Russian Theory of International Relations

1、russian theory of international relationsandrei p. tsygankov, pavel a. tsygankovsan francisco state university, moscow state universityin international studies encyclopedia, edited by robert a. denemark. vol. x, hoboken, nj: wiley-blackwell publishers, 2010, pp. 6375-6387.introductionrussian society

2、 has changed dramatically since the soviet disintegration, and the emergence of new theories of international relations heralded this change. following the breakup of the soviet union and its officially sanctioned “marxist” social science, russian scholars have been making intellectual headway in ad

3、justing to new realities. analyzing the emerging russian ir studies helps us answer some of the key questions about russia. how does the new russia see itself in the world? how does it perceive the new international environment? which social and political institutions does it see as appropriate to d

4、evelop after the end of the cold war? these are the questions that are at the heart of the new russian ir scholarship, and these are the questions that continue to drive western scholarship about the new russia.the recent revival of the sociology of knowledge tradition in international studies has d

5、rawn scholarly attention to the fact that ir scholarship is grounded in certain social conditions and may reflect cultural premises. historically the tradition is rooted in work by karl mannheim (1936) and max weber, among others. (for contemporary scholarship focusing on social foundations of knowl

6、edge, see hoffmann 1977; weaver 1998; crawford and jarvis 2001.)in particular, it has become more common to view international relations as a branch of research that often reflects political, ideological, and epistemological biases of western, particularly american, civilization (hoffmann 1977; craw

7、ford and jarvis 2001). recently scholars from across the globe have attempted to understand ir from the perspective of various peripheries asian (callahan 2004a; acharya and buzan 2007), east european (guzzini 2007), latin american (tickner 2003), and russian (tsygankov and tsygankov 2007; tsygankov

8、 2008) suggesting the emergence of a new subdiscipline of comparative ir theory (callahan 2004b).in addition, some well-known and still widely practiced classifications of ir theory in the west, such as realism, liberalism, and critical theory or constructivism (viotti and kauppi 1998; weber 2005pag

9、e: 1not in refs. please supply details.; nau 2006), are shaped by theorists ideological preferences. as they each emphasize concepts of balance of power, international institutions, and human exploitation/emancipation in their research, these theories reflect broader ideological concerns about self/

10、other relationships. realists, for example, tend to perceive the rise of alternative communities or other as threatening and recommend that self prepare to defend its security. on the other hand, many western liberals, while recognizing the increasingly globalized character of world politics, mainta

11、in an image of a progressive assertion of selfs values and overlook the forces of identity and diversity associated with the other. some critical theorists too have a tendency to oversimplify the self/other relationships (shani 2008).in this essay we argue that russian theory of international relati

12、ons is nationally specific, yet it is also grounded in three main intellectual traditions of presenting self, other, and their relationships. we refer to these traditions as westernism, statism, and civilizationism because they each emphasize categories of the west, the independent state, and the di

13、stinct civilization as their desired identifications of the russian self. although the russian intellectual traditions have recovered their strengths after the soviet disintegration, they have their roots in the history of russias relations with europe and the nineteenth century debates about the “r

14、ussian idea.” we therefore adopt a broad definition of ir theory, viewing it as a systematically developed image of the world that is grounded in a local cultural history, rather than in evolution of the western social science.the essay is organized as follows. we first review the nature of russian

15、historical intellectual debates and the impact of the soviet legacy on discussions of international relations in russia. we then discuss some post-soviet discussions within the field, focusing on theories of international system, regional order, and foreign policy. although russian ir cannot be full

16、y reduced to these areas of research, they remain the most developed. (for other overviews of the russian discipline of international studies, see sergounin 2000; bogaturov et al. 2002; shakleyina 2002; lebedeva 2003; 2004; torkunov 2004; a. tsygankov and p. tsygankov 2004; 2006; kokoshin and bogatu

17、rov 2005.)we conclude by reflecting on future directions of russian international studies and the dialectic of global and local in development of ir theory.three intellectual traditions in russia<p>across different historical eras, russia has developed three traditions or schools of thinking a

18、bout self and other westernist, statist, and civilizationist. throughout centuries, westernizers, statists, and civilizationists sought to present russias international choices in ways consistent with their historically established images of the country and the outside world. this section relies on

19、discussions in tsygankov (2006), neumann (1996), prizel (1998), ringmar (2002), and hopf (2002).westernizers saw the russian idea as an essentially western idea, and they placed the emphasis on russias similarity with western nations and viewed the west as the most viable and progressive civilizatio

20、n in the world. the early westernizers sought to present russia as a loyal member in the family of european monarchies. alexander i, for instance, championed the so-called legitimist policies and established the “holy alliance” with germany and austria in order to suppress revolutionary activities o

