一些科学哲学上的思考讲解

1、03'秋 社會研究方法社會系 關秉寅老師一些科學哲學上的思考科學知識是什麼？幾種不同的觀點1 Wallace (1979: 18): Eleme nts in the Scien tific ProcessThere are at least four ways of gen erati ng, and test ing the truth of, empirical statement: authoritarian,' my-hOdtainal' ' 'aogfico ' scientific.l' A principadisti nc

2、tion among these is the manner in which each vests con fide nee in tlpjoducer of the statement that is alleged to be true (that is, one asks/ho says so?); in theprocedure by which the stateme nt was produced (that is, one askH,ow do you kno w?); and in the effect of the statement (that is, one asks,

3、 Whadifferenee does it makes?).” (Wallace,1979: 11)“.Among these four modes of generating and testing empirical statements, the scie ntific mode comb ines a primary relia nee on the observatio nal effects of the stateme nts in questio n, with a sec on dary relia nee on the procedures (methods) used

4、togen erate them. Relatively little weight is placed on characteristics of the producep er se; but whe n they are invo Ived, achieved rather tha n ascribed characteristics are stressed - not for their own sakes, but asprima facie certifications of effect and procedure claims. (Wallace, 1979: 13)2 Co

5、lli ns (1979): Why is Sociology not a Scien ce?“ My con ten ti on is that sociology can be a successful sciencri that it is well on the way to beco ming so. The problem is to un dersta nd just what is invo Ived in this. There are a nu mber of differe nt goals that have bee n set for sociology (and f

6、or the social scie nces gen erally);.As things sta nd now, we have badly con fused the expla natory, practical, ideological, and aesthetic aspects of the social sciences.” (Collins, 19“The scientific ideal is to explain everything, and to do it by making causalstateme nts which are ultimately based

7、upon experie nee. The most powerful scie ntific theory is the one that can get the most expla natory mileage out of the most con cise body of prin ciples. Science is a way of extrapolat ing from things we know to thi ngs we do not, a way of see ing the no vel as ano ther arran geme nf the familiar.”

8、“ This aim is nodiffere nt whe n applied to sociology tha n to physics, however differe nt the empirical materials may be. ” (Collins, 1979: 2)“ The basic method of expla natory scie nee is that of con trolled comparis on. The essence of methodological empiricism - and that is what science is - is t

9、o explain a phenomenon not by looking at it in isolation but by comparison and contrast to other thin gs. To un dersta nd a thing, we must compare where it occurs with where it does not occur, and note the dference of in the accompanying conditions.” (Collins, 1979: 4)3. Turner (1991: 2) : Types of

10、Kno wledgeIs kno wledge to be empirical?YesNoIdeologies; or beliefsReligi ons; or beliefsYesthat state the way thethat state the dictatesworld should beof super natural forcesIs kno wledge to be evaluative?Scie nce or the beliefLogics; or the variousthat all kno wledgesystems of reas oningNois to re

11、flect thethat employ rules ofactual operati on ofcalculati onthe empirical world.There are different ways to look at, interpret, and develop knowledge about the world. Science is only one way. Science is based upon the presumpti on that kno wledge can be value free, that it can expla in the actual w

12、ork ing of the empirical world, and that it can be revised on the basis of careful observations of empirical eventsHowever, even this portrayal of science is questioned by many who regard itas rather idealized. For these critics, values always figure into what we study. The empirical world is not ju

13、st there ' ; rather, it is filtered through concepts andpresuppositi ons. And rarely are facts dispassi on ately collected to test theories; in deed, there are always orga ni zati onal politics, revolving around vested in terests and resources, that in flue nce what facts ' we collect and ho

14、w we in terpi“tPheriaps eve n m&refun dame ntal tha n criticisms of scie nce' s asserti on of n eutrality' and objectibelief among many sociologists that thevery n ature of the social uni verseprecludes scie nce as a useful mode of inquiry. Huma ns are creative and can cha nge the n atur

15、e of their world; as a con seque nce, they can obviate and make obsolete or irreleva nt theories that purport to explain human interaction and organization. There are no timeless, uni versal properties of huma n orga ni zati on, and hence there can be no laws like that those in n atural scie nces. H

