股权结构、现金流与资本投资讲义课件

Law,CorporateGovernance,andCorporateScandalinChinaYiZhangPekingUniversityInternationalConferenceonCorporateGovernanceShanghaiMarch2005Law,CorporateGovernance,and1I.IntroductionIthasbeenovertenyearssincestockmarketsestablishedinChina.Chinastocksmarkethasbeenplayingarole.thereexistsomanylistedfirmscommittedfraudandscandalSince1992,about200listedfirmsamong1200havebeensubjecttosecurityenforcementactionbyChinaSecuritiesRegulationCommission(CSRC),ShenzhenStockExchange(SZSE)andShanghaiStockExchange(SSE).TheratiooffirmswithscandalisfarabovethelevelofothercountriesI.IntroductionIthasbeenove2MotivationWhatcontributestofirm’sscandal?DoescorporategovernancematterinChina? Isthereasoundcorporategovernancemechanismcouldpreventscandal?Doeslegalandeconomicdevelopmentmatter? -Isthereadifferencebetweenfirmsinregionswithvariouslegaleffectiveness? -economicdevelopment?MotivationWhatcontributesto3本资料来源本资料来源4II.IssuesandHypothesis:

-Corporategovernance-legal-economic-financeII.IssuesandHypothesis:51.

CorporateGovernance1.1.

ownershipOneofthemostessentialfeatureoftheownershipofChineselistedfirmsisthedominanceofthelargestshareholderTherehasnoeffectivemechanismtomonitorandrestrictthelargeshareholdersThelargeshareholdercanexpropriatetheminorityshareholdersforprivatebenefit1.

CorporateGovernance1.1.

61.

CorporateGovernance1.1.

ownershipJensen(1976)Stulz(1988)H1A:Astheownershipofthelargestshareholderincreasesfromzero,afirmismorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandal1.

CorporateGovernance1.1.

7EntrenchmentoflargeshareholdersExpropriationbylargeshareholderLaPorta,Lopez-De-Silanes,Shleifer(1999)LaPorta,Lopez-De-Silanes,Shleifer(2002)Claessens,Djankov,Fan,andLang(2002)FanandWong(2002)H1B:Astheownershipofthelargestshareholderincreasesovercertainlevel,afirmismorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandalEntrenchmentoflargesharehol81.2

FirmControllerThereisfundamentaldifferencebetweenstateandnon-stateshareholdersThereishugedifferenceamongstateshareholdersininternalmonitoring,etc. -centralgovernment(bu/wei,中央部委）和-non-centralgovernment(非部委）LiandZhang（2005）LiandZhang（2004）LinandZhang（2004）1.2

FirmControllerThereisf91.2

FirmController-centralgovernment(bu/wei,中央部委）和-non-centralgovernment(非部委）centralgovernmentcontrolledlocalgovernmentcontrolledlocalStateEnterprises(SOE)controlledNon-statelegalpersoncontrolledNaturalpersonothers1.2

FirmController-centralg101.2

FirmControllerCentralgovernmentcontrolledfirmsareassociatedwithclearerownership,(alittle)moretransparency,moremonitoringmoresocialresponsibility， (maybe)betterprotectionofminorityshareholdersNon-centralSOEandnon-statelegalpersoncontrolledfirmsareassociatedwithlesstransparencyandlackofmonitoring uptolesssocialresponsibility lackofprotectionofminorityshareholdersH2:Firmscontrolledbycentral(/local)governmentarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandal

1.2

FirmControllerCentralgo111.

CorporateGovernance1.3

BoardFamaandJensen(1983)theorizethattheboardofdirectorsisthehighestinternalcontrolmechanismresponsibleformonitoringtheactionsoftopmanagement. -thecompositionofindividualswhoserveontheboardofdirectorsisanimportantfactorincreatingaboardthatisaneffectivemonitorofmanagementactionsFama’s(1980)andFamaandJensen’s(1983)theorywouldpredictthathigherpercentagesofindependentdirectorsincreasetheboard’seffectivenessasamonitorofmanagement.1.

