LN08_Mish10E(lrw)_融资渠道的选择

1、Chapter 8An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure Take-home Messages Financial Structure, 不同融资渠道的统计特征不同融资渠道的统计特征 关于不同融资渠道的特征：Eight Basic Facts / Pattern What affect the structure，不同渠道存在的原因，不同渠道存在的原因 Theory 1, Transaction Costs 重点讨论 Theory 2, Adverse Selection in debt market：Lemons problem重点讨论 The

2、ory 3, Moral Hazard in equity market：Principal-Agent Problem:重点讨论and too big to failin debt market：2 本章的主要内容本章的主要内容 以一个汽车贷款案例串联以上问题提出各种方案，问题，找出对策 思考题：汽车贷款案例思考题：汽车贷款案例 你的祖母过世了，留给你10000美元遗产。当你收到支票的时候，你最好的朋友陪你去银行，并计划把这笔钱存人银行。在银行里，你的朋友提醒你这家银行的存款利率为3%，而其购车贷款的利率为9%。你的朋友建议：“你为何不站在购车贷款办事处的门口，自己直接向来一个来申请购车贷款

3、的客户放贷？这样你可以获得比存款3%的利率更高的利息收入，并且排除中间人。” 1请解释你如果发放这笔贷款很难获得收益的原因。 2请解释由银行发放这笔贷款能够获得收益的原因。 视角一：间接金融视角一：间接金融vs间接金融间接金融 如果选择间接金融 即银行 问题：利率低，回报低 解决方法：用直接金融，example：招财宝 如果选择直接金融， 个人贷款给个人 问题：交易成本之一，合同制定和执行成本很高。 解决方法：银行通过规模效应，与专业分工，降低成本 视角二：如果选择债券合同视角二：如果选择债券合同-逆向选择问题逆向选择问题 问题：逆向选择 信用差的才来借款 解决方法：1.Private pro

4、duction and sale of information 信用调查，央行信用，芝麻信用，2. Government regulation to increase information 温州私人借款，在政府部门登记3. Collateral and net worth 拿你们家牛和犁抵押，找有信用的人大户担保4. Financial intermediation 经过银行借贷 视角三：如果选择债券合同视角三：如果选择债券合同-道德风险问题道德风险问题 问题：道德风险 合同签订后，借款人投资高风险 解决方法1.Net worth and collateral 拿你们家牛和犁抵押，找有信用的

5、大户做中保 2.Monitoring and Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants 合同条款包含Incentive compatible : Discourage undesirable behavior, Encourage desirable behavior Keep collateral valuable, Margin requirement Provide information3. Financial intermediation 经过银行借贷 视角三：如果选择股权合同还是债券合同视角三：如果选择股权合同还是债券合同 如果选择债券合同 内容如上

6、 问题：如上述 解决方法：如上述， 新的方法：股权激励 如果选择直接金融， 股权激励 问题：股权合同的道德风险 解决方法：见下文 视角四：如果选择股权合同视角四：如果选择股权合同-道德风险道德风险 问题：委托代理问题 我出钱你打工 解决方法：1.Monitoring (Costly State Verification)手机定位签到。Free-rider problem among stock holders2.Government regulation to increase informationLaws: standard accounting principles; impose st

7、iff criminal penalties3.Financial Intermediationventure capital firm: hold several positions in the managing body of the firm4.Debt Contracts 1. 如果向律师支付佣金制定一份贷款合同仅仅使用一次的话，那么这一交易成本交易成本就过于高昂。如果你将所有资金都借给一个人，那么就像把所有鸡蛋都放在一个篮子里那样承担了较高的风险，实现风险风险分担分担。最后，你几乎无法获得避免信息不对称所产生问题的方法。在高风险水平的借款者筹借资金的时候，会产生逆向选择逆向选择。而

8、那些将贷款资金用于赌博而非（原计划的）的车的行为，将会导致道德风道德风险险。 2由于商业银行具有多笔同类贷款，所以它们向律师支付一次佣金，制定出一份可以重复使同的合同（规模效应规模效应）。商业银行发放收益率并非总是同向变动的多样化贷款，通过这种方式从总体上降低这些贷款的风险水平。商业银行掌握了监督和控制借款者的方法，以此降低逆向选择和道德风险的危害（专业分工专业分工）。 Warning Warning本章的Pattern与theory脱节Pattern部分讨论：企业不同渠道的融资哪个多，哪个少的问题。但是理论部分却讨论，为什么选这种渠道，不选择那种渠道 Financial Structure

