TimeforconventionalarmscontrolontheKoreanP

1、Time for Conventional Arms Control On the Korean Peninsula Yong-Sup Han, Paul K. Davis, and Richard E. DarilekThe first-ever Korean summit in June2000 was a remarkable event, concluding with a joint statement by the two heads of state that included language on reunification. South Korean President K

2、im Dae Jung dramatized the results afterward by saying that war would no longer be possible on the Korean Peninsula, but noticeably absent from the joint statement was any mention of the need to ease military tensions and build a durable peace on the peninsula. It should not be forgotten that North

3、Korea presently has massive forward-deployed offensive forces, including missiles, long-range artillery, and mechanized forces. If Pyongyang's circumstances or intentions changed for the worse-as is surely possible given its basket-case economy and political system-North Korea could initiate a s

4、urprise attack according to its traditional military strategy, perhaps trying to seize Seoul with the intention of subsequently bargaining from strength. The diplomatic breakthrough achieved at the inter-Korean summit and the subsequent missile talks between Pyongyang and Washington are important, b

5、ut the absence of conventional security issues at the negotiating table should be a major concern-especially to South Korea. The potential for immediate and massive violence that exists between the two Koreas is not a natural state of affairs for nations attempting to normalize relations. Convention

6、al arms control measures can play an important role in reducing tensions and lessening the likelihood of a devastating conflict. The inter-Korean breakthrough provides a positive diplomatic atmosphere-and therefore an important opportunity-to pursue such measures, but there are a number of other rea

7、sons why it is important to move forward as quickly as possible. First, the reduced sense of threat in South Korea stemming from political detente with the North may lead to complacency or even heightened anti-Americanism as South Koreans reassess the costs and benefits of having American troops in

8、their country. In time, such attitudes could lead the U.S. Congress to likewise reconsider the wisdom and necessity of having U.S. soldiers in Korea. The result could be a premature weakening of both U.S. forces in Korea and of the U.S.-R.O.K. security relationship. It is therefore best to address t

9、he threat of North Korea's conventional forces now, while the parties' political will to do so remains strong. A second reason for raising security issues immediately is that the South is currently planning economic assistance and investments that are exceedingly valuable to the North, inclu

10、ding the construction of an industrial complex and related transportation infrastructure in Kaesong. If Seoul gives away too much economically before achieving concessions on military threat reduction, the result could be a somewhat invigorated North Korea with the same unacceptable military capabil

11、ities it has today and perhaps even a weakened relationship with Washington. A third reason is that it is impossible as yet to judge Kim Jong Il's long-term intentions or abilities, much less those of lesser officials and military figures in the D.P.R.K. South Korea would be well advised to purs

12、ue an ambitious, probing, and adaptive strategy that clarifies intentions and reduces the risks of war while preserving the ability to back away, toughen up, and prepare for difficulties if developments sour. By reducing the North Korean threat, conventional arms control could prove extremely useful

13、, and even if political developments subsequently worsened, its accomplishments might nevertheless endure and reduce the risks of war. The current U.S. and South Korean approaches to negotiating with North Korea have been too timid and therefore too risky. Seoul's engagement policy thus far has

14、been a step-by-step approach that starts with political and economic issues and proceeds to security issues-eventually. For its part, Washington will not pay attention to conventional security issues until the nuclear and missile questions are resolved. Dealing with the security threat on the Korean

15、 Peninsula requires a more ambitious, holistic, and adaptive approach that proceeds from the belief that a sustainable and productive engagement policy should include concrete steps to reduce conventional military threats on the peninsula now. Simultaneous political, economic, and security negotiati

16、ons have the best chance of inducing the desired behavioral changes in the North and reducing the threat of war. As illustrated by the European experience during the 1990s, arms control can be a powerful instrument for change once the circumstances and decisions allow, but nothing more. If the trend

17、s on the Korean Peninsula are in fact as favorable as they seem, conventional arms control should be feasible. However, if the underlying realities are in fact less auspicious, then it is better to know sooner rather than later. Rather than waiting for an uncertain future, it is important to seize t

18、he opportunity provided by the inter-Korean breakthrough now to bring down the source of military tensions as part of changing the hostile relationship. Fortunately, there is also groundwork on which to build. Background on Korean Arms ControlIt is often forgotten that a broad scope of Korean arms c

19、ontrol issues were discussed seriously nearly a decade ago. In 1991 and 1992, the South and the North addressed how to improve their overall relationship and how to reduce military tension in the wake of the Cold War's end. They agreed to resolve differences peacefully through dialogue and negot

20、iation, pledged not to use force against each other, and agreed to establish a South-North Joint Military Commission to discuss and carry out steps to build military confidence and realize arms reduction. These were to include the mutual notification and control of large-scale military maneuvers and

