationisdesignedtopreventmonopoliesfromformingandtoattackanticom-petitiveabuses.TheShermanAntitrustActandtheClaytonActformthebackboneofantitrustpolicies;theFederalTradeCommissionActestablishedtheFTCastheagencyinchargeofmonitoringandenforcingthelegislation.Ofcourse,aswithanylaws,thecourtsultimatelyinterprettheirmeaning,andacenturyoflegalprecedentdefinesthemeaningofthesestatutes.LEARNINGOBJECTIVES1.Distinguishbetweentwobrandsofregulation:economicandsocial.Explainwhygovernmentwoulduseeitherofthesetypesofregulationtoalleviatemarketfailure.2.Reviewthethreemajorpublic-interestjustificationsofregulation.3.Provideanoverviewofthealternativestrategiesthatcanbeusedtoregulatenaturalmonopolies.Illustratethesealternatives,anduseyourillustrationtodiscussthecostsofregulation.4.ExplainthesignificanceoftheShermanAntitrustAct,theClaytonAct,andtheFederalTradeCommissionAct.5.Understandthedifferencesbetweenconductandstructureasusedintheapplicationofantitrustlaws.6.Tracetheevolutionofantitrustactivitytoitsmodernformulation,whichhasfocusedonimprovingefficiencyandnotjustonpreventingbignessitself.SUGGESTEDANSWERSTOQUESTIONSINTHETEXT1.Considereconomicregulationandantitrustpolicies.Somecomponentsofeacharemoredirectandallowlessflexibility.Othersaremoreindirectandallowcorrespondinglymoreflexibility.Asyouconsiderstrengthsandweaknesses,statetheobjectivesof“restraint”explicitly.2.ConsultFigure17-1;itduplicatesFigure17-2inthetext.NotePMPRPIandQMQRQI.DeadweightlossfallsasPMconvergestoPI,butprofitsturnnegativeafterPR.BeyondPR,therefore,taxrevenuefromelsewhereisrequiredandbringswithittheeffectsofitsowndistortions.IfPMisnotverymuchdifferentfromPI,thistaxdistortionmightcausealargerwelfarereduction.Also,differentpeopleloseandgain,sodifferentpeoplepreferdifferentapproaches.81CHAPTERPromotingMoreEfficientMarkets17Figure17-13.Price-capregulationprovidesbetterincentivesbecausefirmsareencouragedtolowertheirproductioncosts.Theyareguaranteedapriceincrease;thisbenefitstheirprofitabilitymoreiftheyareableatthesametimetolowercosts.Averagecostpricingguaranteesthelong-runcompetitivesolution,whileaprice-capstrategyallowsfirmstoearneconomicprofitsiftheyareefficientintheirproductionprocesses.4.Microsoftisanearmonopolistintheproductionofcertaintypesofcomputersoftware,namelyoperatingsystems.IsMicrosoftbadbecauseitisbig,ormightwebeinterestedintoleratingthisbigness(alaSchumpeterinordertobenefitfromtheresearchanddevelopmentthatsuchalargefirm(earningeconomicprofits,nodoubtisabletoafford?5.ConsultFigure17-2.NotethatMR=MCatQ*/2;thecorrespondingpricewouldbeintheneighborhoodof$400.Meanwhile,theidealregulatedpriceisabout$100,supportingoutputQ*whereMC=DD(andDD=MB,remember.NotethatAC(Q*=$175>$100=price,sosomesubsidywouldberequired.Figure17-26.a.ExcerptsfromthemajorantitrustlawsarepresentedinTable17-1.SectionIoftheShermanActisslightlytargetedatconduct;Section2revealsitsmajorfocustobestructure.Sections2and3oftheClaytonActspeakmostdirectlytoconduct;Section7returnstostructure.TheFederalTradeCommissionActisaddressedprimarilytoconduct.b.Structureiseasiertomonitor,butthereareincreasingreturnstoscaleinsomeindustriesthatcanbecapturedonlybyone(orafewfirms.Conductishardertomonitor,butitcanallowthesesortsofefficienciestobeexploited.82CHAPTER17:PROMOTINGMOREEFFICIENTMARKETSCHAPTER17:PROMOTINGMOREEFFICIENTMARKETS83Table17-1TheAntitrustLawsSHERMANANTITRUSTACT(1890,asamendedSection1.Everycontract,combinationintheformoftrustorotherwise,orconspiracy,inrestraintoftradeorcommerceamongtheseveralStates,orwithforeignnations,isdeclaredtobeillegal.Section2.Everypersonwhoshallmonopolize,orattempttomonopolize,orcombineorconspirewithanyotherpersonorpersons,tomonopolizeanypartofthetradeorcommerceamongtheseveralStates,orwithforeignnations,shallbedeemedguiltyofafelony...CLAYTONANTITRUSTACT(1914,asamendedSection2.Itshallbeunlawful...todiscriminateinpricebetweendifferentpurchasersofcommoditiesoflikegradeandquality...wheretheeffectofsuchdiscriminationmaybesubstantiallytolessencompetitionortendtocreateamonopolyinanylineofcommerce....Provided,thatnothinghereincontainedshallpreventdifferentialswhichmakeonlydueallowancefordifferencesinthecost...Section3.Thatitshallbeunlawfulforanyperson...toleaseormakeasaleorcontract...onthecondition,agreement,orunderstandingthatthelesseeorpurchaserthereofshallnotuseordealinmoditiesofacompetitor...wheretheeffect...maybetosubstantiallylessencompetitionortendtocreateamonopolyinanylineofcommerce.Section7.No[corporation]...shallacquire...thewholeoranypart...ofanother[corporation]...where