21、n the continent. in the second half of the nineteenth century, westernizers, such as alexander ii, identified with the west of constitutional freedoms and political equality. westernizers within the soviet system saw russia as not standing too far apart from european social-democratic ideas. for ins

22、tance, one of gorbachevs favorite lines of thinking was that the soviet union had to “purify” itself of stalinist “distortions” and become a democratic, or “human,” version of socialism (gumannyi sotsializm). finally, the post-soviet liberal westernizers argued the “natural” affinity of their countr

23、y with the west based on such shared values as democracy, human rights, and a free market. sharing the prejudices of many in the west, liberal westernizers, like andrei kozyrev and boris yelstin, were fearful of the other and warned against relations with former soviet allies. they insisted that onl

24、y by building western liberal institutions and integrating with the coalition of what was frequently referred to as the community of “western civilized nations” would russia be able to respond to its threats and overcome its economic and political backwardness.statists have equated the russian idea

25、with that of a strong independent state and emphasized the states ability to govern and preserve the social and political order. they too showed their wariness of the other and introduced the notion of external threat as central to russias security. depending on a situation, the threatening other wa

26、s presented as coming from either an eastern or western direction. ever since the two-centuries-long conquest by mongols, russians has developed a psychological complex of insecurity and a readiness to sacrifice everything for independence and sovereignty. for instance, when justifying the need for

27、rapid industrialization, the leader of the soviet state josef stalin famously framed his argument in terms of responding to powerful external threats.<ex>the history of the old russia was the continual beating she suffered because of her backwardness. she was beaten by the mongol khans. she wa

28、s beaten by the turkish beys. she was beaten by the swedish feudal lords. she was beaten by the polish and lithuanian gentry. she was beaten by the english and french capitalists. she was beaten by the japanese barons. all beat her for her backwardness we are fifty or a hundred years behind the adva

29、nced countries. we must make good this distance in ten years. either we do it, or we shall be crushed” (sakwa 1999:1878).<p>the statists are not inherently anti-western; they merely seek for the wests recognition by putting the emphasis on economic and military capabilities. the statists of th

30、e monarchical era valued russias autocratic structure of power, partly because such were the structures of european monarchies as well. the socialist statists insisted on the importance of the communist partys firm control over the society for the purpose of maintaining political order and averting

31、external “capitalist” threats. in foreign policy, some statists advocated relative accommodation with the west, while others favored balancing strategies. maxim litvinov, for instance, supported a “collective security” system in europe in order to prevent the rise of fascism. nikita khrushchev, too,

32、 wanted to break taboos of isolationism and to bring soviet russia closer to europe. on the other hand, stalins pact with hitler, as well as brezhnevs “correlation of forces” strategy, reflected the will to balance perceived dangerous influences from the outside world. that dualism survived the sovi

33、et era. for instance, both primakov and putin viewed russias greatness and strength as key goals of their foreign policies, yet the former was trying to rebuild the former soviet union and contain the united states through a strategic alliance with china and india, whereas the latter emphasized bila

34、teral relations in russias periphery and had the ambition to develop partnership with america to deter terrorism.finally, civilizationists conceptualized the self/other relationships in terms of cultural oppositions. this intellectual tradition positioned russia and its values as principally differe

35、nt from those of the west. viewing russia as a civilization in its own right, many civilizationists insisted on russias “mission” in the world and spreading russian values abroad (duncan 2000). as a policy philosophy, civilizationism dates back to ivan the terribles “gathering of russian lands” afte

36、r the mongol yoke and to the dictum “moscow is the third rome” adopted under the same ruler. some representatives of this school advocated a firm commitment to values of orthodox christianity, while others viewed russia as a synthesis of various religions. in the nineteen century, civilizationists d

37、efended the notion of slavic unity, and their ideology of pan-slavism affected some of the tsars foreign policy decisions. born out of the agony of autocratic and liberal europe, the soviet russia saw itself as superior to the “decadent” and “rotten” western capitalist civilization. the early social

38、ist civilizationists challenged the west in a most direct fashion, defending at one point the doctrine of the world revolution. other soviet thinkers, however, advocated a peaceful coexistence and limited cooperation with the world of “capitalism.” yet another version of civilizationist thinking was

39、 the so-called eurasianism that saw russia as an organic unity distinctive from both european and asian cultures. (on eurasianism and its influence in the contemporary russia, see solovyev 2004; bassin and aksenov 2006; shlapentokh 2007; laruelle 2008.)the soviet interlude<p>soviet marxism hel

40、ped to legitimize russias new socialist identity and provided intellectuals with new lenses through which to analyze the outside world. both ontologically and epistemologically, marxism presented an important challenge to western social sciences and international relations. at least three key featur

