外文翻译--股利政策：一个综述

1、外文原文Dividend policy: a review1. IntroductionExplaining dividend policy has been one of the most difficult challenges facing financial economists. Despite decades of study, we have yet to completely understand the factors that influence dividend policy and the manner in which these factors interact.

2、Allen and Mich aely (1995) conclude that much more empirical and theoretical research on the subject of dividends is required before a consensus can be reached (p. 833). The fact that a major textbook sauschBrealey and Myers (2002) lists dividends as one of the ten important unsolved problems in fin

3、ance reinforces this conclusion. The first empirical study of dividend policy was provided by Lintner (1956), who surveyed corporate managers to understand how they arrived at the dividend policy. Lintner found that an existing dividend rate forms a bench mark for the management. Companiesmanagement

4、usually displayed a strong reluctance to reduce dividends. Lintner opined that managers usually have reasonably definitive target payout ratios.Over the years, dividends are increased slowly at a particular speed of adjustment, so that the actual payout ratio moves closer to the target payout ratio.

5、2. Dividend irrelevance and tax clientelesWhile Lintner (1956) provided the stylistic description of dividends, the watershed in the theoretical modelling of dividends was almost surely the classic paper Miller and Modigliani (1961), which first proposed dividend irrelevance. Essentially, their mode

6、l is a one-period model under certainty. Given a firm s investment program, the dividend policy of the firm is irrelevant to the firm value, since a higher dividend would necessitate more sale of stock to raise finances for the investment program. The crucial assumption here is that the futuremarket

7、 valuewill remain unaffected by current dividends.The argument rests on the assumptions that the investment program is determined independently and that every stockholder earns the same return (i.e. the discount rate remains constant). Miller and Modigliani dsividend-irrelevance argument is elegant,

8、 but this does not explainwhy companies, the public, investment analysts are so interested in dividend announcements. Clearly, the observed interest in dividend announcement must be related to some violation of theMiller andModigliani assumptions.Miller and Modigliani, while formulating their famous

9、 dividend irrelevance propositions, observed that in the presence of taxation, investors will form clienteles with specific preferences for particular levels of dividend yields. This specific preference for dividends may be determined, inter alia, by the marginal tax rates faced by the investor. Alt

10、ering the dividend level, according to Miller and Modigliani, leads only to a change in the clientele of shareholders for the firm. Part of the dividend puzzle arises from the fact that dividends are typically taxed at a higher rate compared to the income from capital gains. This has certainly been

11、historically true although in recent years we have noticed a move to eliminate/reduce tax on dividends. We should, therefore, expect investors to prefer cash from capital gains over cash from dividends.Miller and Scholes (1978) provide an ingenious scheme to convert dividend income to capital gains

12、income. Recently Allen et al. (2000) have advanced a theory based on the clientele paradigm to explain why some firms pay dividends and others repurchase shares. A variant of the clientele theory has also been advanced by Baker (2004) where they posit that dividend payments are in response to demand

13、s from investors for dividends.3. Informational asymmetry and signalling modelsDeviations from the Miller and Modigliani (1961) dividend irrelevance proposition is obtainable only when the assumptions underlying the setting of Miller and Modigliani are violated. The tax-clientele hypothesis uses the

14、 market imperfection of differential taxation of dividends and capital gains to explain the dividend puzzle. Bhattacharyya (1979) develops another explanation for the dividend policy based on asymmetric information. Managers have private knowledge about the distributional support of the project cash

15、 flow and they signal this knowledge to the market through their choice of dividends.In the signalling equilibrium higher value of the support is signalled by higher dividend. In other words, the better the news, the higher is the dividend. Heinkel (1978) considers a set up where different firms hav

16、e different return-generating abilities. This information is transmitted to the market by means of dividends, or equivalently, from investing at less than the first best level. In the equilibrium of Heinkel s model, the firm with less productivity invests up to its firstbest level and declares no di

17、vidend, while the firm with higher productivity invests less than its first best level of investment, and declares the difference between the amount raised and the amount invested as the dividend. The firm with higher productivity acts in this way in order to distinguish itself from the firm with le

18、ss productivity. Dividends are still irrelevant in the sense that both firm types could raise an extra X dollars with a new issue to pay an extra X dollars as a dividend with no signalling effect. The signalling cost in this model comes from reduced investment from first best level. In contrast, the

