土地开发型国有企业会计核算的思考

1、土地开发型国有企业会计核算的思考近来，为加快地区发展，更好地引进企业项目，带 动地方经济，各地纷纷成立土地开发型国有企业 （以下简称土地开发 企业）。该企业主要任务是以接受政府委托，代理开发在开发区内的 大面积土地，同时进行相关基础配套设施建设， 为土地挂牌出让及引 进企业项目做好前期开发准备。该企业具有以下特点：（一）企业行业性质难以确定。土地出让主要以政府挂牌形式，企 业不具有出让国有土地的资质，故企业不能划分为房地产开发行业。 同样，企业资金主要来源于政府政策性扶持，而非企业本身服务收入， 划为服务型行业也有所牵强。（二）企业财务核算无参考标准。基于行业性质难以确定，故企业财务核算无法规

2、范，同时国家也无明确文件规定，企业财务通则和企业会计制度亦未涉及相应具体内容。财务核算争议较大，有 的企业按房地产会计进行财务核算，也有企业按服务业会计进行财务 核算，财务核算缺少统一标准。（三）企业政策性因素影响较大。企业受政府委托代理开发土地和 进行基础配套设施建设，均严格按照政府规划和相关政策进行， 企业 的资金来源除一部分自身注册资金外，均来自政府政策性扶持。因此，针对土地开发行业，建立规范的财务核算就显得尤为重要。 笔者结合工作实践，探索了一套核算方法，以便与大家共同探讨。一、土地开发企业开发建设核算（一）企业开发建设需按区域规划，根据企业实际开发面积和财务 核算需要，可人为划分核算

3、区域。企业开发区域面积较大，可划分为 若干个较小区域以方便核算；若开发区域事先未明确以后需逐年扩大 增加面积的，也可事先确定部分区域面积，以后增加部分，则按实际 面积成为新区域，以此类推，方便财务核算。（二）企业投入建设主要通过“开发成本”科目核算。“开发成本”账户按企业区域划分二级明细，并根据企业实际投入需要设置以 下明细：1 .“土地征用及拆迁补偿”：该细目主要核算企业土地开发前期 的征用补偿、拆迁安置、植被补偿和耕地占用税等直接开发成本，并 明确记载土地征用数量。2 .“基础配套设施建设”：该细目主要核算企业道路、河流、桥 梁、绿化、污水处理以及通电、通水、通信“三通”等基础性公共配 套

4、设施建设。3 .“资本化利息”：该细目主要核算企业为土地开发向银行或者 其他金融机构等借入资金而发生的符合资本化条件的利息费用。4 .“其他开发费”：该细目主要核算除上述细目外的其他相关的 开发费用。5 .“转入开发产品”：该细目主要核算土地开发完工结转的开发 成本，通常以红字记载，除冲减“开发成本”外，同时转出对应完工 土地数量。（三）土地征用及拆迁后，可采用自建或招标出包的方式进行项目 施工和基础配套设施建设。1 .米用自行建造方式企业自行进行项目施工和基础配套设施建设， 按企业实际发生的物 资成本、人工成本、交纳的相关税费等其他相关成本归集企业“开发 成本”账户。相关会计分录如下：借：开

5、发成本一一#园区（1） * 基础配套设施建设贷：原材料应付职工薪酬应交税费等注：*表示因#园区开发规模较大而在其内部人为划分若干个较小 的开发区域，以方便财务核算。（1）为#园区内的1号子区域，以下 相同。2 .米用招标出包方式企业采用招标出包方式进行项目施工和基础配套设施建设， 根据与 中标施工企业合同中列明的工程款支付日期及工程进度支付款项。 相 关会计分录如下：借：预付账款贷：银行存款待施工企业项目和基础配套设施建设完工后， 转入“开发成本”账 户。借：开发成本一一#园区（1）基础配套设施建设贷：预付账款二、土地开发企业资金来源核算土地开发企业资金主要来源于政府政策性扶持，该款项主要用于

