Managerialandindividualdecisionproblemsasymmetric管理和个人的决策问题的非对称学习教案

1、会计学1Managerialandindividualdecisionproblemsasymmetric管理管理(gunl)和个人的决策和个人的决策问题的非对称问题的非对称第一页，共29页。第1页/共28页第二页，共29页。第2页/共28页第三页，共29页。第3页/共28页第四页，共29页。Should Dr Punter invest? What would be a sensible decision rule?第4页/共28页第五页，共29页。Expected value of payoff from investing = 0.1(M+w) + 0.9(M-c)Payoff from

2、 not investing = M (sure thing)So perhaps should invest if: 0.1(M+w) + 0.9(M-c) M or: w 9ca simple rule.but ignores attitudes to risk第5页/共28页第六页，共29页。第6页/共28页第七页，共29页。第7页/共28页第八页，共29页。第8页/共28页第九页，共29页。Adverse selection第9页/共28页第十页，共29页。第10页/共28页第十一页，共29页。第11页/共28页第十二页，共29页。第12页/共28页第十三页，共29页。ChanceAH

3、HLacceptPayoffsPrinciple AgentALaccepthigh negative0 0low positive0 0cPrinciple, P: offers agent (A) a contract, c, based on average quality Chance/Nature determines agents type/quality: quality is high (H) or low (L); probability of each = so principles expected payoff = high + lowAgent, A: knows o

4、wn type: accepts contract if payoff is positive i.e. value of contract is 0, rejects contract otherwise (payoff = zero)What kind of agent will accept the contract? What will the principles payoff be?rejectrejectP1第13页/共28页第十四页，共29页。ChanceAHHLacceptPayoffsPrinciple AgentALaccepthigh negative 0 0low p

5、ositive 0 0cWhat kind of agent will accept the contract? Only low quality agents will accept the contract What will the principles payoff be? so the principles payoff will be lower than expected payoff - lower than ( high + low) rejectrejectP1第14页/共28页第十五页，共29页。nnds that only low quality agents (sel

6、lers) accept a contract based on average quality, then offered payment (price) will be lowered to reflect this adverse selection n. if there are any intermediate quality agents they may withdraw from the market as well adverse selection gets worse (more adverse)nMarket gets thinner and thinner第15页/共

7、28页第十六页，共29页。Moral hazard第16页/共28页第十七页，共29页。Examples of scenarios in which moral hazard may arise第17页/共28页第十八页，共29页。第18页/共28页第十九页，共29页。第19页/共28页第二十页，共29页。第20页/共28页第二十一页，共29页。第21页/共28页第二十二页，共29页。第22页/共28页第二十三页，共29页。APcontractState of worldGood or bad?Good or bad?More effort (less utility)Less effort(

8、more utility)Output?Agent/worker prefers less effortPrinciple/employer prefers more effort output generally, but not always higher Principle never knows what the state of the world was/is or the agents effort as there is no 1-2-1 relationship between action/effort and output. Uncertainty for the pri

9、ncipleOutput?第23页/共28页第二十四页，共29页。AP50404020contractState of worldGoodBadGoodBadMore effort (less utility)Less effort(more utility)OutputWith wage constant what effort level do you think the agent/worker will choose? What would you do?Agent/worker prefers less effortPrinciple/employer prefers more ef

10、fort:Uncertainty for the principleExpected output = pgood50 + pBad40Expected output = pgood40 + pBad20第24页/共28页第二十五页，共29页。AP50404020contractState of worldGoodBadGoodBadMore effort Less effortOutputEffort doesnt map cleanly to output so agent has an incentive to make less effort/ be careless but lie: say made an effort but the state of the world was bad e.g. agent was unlucky that accident/mistake happened especially if pBad is lowUncertainty for the pri