19、 signalling cost in Bhattacharyya (1979) comes from taxation and non-symmetric cost of raising funds in the capital market. Bhattacharyya and Heinkel wsork was followed by a number of other papers which posited that dividends are used by managers to transmit information to the capital market.Notable

20、 works in signalling paradigm of dividend policy are those of Miller and Rock (1985), John andWilliams (1985) andWilliams (1988). These signalling models typically characterize the informational asymmetry by bestowing the manager or the insider with information about some aspect of the future cash f

21、low. In the signalling equilibriums obtained in these models, the higher the expected cash flow, the higher is the dividend. In Miller and Rock (1985), the signalling cost is the opportunity cost of less than first best investment. In John and Williams (1985), and Williams (1988), the differential t

22、axation of dividends vis-a-vis capital gains sustains the signalling equilibriums. In these papers dividends sustain a fully separating equilibrium. By contrast, Kumar (1988) demonstrates that dividends could also sustain a semi-separating equilibrium where the manager has private information about

23、the productivity of the firm. Venezia (1991) set up a rational equilibrium expectation model. Bayesian investors expect that dividends will be proportional to cash flows.Managers have advance noisy information about the future cash flow. The investors observe the dividend and update their belief abo

24、ut the cash flow. Under these circumstances, Venezia show that the optimal dividend is proportional to the cash flow. Brennan and Thakor (1990) focus on a different question compared to the other signalling type papers on dividend policy. Most dividend policy papers model the dividend decision, as a

25、 decision about the amount to be distributed as dividends. In contrast, this paper views the amount of cash to be distributed as exogenously given. It consider three forms of disbursement: dividebd declaration, non-proportionate share repurchase through open market operation, and non-proportionate s

26、hare repurchase through tender offer. Brennan and Thakor assume that there are two classes of shareholders - in formed and unin formed. They show that in a ten der offer, the uninformed shareholder always tenders, whereas the informed holds onto his/her shares. The situation is reversed in an open m

27、arket operation, where the informed shareholder always sell his/her holding and the uninformed never does.4. Free cash flow hypothesisThe rich theoretical development in modelling dividends as signals of private managerial/entrepreneurial information also gave rise to empirical research seeking to d

28、etermine the fit of the signalling theory to real world data. Typically, the empirical literature attempted to test the signalling paradigm counterpoised against an alternative rationale for dividends advanced by Jensen (1986), based on the principalagent framework. According to this framework, divi

29、dends are used by shareholders as a device to reduce overinvestment by managers. The managers control the firm; therefore, they might invest cash in projects with negative net present values, but which increase the personal utility of the managers in some way. A dividend reduces this free cash flow

30、and thus reduces the scope for overinvestment. The two most cited works in this genre are the papers by Easterbrook (1984) and by Jensen (1986). Unfortunately, neither of these papers try to model the situation; rather, they put forward plausible hypotheses. On the one hand, Easterbrook (1984) hypot

31、hesizes that dividends are used to take away the free cash from the control of the managers and pay it off to shareholders. This ensures that the managers will have to approach the capital market in order to meet the funding needs for new projects. The need to approach the capital markets imposes a

32、discipline on the managers, and thus reduces the cost of monitoring the managers. Additionally, Easterbrook hypothesizes that the imperative to approach the capital market also acts as a counterweight to the managersown risk aversion. Jensen (1986) on the other hand, contends that in corporations wi

33、th large cash flows, managers will have a tendency to invest in low return projects. According to Jensen, debt counters this by taking away the free cash flow. Jensen contends that takeovers and mergers take place when either the acquirer has a large quantum of free cash flow or the acquired has a l

34、arge free cash flow which has not been paid out to stakeholders. Although Jensen does not deal with the issue of dividends, empirical researchersof dividend policy often use Jensen asrticle for motivating tests of the free cash flow hypothesis of dividend policy.The empirical evidence on the three h

35、ypotheses are mixed, as we observe in Table I. Dividend policy thus continues to remain a puzzle. We can however enumerate some interesting stylized facts. In Table II we compile the stylized facts as they emerge from a study of the empirical literature.5. ConclusionWe have seen that the empirical e