6、土 地开发园区的开发建设，具有专款专用的性质，因此需要通过“专项 应付款”科目进行财务核算。该科目应按对应开发区域设置二级明 细。土地开发期间，资金的拨入，应增加“专项应付款”贷方账户； 土地开发完成，完工结算后，冲减“专项应付款”贷方账户。三、土地开发企业完工结算核算土地开发完工，由政府收回挂牌出让前，相应结转土地开发成本。 完工成品土地通过“开发产品”科目核算， 并按开发区域设置二级明 细，同时记载转入的成品土地数量。开发区域内结转的计划开发成本， 可按企业预计区域总成本除以征用土地数量计算，公共基础配套设施 投入，也按受益原则相应分配。完工成品土地按上述计算的计划成本 和对应数量，由“开

7、发成本”贷方账户转入“开发产品”借方账户。 待政府收回后，转入的“开发产品”冲减对应“专项应付款”二级区 域明细。具体分录如下：借：开发产品一一#园区（1）贷：开发成本一一#园区（1）转入开发产品待政府收回后：借：专项应付款一一#园区（1）贷：开发产品一一#园区（1）如上例至整个#园区内所有开发土地全部完工结算，“开发成本” 的账户仍有余额，为企业实际结转成本与计划结转成本的差异数， 应 调整“开发产品”账户，并相应调整该区域内“专项应付款”账户余 额。调整完毕，“专项应付款”账户仍有贷方余额，应确认收入，如 为借方余额，确认当期损失。四、资产负债表列示（一）“开发成本”的列示：根据该账户的借

8、方余额，列示于资产 负债表“存货”账户，表明企业在开发进程中尚未完工土地的各项开 发成本。（二）“开发产品”的列示：根据该账户的借方余额，列示于资产 负债表“存货”账户，表明企业已办理完工结算，政府尚未收回挂牌 出让的成品土地。（三）“专项应付款”的列示：根据该账户的贷方余额暂列于“专 项应付款”账户，表明企业区域开发尚未完结时政府扶持资金拨入数，该科目待区域开发完结后仍有贷方余额， 应确认收入；借方余额， 确认当期损失。以前只听人说过享有“天下第一村”美誉的华西村，前几天街道组织参观了华西村使我对华西村有了一个全新的认识。一是坚持解放思想、实事求是。吴仁宝带领华西村的干部群众把贯彻党的路线方

9、针政策的坚定性与因地制宜发展的创造性高 度统一，40多年来，他们解放思想，与时俱进，不唯书，不唯上， 从本村实际出发，用科学的态度、独特的理念、创新的思路，弓I导华 西的改革和发展，表现出了共产党员敢为人先、敢于超越的创新勇气。 华西村搞“一村两制”，村民既可以搞集体，也可以从事个体，但干 部不得搞“一家两制”，更不允许搞“一人两制”。华西村走出了一 条以集体经济为主，多种经济成分并存的多元化、混合型经济发展新 路子。华西人坚持实事求是的坚定性令人叹服。二是坚持制度创新。他们从华西实际出发，制定了一整套具有华 西特色的管理制度和分配制度，创造性地提出了“企业合作制、 厂长 负责制、经理监管制、

10、工代议事制”，对员工实行“首位高工资、末 位淘汰制、违章辞退制”。在分配机制上，他坚持“少分配，多积累； 少拿现金，多入股”。吴仁宝认为，农民办企业要发展，要壮大，只 能靠自我积累，增强自身的造血功能。2001年6月以来，吴仁宝创 造性地提出“一分五统”（即村企分开，经济统一管理、干部统一使 用、劳动力统一安排、福利统一发放、村建统一规划）的发展建设大 华西的新举措，这些创新理念和举措，吸引了大批有识之士，来这里 创业，使华西村获得了源源不断的发展动力，华西经济如滚雪球一般 越来越大。三是坚持科学发展。华西村始终把率先发展、协调发展的科学发 展观放在首位，构建和谐、文明、宜人的社会主义新农村。

11、华西村从 创业初期开始，一直把率先发展、科学发展、和谐发展贯穿始终，成 为全国通过IS014001国际环境质量管理体系认证的第一个村庄。华 西村提出要倡导绿色文明，实施绿色发展战略，追求经济与环境的协 调发展。先后投资数亿元，综合治理工业区环境，使工厂变成了花园。 大力发展循环经济和生态经济，目前，华西村已基本实现了“三废” 资源化管理，对高炉、电炉、轧钢生产的煤气、工业废水等进行分类 安置，实行综合利用。还投资近 1000万元美化生活区，全村的绿化 覆盖率超过40%，被评为“全国造林绿化先进村”。四是坚持两手抓。“物质精神双富有，才是真正的富有”。吴仁 宝始终坚持以人为本，一手抓经济发展，一

