英文文献：代理成本公司治理机制和上市公司股权结构模型分析

1、外文翻译:代理成本，公司治理机制和公开英国大型上市公司的股权结构：一个数据模型分析原文来源： received 2 august 2006; received in revised form 2 september 2007; accepted 25 september 2007更多原创经管论文及英文文献与翻译请访问：http:/经管论文com/,并提供定制服务译文正文：摘要本文探讨了代理成本，公司治理机制和所有制结构对英国大型上市公司的影响。我们使用的代 理成本三项措施：销售与总资产的比率，互动的自由现金流量的增长前期和收购数量。我们采用一 定范围的技术分析数据：固定效果，工具变量与线性回归

2、。我们发现，过去的公司结构没有发生变 化，一般来说，受到影响的是代理成本。这表明一系列机制与公司价值一致。我们也发现，有一个 提名委员会代理成本增加，这表明相关费用具有一定的治理机制。提高董事会对股份的所有权，还 有助于降低代理成本。我们还发现，债务降低代理成本。我们的研究结果引起了人们对公司向股东 发出建议的关注。1.介绍当所有权控制发生分离时，代理成本产生的业主和企业管理者的利益错位（詹森，1986）。该 机构采用了重新调整代理人和委托人利益的治理模式，降低了代理成本。例如最近在英国的变化， 通过吉百利和汉普委员会来强调采取具体的公司治理机制的重要性。在英国，公司预计将通过一个 包含最佳实

3、践标准的董事会结构。相比z下，莱蒙，麦斯卡（2005）,科尔斯，丹尼尔，纳温（2007）认为，公司采取了一系列 治理机制，这与每个公司价值最大化是一致的。因此，他们对公司治理有用性的质疑促使向更合理 的治理机制的迈进。这样，一个系统可能会迫使公司来摆脱一个结构的价值最大化，并采取最佳结 构。第一，该理论对代理成本辩论数量的研究做出了贡献。首先，我们提出一个英国的理论分析， 企业选择价值最人化的治理结构。这是英国公司越来越多的通过综合守则的证据。因此，这个变化 是否代表脫离现有价值最大化的管理机而与另一个最大化机制相结合？第二，很少有研究试图直接测量美国的代理成本。昂，科尔和林（2000）研究了

4、美国小型非上 市公司，辛格和戴维森（2003）分析了美国公司的报价。我们将代理成本的研究首次引向英国大公 司。第三，我们提岀了使用数据模型的代理成木，是我们的技术不受科技和时间的影响。我们的分 析明确区分固定和随机效应模型。相比z下，辛格和戴维森（2003）没有区分这些影响，他们只是 公布了结果。但是这一点很重要，因为她们的结果z间的固定和随机效应不同。第四，我们通过调查采用的工具变量的内生性问题。辛格和戴维森（2003）没有解决这个问题。 我们发现，有越来越多的公司董事会通过综合守恒的结构建议。在英国，上市公司提名委员会 正变得越来越普遍。非执行董事的比例一直在增加，目前大约占50%。我们发

5、现，通过使用一系列代理成本措施，对改变董事会治理机制对成本影响不大。这表明， 英国的公司已经能够无成本地移动到新的治理结构。但是，我们发现，提名委员会的结构已对代理成本造成意外的负面影响。这表明，成立这样的一个委员会创建了一个无效的机制，这不是价值最 大化的选择组件。本文的结构如下。下面部分讨论关于代理成本和最佳董事会结构在英国综合守则方面的最佳做 法。它还讨论了所有权与代理成本和债务问题。第二节规定了方法和变量定义的讨论。第三节讨论 了研究结果。第四节得出了一些结论。2、文献回顾与假设这项研究提供了一个评估英国治理机制的模式。德姆塞茨和利比亚龙加（2001）黑幕拜耳（2002） 斯科尔（20

6、05, 2008）为此做出了贡献。虽然传统代理机制确定的代理模式效果较小，但治理结构结 构与与性能较好。因此，假定该模型的最优结构代表英国公司价值最大化结构。该模式通过摆脱现有治理结构， 是企业转移到另一个价值最大化状态。或者，也对能会招致费用增加。如果是这样，麦康奈尔认为, 她可能没有帮助，一迫使公司采取一系列规定设立董事会的组成特征。因此，零假设，治理结构相关的琐碎费用是企业承担响应综合守则变化的建议。在这种情况下, 既不损害也不综合股东利益，所以不会影响代理成本。替代假设成立的条件中，设有一个传统的代理观点，合并守则建议“善治”结构与治理模型预 测一致。这里隐含的假设是，不同的治理结构，

7、代表了一个非最佳的治理结果。换言之，采用该模 型的建议应降低代理成本。2. 1代理成本我们直接测量治理成本在三个方面：第一，使用的资产与销售的比例；第二，通过自由的现金 流与增长前景的互动方式；第三，通过由单个企业承担收购的手段。辛格（2000）和戴维森（2003） o 这两项研究认为，这个比例措施与使用的管理公司的资产产生的销售成正比。高比率表明，资产产 生重大的销售和代理成木低。与此相反，低比率表明管理层实施者实施投资决定或过度特权消费的 政策。然而，这项措施存在一个潜在的弊端。首先，销售可能无法成为股东权利的代名词，因为销售 可能并不來自有利可图的活动。第二，销售可能产生现金由流动转为不