CorporateGovernance1.3

B12Jensen(1993)arguesthatboardsofdirectorareineffectivemonitorswhentheboardistoolarge,whentheboard’sequityownershipissmall,andwhentheCEOisalsotheChairmanoftheBpositionoftheboardofdirectorsdeterminesitseffectiveness DeFondandJiambalvo(1991) Beasley(1996) Dechow,SloanandSweeney(1996),etc. Boardcompositionanddisclosure

ChenandJaggi（2000）Jensen(1993)arguesthatboar13TheboardsizeH3A:FirmwithalargerboardsizeismorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandalTheboardsize14Theboard-managementrelationshipTheCEO/ChairmanH3B:FirmwithaseparateCEOandChairmanislesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalTheboard-managementrelations15IndependentdirectorsIndependentdirectors,comparedwithinsidedirectors,arelesslikelytocolludewithmanagementH3C:Firmswithlowerproportion(seats)ofindependentdirectorontheboardofdirectorsaremorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandalIndependentdirectors16DirectorholdingsH3D:Firmswithahigherratio(number)ofdirectorsholdfirmstockarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalChairmanHoldingH3E:FirmswithhigherChairmanstockholdingarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalDirectorholdings17DirectorCompensationH3F:Firmwithhigherratio(number)ofdirectorpaidarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalDirectorCompensation181.4SupervisoryCommittee(BoardofSupervisors-监事会)SupervisoryCommitteesizeH4A:FirmswithalargerSupervisoryCommitteesizeismore(less?)likelytobeassociatedwithscandal1.4SupervisoryCommittee(Boa191.4SupervisoryCommittee(BoardofSupervisors-监事会)SupervisoryCommitteememberholdingsH4B:Firmswithahigherratio(number)ofsupervisorsholdfirmstockislesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandal1.4SupervisoryCommittee(Boa20SupervisoryCommitteememberCompensationH4C:Firmwithhigherratio(number)ofSupervisoryCommitteememberpaidisless(ormore?)likelytobeassociatedwithscandalSupervisoryCommitteememberC214．Institutioninvestors机构投资者能够降低公司内部的代理成本，减少公司管理层的不良行为 JarrellandPoulsen(1987) Brickley,Lease,andSmith(1988) 机构投资者更倾向于反对减少股东财富的行为机构投资者相比其他类型的投资者而言更需要透明度和信息的披露 Healyetal.(1999) Bushee和Noe(2000) 机构投资者更偏好购买那些持续披露信息的公司的股票4．Institutioninvestors机构投资者能够22长期持有公司股票的机构投资者，很可能出于自身的利益而合谋进行不法行为机构投资者可以从中得到的益处 财务性的收益，如低于市价的转让价格，阻止封闭式基金的赎回以及承销、财务顾问方面的合同（Barclay,Holderness,和Pontiff(1993)）非财务性的收益，如影响公司在政治、经济或社会方面的政策长期持有公司股票的机构投资者，很可能出于自身的利益而合谋进行23就我国的实际情况而言，基金、证券等机构重仓持有上市公司的股票，利用内部信息进行炒作、牟取暴利已不是秘密因此，在我国机构投资者的持股比例同公司违规行为是正相关还是负相关或不相关需要实证检验。H4：Institutionholdingsarerelatedtothelikelihoodforfirmtocommitscandal就我国的实际情况而言，基金、证券等机构重仓持有上市公司的股票24FinancialdistressFirmsconfrontingwithfinancialdistressaremorelikelytocommitfinancialstatementfraudNeedcontrolforfinancials

FinancialdistressFirmsconfro25

3.EconomicdevelopmentFirmsinmoreeconomydevelopedregionarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandal

3.Economicdevelopment26

4.Law

WrittenlawLLSV(1998)Allen,Qian,Qian(JFE,forthcoming)EffectivenessoflawismoreimportantthanthewrittenlawinatransitioneconomyBerkowitzetal(2003)Alford(2000)LuandYao(2004)

4.Law27

China’sprovincessignificantlydiffersintermsoflegaldevelopment.Whetherlaweffectivenessintheregionaffectsfirm’sdecisiontocommitfraud?MaybelawdoesnotmattersincelawisnoteffectiveoverallinChina?