21、 exercises; the peaceful utilization of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ); exchanges of military personnel and information; phased arms reductions, including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and offensive capabilities; and verification of such elimination.1 In large part because it regarded

22、 discussing U.S. forces as out of the question, the South demanded that confidence building take place before any arms reduction talks, whereas the North demanded that arms reduction take place first. The South proposed that the two Koreas agree to notification and observation of military exercises

23、and maneuvers, peaceful utilization of demilitarized zones, exchange of military personnel and information, verification, and elimination of weapons of mass destruction. The North proposed prohibiting military exercises with foreign countries, changing the DMZ into a peace zone, staging force reduct

24、ions from 300,000 soldiers to 100,000 (with the phased withdrawals of U.S. forces in Korea being proportional to the reductions made by the two Koreas), reducing offensive weapons in proportion to manpower reduction, and suspending the acquisition of advanced weapons from abroad. Although the North&

25、#39;s proposals were patently one-sided in many respects, they were ambitious and discussions proved possible. The two sides agreed that subsequent negotiations would take up confidence-building and arms-reduction measures at the same time. The sides appeared to be making progress, but the measures

26、were never implemented for several reasons. First, the issue of North Korea's nuclear program emerged and the U.S. focus on that blocked progress on conventional arms control. Second, South Korea and the United States decided to resume Team Spirit military exercises in 1993 when North Korea refu

27、sed to accept inspection of its nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency. (The Team Spirit exercises, annual military maneuvers symbolic of the highly developed U.S.-R.O.K. alliance, had been cancelled in 1992 to promote Pyongyang's cooperation on nuclear issues.) Third, the

28、North unilaterally violated its commitment not to vilify and antagonize the South and not to intrude forces secretly into the South's territory or its territorial waters. And, finally, the North learned from the nuclear discussions that it could go "over the head" of the South, thereby

29、 reducing its incentive to negotiate with South Korea. Although the inter-Korean arms control discussions yielded important results, a net assessment of the progress made is not encouraging. North Korea achieved some of its aims in the conventional military arena and gained a good deal from the nucl

30、ear discussions. Consistent with its objectives, Pyongyang saw a complete pullout of U.S. nuclear weapons from Korea and, in 1997, a unilateral cancellation of Team Spirit exercises by the United States and South Korea. Moreover, it achieved its goal of direct security talks with the United States,

31、rather than South Korea. North Korea now contends that there are two remaining tasks: withdrawal of U.S. forces and cessation of the U.S.-R.O.K. military alliance. In contrast, South Korea and the United States ultimately gained nothing from the 1991 conventional arms control efforts, though they di

32、d make some gains on nuclear and missile issues. During the inter-Korean nuclear talks of December 1991, prompted by unilateral withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, the two Koreas agreed to the principle of denuclearization of the peninsula. In 1994, the United States was able to freeze Nort

33、h Korea's nuclear weapons development program in exchange for heavy fuel oil and light-water nuclear reactors. More recently, North Korea agreed to a moratorium on its missile test launches, and relations between Washington and Pyongyang eased in the wake of June's North-South summit as the

34、United States lifted economic sanctions and changed the grating "rogue state" appellation to the less offensive "state of concern." There is still no permanent agreement on the development, testing, or export of missiles, but Kim Jong-Il reportedly promised Secretary of State Mad

35、eleine Albright in October that North Korea would conduct no further tests of the Taepo Dong-1 ballistic missile. However, these developments will largely benefit the United States, not South Korea. One other diplomatic development of note has been the Four Party talks, which were convened in Decemb

36、er 1997 to work toward replacing the armistice ending the Korean War with a permanent peace agreement. The talks-envolving North Korea, South Korea, the United States, and China-served as a forum for addressing confidence-building measures until August 1999. Unfortunately, North Korea resisted movem

37、ent on security issues because of Washington and Seoul's refusal to include U.S. forces in the agenda. The joint communiqué that followed North Korean Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok's visit to Washington this October mentioned the Four Party talks, but it seems unlikely that they are the mos

38、t promising forum for addressing conventional arms control. The conventional arms control process needs to be hammered out between the two Koreas without the often overbearing presence of the United States, particularly in light of the conflicting security interests between Beijing and Washington.2

39、Against this background, what is the context for new negotiations? The Kim Dae Jung government still believes that confidence building should take place before any arms reduction talks. It worries that any premature arms reduction talks will entail reconfiguration and reduction of U.S. troops in Kor

40、ea, thus jeopardizing deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. Some officials believe that such talks would also be "more than the traffic could bear," an opinion often expressed over the years by U.S. officials focused on nuclear issues. In contrast, North Korea probably still believes that ar