12、手抓以德依法治村，让村 民“既富口袋，又富脑袋”。目前，华西村里有书场、球场、溜冰场， 有歌厅、舞厅、影剧院，各种文化娱乐设施配套齐全，村民的业余文 化生活丰富多彩，全村上下始终保持勤于开拓、勇于创新、不甘守旧、 奋发进取的精神状态。六是坚持德孝为先。华西村人重“孝”。早在20世纪80年代初，电热毯刚面世，吴仁宝和村干部就把它铺到 了华西老人的床上：每年村里生产的瓜果蔬菜要让老人先尝鲜； 看戏 老人坐前排，看电影老人坐中间。从 1979年起，华西村就逐步探索 农村养老制度，目前凡年满55岁的妇女和60岁以上的男子，每月都 能领到村里发的退休金。华西村还规定，家中如有老人活到100岁，奖励所有直

13、系亲属每人一万元，真正实现了老有所养、老有所敬、老 有所乐。华西的老人们都说，“儿好，女好，不如华西好”“凡到华 西工作的，就是华西人”。他们非常关心外地来华西工作的人，不准 称他们“打工仔”、“打工妹”。在政治上、经济上把外来职工与华 西人同等对待。这也许是华西人气汪，事业兴的一个重要方面。这些都值得我街道在建设社会主义新农村的实践中认真学习借 鉴。更值得我个人在工作学习生活和做人上认真思考学习借鉴。The world is cha nging with really remarkablespeed. If you look at the chart at the top here, you

14、 II seethat in 2025, these GoldmanSachs projectionssuggest that theChi nese economy will be almost the same size as the America n economy. And if you look at the chart for 2050, it s projected that the Chinese economywill be twice the size of the American economy, and the In dia n economy will be al

15、most the same size as the America n economy. And we should bear in mind here that these projecti ons were draw n up before the Western finan cial crisis.A couple of weeks ago, I was look ing at the latest projectio n by BNP Paribas for whe n Chi na will have a larger economy tha n theUnitedStates.Go

16、ldman Sachs projected 2027. Thepost- crisis projection is 2020. That s just a decade away.China is going to cha nge the world in two fun dame ntal respects. First of all, it s a huge developing country with a population of 1.3 billion people, which has been growing for over 30 years at around 10 per

17、ce nt a year.And within a decade, it will have the largest economy in the world. Never before in the moder n era has the largest economy in the world bee n that of a develop ing coun try, rather tha n adeveloped coun try. Secon dly, for the first time in the moder nera, the dominant country in the w

18、orld - which I think is what Chi na will become - will be not from the West and from very, very differe nt civilizatio nal roots.Now I know it s a widespread assumption in the West that, as countries modernize, they also Westernize. This is an illusion. It s an assumption that modernity i s a produc

19、t simply of competiti on, markets and tech no logy. It is not; it is also shaped equally by history and culture. Chi na is n ot like the West, and it will not become like the West. It will rema in in very fun dame ntal respects very differe nt. Nowthe big questi on here is obviously, how do we make

20、sense of China? Howdo we try to understand what China is? And the problem we have in the West at the mome nt by-a nd-large is that the conven ti onal approach is that we understand it really in Western terms, using Western ideas. Wecan t. NowI want to offer you three buildingblocksfor tryingto under

21、stand what China is like - just as abegi nning.Nowwhat is extraordinary about this is, what gives China it s sense of being China, what gives the Chinese the sense of what it is to be Chinese, comes not from the last hundred years, not from the nation state period, which is what happened in the West

22、, but from the period, if you like, of the civilizati on state.I m thinking here, for example, of customs like ancestralworship, of a very dist in ctive no ti on of the state, likewise, a very dist in ctive no ti on of the family, social relatio nships like gua nxi, Con fucia n values and so on. The