16、uma n con sta ntly remake their uni verse in ways that ren der scie ntific theories in appropriate.” (T-rt" er, 1991: 34. Alexa nder (1985: 632-633): Positivist and Post-Positivist Views of Science among Social Scie ntistsA. The major postulates of the“ positivist persuasi on”：(1) A radical bre

17、ak exists betwee n empirical observati ons and non-empirical stateme nts.(2) Because of this assumed break betwee n gen eral stateme nts and observatio ns, it is widely believed that more gen eral in tellectual issues - philosophical or metaphysical - are not fun dame ntally sig nifica nt for the pr

18、actice of an empirically orie nted discipli ne.(3) Since such an elimination of the non-empirical (purely intellectual) reference istaken to be the distinguishing feature of theiatural sciences, it is believed that any objective study of society must assume a n atural scie ntificself-c on scious nes

19、s.(4) Questi ons which are of a theoretical or gen eral n ature can correctly be dealt with only in relation to empirical observations. There are three important corollaries to this fourth point: (a) Regarding the formulation of scientific theories, the positivist persuasi on argues that the process

20、 of theory formati on should be one of303'秋 社會研究方法 社會系 關秉寅老師 construction through generalization, a construction consisting of inductions from observation. (b) Regarding the problem of theoreticacl onflict , the positivist persuasion argues that empirical tests must in every case be the final ar

21、biter between theoretical disputes. It is crucial experiments' rather than conceptualdispute that determine the outcome of competition between theories. (c) If the formulation of theories and the conflict between them can be entirely reduced to empirical material, there can be no long-term basis

22、 for structured kinds of scientific disagreemen.t Social-scientific development is viewed as a basically progressive one, that is as linear and cumulative, and the segmentation or internal differentiation of a scientific field is viewed as the product of specialization rather than the result of gene

23、ralized, non-empirical disagreement.B. The fundamental postulates of the -positivispt opsetrsuasionch'a,llwphoiint to therehabilitation of the theoretical:ex(1) First, all scientific data are theoretically informed. The fact/theory distinction is not concrete, does not exist in nature, but is an

24、alytic. Calling statements observational ' is a manneer cohf.spWe use some theories to provide us with the hard facts ', while we allow others the privilege of tentativelythem.(2) Empirical commitments are not based solely on empirical evidence. The principled rejection of evidence is often

25、the very bedrock upon which the continuity of a theoretical science depends.(3) The elaboration of general scientific theory is normally dogmatic rather than skeptical. Theoretical formulation does not proceed, as Popper would have it, according to the law of fiercest struggle for survival , when a

26、generaltheoretical position is confronted with contradictory empirical evidence which cannot be simply ignored (which is often the first response), it proceeds to develop ad hoc hypotheses and residual categories which allow these anomalous phenomena to be explained ' in a manner that does not s

27、urrender a theory general formulations.(4) Fundamental shifts in scientific belief will occur only when empirical challenges are matched by the availability of alternative theoretical commitments. The struggle between general theoretical positions is among the most powerful energizers of empirical r

28、esearch, and it must be placed at the heart of major changes in the natural sciences.403'秋 社會研究方法社會系 關秉寅老師5. Sayer (1992): A Realist Approach of KnowledgeA. Some importa nt claims of the realist view of kno wledge:(1) The world exists in depe nden tly of our kno wledge of it.(2) Our kno wledge o

29、f that world is fallible and theory-lade n. Con cepts of truth and falsity fail to provide a cohere nt view of the relati on ship betwee n kno wledge and its object. Nevertheless, knowledge is not immune to empirical check, and its effective ness in in formi ng and expla ining successful material pr

30、actice is not mere accide nt.(3) Kno wledge develops n either wholly con ti nu ously, as the steady accumulati on of facts within a stable con ceptual framework, nor wholly disc on ti nu ously, through simulta neous and uni versal cha nges in con cepts.(4) There is n ecessity in the world; objects -

31、 whether n atural or social - n ecessarily have particular causal power or ways of act ing and particular susceptibilities.(5) The world is differentiated and stratified, consisting not only of events, but objects, including structures, which have power and liabilities capable of generatingeve nts.