9、金融合同的常见形式：股权与债券 金融交易链条的长短：直接与间接 股权，债券，直接，间接 都有存在价值 都出现问题 都有解决方案 此消彼长的原因 本书没有讨论量变的原因，而是关注存在价值。 在于成本和收益的平衡 股权股权vs债权债权 股权 为什么需要股权合同，视频：How the Stock Market Works (9:12) 股权的问题 解决方法 债权 为什么需要债权合同 债权合同的问题 解决方法 直接金融直接金融vs间接金融间接金融 直接债权 Why需要直接金融，视频的截图 直接金融的问题 解决方法 间接债权（债权的金融中介：银行） 为什么需要间接债权。也即为什么需要银行。 间接债务的问

10、题：余额宝的兴起与银行衰弱 解决方法 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved. 8-17 Basic Facts about Financial Structure Throughout the World This chapter provides an economic analysis of how our financial structure is designed to promote economic efficiency The bar chart in Figure 1 shows how American busin

11、esses financed their activities using external funds (those obtained from outside the business itself) in the period 19702000 and compares U.S. data to those of Germany, Japan, and Canada 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved. 8-18 Figure 1 Sources of External Funds for Nonfinancial Busin

12、esses: A Comparison of the United States with Germany, Japan, and CanadaSource: Andreas Hackethal and Reinhard H. Schmidt, “Financing Patterns: Measurement Concepts and Empirical Results,” Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universitat Working Paper No. 125, January 2004. The data are from 19702000 and are gros

13、s flows as percentage of the total, not including trade and other credit data, which are not available. 76%4%16%4%18%38%32%11%76%10%7%8%78%8%9%5%56%18%15%12%0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%bank loansnonbank loansbondsstockChinaUSGermanyJapanCanada Sources of External Funds for Nonfinancial Businesses:

14、A Comparison杨玉琳杨玉琳 林明英林明英 奚雅芝奚雅芝 付佩雯付佩雯 直接融资间接融资stockbondloan 76%4%16%4%18%38%32%11%76%10%7%8%78%8%9%5%56%18%15%12%0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%bank loansnonbank loansbondsstockChinaUSGermanyJapanCanada Sources of External Funds for Nonfinancial Businesses: A ComparisonFact 2Fact 2： marketable debt

15、and equity securities is not the primary wayFact 1Fact 1： Stocks are not the most important sources 76%4%16%4%18%38%32%11%76%10%7%8%78%8%9%5%56%18%15%12%0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%bank loansnonbank loansbondsstockChinaUSGermanyJapanCanada Sources of External Funds for Nonfinancial Businesses: A Co

16、mparisonFact 3Fact 3： Indirect finance is many times more important than direct finance Fact 4Fact 4： Financial intermediaries, particularly banks, are the most important source91.9081.1079.2078.5073.8060.9070.3069.0056.7058.2052.1051.3559.4493.2096.1094.2089.9087.0084.3080.7083.9083.1080.8072.7073.

17、9276.051.801.501.606.705.403.807.908.907.9010.6014.3010.4614.743.101.602.401.103.607.304.802.404.103.401.601.282.640.0020.0040.0060.0080.00100.00120.002002200320042005200620072008200920102011201220132014社会融资规模占比:中国的长期趋势社会融资规模占比:新增人民币贷款 年Bank loanNonbank loanBondStock直接融资的发展趋势 2013 Pearson Education,

18、 Inc. All rights reserved. 8-24 Eight Basic Facts1. Stocks are not the most important sources of external financing for businesses Really？ Why？2. Issuing marketable debt and equity securities is not the primary way in which businesses finance their operations Why？3. Indirect finance is many times mo

19、re important than direct finance Why？ What is advantage of indirect finance? What is advantage of direct finance? 4. Financial intermediaries, particularly banks, are the most important source of external funds used to finance businesses. Are these true in china? Eight Basic Facts (5-8)5.The financi

20、al system is among the most heavily regulated sectors of the economy6.Only large, well-established corporations have easy access to securities markets to finance their activities The rules is changing as time goes by. How about crowd-funding? Kickstarter is the worlds largestfundingplatform for crea

21、tive projects. 雷锋网。7.Collateral is a prevalent feature of debt contracts for both households and businesses. Why? Any examples? Think about the story of rural loans in republic of china. Is this true in china.8.Debt contracts are extremely complicated legal documents that place substantial restricti

22、ve covenants on borrowers Theory 1, Transaction cost Why Financial intermediaries? Transaction cost： Economies of scale and Expertise 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved. 8-27 Transaction Costs Why transaction costs is cause problems? (1) Threshold of investment: large commission on sma

23、ll trade. (2) restricted channel of investment, you have to put all your eggs in one basket. Financial intermediaries have evolved to reduce transaction costs Economies of scale Examples? Bundle small investors funds together. Mutual funds. (1) Overcome threshold problem; (2) diversification. Expert