...theeffectofsuchanacquisitionmaybesubstantiallytolessencompetition,ortotendtocreateamonopoly.FEDERALTRADECOMMISSIONACT(1914,asamendedSection5.Unfairmethodsofcompetition...andunfairofdeceptiveactsorpractices...aredeclaredunlawful.7.Consideryourexperiences,here.ConsultFigure17-3forsomeideas,butaddyourown.PerfectCompetitionAgriculture*OilDrillingandMining*IndustrieswherepricesaresignificantlyaffectedbygovernmentregulationTextilesTruckingSteelAirlinesBankings*AutomobileManufactureAircraftManufactureRailroads*LocalTelephone*Electricity*NaturalMonopolyFigure17-384CHAPTER17:PROMOTINGMOREEFFICIENTMARKETS8.StartwithMC>0.SinceprofitsaremaximizedwhereMR=MC,MR>0anddemandisprice-elastic.Allthatnotwithstanding,MCand/orACcouldcutdemandinitsinelasticregion.Ahigherpriceshouldproducehighprofitsinallcases(iftheregulationisbinding,thenthemonopolistwantsahigherprice.Revenuewill,meanwhile,climbwithpricethroughtheinelasticregionofdemand;butitwillfallaspricerisesintotheelasticregion.9.TheguidelinessaythatiftheHHIisabove1800theindustryishighlyconcentrated.Thus,thecodesharingagree-mentswouldbeverydifficulttojustifyifthegovernmentistryingtomaintaincompetitionintheairlineindustry.10.Anyfirmthathascontroloverthepriceofitsproductisnotoperatingunderperfectlycompetitivemarketcondi-tions.Sincetheyaresettingthepriceoftheirproduct,theyhavesomedegreeofmonopolypower.ToproveMicrosoftwasamonopoly,onewouldhavetoprove:1thatMicrosofthasasignificantamountofmarketshareinthisparticularmarket,2thatMicrosoft’smarketshareisprotectedbybarrierstoentry,and3thatasaresultofitsmarketpowerMicrosofthasfewrivalsinthisparticularmarket.DISCUSSIONQUESTIONS1.TracethehistoryofregulatoryactivityintheUnitedStatesfromitsinceptionin1887throughitshighpointinthelate1970sandintoitssubsequentdecline.Whatdoyouthinkthefuturehasinstore?Why?Howmightincreasedinternationalcompetitioninmanyindustriesaffectourattitudestoward“bigness”?2.HowdoesincreasedcompetitionfromforeignmanufacturersaffectthespiritofantitrustlegislationintheUnitedStates?Ifwehavemorecompetitionfromabroad,andthosecompetitorsareattimesworkingwithoneanotherandwiththeirhomegovernments,shouldourdomesticfirmsbehandcuffedbyantitrustlaws?Whyorwhynot?3.AretherelargeAmericanoilcompaniesthatcanserveasexamplesofverticalorhorizontalintegration?Whyareantitrustsuitsdirectedathorizontallyintegratedfirms?Shouldverticallyintegratedfirmsalsobesued?4.Doyouthinkthattheexistenceofmonopolypoweris,inandofitself,causeforpublicconcern,orshouldconcernberaisedonlyabouttheknownabuseofpower?Whathasbeentheattitudeofthecourts?5.Exactlywhatismeantbyaconglomerate?Namesomeexamples.Whataretheadvantagesofbringingunrelatedactivitiesunderonecorporatetent?Disadvantages?6.WeretheJusticeDepartment’santitrustsuitsagainstIBMandAT&TarepudiationoftheSchumpeterianideathatinnovationisencouragedbythepresenceoflargefirmsinthemarket?Canyougiveanotherexplanationoftheiroutcomes?7.NametwoorthreeAmericanindustriesthathavebeenderegulatedrecently(overthepast10to15years.Whathavebeentheeffectsofthederegulation?8.ThemostrecentattemptatderegulationintheUnitedStateshasoccurredintheelectricpowerindustry.Competitionisbeingpromoted,andconsumersinmanyareaswillsoonhaveachoiceoffirmsfromwhichtobuytheirelectricpower.Whathappenedtocausethischange?Whatsortsofnewtechnologyarenowavailablethathavechangedourideasaboutthegenerationofelectricpowerbeinganaturalmonopoly?9.Explainwhatismeantbythe“BellDoctrine”.Whatmightitmeanforthesoftwareindustry?Thatis,arethereaspectsofthesoftwareindustrythatmightbe“quarantined”fromotheraspectsoftheindustry,thatshouldremaincompetitive?10.Inthespringof2000,thepriceofgasolinerosebyapproximatelythirtypercent,fromaround$1.30pergallontoaround$1.80pergalloninConnecticut.Someblamedaheavydemandforoilduringaparticularlycoldwinter,othersblamedtheOPECcartelforeffectivelyrestrictingsupply.Whateverthecause,somepeoplebegantoclamorforgovernmentregulationofthemarketforpetroleumproducts.Discusstheprosandconsofregulationinthisindustry.Wouldregulationbeagoodidea?Whatsortsofmonopolypowerwouldthisregulationcontain?ESSAYQUESTIONS1.OutlinebrieflythehistoryofantitrustpolicyintheUnitedStates,mentioningtheimportantgovernmentactsthathavebeenmilestonesinitshistory,indicatingthesignificanceofeach.Howaretheselawsinterpretedinmoderncaselaw?2.Antitrustactivitycanbebasedonstructureorconduct.ReviewafewofthevariousstatutesandcasesinAmericanantitrustlawanddeterminewhethertheyaredirectedatstructureorconduct.Whataboutguidelinesfornewmergers?Presenttheadvantagesanddisadvantagesofbothapproaches.3.Con