23、se are all things that come from the period of the civilizatio n state. In other words, China, un like the Wester n states and most coun tries in the world, is shaped by its sense of civilization,its existeneeas a civilizatio n state, rather tha n as a n ati on state. And there s one other thing to

24、add to this, and that is this: Of course we know China s big, huge, demographically and geographically, with a populati on of 1.3 billi on people. What we often aren t really aware of is the fact that China is extremely diverse and very pluralistic, and in many ways very decentralized. You can t run

25、 a place on this scale simply from Beijing, even though we think this to be the case. It s never bee n the case.So this is Chi na, a civilizatio n state, rather tha n a n ati on state. And what does it mean? Well I think it has all sorts of profound implications. I ll give you two quick ones. The fi

26、rstis that the most importa nt political value for the Chin ese isuni ty, is the maintenance of Chin ese civilizati on. You know, 2,000 years ago, Europe: breakdow n, the fragme ntati on of the Holy Roman Empire Roman Empire. It divided, and it s remained divided ever since. China, over the sametime

27、 period, went in exactly the opposite directi on, very pain fully holdi ng this huge civilizati on, civilizati on state together.The sec ond is maybe more prosaic, which is Hong Kong. Do you remember the handover of Hong Kong by Britain to China in 1997?You may remember what the Chin ese con stituti

28、 onal propositi on was. Onecountry, two systems. And I ll lay a wager that barely anyone in the West believed them. “Windowdressing. WhenChina gets it s hands on Hong Kong, that won t be the case. ” 13 years on, the political and legal system in Hong Kong is as differe ntno was it was in 1997. Wewer

29、e wrong. Whywere we wrong?We were wrong because we thought, n aturally eno ugh, in n ati on state ways. Thi nk of Germa n uni ficatio n, 1990. What happe ned?Well, basically the East was swallowed by the West. Onenation, one system. That is the nation state mentality.But you can trun a country like

30、Chi na, a civilizatio n state, on the basis of one civ ilization, one system. It doesn t work. So actually the response of China to the question of HongKong - as it will be to the questi on of Taiwa n - was a n atural resp on se: onecivilizati on, many systems.Nowthe great advantage of this historic

31、alexperienee has beenthat, without the Han, Chi na could n ever have held together.The Han identityhas been the cement which has held this countrytogether. The great disadva ntage of it is that the Han have a very weak conception of cultural differenee. They really believe in their own superiority,

32、and they are disrespectful of those whoare not. Hence their attitude, for example, to the Uyghurs and to the Tibeta ns.Or let megive you my thirdbuilding block, theChinese state.Nowthe relationship between the state and society in China is very differentfrom that in the West. Now we in the Westoverw

33、helmingly seemto think - inthese days at least - thatthe authority and legitimacy of the state is a fun cti on of democracy. The problem with thispropositi onis that theChinese state enjoys more legitimacy and more authority amongst the Chinese than is true with any Western state. And the reason for

34、 this is because - well, there are two reas on s, I thi nk.And it s obviously got nothing to do with democracy, becau se in our terms the Chinese certainly don t have a democracy. And the reason for this is, firstly, because the state in China is give n a very special -it enjoys a very special sig n

35、i fica neeas the representative, the embodiment and the guardian of Chi nese civilizatio n, of the civilizatio n state. This is as close as China gets to a kind of spiritual role.And the sec ond reas on is because, whereas in Europe and North America, the state s power is continuously challenged- Im

36、eanin the European tradition,historicallyagainst the church,against other sectors of the aristocracy, against merchants and so on - for 1,000 years, the power of the Chi nese state has not been challenged. It s had no serious rivals. So you cansee that the way in which power has bee n con structed i

37、n China is very differe nt from our experie nee in Western history. The result, by the way, is that the Chin ese have a very differe nt view of the state. Whereas we tend to view it as an in truder, a stranger, certainly an organ whose powers need to be limited or defined and constrained, the Chines

38、e don t see the statelike that at all. The Chin ese view the state as an in timate - n ot just as an in timate actually, as a member of the family - n ot just in fact as a member of the family, but as the head of the family, the patriarch of the family. This is the Chi neseview of the state - very,

39、very different to ours. It s embedded in society in a differe nt kind of way to what is the case in the West.And I would suggest to you that actually what we are deali ng with here, in the Chi nese con text, is a new ki nd of paradigm, which is different from anything we ve had to think about inthe