24、ise the expertise in computer/internet technology reduce the cost （supply side）Case: Alibabas YuE Bao （余额宝） Hits 2.5M Users, $1 Billion Already Deposited; Yongjinbao（国金证券 “佣金宝”） Theory 2, Adverse selection 原理：lemon problem in second hand car market 股权：PE 债权：lemon problem in Loan market For instance,

25、 if you offer an average interest rate for your loans, the people who are better risks will go elsewhere for their money, while the risky people will gladly take your money. 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved. 8-29 Asymmetric Information: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Adverse sele

26、ction occurs before the transaction Moral hazard arises after the transaction Agency theory analyses how asymmetric information problems affect economic behavior 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved. 8-30 The Lemons Problem: How Adverse Selection Influences Financial Structure If quality

27、 cannot be assessed, the buyer is willing to pay at most a price that reflects the average quality Sellers of good quality items will not want to sell at the price for average quality The buyer will decide not to buy at all because all that is left in the market is poor quality items This problem ex

28、plains fact 2 and partially explains fact 1 Cases： the used-car market. Akelof(1970). Stock and bond markets. Discuss: Why there are still peach in the used-bysicle market? Adverse Selection ：lemons problem lemons problem in finance GoodBadGovernment regulation to increase informationPrivate product

29、ion and sale of informationFinancial intermediationCollateral and net worth 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved. 8-33 Tools to Help Solve Adverse Selection Problems Private production and sale of information that distinguishes good from bad firms and then sell it (征信公司) Free-rider probl

30、em (与盗版有何区别) How about public goods. Government regulation to increase information Not always works to solve the adverse selection problem, explains Fact 5. Case: Cheat with no punishment in chinas stock market. Special treatment stock, ST* for short. Is it lemon market? Financial intermediation Exp

31、lains facts 3, 4, & 6. Peach or lemon? In the used-car market， used-car dealers? In the financial market, bank? Collateral and net worth Explains fact 7. Collateral v.s. information ? Equity capital as collaterral. republic of china rural loan.Eight Basic Facts (contd) Theory 3, Moral hazard 原理：

32、Principal Agent problem 股权：Moral Hazard in Equity Contracts: （1）People who invested in AIG， thought that their money was relatively safe(2) However, AIG was also selling CDS and MBSs that started to default in large numbers in 2008 （3） AIG is too big to fail 债权：Moral Hazard in Debt Contracts Moral h

33、azard Moral hazard的特点（成本）。 Video: Moral Hazard（ 1:21） Video：To big to fail : CEO Richard Fuld got $483,800,000 to Bankrupt Leheman. Is this fair? （ 6:41） Video: Introduction to Moral Hazard ( 4:09) Video: Solutions to Moral Hazard (5:55) Video: Solutions to Moral Hazard: Signaling (6:45) 2013 Pearso

34、n Education, Inc. All rights reserved. 8-36 How Moral Hazard Affects the Choice Between Debt and Equity Contracts Called the Principal-Agent Problem Principal: less information (stockholder) Agent: more information (manager) Theory or math,. Separation of ownership and control of the firm Managers p

35、ursue personal benefits and power rather than the profitability of the firm How to solve the principal-Agent Problem Video：Busy Secretary - The Principal-Agent Problem ( 4:17) 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved. 8-38 Tools to Help Solve the Principal-Agent Problem Monitoring (Costly St

36、ate Verification) Free-rider problem among stock holders Fact 1 Government regulation to increase information Fact 5 (Laws: standard accounting principles; impose stiff criminal penalties) Financial Intermediation Fact 3 (venture capital firm: hold several positions in the managing body of the firm

37、Debt Contracts Fact 1 : fixed payment instead of flexible return;Mechanism design: incentive-compatible, truth-telling condition, participation conditionEight Basic Facts 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved. 8-39 How Moral Hazard Influences Financial Structure in Debt Markets Borrowers

38、have incentives to take on projects that are riskier than the lenders would like. This prevents the borrower from paying back the loan. 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved. 8-40 Tools to Help Solve Moral Hazard in Debt Contracts Net worth and collateral Lower the collateral, greater the

39、 moral hazard problem Incentive compatible Monitoring and Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants Discourage undesirable behavior Encourage desirable behavior Keep collateral valuable Provide information Covenant Monitoring and Enforcement are often costly Financial Intermediation Facts 3 & 4 ： Bank： private loans avoiding free-ride problem . insurance company: ? 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved. 8-41 Summary Table 1 Asymmetric Information Problems and Tools to Solve Them 201