36、vidence is equivocal about the existing theories of dividend policy. Research has discovered a large number of stylized facts but the explanation of dividend policy in an integrated framework still eludes us. In his PhD dissertation, Bhattacharyya (2000) explains dividend policy by using the asymmet

37、ric information paradigm. However, unlike the signalling models (where the informed manager/insider uses the dividend as a signalling device), he posits dividend policy as a component of a screening contract set up by an uninformed principal. In signalling models, hidden information is the source of

38、 informational asymmetry. In the dissertation, he uses a richer source of informational asymmetry -that due to moral hazard (because the effort exerted by agent is not observable) and that due to hidden information (because the productivity of agent is not observable). He assumes that the manager wa

39、nts to maximize his net wealth and the principal recognizes this and sets up a discriminating contract to utilize the skill of the agent in the productive enterprise.He finds that contrary to the findings of the dividend models based on the signalling paradigm, divide nd con diti onal on cash availa

40、bility -bears an inv erse relati on ship to managerial type. That is, for a given level of available cash, the manager with lower productivity declares a higher dividend than that declared by a manager with higher productivity. He concludes that his model can be used to explain many of the empirical

41、 findings obtained by other researchers. An interesting corollary of his model is that when we include costly private effort and differences in productivity, the relationship between dividend and managerial type shifts from being monotone increasing to monotone decreasing. This relationship shows th

42、at incorporation of costly effort and difference in productivity modify the result (Miller and Rock, 1985) obtained. Miller and Rock study a model which does not include managerial effort. Another interesting implication of this dissertation is that dividends can be shown to be relevant in the prese

43、nce of moral hazard and hidden information, even when the agency contract is optimally chosen.The free cash flow conjecture posits that higher dividends are better because higher dividend removes free cash from the hands of the managers; consequently, the managershave less money to waste. According

44、to this conjecture, announcement of higher dividends would also lead to higher abnormal return.The proof of the pudding, as the adage goes, is in eating, and the validity of a theory is the degree of its congruence with empirical reality. A properly conducted research will take into account the empi

45、rical implications of all the theories and test them simultaneously. This is the task for future.Source: N. Bhattacharyya, (2007) Dividend policy: a review, Managerial Finance, Vol. 33 Iss: 1, pp.4 -13.中文译文：股利政策：一个综述1、简介解释股利政策对财务经济学家来说已经是面临的最困难挑战之一。 尽管经过 了几十年的研究， 但我们还没有完全理解影响股利政策的因素， 以及这些因素以 何种方式相互影

46、响。艾伦和迈克尔（ 1995）的结论是“在达成一致意见前，进行 更多的有关股利分配主题的实证和理论研究是必需的”。事实上 , 在一本重要的 教科书中布莱雷和梅耶 （2002） 列出了股利成为十大加强财务管理必须解决的问 题之一的结论。首先以调查公司管理层是如何得出股息政策为研究对象进行股利 政策实证研究的是林特纳（ 1956） 。林特纳发现，现有的股利率形成了一个管理 的标竿。 公司的管理部门通常表现出很不愿意减少分红。林特纳认为， 管理者通 常有明确的合理支付率目标。经理们告诉林特纳通常有合理确定的目标股利率。 在过去的几年中 ,股利的调整在以某一特定的速度慢慢增加 , 所以实际的股利支 付

47、率向目标股利率更加靠近。2 、股息和税收的客户群无关有关于描述股息的文章有林特纳（ 1956）所提供的， 该领域股利理论模型几 乎可以肯定的是米勒和莫迪里阿尼（ 1961）的经典论文，但其中也首次提出了股 利无关理论。 从本质上讲，他们的模型是一个确定性的单期模型。 鉴于一个公司 的投资计划， 股利政策与该公司的价值是无关的， 因为较高的股息将需要更出售 股票来筹集资金的投资方案。 这里的关键假设是未来的市场价值将继续因分红不 受分离。这个论点在于对方案确定的假设， 该投资独立性在于每个股东赚取相同 的回报率（即贴现率保持不变） 。米勒和莫迪利亚尼的股利无关的论点是准确的， 但这并不能解释为什