32、These structures may be prese nt eve n where, as in the social world and much of the n atural world, they do not gen erate regular patter ns of eve nts.(6) Social phe nomena such as acti ons, texts and in stituti ons are con cept-depe ndent. We therefore have not on ly to explai n their producti on

33、and material effects but to un dersta nd, read or in terpret what they mean. Although they have to beinterpreted by starting from the researcher' s own frames of meaning, by and largethey exist regardles of researchers ' in terpretati ons of them .In view tf4 methods of social scie nee and n

34、 atural scie nee have both differe nces and similarities.(7) Scie nee or the producti on of any other kind of kno wledge is a social practice. For better or worse (not just worse) the con diti ons and social relati ons of the producti on of kno wledge in flue nee its content. Kno wledge is also larg

35、ely - though not exclusively - lin guistic, and the n ature of Ian guage and the way wecom muni cate are not in cide ntal to what is known and com muni cated.Aware ness of these relati on ships is vital in evaluat ing kno wledge.(8) Social science must be critical of its object. In order to be able

36、to explain and un dersta nd social phe nomena we have to evaluate them critically (Sayer, 1992: 5-6).B. Knowledge in context:“ I shall argue that knowledge is primarily gained through activity both inattempting to change our environment (through labour and work) and through interaction with other pe

37、ople, using shared resources, in particular a common language. Although the development of knowledge may be furthered through passive contemplation of the world, it always presupposes the existence of these two contexts, which provide a kind of feedback or test for our ideas and a language in which

38、and with which to think.” (Sayer, 1992: 15)“ To develop knowledge ' we need raw materials and tools on which and with which we can work, These are linguistic, conceptual and cultural as well as material. Science is not a thing but a social acivtity. ” (Sayer, 1992: 16)“ I shall argue that differ

39、ent types of knowledge are appropriate to different functions and contexts; for example, engineering for the task of making nature move to our designs, ethics to the harmonization of the conduct of people in society. But these contexts are not mutually exclusive but overlapping. Scientific practice

40、embraces several types of knowledge, including some which are generally excluded as non-science or even anti-science by scientism. For example, many philosophers who have adopted this stance of scientism ' have treated ethica-rladtieocniasilo, ns as a purely with matters of fact, with rational a

41、nd objective questions of what is theYet science is also a specialized type of social activity and as such it requires rules governing what is proper and improper conduct; withoutethical principles such as those concerning honesty of reporting and refusal of illogical argument, science could not exi

42、st. ” (Sayer, 1992: 17)“ Knowledge is developed and used in twmoain types of context - work (or labour ' ) and communicative interaction.” (Sayer, 1992: 17)9where is the boundary ot the language community represent social relations represent activities between s and o which include observing, re

43、cording information and practice.£ S s represent other knowing subjects within in h 乙 n language cominunityOj 0 2On are social objectsN0 are material, Intrlslcallly meaningless objects, whether natural or aritificalUn dersta nding social phe nomena is by no menst a questi on of un dersta nding

44、con cepts in society and the meanings of practicesSocial phe nomena have crucialmaterial dime nsion and are closely associated everywhere to relatio nships with n ature, both in its virgin and its artificially transformed states.” (Sayer, 1992: 28)“.the situation in socialcienceis more complex for t

45、wo reasons: 1 the unavailability of experiments makes it more difficult to use such material interventions for scie ntific purposes; 2 social phe nomen a can be cha ngedtri nsically by lear ning and adjusting to the subject s understanding.” (28)yer, 1992: 27自然、生命與社會科學之比較一、自然科學是研究物質的現象，生物科學是研究由物質構成之

46、生命的現象，而社會科學是研究生存在物質世界之人類這種生命體所建構成之社會文化 世界。因此不論是何種科學都與物質世界之各種不同面向有關聯。二、生命及社會雖有物質基礎，但生命與社會都有emergent phenomen，a 不是物質之現象與知識所能完全解釋的。而生命及社會科學之重點應即是在了 解這種emerge nt現象。譬如說，人類語言之複雜繁多，即為一種emerge nt現象。三、從社會學的角度來看，科學的活動的另一個重要的基礎就是社會。科學的活 動是一種社會的活動。例如，科學知識的根源，傳播及科學家的教育及 互動，都是在社會文化之環境中發生，並受其影響。某種程度來說，一 種知識或活動是靠科學家的社群來認定是否屬於科學、合乎科學的要 求。四、不論是自然或社會科學其知識之核心是理論及觀察，亦即理性及經驗的結合。正如 Turner et al. ( 1995:10)所說 “Through concepts, speculation, and logic, the facts o