China’sprovincessignificant28四、实证研究方法

（i）变量

SCANDAL，公司是否被监管机构认定为违规并公开批评,谴责或处罚控制变量DEBT：公司的资产负债率ROA：公司的资产收益率LIQUIDITY：公司的流动比率四、实证研究方法（i）变量292．实证回归模型

Matchingscandalfirmswithnon-scandalfirmsLogisticregressionExaminefirm’spropensitytocommitscandalSCANDAL=f(β0+β1GOVERN+β2INSTITUTE+β3BOARD+β4FSIZE+β5DEBT+β6ROA+β7LIQUIDITY+（OtherControls）) （1）

2．实证回归模型Matchingscandalfirm30五、样本与数据

（一）数据

Inordertoidentifyfirmsthatcommitscandal,werefertotheChinaSecuritiesJournal,ShanghaiSecuritiesJournalandtheGuotaianDatasetforfinancialscandals. ThetotalnumberoffirmssubjecttoenforcementactionsbytheCEC,SSE,andSZSEbetween1993and2003is178.

Weeliminate12firmswhosegovernanceinformationinandbeforethefraudperiodarenotavailable,2firmslistedonB-StockMarketofChina,and4firmsthatcannotbematchedbyindustrycode,andthenthesamplesizeisreducedto160

五、样本与数据（一）数据31虚构利润虚列资产虚假陈述重大遗漏擅自改变资金用途大股东占用资产违规担保股权结构、现金流与资本投资讲义课件32五、样本与数据

Eachofthescandalfirmismatchedwithano-scandalfirm,creatingachoice-basedsampleof160scandaland160no-scandalfirms.

Thecontrolfirmisobtainedbythefollowingfour-stepprocess:(i)StockExchange (ii)

Industry.3-digitindustrialcode.Ifthere’snofirmmatchingthethreedigits,thenselectthatofthesameprimarytwodigits

(iii)FirmSize.

53of160committedscandalinaperiodlasting2ormoreaccountingyears,andwedefinethefraudperiodofthesefirmsasthefirstdateoftheirfinancialstatementfraud Whenfirmscommittedscandalandwasdenounced/criticized/punishedmorethanonce,weonlyrecordthefirsttime五、样本与数据Eachofthescandalfi33SampledescriptionSampledescription34

35logistic回归分析GovernanceandfinancialsAddmarketizationindexProxyforeconomicsdevelopmentProxyforlegaldevelopmentProxyforfinancialdevelopmentlogistic回归分析Governanceandfin36CorporateGovernance

Ownership

LARGEST回归系数为负,在5%水平上显著,LARGESTSQ的回归系数为正，在10%水平上显著第一大股东持股比例从零开始增大,公司越不会commitscandal;当第一大股东持股比例达到一定水平,持股比例越高,公司越可能commitscandal;LOCAL和LEGALP的回归系数为正，LOCAL在5%水平上显著，LEGALP在0.1%水平上显著 非国有法人和地方政府控制的公司更有可能违规CorporateGovernance

Ownership37董事会BOARDSIZE,INDEPENDENT均不显著 董事会规模和独立董事席位（比例）CHAIRCEO不显著 CEO是否兼任董事持股董事人数（比例）和付报酬董事人数（比例）均不显著CHAIRHOLDING为负，在10％水平上显著董事长持股比例越高，公司越不会commitscandal董事会BOARDSIZE,INDEPENDENT均不显著38监事会监事会规模不显著持股监事人数（比例）不显著付报酬监事比例显著为正(10%水平) 取得报酬的监事比例越高，公司越可能commitscandal监事会监事会规模不显著39机构投资者机构投资者持股比例不显著机构投资者机构投资者持股比例不显著40分拆上市或整体上市分拆上市或整体上市没有显著影响分拆上市或整体上市分拆上市或整体上市没有显著影响41Controls流动比率的回归系数显著为负 流动比率越高的公司，financialdistress的可能较小,违规可能较小DEBT的回归系数为正，但统计上不显著ROA的回归系数显著为负 资产收益率较高的公司违规可能较小Controls42RegiondevelopmentNortheast显著为正,公司发生丑闻的可能性较高midyangtz显著为正,公司发生丑闻的可能性较高Regiondevelopment43Economicdevelopmentlgdppc，该省人均GDP对数值为负，并在统计上显著 经济越发达，公司发生丑闻的可能性越小Economicdevelopment44LegaldevelopmentMeasureoflegaleffectiveness检察院(procuratorialsystem)ProcuratorialCases_per_capita:立案经济案件ProcuratorialCases_gdpLoss_to_GDP:TheratioofsavedlossbyprocuratorialsuitstolocalGDPCadre_In_procurate: Thismeasuresthecorruptnessofofficials.Thenumberofcadresatcountylevelorabove(县处级以上)involvedinprocuratatedividedbythepopulation