48、么企业、市民、投资分析师们如此感兴趣分红公告。显然， 必须从利息股息公布中来观察是违反了米勒和莫迪利亚尼的一些相关的假设。 米 勒和莫迪利亚尼，在制定其著名的股利无关主张理论中指出，在税收存在的， 投 资者将形成的客户群以股息收益率的具体水平为特定的偏好。 这一特定的偏爱红 利可以确定 , 边际税率所面临的投资者。改变股息级别 , 按照米勒和莫迪里阿尼 , 引导和改变了客户为本公司的股东。 股息难题的一部分来自于事实的股利税率更 高的利率的收入相比的资本收益。 这已经被确定历史上的事实， 尽管近年来我们 也注意到这样一个消除或减少税收的红利。因此 , 我们应该选择投资者认为股息能带来现金资本收

49、益的股票。 米勒和斯科尔斯 (1978) 提供一个巧妙的计划方案来 转换股利收益从而来增加资本收益的收入。 他们的工作提供了一个崭新的方法对 于毫不相干的股息的定位。 他们的争论点是建立在一个普通的所得税的条文允许 下收入中扣除利息费用申请前的税收。米勒和斯科尔斯表明, 适量借款利息总额可以抵作的股利收益在某种程度上使应纳税所得额减少到零。以彼得森 (1985) 看来在一定程度上 , 投资者试图使股息收入来自税收。米勒和斯科尔斯 (1978) 。他们选择从个人所得税申报表归档来返还。 他们发 现,85%的申报收益报告是股息收入。 最近艾伦(2000) 已提出一种基于客户范式理 论来解释为什么有

50、些公司分红而其他公司回购股份。 客户的一个变化理论也是促 进贝克(2004) 认为股利发放的要求是为了响应一起投资者对股息的要求。3、信息不对称和信号模型从莫迪里阿尼和米勒 ( 1961)股利无关理论的差异中我们知道只有当与米勒 和莫迪利亚尼理论相违背的假设条件可设立下才能得出结论。 客户税假说使用的 是不完善的市场微分红利课税和资本收益来解释股息难题。巴特查里亚( 1979) 发展的股利政策是在另一种解释信息不对称的基础上。 经理人的私人支持有关知 识分布项目现金流和信号这方面的知识， 他们的市场， 通过他们的选择股息来确 定的。在支持的价值更高的信号均衡的的标志是较高的股息。换句话说，更高

51、的 股利能带来利好消息。海因克尔 (1978) 把建立在不同的公司有不同的生产回报 能力，这些信息通过股息传递给市场 , 即以低于投资的最优水平。在亨克尔的平 衡模型中， 以较少的生产力公司首次投资高达最好水平，并宣布任何股息， 而公 司的生产力较高投资少以这种最好的投资比例并宣布了金额之间的差额提出和 股息作为投资的金额。 公司用更高的生产率这样行动来区分公司本身降低生产效 率。股息仍然是无关的，从这个意义上来说，两公司类型能够提高额外的 X美元， 一个新问题是支付额外的X美金作为股息是没有信号的效果。传递信号的成本在 该模型中来自减少投资从而达到最佳水平。与此相反，巴特查里亚(1979)的

52、信令成本来自税收和非对称筹集资金成本的资本市场。 巴特查里亚和海因克尔的紧 随其后的工作总结中指出股息是企业经理用于传输信息给资本市场的工具。在股利政策的股利信号模型中，最著名的范例是米勒和罗克(1985)，约翰和威廉姆斯( 1985)和威廉斯( 1988)等。这些信号模型的信息不对称是由于经 理或和相关的某些方面未来现金流量的内幕信息。 在这些信号模型取得均衡就能 实现更高的预期现金流量，更高的股息。在米勒和罗克（ 1985），信息的成本不 是机会成本最优投资。在约翰和威廉姆斯（ 1985），和威廉斯（ 1988），鉴别税 务股利分配与资本收益扶持信号均衡。在这些文件股息维持一个完全分离均衡。 相比之下，库马尔（ 1988）表明，红利可以维持一个半分离均衡的地方是私人拥 有工作效率的公司。瑞古奇（ 1991）成立了一个合理的平衡期望值研究模型。贝 叶斯投资者预期股息将与现金流量成比例。经理拥有先进的关于现金流量的信 息。投资者遵守股利和更新他们的信仰的现金流。在这些情况下 ,瑞古奇表明 , 最佳股利是与现金流成正比例的。 布伦南和赛克（ 1990）集中在不同问题上比较 其他信号类型