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外文翻译模板外文翻译模板外文翻译模板外文翻译模板编制仅供参考审核批准生效日期地址：电话：传真:邮编:杭州电子科技大学毕业论文外文文献翻译要求根据《普通高等学校本科毕业设计（论文）指导》的内容，特对外文文献翻译提出以下要求：一、翻译的外文文献可以是一篇，也可以是两篇，但总字符要求不少于万（或翻译成中文后至少在3000字以上）。二、翻译的外文文献应主要选自学术期刊、学术会议的文章、有关著作及其他相关材料，应与毕业论文（设计）主题相关，并作为外文参考文献列入毕业论文（设计）的参考文献。并在每篇中文译文标题尾部用“脚注”形式注明原文作者及出处，中文译文后应附外文原文（全文，格式为word）。不能翻译中国学者的文章，不能翻译准则等有译文的著作。三、中文译文的基本撰写格式1.题目:采用小三号、黑体字、居中打印；段前二行，段后二行。2.正文:采用小四号、宋体字，行间距一般为固定值20磅，标准字符间距。页边距为左3cm，右2.5cm，上下各2.5cm，页面统一采用A4纸。四、外文原文格式1.题目:采用小三号、TimesNewRoman、居中打印；段前二行，段后二行。2.正文:采用小四号、TimesNewRoman，行间距一般为固定值20磅，标准字符间距。页边距为左3cm，右2.5cm，上下各2.5cm五、封面格式由学校统一制作（注：封面上的“翻译题目”指中文译文的题目），并按“封面、封面、译文、外文原文、考核表”的顺序统一装订。

毕业论文外文文献翻译毕业论文题目Xxx翻译题目指翻译后的中文译文的题目学院会计学院（以本模板为准）专业XXXXXX（以本模板为准）姓名XXXXXX（以本模板为准）班级XXXXXX（以本模板为准）学号XXXXXX（以本模板为准）指导教师XXXXXX（以本模板为准）译文管理者过度乐观与债务、股权融资之间的选择MichaelGombola.&DaliaMarciukaityte.TheJournalofBehaviorFinance,2007Vol.8,No.4,–235本文采取了一家成长较快速的公司作为样本，比较债务融资和股权融资后的长期股票业绩。如果管理者过于乐观的预测他们将获得的资产,那么他们更有可能通过债务融资来增加资本而不是股权融资。然而他们通过债务融资获得的资本与股权融资后的长期的业绩相比将会更差。但是，从另一方面来说，管理者利用“机会窗口”发行股票，我们认为会比发行债券有更差的业绩。伴随着管理者过度的乐观假设，我们发现，债务融资比股权融资后的股票业绩更差。管理者过度乐观对于选择债务或股权融资还有之后的股票业绩有着显着的影响。关键词：过度乐观、过于自信、债务融资、股权融资、长期的股票表现一、前言股价低和经营业绩差的表现导致了一个假说，即利用高股价和投资者的过度乐观的时期，销售定价过高的股票。这个“机会之窗”假说认为，管理者存在时间股权的问题时，他们公司的股票会被高估（Ritter[1991]）。然而，这一假说，不能用来解释股票表现不佳的问题（Spies，Affleck-Graves[1999]和Datta,Iskandar-DattaandRaman[2000]）。绩效差带来的债务融资问题表明必须要有一种替代假说可以解释这些发现。……

外文原文ManagerialoveroptimismandtheChoicebetweenDebtAndEquityFinancingThispapercompareslong-runstockperformancefollowingdebtfinancingandequityfinancingforasampleofrapidlygrowingfirms.Ifmanagersaresubjecttooverlyoptimisticpredictionsfortheirassetacquisitions,theyaremorelikelytofinanceassetgrowthbydebtratherthanbyequity.Themanagerialoveroptimismhypothesispredictsworselong-termperformancefordebt-financedassetacquisitionsthanequity-financedassetacquisitions.If,ontheotherhand,managerstakeadvantageof“windowsofopportunity”forissuingequity,weexpectworseperformancefollowingequityissuancethanfollowingdebtissuance.Consistentwiththemanagerialoveroptimismhypothesis,wefindthatdebtfinancingisfollowedbysignificantlyworsestockperformancethanequityfinancing.Managerialoveroptimismseemstobeasignificantfactoraffectingthechoicebetweendebtandequityfinancingandpost-financingstockperformance.Keywords:Overoptimism,Overconfidence,Debtfinancing,Equityfinancing,longrunstockperformanceIntroductionEvidenceofpoorstockandoperatingperformancefollowingequityissueshasledtothehypothesisthatmanagerstakeadvantageofperiodsofhighstockpricesandinvestoroveroptimisminordertoselloverpricedequity.This“windowsofopportunity”hypothesissuggeststhatmanager’stimeequityissueswhentheirfirm’ssharesareoverpriced(Ritter[1991]).Thishypothesis,however,cannotbeusedtoexplainpoorstockperformancefollowingdebtissuesdocumentedbySpiesandAffleck-Graves[1999]andDatta,Iskandar-DattaandRaman[2000].Underperformancefollowingdebtfinancingindicatesaneedforanalternativehypothesisthatcanexplainthesefindings.Wesuggestthatmanagerialoveroptimismisafactorthatcanexplainpoorlong-termstockperformancefollowingstockand,especially,bondissuance.Recentstudiesshowthatmanagerialoveroptimismaffectscorporatedecisions.,Heaton[2002],Gervais,HeatonandOdean[2003],MalmendierandTate[2003and2005]).Asmanagersaremoreaffectedbytheper-formanceoftheirfirmthanarewell-diversifiedshareholders,moderatemanagerialoveroptimismcanhelptoensurethatmanagersbehaveinthebestinterestofshareholdersbycounteractingtheeffectofmanagerialriskaversion;however,strongmanagerialoveroptimismcanresultintheundertakingofnegativenetpresentvalueprojectsanddestructionofafirm’svalue(Gervais,HeatonandOdean[2003]).Anexcessivelyfavorableestimateoffutureoutcomesforinvestmentsisthecruxofthismanagerialoveroptimismhypothesis.Whenmanagershaveoptimisticpredictionsofinvestmentoutcomes,theyaremoreinclinedtofinancewithdebtratherthanequity.Confidenceaboutthesizeoffutureoutcomesmakesmanagersunwillingtosharefutureprofitswithnewequityinvestorsandmakethemmorewillingtoissuedebtratherthanequity.Thisstudyteststhemanagerialoveroptimismhypothesisbyexaminingpost-financingstockperformanceforbothdebtandequityfinancing.Ifmanagerialoveroptimismhasamoresignificanteffectonthechoicebetweendebtandequityfinancingandpostfinancingperformancethanmanagerattemptstotimethemarketandtakeadvantageofwindowsofopportunityforissuingequity,weexpectworsestockperformancefollowingdebtfinancingthanfollowingequityfinancing.Wefocusonasampleoffirmswithrapidgrowthinassetsandacorrespondingneedtofinancethoseassets.Byfocusingonfirmsthatrequireassetfinancing,securityissuanceforotherpurposescanbelargelyeliminated.Furthermore,sincestudyinglong-termperformancedoesnotrequireidentifyingaparticularissuancedate,ourstudyisnotlimitedtofirmswithexplicitannouncementsofsecurityissuance.Ratherthanlimitingthestudytofirmsthatannouncenewissuesofdebtorequity,weincludeallformsoffinancingandmeasurefinancingbythechangeindebtorchangeinequity.Inthismanner,implicitsecurityissuancesuchasstock-for-stockmergerscanbeincorporatedinthesample.Anotherreasonforfocusingonhighgrowthfirmsisourexpectationofstrongermanagerialoveroptimismamongthesefirms.Allelsebeingequal,overoptimisticmanagersperceivethattheyhavemoregoodprojectsavailablethanothermanagers.Asmanagersshouldtakeallprojectstheybelievetohavepositivenetpresentvalue,overoptimisticmanagerswouldundertakemoreprojectsresultinginthefastergrowthoftheirfirms.Therearetworeasonswhyitisimportanttofocusonasampleaffectedbystrongmanagerialoveroptimisminastudyexaminingwhethermanagerialoveroptimismaffectsthechoicebetweendebtandequityfinancingandpoorpost-financingperformance.First,thewindowsofopportunityhypothesisandthemanagerialoveroptimismhypothesisarenotmutuallyexclusive.Itispossiblethatwhilesomemanagerschoosebetweendebtandequityfinancingtotakeadvantageofwindowsofopportunity,othermanagersaresignificantlyaffectedbyoveroptimismwhenmakingsecuritychoicedecisions.Eventhesamemanagercanbeaffectedbybothfactorsatthesametime:anoveroptimisticmanagermayattempttotakeadvantageofsharemispricings.Becauseofmarkettimingtoselloverpricedshares,equityfinancingwillbefollowedbyworsepost-financingstockperformancethandebtfinancing.Becauseofthemanagerialoveroptimismeffectonthechoicebetweendebtandequityfinancing,debtfinancingwillbefollowedbyworsestockperformance.Asthesefactorsworkinoppositedirections,theeffectofmarkettimingcancanceltheeffectofmanagerialoveroptimisminasampleofalldebtandequityissues.Thesecondreasonforfocusingonasampleaffectedbystrongmanagerialoveroptimismisrelatedtothemarketoveroptimism.Poorpost-financingstockperformanceindicatesthatthemarketisoveroptimisticaboutthefirmobtainingexternalfinancing.Overoptimisticmanagerspreferdebtfinancingtoequityfinancingwhentheyperceivetheirsharestobeunderpriced,whichhappenswhenmanagersaremoreoveroptimisticabouttheirfirm’sfuturethanisthemarket.Asthemarketisoveroptimisticaboutfinancingfirms,overoptimisticmanagerpreferencefordebtfinancingwillbeobservedonlyforthemostoveroptimisticmanagerswhoseoveroptimismexceedstheoveroptimismofthe,ifwewouldexaminethewholepopulationoffirmsobtainingexternalfinancing,itislikelythatwewouldfindnoevidenceofworsestockperformancefollowingdebtfinancingthanequityfinancing,evenifmanagerialoveroptimismsignificantlyaffectsthechoicebetweendebtandequityfinancingandpost-financingstockperformance.ThisexpectationisconsistentwiththeJung,KimandStulz[1996]studythatcomparesstockperformanceafternewbondissuesandprimarystockofferingsand,whencontrollingforthecharacteristicsofissuingfirms,findnosignificantdifferenceinthepost-issueperformance.Weexamineasampleofhigh-growthfirmsthatincludesthetop10%offirmsintheCompustatdatabase,basedontheirone-yearpercentagetotalassetgrowth.Theresultingsamplecontainsfirmswithsignificantfinancingduringtheexaminedyear.Westudytwosubsetsofthehigh-growthsample:asampleoffirmsthatprimarilyusedebttofinanceassetgrowthandasampleoffirmsthatprimarilyuseexternalequitytofinanceassetgrowth.Ifmoreoverlyoptimisticmanagersusedebtfinancing,thenwewouldfindworseperformanceforthesamplethatprimarilyusesdebtfinancing.Worseperformanceforthesampleofequityfinancingfirmscouldprovidesupportforthewindowsofopportunityhypothesis.Wefindthatdebtfinancingisassociatedwithsignificantlyworsepost-financingone-tofive-yearstockperformance.Forexample,inthefirstpost-financingyear,ourdebt-financingsampleunderperformsourequity-financingsampleby8%to10%,dependingonthemethodologyusedtocontrolforrisk.Wecontrolforriskusingthematched-sampleapproachadvocatedbyBarberandLyon[1997]andafour-factormodel,includingthethreeFamaandFrench[1993]factorssupplementedbyamomentumfactor.Wealsoexaminetheeffectofthechoicebetweendebtandequityfinancingonpost-financingperformanceusingacontinuousvariabletomeasureafirm’srelianceondebtfinancingandcontrollingforfirmcharacteristics.Furthermore,wetesttherobustnessofourresultsusingrestrictedsamples.Regardlessofthetestdesign,wefindthatstrongerrelianceondebtfinancingisassociatedwithworsepost-financingstockperformance.Ourresultssupportthenotionthatthechoicebetweendebtandequityfinancingandpost-financingstockperformanceareaffectedbymanagerialoveroptimism.AlternateHypothesesSeveralhypotheseshavebeenpresentedtoexplainthepricereactiontotheannouncementofsecurityissuanceandtheperformancefollowingthatissuance.InthesignalingmodelpresentedbyMyersandMajluf[1984],investorslearnabouttheprivateinformationmanagershaveaboutthevalueofthefirm’sassetsfromtheirchoiceoffinancing.Managersavoidissuingsecuritiestheybelieveareunderpricedandavoidsharingthevalueaddedfromgoodinvestmentopportunitieswithoutsideinvestors.Mangersprefertofundinvestmentsinternallyandissuelower-risksecuritieswhenoutsidecapitalisneeded.Thishypothesisprovidesbackgroundforthemanagerialoveroptimismhypothesisandthewindowsofopportunityhypothesis.ManagerialOveroptimismHypothesisAcorollarytothesignalinghypothesisisthesuggestionthatmanagerswhoareoveroptimisticabouttheirfirm’sabilitytogeneratewealth-creatingprojectsandbelievetheirequitytobeundervaluedprefertoissuedebtratherthanequity.Heaton[2002]formalizesthemodelexaminingtheeffectofmanagerialoveroptimismoncorporatedecisions.Hesuggeststhatwhenmanagersareoveroptimisticaboutthefirm’sprospects,theyperceivetheirfirm’sriskysecuritiestobeundervaluedand,toavoidissuingunderpricedsecurities,preferdebtissuestoequityissues.Also,sinceoveroptimisticmanagersovervaluetheprojectsavailabletothem,theyundertakesomeprojectsthatarenegativenetpresentvalueprojectseventhoughtheirintentionsaretoactinthebestinterestsoftheirshareholders.RecentempiricalstudiessupportHeaton’s[2002]hypothesisthatoveroptimisticmanagerspreferdebtfinancingtoequityfinancing.Malmendier,TateandYan[2006]examineasampleofForbes500firmsandfindthatoverconfidentCEOsaremorelikelytoissuedebtthanequity.Furthermore,Marciukaityte[2006]findsthatfirmsobtainingsubstantialdebtfinancinghavehigherdiscretionaryaccrualsthanfirmsobtainingsubstantialexternalequityfinancing.Shesuggeststhathighdiscretionaryaccrualsatthetimeofdebtfinancingareduetomanagerialoveroptimism.Poorstockperformancefollowingequityanddebtissues.,Ritter[1991],LoughranandRitter[1995]SpiesandAffleck-Graves[1995and1999],Datta,Iskandar-DattaandRaman[2000])suggeststhatthemarketisoveroptimisticaboutthevalueoffirmsobtainingexternalfinancing.Foroveroptimisticmanagerstobelievethattheirfirmisundervalued,theyneedtobemoreoveroptimisticthanthemarketaboutthevalueoftheirfirm.Behavioralstudiessuggestthatatleastthemostoveroptimisticmanagersareevenmoreoveroptimisticaboutthevalueoftheirfirmsthanthemarket.Thesestudiesshowthatoveroptimismandoverconfidencearenotjustcharacteristicsoflaypeople;managersarealsolikelytobeoverconfident.Aftertestingoverconfidenceamonggroupsofmanagersfromdifferentindustries,RussoandSchoemaker[1992]concludethat“everygroupbelieveditknewmorethanitdidaboutitsindustryorcompany”andmorethan99%wereoverconfident.Also,Langer[1975]andWeinstein[1980]showthatpeopletendtobemoreoveroptimisticaboutoutcomeswhentheybelievetheyhavecontrolofthoseoutcomes.Ofcourse,managersdohavemorecontroloftheirfirmsthaninvestorsdo.Furthermore,desirabilityofoutcomesandcommitmenttooutcomesincreaseoveroptimism(Frank[1935],Weinstein[1980]).Asmanagers’compensationandreputationareaffectedbytheperformanceoftheirfirms,managersarelikelytobemorestronglycommittedtotheirfirmsthaninvestors.Evenhigherintelligencedoesnotseemtoprotectagainstoveroptimism;KlaczynskiandFauth[1996]showthatoveroptimismisactuallymoresevereamongpeoplewithsuperiorintellectualabilities.Furthermore,assomeofthefactorsaffectingmanagerialandmarketoveroptimismmaybethesame,.,pastperformanceofthefirmorpastperformanceofsimilarfirms,managersarelikelytobethemostoveroptimisticwhenthemarketisoveroptimistic.Thus,themostoveroptimisticmanagerswillperceivetheirfirmtobeundervaluedbythemarketevenwhenitisovervalued.Managerialoptimismforindividualprojectscanextendtooverconfidenceintheabilitytoaddvaluetoanyacquiredassets,includingacquiringanentirefirm.Withinthecontextofamerger,themanagerialoverconfidenceisreferredtoas“ManagerialHubris.”Itisanexplanationforacquiringfirmspayingsubstantialpremiumstoacquiretargets,wherethepremiumsareinexcessofmanagerialabilitytoaddvaluetothetargetassets.Themethodologyofthisstudyincorporatesmergeractivitywithinitsdefinitionoffirmgrowth,sinceassetgrowthcanbeaccomplishedeitherthroughcapitalexpenditurefornewassets,purchaseofexistingassetsfromanotherfirm,ormergers.Likewise,debtorequityissuedtofinanceamergeroracquisitionisincorporatedwithinthemethodologyofthisstudy.Suchdebtorequityissuancewillnotbeaccompaniedbyanannouncementofanewsecurityofferingeventhoughtheeffectisthesamewhethersecuritiesareissuedviaapublicofferingorinconjunctionwithamergeroracquisition.WindowsofOpportunityHypothesisIfmanagersarereluctanttoissueunderpricedsecurities,thenequityissuancewouldoccurprimarilywhenmangersperceivethesesecuritiestobeoverpriced.ThemanagerialpracticeofissuingoverpricedequityreceivesempiricalsupportinthestudybyRitter[1991]ofstockunderperformanceafterinitialpublicequityofferings(IPOs).RitterfindsthatIPOfirmsunderperformmatchingfirmsforthreeyearsafterthefirstdayofpublictrading.SuchunderperformanceisevenstrongerforfirmsgoingpublicinyearswithheavyIPOactivity.Thesefindings,Rittersuggests,“indicatethatissuersaresuccessfullytimingnewissuestotakeadvantageof‘windowsofopportunity.”’(p.4)Ifinvestorsareoveroptimisticaboutthefirmvalueincertainperiods,makingequityissuesinthoseperiodsallowsafirmtoraisethesameamountofmoneywithanissueoffewershares,takingadvantageofnewshareholders.Thishypothesissuggeststhatinvestorsareoveroptimisticaboutthevalueofafirmatthetimeoftheofferingandareslowtoreacttotheinformationcontainedintheannouncementofsecurityissue.LoughranandRitter(1995)andSpiessandAffleck-Graves(1995)showthatpost-issueunderperformanceisnotrestrictedtoIPOs;firmsmakingseasonedpublicequityofferingsalsounderperformmatchedfirmsintheone-tofive-yearpost-issueperiods.Thetypeofequityoffering,publicorprivate,alsoseemsnottomatter.Privateplacementsofequityarefollowedbysimilar-sizestockunderperformanceaspublicequityissues(Hertzel,Lemmon,LinckandRees[2002]).Furthermore,post-issueunderperformanceisnotlimitedtoequityissuesintheUnitedStates.Levis[1995]documentspoorpost-issueperformanceintheUnitedKingdom.Kang,KimandStulz[1999]showthatprivateandpublicequityissuesinJapanarefollowedbysimilarpoorpost-issueperformanceasequityissuesintheUnitedStates.Althoughempiricalevidenceofunderperformancefollowingequityissuanceisconsistentwiththewindowsofopportunityhypothesis,underperformancefollowingdebtissuanceisnotconsistentwiththishypothesis.However,severalstudiesfindstockunderperformancefollowingpublicstraightandconvertibledebtofferings(SpiessandAffleck-Graves[1999]),initialdebtofferings(Datta,Iskandar-DattaandRaman[2000]),andbankloans(Billett,FlanneryandGarfinkel[2002]).Thesefindingsbringintoquestionthewindowsofopportunityhypothesisastheonlyexplanationofthepost-financingunderperformance.Sincethecostofdebtfinancingdependsprimarilyuponmarketinterestratesandnotspecificfirmperformance,managersarenotlikelytohaveanybetterforecastofthefuturedirectionofinterestratesthandooutsideinvestors.Evenwithprivateinformationaboutthedefaultriskoftheissuingcompany,thevaluebenefitsaregreaterfromsellingoverpricedequitythanoverpriceddebtpriortoinformationaboutthetruedefaultriskbecomingpublic.SampleandMethodologySampleWecompilethehigh-growthsampleusingthefollowingsteps.First,weidentifythesetoffirm-yearsthatareincludedinbothCRSPandCompustatdatabasesduringtheperiod1981-1999.Welimitthissettofirmyearswiththedatanecessarytoidentifythehighgrowthsample,thedebt-financingsample,andtheequity-financingsample.Weexcluderegulatedutilities(SICcodes4910-4949),depositoryinstitutions(SICcodes6000-6099),andholdingorotherinvestmentoffices(SICcodes6700-6799).Weconsideronlyfiscalyearsthatare12monthslong.Thehigh-growthsampleincludesfirm-yearsinthehighestdecileofassetgrowth.Wecalculatetheassetgrowthasachangeintotalassets(CompustatitemA6)duringonefiscalyear,dividedbytotalassetsatthebeginningofthefiscalyear.Thisprocedurelimitsthesampleto7,664firms.Furthermore,toreducetheproblemofcross-sectionaldependenceofobservations,werequirethatfirm-yearsforthesamefirmareatleastfiveyearsapart.Ifwehavemorethanonefirm-yearinanyfive-yearperiod,weincludeonlytheearliestone.Thisprocedurecreatesthehigh-growthsampleincluding5,583firms.Thepercentagegrowthintotalassetsisevaluatedforaneventyear,definedasYear0.WedefinetheeventdayasthelastdayofthethirdmonthafterYear0.Weusethethree-monthlagaftertheendofthefiscalyeartoallowthemarkettohaveaccesstoeachfirm’saccountinginformationforYear0.Ourpost-eventperiodstartsthreemonthsaftertheendofYear0.Aftercompilingthesampleofhigh-growthfirmsanddeterminingeventdays,wesubdividethehighgrowthsampleintosubsamplesthatuseprimarilydebtandexternalequityfinancing.Thedebt-financingsampleincludesfirmswithdebtfinancingatleast50%