41、ms reduction should take place first, although, notably, it has indicated willingness to compromise on the future role of U.S. forces in Korea so long as they change their status to one of neutrality or peacekeeping. Nevertheless, the June summit and subsequent meetings suggest that many changes can

42、 occur in the security premises held by the South and by the North. This suggests that defense planners in Seoul and Washington can think anew about reciprocal conventional threat reduction and how to make headway for a peaceful unification, while maintaining Korea's long-term stability and regi

43、onal status in East Asia. The first chance for conventional threat reduction failed in the early 1990s, but the conditions are more auspicious now. Objectives for Arms ControlA renewed attempt at conventional arms control on the Korean Peninsula should pursue the following major objectives: · F

44、acilitating peace, normalization, and potential eventual reunification. · Deterring invasion or other acts of attempted aggression. · Avoiding crisis and, if that fails, assuring crisis stability. · Cutting back on arms competition to enhance strategic stability and permit increased a

45、llocation of resources for social and economic development. · Laying the groundwork for a military transition consistent with the strategic interests of a post-normalization Korea (or two Koreas) in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. Although it may seem like fluff to some, the first object

46、ive is important given Korea's long history of rancor. If the D.P.R.K. has taken the strategic decision to forego unification by force and instead to pursue peace and normalization, then it is important to shift perceptions at all levels of society. Conventional arms control could help. After fi

47、ve decades of ideologically based hostility and mistrust, even modest confidence-building activities could be useful. There are times when perceptions are reality and when changing those perceptions is both feasible and desirable. That said, the crux of the issue is that the North poses a serious an

48、d immediate threat to the South, and deterring invasion and other acts of aggression must therefore remain a top priority. Theoretically, the South could invade the North, but it is not a realistic possibility. It is hard to imagine the United States seeing such an invasion as in its interest under

49、almost any circumstances, and South Korea would have substantial difficulties operating by itself since its military system has long been so intertwined with that of the U.S.-led UN command. Given the number and character of U.S. interventions or near-interventions in the last decade, the North coul

50、d be legitimately concerned about air and missile strikes by the United States. But the severity of that threat is not a function of the nature of conventional forces on the Korean Peninsula because such strikes could be launched from aircraft carriers or distant bases. Because the D.P.R.K. has syst

51、ematically mounted an immediate surprise-attack threat against the South by establishing forward-deployed invasion forces and because that threat is made more acute by geographic asymmetries, conventional arms control should first focus on reducing the danger to the South. If its objectives were tra

52、ditionally grandiose-as in conquering South Korea-any full-scale D.P.R.K. invasion of the South would be doomed to failure. The only issue would be how long it would take for R.O.K. and U.S. forces to devastate the North's army. However, the North could be successful if it had more limited objec

53、tives, such as the capture or siege of Seoul. That scenario remains a nightmare. In short, the only serious conventional military threat on the peninsula is that of the North launching a surprise attack on the South. Thus, while the overarching objective is an evenhanded onehat neither side should f

54、ear surprise attack-addressing the South's invasion concerns has special importance. Another component of enhancing military security is avoiding crises or, failing that, assuring that crises do not lead to war as the result of misperceptions or instabilities. In particular, there should be no s

55、ignificant real or perceived advantage in initiating hostilities. This is related to the issue of surprise attack but goes well beyond it. It relates to the ability of the sides to defend against attack. Moving beyond the core security concerns, the sides should have every incentive to reduce the ma

56、gnitude of defense expenditures so that national resources can be put to more productive ends. Given the very large levels of current Korean forces, normalization should include substantial reductions in force levels and a significant reduction in absolute defense expenditures. In pursuing conventio

57、nal arms control on the peninsula, the parties need also to recognize that some well-intentioned actions taken under the rubric of peace, normalization, and arms control could prove harmful to Korea's long-term security interests. When normalization is achieved, Korea (or two cooperating Korean

58、states) will exist in a highly dynamic region of the world, confronted by many opportunities, issues, and challenges. To the north will be a massive neighbor, China, whose long-term behavior may range from that of a good and powerful neighbor and competitor to that of an ambitious regional hegemon.

59、Continuing tensions will exist among China, Japan, and Korea; and problems may arise involving other regional states. A question, then, is how Korea views its long-term regional role. This question is easy enough to ask, but it deals with a different U.S.-Korean relationship than currently exists. T

60、oday, U.S. military leaders dominate planning for the security of South Korea, U.S. ground forces are permanently stationed in the heart of Korea itself, and the United States would in some respects (e.g., air forces, naval forces, and command and control) play the lead role in any defense. In the post-normalizati