LegaldevelopmentMeasureofle45Legaldevelopment法院(courtsystem)Case_Close_Rate

RCMP:Thenumberofcommercialcasesreceivedbythecourtpermillionofpopulation律师协会(lawyerassociation)Lawyer_per_capitaLawyer_GDP_Ratio

Legaldevelopment法院(courtsys46Legaldevelopment

ProcuratorialCases_per_capitaProcuratorialCases_gdpShowpositiverelationshiptopropensitytocommitscandal? Measurestheextentofillegalactivity,butnotthelaweffectivenesswhentheeffectivenessofprocuratorialsystemisextremelylowLegaldevelopmentProcuratoria47LegaldevelopmentRCMP显著为正,RCMP平方显著为负TwodifferentsceneriesWhenthelaweffectivenessisextremelylowWhenlawbecomeseffective(e.g.Shanghai) BetterlegalenvironmentLegaldevelopment48FinancialdevelopmentMeasurementPrivate_Invest:Obtainedbysubtractingthefixed-assetinvestmentmadebySOEsandcollectivefirmsfromthetotalamountoffixed-assetinvestmentinaprovinceFIN_Competition:Subtractingthecreditissuedbythefourmajorstatebanksfromthetotalamountofcredit,wegetthecreditissuedbylocalfinancialinstitutions.Theproportionofcreditissuedbylocalfinancialinstitutionstothetotalamountofcreditcanserveasameasureoffinancialcompetition.FinancialdevelopmentMeasureme49股权结构、现金流与资本投资讲义课件50Law,CorporateGovernance,andCorporateScandalinChinaYiZhangPekingUniversityInternationalConferenceonCorporateGovernanceShanghaiMarch2005Law,CorporateGovernance,and51I.IntroductionIthasbeenovertenyearssincestockmarketsestablishedinChina.Chinastocksmarkethasbeenplayingarole.thereexistsomanylistedfirmscommittedfraudandscandalSince1992,about200listedfirmsamong1200havebeensubjecttosecurityenforcementactionbyChinaSecuritiesRegulationCommission(CSRC),ShenzhenStockExchange(SZSE)andShanghaiStockExchange(SSE).TheratiooffirmswithscandalisfarabovethelevelofothercountriesI.IntroductionIthasbeenove52MotivationWhatcontributestofirm’sscandal?DoescorporategovernancematterinChina? Isthereasoundcorporategovernancemechanismcouldpreventscandal?Doeslegalandeconomicdevelopmentmatter? -Isthereadifferencebetweenfirmsinregionswithvariouslegaleffectiveness? -economicdevelopment?MotivationWhatcontributesto53本资料来源本资料来源54II.IssuesandHypothesis:

-Corporategovernance-legal-economic-financeII.IssuesandHypothesis:551.

CorporateGovernance1.1.

ownershipOneofthemostessentialfeatureoftheownershipofChineselistedfirmsisthedominanceofthelargestshareholderTherehasnoeffectivemechanismtomonitorandrestrictthelargeshareholdersThelargeshareholdercanexpropriatetheminorityshareholdersforprivatebenefit1.

CorporateGovernance1.1.

561.

CorporateGovernance1.1.

ownershipJensen(1976)Stulz(1988)H1A:Astheownershipofthelargestshareholderincreasesfromzero,afirmismorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandal1.

CorporateGovernance1.1.

57EntrenchmentoflargeshareholdersExpropriationbylargeshareholderLaPorta,Lopez-De-Silanes,Shleifer(1999)LaPorta,Lopez-De-Silanes,Shleifer(2002)Claessens,Djankov,Fan,andLang(2002)FanandWong(2002)H1B:Astheownershipofthelargestshareholderincreasesovercertainlevel,afirmismorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandalEntrenchmentoflargesharehol581.2

FirmControllerThereisfundamentaldifferencebetweenstateandnon-stateshareholdersThereishugedifferenceamongstateshareholdersininternalmonitoring,etc. -centralgovernment(bu/wei,中央部委）和-non-centralgovernment(非部委）LiandZhang（2005）LiandZhang（2004）LinandZhang（2004）1.2