40、past. Knowthat China believes in the market and the state.I mean, Adam Smith, already writ ing in the late 18th cen turysaid, “The Chinese market is larger and more developed and more sophisticated than anything in Europe.” And, apart from theMaoperiod, that has remained more-or-less the case ever s

41、ince. But this is comb ined with an extremely str ong and ubiquitous st ate. The state is everywhere in China. I mean, it s leading firms, many of them are still publicly own ed. Private firms, however large they are, like Lenovo, depe nd in many ways on state patr on age. Targets for the economy an

42、d so on are set by the state. And the state, of course, its authority flows intolots of other areas - as we are familiar with - with something like the the on e-child policy.Moreover, this is a very old state tradition, a very old traditi on of statecraft. I mean, if you want an illustrati on of thi

43、s, the Great Wall is one. But this is ano ther, this is the Grand Can al, which was con structed in the first in sta nee in the fifth cen tury B.C. and was fin ally completed in theseve nth cen tury A.D. It went for 1,114 miles, li nking Beiji ngwith Hangzhou and Shanghai. So there s a long history

44、of extraord inary state in frastructural projects in Chi na, whichI suppose helps us to expla in what we see today, which is something like the Three Gorges Damand many other expressions of statecompete nee withinChi na. So there we have threebuilding blocks for trying to to understand the differene

45、e that is China - the civilization state, the notion of race and the nature of the state and its relati on ship to society.And yet we stillinsist,by-and-large,in thinking that we canunderstand China by simply drawing on Western experienee, looking at it through Western eyes, using Western concepts.

46、If you want to know why we un erri ngly seem to get Chi na wrong -our predictions about what s going to happen to Ch ina arein correct- this is the reas on. Unfortun ately I thi nk, I haveto say that I thi nk attitude towards China is that of a kind of little Westerner mentality. It s kind of arroga

47、nt. It sarroga nt in the sense that we thi nk that we are best, and therefo re we have the uni versal measure. And sec on dly, it signorant. Werefuse to really address the issue of differenee.You know, there s a very interestingpassage in a book by PaulCohe n, the America n historia n. And Paul Cohe

48、 n argues that theWest thinks of itself as probably the most cosmopolitan of all cultures. But it s not. In manyways, it s the most parochial, because for 200 years, the West has been so dominant in the world that it s not really needed to understand other cultures, other civilizations. Because, at

49、the end of the day, it could, if necessary by force, get its own way. Whereas those cultures -virtually the rest of the world, in fact - which have bee n in a far weaker position,vis-a-vis the West, have been therebyforced to understand the West, because of the West s presenee in those societies. An

50、d therefore, they are, as a result, more cosmopolita n in many ways tha n the West.I mean, take the question of East Asia. East Asia: Japan, Korea, China, etc. - a third of the world s population lives there, now the largest economic region in the world. And I ll tellyou now, that East Asianers, peo

51、ple from East Asia, are far more knowledgeable about the West than the West is about East Asia. Now this point is very germane, I m afraid, to the pre sent. Because what s happe ning? Back to that chart at the beg inning -the Goldma n Sachs chart. What is happe ning is that, very rapidly in historic

52、al terms, the world is being drive n and shaped, not by the old developed countries,but by thedeveloping world. We ve seen thisin terms of the G20 - usurp ing very rapidly the positi on of the G7, or the G8. Andthere are two consequences of this. First, the West is rapidly losi ngitsin flue neein th

53、e world. There was a dramaticillustrationof this actually a year ago - Copenhagen, climatecha nge conferen ce. Europe was not at the final n egotiati ng table. Whendid that last happen? I would wager it was probably about 200 years ago. And that is what is going to happen in the future.And the sec o

54、nd implicati on is that the world will in evitably,as a con seque nee, become in creas in glyun familiar to us, becauseit ll be shaped by cultures and experiences and histories that we are not really familiar with, or conversant with. And at last, I m afraid - take Europe, America is slightly different -but Europea ns by and large, I have to say, are ignorant, are un aware about the way the world is cha nging. Some people -I ve got an English friend in China, and he said,“Thecontinent is sleepwalking into oblivion. ”