41、es deserve to be mentioned here. first, the new way of thinking about the world was socially critical or emancipatory. marxs dictum that philosophers must go beyond explaining the world and toward changing it radically drew attention to the relationships between theory and practice and therefore sha

42、ttered the very foundations of status-quo-oriented positivist thinking. second, marxist historically structural approach meant to link world affairs to the existing phenomena of global exploitation and inequality and to reveal their origins and social roots. finally, marxist analysis was holistic an

43、d global, as it understood the world as globally united and globally divided at the same time. as opposed to the three familiar levels of analysis in mainstream international relations individual, national, and systemic marxism viewed the struggle for human liberation and emancipation as universal a

44、nd without boundaries.the soviet period in russias development also suppressed the described debate among westernizers, statists, and civilizationists. by legitimizing russias new socialist identity, the soviet regime also developed a self-serving vision of marxism and legitimized the countrys relat

45、ive isolation from western intellectual developments. in addition to some of its progressive and liberating elements, the soviet version of marxism served as an ideologically pretentious way to preserve the state-favored status quo and as a tool for suppressing dissent. the official ideological hege

46、mony of soviet marxism stiffened creative thought by imposing rigid cannons on scholars of international relations and encouraging dogmatic interpretations of world affairs. ir “scholarship” was all too often reduced to interpretations of official documents and speeches of the leaders to the communi

47、st party congresses. soviet marxism also allowed for only a minimal dialogue with non-marxist scholars. even marxist and neo-marxist developments outside the soviet union, such as the frankfurt school in germany, were not welcome. cross-fertilization with the outside world was therefore negligible a

48、nd confined to narrow circles of elite scholars with privileged access to information.still, the centuries-old intellectual debate on the russian idea could not be eliminated partly because soviet marxism had never been entirely homogeneous ever since the death of its founder vladimir lenin in 1924,

49、 at least two schools competed for the status of official ideology and “loyal” interpreter of leninist intellectual legacy. radicals advocated forceful methods of industrialization, whereas moderates argued for a more gradual process of development and proceeded from the late lenins notion of “coexi

50、stence” with the western “capitalist world.” this debate had been terminated by stalin after his break with lenins post-1921 philosophy of moderation in relations with the peasant class and the external world, and was only revived after stalins death. the soviet social science also began to slowly a

51、bsorb ideas from the west, some of which were revisionist marxist in nature, others liberal and anti-communist, and still others fiercely nationalistic. although for decades the russian idea debate was to develop within the officially sanctioned version of marxism, it was alive with westernizers adv

52、ocating european social democratic ideas, statists insisting on preservation of balance of power, and civilizationists arguing russias cultural distinctiveness.the soviet decline and gorbachevs perestroika further opened up the space for debate. reflecting gorbachevs own evolution, official marxism

53、evolved along the lines of european social democracy (herman 1996; english 2000). opposition to it came from the neo-orthodox thinking advocated by the newly emerged communist party of the russian federation and its leader gennadi zyuganov. zyuganovs (1999; 2002) “marxism” is a merger of the old sta

54、linist ideas, traditional geopolitics, and russian imperial nationalism. aside from gorbachev and zyuganov, marxist scholars also developed an interest in world-system approaches, often associated in the west with the name of immanuel wallerstein. both gorbachevs new thinking and world-system analys

55、is (ilyin 2004; kagarlitsky 2005) have continued a long-standing tradition of marxist “global thinking” and have roots in the domestic interests in the study of such global issues as the environment, population dynamics, and the arms race. a variety of new approaches have emerged outside of the marx

56、ist worldview. liberals pursue the ideas of globalization and democratic peace and are often political scientists by training (davydov 2002; trenin 2006; kulagin 2007). russian realism is emerging as a complex intellectual movement, in which historians, philosophers, sociologists, and economists dev

57、elop their own schools and research agendas (shakleyina and bogaturov 2004page: 5not in refs. please supply details.; konyshev 2007). finally, russia is beginning to respond to the western “post-structural turn,” and philosophers and sociologists are increasingly taking a lead in exploring the cultu

58、ral foundations of russias development (kapustin 1998; neklessa 2000).russian new ir theory<p>heavily influenced by the west, russian international thinking has developed consistently with the countrys historical experience. consistently with their historically established images of the countr

59、y and the world, the above-described intellectual traditions have each produced a new type of ir scholarship.liberalism<p>russian liberal ir theory is much more heavily shaped by western approaches than other russian approaches. although there are deep divisions and disagreements within russian liberalism (p. tsygankov and a. tsygankov 2004), those who favor following american theories enjoy a position of considerable dominance. in international relations theory, this position of d