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1、香山论坛青年军官学者研讨会英文发言稿材料trategic context and security priorities have a huge impact on international security and strategic studies. According to leading British strategist Lawrence Freedman, in the 1980s, arms control dominated strategic studies in the 1980s, civil war and regional conflict in the 1990

2、s, counter terrorism in the 2000s, but after 2010, great power competition has gradually returned.As great power competition disappeared for almost thirty years, when it returns, many of us try to seek somewisdom from history. Two years ago, the Brexit vote and Trumps election led to the new discuss

3、ion of the years between the world wars, when isolationism contributed to deterioration of great power relations and the outbreak of the Second World War. In 2018, the release of major U.S. strategic documentsand policy statements, and Pences speech on China, has ledto unprecedented discussion of th

4、e Cold War.Historical lessons should prevent anyone from beingthrilled at the prospect of great power competition between China and the US. The twentieth century witnessed three waves of long term great power competition. Two of these in thefirst half of the twentieth century greatly contributed to

5、the outbreak of the two World Wars characterized by unprecedented destruction and human suffering. The last one drove human civilization to the verge of total destruction and inflicted heavy casualties on the two competitors themselves in Korea, Indochina, and Afghanistan. Therefore, participants of

6、 great power competitions have to cope with both its cost to daily life and the risks of conflict. Duringthe past competitions, decision makers developed many approaches to manage competition and crisis, including summits, mediation, arms control and limitation, localization of conflicts, confidence

7、 building measures, and crisis management mechanisms. We should bear them in mind, and understand both their effectiveness and limitations.Nevertheless, the diversity of previous great power competition also implies that one should avoid determinism or superficially embrace notions like the Thucydid

8、es Trap. Context and the choices of decision makers shape the outcome of competition. As a student of history, I am confused by many over simplified comparisons between China and Imperial Germany or the Soviet Union. As a student of Cold War history, I also find that the U.S. success results more fr

9、om its domestic innovation, strategic adaptation, and cost management, than opposing an enemy.Finally, as strategic context keeps changing, Cold Warexperiences should not become a measure of currentcompetition, or we will miss real challenges andopportunities. For example, we should not be preoccupi

10、ed withwhether any major policy statements in 2018 are similar tothose in 1946 and 1947. Then, the two sides had notestablished a Cold War strategic framework such as militaryalliances and national security institutions at home. Today,these tools are available; some of them have already beenemployed

11、 and have intensified the competition. Speech andstatements are still important in reflecting policy changes,but they matter less than they did 70 years ago. Cold War competition originated from and concentrated on continental Europe, but the primary security competition between China and the US is

12、taking place in a maritime theater. With regard to technology, the recent shock to the INF treaty reminds us of a new nuclear arms race, but we also have to cope with the impact of new technological innovations such as cyber, outer space, artificial intelligence, and hypersonic weapons. Meanwhile, b

13、oth countries also face unique opportunities that did not exist in the late 1940s. The two countries have strong social and economic ties. The two sides should work hard to identify and address problems in these ties. But terminating them is out of question. Externally, the foreign policy agenda for

14、 the US and China today is broader than thatbetween the US and the USSR 70 years ago. The cooperation will go beyond mere crisis management, thus constantly improving communication, and developing new momentum for bilateral relations.The emergence of strategic competition between China and the US does not imply that the two countries will follow the model of previous competitions. Learning historical lessons is important to address complex situations and avoid previous mistakes. However, solely rely

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