8、被分配给股东。第三，科尔 斯（2005）表明，甚至同一行业内的企业之间的生产率可以不同。不过，我们认为，正如昂（2000）, 辛格和戴维森（2003）所述，该措施提供了代理成本的有用指标。奥普勒和泰特曼（1993）认为，企业有高增长前景更有可能得到更好的管理。另外，他们不太 可能有多余的现金流量。因此，正如杜斯卡，金（2000）认为，代理成本可视为经济增长的机会和 现金流的互动功能。企业相结合的低增长前景和高现金流可被视为高代理成本的苦难。尤其是从收购公司的股东的角度看，股东财富显示收购减少而不是增加，是很重要的。例如， 塞维斯（1991），卡普兰和魏滋巴赫（1992），沃克（2000）,和休

9、斯顿，詹姆斯（2001）已发现 短期收益负向收购。也有长期的负冋报证据，例如，阿格拉瓦尔，谢斐，曼德克（1992）格雷戈里 （1997）,劳（1998）和科斯尔（2001） 0会计学等,如舍雷尔（1987）,德克森,夏尔玛（2002） 也显示较差收购后的表现。最后，调查证据，如凯利，保利，斯皮策（1999）发现，积极的收购缺 乏收购公司的股东。我们认为，收购可作为董事代表代理成本的限制使用。2. 2董事会特性董事会的治理机制，一直是一个在英国的报道的重点，例如关键的卡波得利报告（1992）,和 汉普尔报告（1998）和格林伯利报告（1996）。在英国，公司预期会通过董事会结构与综合守恒一 致。

10、由于在伦敦证券交易所上市条件是，公司必须提供有关如何在他们所适用的模式中表示其年度 报告的原则声明。该模式确立了三个重点治理机制：非执行泣事的比例，对偶和设立泣事会的小组 委员会。agency costs, corporate governance mechanisms andownership structure in large uk publicly quotedcompanies: a panel data analysisphillip j. mcknighta, charlie weir b,abstractthis paper examines the impact of gov

11、ernance and ownership variables on agency costs for a panel of large uk quoted companies we use three measures of agency costs: the ratio of sales-to-total assets, the interaction of free cash flows and growth prospects and the number of acquisitions. we employ a range of techniques to analyse the d

12、ata: fixed-effects, instrumental variables, and tobit regressions. we find that the changes in board structures that have occurred in the post-cadbury period have not, generally, affected costs. this suggests a range of mechanisms is consistent with firm value maximisation.we also find that having a

13、 nomination committee increases agency costs, which indicates that there are costs associated with certain governance mechanisms. increasing board ownership also helps to reduce agency costs. we also find that debt reduces agency costs- our results raise questions about the usefulness of the informa

14、tion sent to shareholders when firms adopt a recommended governance framework.© 2008 the board of trustees of the university of illinois published by elsevier b.v. all rights reserved.1. introductionagency costs arise from the misalignment of the interests of the owners and managers of firms wh

15、en the separation of ownership and control occurs (jensen, 1986). the agency model identifies a number of governance mechanisms which realign the interests of agents and principals and so reduce agency costs. recent changes in the uk, for example through the cadbury and hampel committees, have stres

16、sed the importance of corporate governance mechanisms that take specific forms. in the uk, firms are expected to adopt board structures con sistent with a combi ned codeof best practice in contrast coles, lemmon, and mescke (2005), coles, daniel, and naveen (2008) and boone, field, karpoff, and rahe

17、ja (2007) argued that companies adopt a range of governance mechanisms, each of which is consistent with maximising firm value. therefore, they, question theusefulness of moving towards governance systems that identify preferred mechanisms. such a system may force a firm to move away from a value ma

18、ximising structure and to adopt a non-optimal structure the paper makes a number of contributions to the agency costs debate first, we present a uk analysis of the theory that firms choose value-maximising governance structures. there is evidence of that uk firms have increasingly adopted the combin

19、ed code does this change therefore represent a move away from existing value-maximising governance mechanisms to another combination of maximising mechanisms? alter natively, does the adoptio n of recommended governa nee structures cause firms to end up with inappropriate governance structures?secon

20、d, the few studies that have attempted to directly measure agency costs have analysed the us context. aug, cole, and lin (2000) looked at small unquoted us companies and singh and davids on (2003) analysed quoted us companies. we undertake the first direct study of agency costs in large quoted ukcom

21、panies third, we present the first uk study of agency costs that uses panel data, a technique which enables us to isolate both cross section and time series effects. our analysis also explicitly differentiates between fixed and random effects models. in contrast, singh and davids on (2003) did not d

22、istinguish between these effects but merely reported results for both approaches this is important because their results differ between fixed and random effects fourth, we investigate the endogeneity issue through the use of instrumental variables singh and davidson (2003) do not address this issue

23、we find that there has been an increasing adoption of the key board structural recommendations of the combined code. in uk quoted companies, nomination committees are becoming more common, duality is rare, and becoming rarer. the percentage of non-executive directors has been increasing and now cons

24、titutes around 50% of boards. using a range of agency cost measures, we find that the changes to board governance mechanisms brought about by adopting the combined codecs recommendations have had little effect on agency costs. consistent with coles et al. (2005, 2008) this suggests that uk firms hav

25、e been able to move costlessly to new governance structures consistent with valuemaximisation. however, we find that the nomination committee, and its structure, has hadan unexpectedly negative impact on agency costs. this shows that setting up such a committeecreates an ineffective mechanism and is

26、 not a component of the value maximising alternatives.this paper is structured as follows. the following section discusses the literature relating to agency costs and optimal board structures within the context of the uk combined code of best practice. it also discusses ownership and debt issues in

27、relation to agency costs. section 2 provides a discussion of the methodology and variable definition. section 3 discusses the results of the study and in section 4 some conclusions are drawn2. literature review and hypothesesthis study provides a uk context for assessing the work of demsetz and vill

28、alonga (2001), himmelberg (2002), coles et al. (2005, 2008). the traditional agency model identifies governance mechanisms that yield better governance relative to other less effective mechanisms.however, the above argue that there is a range of optimal governance structures each consistent with per

29、formance-maximising (agency cost minimising) outcomes and that performanee and governance are endogenously determined. the optimal structures model therefore assumes that the pre-combined code position represents a value-maximising outcome for uk firms. the adoption of the code, with the move away f

30、rom existing governance structures, will therefore enable firms to move to another valuemaximising situation. alternatively, they will incur costs as they adopt the non-optimal structures recommended by the code. if this is the case, as mcconnell (2002) argues, it may not be helpful to compel firms

31、to adopt a prescribed set of board composition characteristics the null hypothesis, therefore, is that firms incur trivial costs associated with changing governance structures in response to the combined code's recommendations. in this case, the combined code neither harms nor benefits sharehold

32、ers and so will not affect agency costs. therefore, no relationship is expected between the governance mechanisms and agency costs. the alternative hypotheses set out in the paper are consistent with a traditional agency perspective that the combined code recommends 'good governance, structures

33、as predicted by the agency model. the implicit assumption here is that governance structures that are different from the recommended structures represent a non-optimal outcome. in otherwords, adopting the code's recommendations should reduce agency costs2.7. agency costswe directly measure agenc

34、y costs in three ways: first, using the assets-to-sales ratio; second, by means of the interaction of free cash flow and growth prospects; and third, by means of the number of acquisitions undertaken by an in dividual firm. the assets-to-sales ratio has been used in two us studies as a direct measur

35、e of agency costs, ang et al. (2000) and singh and davidson (2003). both studies argue that the ratio measures the efficiency with which management uses the firm's assets to generate sales. a high ratio shows that assets are generating significant sales and therefore suggests low agency costs. i

36、n contrast, a low ratio suggests that management is implementing policies such as poor investment decisions or consuming excessive perquisites. a lowratiotherefore indicates high agency costs and inefficient asset utilisation. this measure does, however, have a number of potential drawbacks first, s

37、ales generation may not be synonymous with shareholder wealth because the sales may not actually come from profitable activities second, the sales may be generating cash flows that are being expropriated by the management and not being distributed to shareholders. third, as coles et al. (2005) showe

38、d, productivity can vary even between firms within the same industry. nevertheless, we argue, as ang et al. (2000) and singh and davids on (2003), that the measure provides a useful indicator of agency costs the second measure of agency costs is the interaction of free cash flow and growth prospects

39、. jensen (1986) proposed that agency costs are high when high free cash flows are combined with poor growth opportunities. retaining free cash flows reduces the ability of the capital market to monitor the decisions of management and hence large free cash flows suggest greater man agerial discretion

40、 and higher agency costs. opler and titman (1993) argued that firms that have high growth prospects are more likely to be better managed they are also less likely to have excess free cash flows because the available cash will be spent on positive net present value projects. thus, as doukas, kim, and

41、 pantzalis (2000) argued, agency costs may be regarded as a function of the interaction of growth opportunities andfree cash flow. firms that combine low growth prospects and high free cash flow can therefore be regarded as suffering from high agency costs. the third measure of agency costs is the n

42、umber of firms acquired by a firm. acquisitions are consistent with the managerial objectives such as power, jensen (1986), and pay, murphy (1985). denis and mcconnell (2003) argued that takeovers therefore may be undertaken to maximise managerial utility rather than to maximise shareholder wealth.

43、acquisitions are one way in whichfunds can be spent by managers rather than distributed to shareholders.there is a significant literature that shows acquisitions decrease, rather than increase, shareholder wealth, particularly from the perspective of the acquirer shareholders for example, significant negative short run returns to acquirers have been found by servaes (1991), kaplan and weisbach (1992), walker (2000) and houston, james, and ryngaert (2001