FirmControllerThereisf591.2

FirmController-centralgovernment(bu/wei,中央部委）和-non-centralgovernment(非部委）centralgovernmentcontrolledlocalgovernmentcontrolledlocalStateEnterprises(SOE)controlledNon-statelegalpersoncontrolledNaturalpersonothers1.2

FirmController-centralg601.2

FirmControllerCentralgovernmentcontrolledfirmsareassociatedwithclearerownership,(alittle)moretransparency,moremonitoringmoresocialresponsibility， (maybe)betterprotectionofminorityshareholdersNon-centralSOEandnon-statelegalpersoncontrolledfirmsareassociatedwithlesstransparencyandlackofmonitoring uptolesssocialresponsibility lackofprotectionofminorityshareholdersH2:Firmscontrolledbycentral(/local)governmentarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandal

1.2

FirmControllerCentralgo611.

CorporateGovernance1.3

BoardFamaandJensen(1983)theorizethattheboardofdirectorsisthehighestinternalcontrolmechanismresponsibleformonitoringtheactionsoftopmanagement. -thecompositionofindividualswhoserveontheboardofdirectorsisanimportantfactorincreatingaboardthatisaneffectivemonitorofmanagementactionsFama’s(1980)andFamaandJensen’s(1983)theorywouldpredictthathigherpercentagesofindependentdirectorsincreasetheboard’seffectivenessasamonitorofmanagement.1.

CorporateGovernance1.3

B62Jensen(1993)arguesthatboardsofdirectorareineffectivemonitorswhentheboardistoolarge,whentheboard’sequityownershipissmall,andwhentheCEOisalsotheChairmanoftheBpositionoftheboardofdirectorsdeterminesitseffectiveness DeFondandJiambalvo(1991) Beasley(1996) Dechow,SloanandSweeney(1996),etc. Boardcompositionanddisclosure

ChenandJaggi（2000）Jensen(1993)arguesthatboar63TheboardsizeH3A:FirmwithalargerboardsizeismorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandalTheboardsize64Theboard-managementrelationshipTheCEO/ChairmanH3B:FirmwithaseparateCEOandChairmanislesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalTheboard-managementrelations65IndependentdirectorsIndependentdirectors,comparedwithinsidedirectors,arelesslikelytocolludewithmanagementH3C:Firmswithlowerproportion(seats)ofindependentdirectorontheboardofdirectorsaremorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandalIndependentdirectors66DirectorholdingsH3D:Firmswithahigherratio(number)ofdirectorsholdfirmstockarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalChairmanHoldingH3E:FirmswithhigherChairmanstockholdingarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalDirectorholdings67DirectorCompensationH3F:Firmwithhigherratio(number)ofdirectorpaidarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalDirectorCompensation681.4SupervisoryCommittee(BoardofSupervisors-监事会)SupervisoryCommitteesizeH4A:FirmswithalargerSupervisoryCommitteesizeismore(less?)likelytobeassociatedwithscandal1.4SupervisoryCommittee(Boa691.4SupervisoryCommittee(BoardofSupervisors-监事会)SupervisoryCommitteememberholdingsH4B:Firmswithahigherratio(number)ofsupervisorsholdfirmstockislesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandal1.4SupervisoryCommittee(Boa70SupervisoryCommitteememberCompensationH4C:Firmwithhigherratio(number)ofSupervisoryCommitteememberpaidisless(ormore?)likelytobeassociatedwithscandalSupervisoryCommitteememberC714．Institutioninvestors机构投资者能够降低公司内部的代理成本，减少公司管理层的不良行为 JarrellandPoulsen(1987) Brickley,Lease,andSmith(1988) 机构投资者更倾向于反对减少股东财富的行为机构投资者相比其他类型的投资者而言更需要透明度和信息的披露 Healyetal.(1999) Bushee和Noe(2000) 机构投资者更偏好购买那些持续披露信息的公司的股票4．Institutioninvestors机构投资者能够72长期持有公司股票的机构投资者，很可能出于自身的利益而合谋进行不法行为机构投资者可以从中得到的益处 财务性的收益，如低于市价的转让价格，阻止封闭式基金的赎回以及承销、财务顾问方面的合同（Barclay,Holderness,和Pontiff(1993)）非财务性的收益，如影响公司在政治、经济或社会方面的政策长期持有公司股票的机构投资者，很可能出于自身的利益而合谋进行73就我国的实际情况而言，基金、证券等机构重仓持有上市公司的股票，利用内部信息进行炒作、牟取暴利已不是秘密因此，在我国机构投资者的持股比例同公司违规行为是正相关还是负相关或不相关需要实证检验。H4：Institutionholdingsarerelatedtothelikelihoodforfirmtocommitscandal就我国的实际情况而言，基金、证券等机构重仓持有上市公司的股票74FinancialdistressFirmsconfrontingwithfinancialdistressaremorelikelytocommitfinancialstatementfraudNeedcontrolforfinancials

FinancialdistressFirmsconfro75

3.EconomicdevelopmentFirmsinmoreeconomydevelopedregionarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandal

3.Economicdevelopment76

4.Law

WrittenlawLLSV(1998)Allen,Qian,Qian(JFE,forthcoming)EffectivenessoflawismoreimportantthanthewrittenlawinatransitioneconomyBerkowitzetal(2003)Alford(2000)LuandYao(2004)

4.Law77

China’sprovincessignificantlydiffersintermsoflegaldevelopment.Whetherlaweffectivenessintheregionaffectsfirm’sdecisiontocommitfraud?MaybelawdoesnotmattersincelawisnoteffectiveoverallinChina?

China’sprovincessignificant78四、实证研究方法

（i）变量

SCANDAL，公司是否被监管机构认定为违规并公开批评,谴责或处罚控制变量DEBT：公司的资产负债率ROA：公司的资产收益率LIQUIDITY：公司的流动比率四、实证研究方法（i）变量792．实证回归模型

Matchingscandalfirmswithnon-scandalfirmsLogisticregressionExaminefirm’spropensitytocommitscandalSCANDAL=f(β0+β1GOVERN+β2INSTITUTE+β3BOARD+β4FSIZE+β5DEBT+β6ROA+β7LIQUIDITY+（OtherControls）) （1）

2．实证回归模型Matchingscandalfirm80五、样本与数据

（一）数据

Inordertoidentifyfirmsthatcommitscandal,werefertotheChinaSecuritiesJournal,ShanghaiSecuritiesJournalandtheGuotaianDatasetforfinancialscandals. ThetotalnumberoffirmssubjecttoenforcementactionsbytheCEC,SSE,andSZSEbetween1993and2003is178.

Weeliminate12firmswhosegovernanceinformationinandbeforethefraudperiodarenotavailable,2firmslistedonB-StockMarketofChina,and4firmsthatcannotbematchedbyindustrycode,andthenthesamplesizeisreducedto160

五、样本与数据（一）数据81虚构利润虚列资产虚假陈述重大遗漏擅自改变资金用途大股东占用资产违规担保股权结构、现金流与资本投资讲义课件82五、样本与数据

Eachofthescandalfirmismatchedwithano-scandalfirm,creatingachoice-basedsampleof160scandaland160no-scandalfirms.

Thecontrolfirmisobtainedbythefollowingfour-stepprocess:(i)StockExchange (ii)

Industry.3-digitindustrialcode.Ifthere’snofirmmatchingthethreedigits,thenselectthatofthesameprimarytwodigits

(iii)FirmSize.

53of160committedscandalinaperiodlasting2ormoreaccountingyears,andwedefinethefraudperiodofthesefirmsasthefirstdateoftheirfinancialstatementfraud Whenfirmscommittedscandalandwasdenounced/criticized/punishedmorethanonce,weonlyrecordthefirsttime五、样本与数据Eachofthescandalfi83SampledescriptionSampledescription84

85logistic回归分析GovernanceandfinancialsAddmarketizationindexProxyforeconomicsdevelopmentProxyforlegaldevelopmentProxyforfinancialdevelopmentlogistic回归分析Governanceandfin86CorporateGovernance

Ownership

LARGEST回归系数为负,在5%水平上显著,LARGESTSQ的回归系数为正，在10%水平上显著第一大股东持股比例从零开始增大,公司越不会commitscandal;当第一大股东持股比例达到一定水平,持股比例越高,公司越可能commitscandal;LOCAL和LEGALP的回归系数为正，LOCAL在5%水平上显著，LEGALP在0.1%水平上显著 非国有法人和地方政府控制的公司更有可能违规CorporateGovernance