Constructing PostCold War Collective Security

1、constructing post-cold war collective securitybrian frederkingpresented by kim yun keasupporting theory: language games: dialogical analysis of inf negotiationgavan duffy; brian k. frederking; seth a. tuckeropposing theory: the false promise of international institutionsjohn j. mearsheimersummary: r

2、ule-oriented constructivism is built on an interpretive method called dialogical analysis. dialogical analysis models a linguistic conception of social interaction capable of illustrating constructivist arguments. it assumes the existence of constitutive social rules and communicatively rational age

3、nts constructing those social rules through the performance of speech acts. building on the rule-oriented constructivism, the author posits four social arrangements constituting the security structures on world politics: war, rivalry, collective security, and security community. the dominant post-co

4、ld war global security trend is the gradual construction of collective security rules and september 11 did not fundamentally change the exiting world political order; instead, it exacerbated it. moreover, the kosovo and iraq wars are embedded in collective security social arrangement. q1: can dialog

5、ical analysis effectively explain the international relations? frederking: yes. dialogical analysis models a linguistic conception of social interaction capable of illustrating constructivist arguments. it assumes the existence of constitutive social rules and communicatively rational agents constru

6、cting those social rules through the performance of speech acts. the development of interpretive methods like dialogical analysis is important if we are to move beyond epistemological debates between advocates of science and advocates of anti-science. (p. 363) duffy and tucker: yes. it dialogical an

7、alysis combines linguistics analyses of the discourse contents, argument analyses of parties moves and countermoves in this discourse, and logical deductions to test counterfactual hypothesis. by tacking between the negotiation discourse and the (empirically supported) background assumptions that ma

8、ke that discourse comprehensible, dialogical analysis progressively elaborate deeper and more refined understandings of the interaction, (p. 290)q2: does dialogical analysis reflect the existence and importance of social structures such as norms, beliefs, and identities? frederking: yes. dialogical

9、analysis helps make the speech acts constructing post-cold war security intelligible by showing those acts to be logically consistent with the social rules-beliefs, norms, identities-constituting global security structures. (p. 376) duffy and tucker: yes. game theory provides a powerful set of forma

10、l tools for explaining political interactions. yet the formality of game models sometimes limits their empirical application. contextual factors generally held exogenous to game models may prove decisive for outcomes. these factors include actors belief about the nature of the interaction, their bel

11、iefs about other actors beliefs, and the means by which actors convey and infer intentions to and from one another. scholars concerned with the role of norms, beliefs, and identities in social interaction (e.g., constructivists, cognitivists, negotiation theorists, diplomatic historians) could benef

12、it from a model of social interaction that captures these contextual factors. (p. 271)q3: are the existence and development of social arrangement rules characterized by multilateralism? frederking: yes. social rules are constantly negotiated and mediated through the actions of many agents. whether f

13、uture global security rules are constituted by collective security rules or war rules is always being negotiated and renegotiated. (p. 376) duffy and tucker: yes. they the inf negotiations consisted of intentional exchanges of intent as the parties progressively elaborated a largely mutual context t

14、hat promoted the mutual intelligibility of their utterances. on the constructivist account of global politics, the substantive commitments that accompany such an interaction constitute a regime. if so, then the inf language game helped to transform that regime and, with it, world history. (p. 291) q

15、4: are states behavior and action determined by the nature of shared understanding regarding norms and identity, rather than materialist concept such as military capability? frederking: yes. norms are shared understandings of appropriate action. norms guide action and make action possible, enabling

16、agents to criticize assertions and justify actions. identities tell agents who they are and who other are; they enable agents to make the actions of themselves and others intelligible interests stems from a particular, constructed representation of the relationship between self and other material st

17、ructures have meanings for human agents only within the context of social rules. for example, a states military capability has different meanings depending on whether it belongs to an ally or an enemy. (p. 365) s. d.: yes. why are iraq, iran, and north korea dangerous to america?table 1: the worlds

18、nuclear arsenalscountrysuspected strategic nuclear weaponsuspected non-strategic nuclear weaponssuspected total number of nuclear weaponschina 250120400france3500350india60?60+?israel100-200?200+?pakistan24-48?24-48russia6000 400010,000united kingdom1805185united states8,6462,01010,656source: cdi: n

19、uclear issue. last updated february 4, 2003/issues/nukef&f/database/nukearsenals.cfmiraq: 0 (jehl, 2004)iran: 0 (smith, 2004)north korea: 1 - 8 (edward qtd. in excerpts in new york times)table 2: military budget (1995)countrymilitary budget (in billion)china$29france$41india$8israel

20、$7pakistan$4russia$63united kingdom$35united states$254iraq$3iran$2north korea$6prepared by center for defense information. sources: iiss, dod, cdi/dm/dm/images/country.gifq5: are the international involvement, legitimacy, and justification ground important in institutionalizing the

21、 collective security arrangement? frederking: yes. collective security orients agents to act with a sense of duty to generate rules of peaceful behavior and punish those who break the rules. through the explosion of multilateral treaties, security council resolutions, un peacekeeping missions, and n

22、ongovernmental organizations, agents have been slowly institutionalizing a global collective security arrangement in the post-cold-war world a collective security enforcement may enforce only the rule of state sovereignty, or it could enforce rules regarding weapon of proliferation, terrorism, human

23、 rights, and so on. (p.368) s.d.: yes. kosovo war is embedded in collective security. nato spokesman jamie shea: serb forces were holding 700 kosovo-albanian boys prisoner, using them as “blood banks” for injured troops, and using kosovo albanians as human shields, forcing them to stand in front of

24、serb tanks for two days, and upwards of 100,000 albanian men of fighting age were unaccounted for in kosovo, more than 3,500 had been executed. http:/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/324173.stm 4/20/99 with a nato cease-fire in place, the u.n. security council gave its backing thursday on a nato-led

25、 force that will enter yugoslavia as peacekeepers while yugoslav troops withdraw from kosovo as the cease-fire was announced, the vanguard of a 50,000- strong peacekeeping force dubbed kfor prepared to move into kosovo. /world/europe/9906/10/kosovo.05/ 06/10/99 the u.n. war crime tr

26、ibunal indicted the former yugoslav president slobodan milosevic and his four aides: the president of serbia, the yugoslav deputy premier, serbias interior minister, and the head of yugoslav army. /world/europe/9906/03/kosovo.peace.06/ 5/27/99 q6: can it be assumed that in war socia

27、l rule, states sovereignty is not recognized and its survival is determined by military capability? frederking: yes. in war, agents identify each other as enemies (rule 1), perhaps even an enemy that threatens their existence. agents do not recognize the autonomy of others or perhaps even the right

28、of others to exist (rule 2). survival demands a military capability greater than ones immediate enemies (rule 3) because the military capabilities of others are interpreted as a threat to ones existence. the directive rule in war is to surrender (rule 4), supported by the commitment to attack until

29、the other does surrender (rule 5). because others are enemies with the military capability to threaten ones existence, the use of force is considered inevitable, necessary, and appropriate (rule 6). s.d.: yes. at dawn of world war ii, japan invaded manchuria and germany acquired czechoslovakia and p

30、oland respectively by force. during the course of the war, nine formerly independent states had submitted to the domination of berlin in various guises, ranging from outright annexation in the case of austria to a fictitious independence in the case of the vichy regime in france. the remaining natio

31、ns of the continent had become either military allies or economic vassals of germany except spain, portugal, switzerland, and sweden that managed to cling to precarious neutrality. in asia, the western colonial possessions such as singapore, the philippines, malaya, indochina, most of the dutch east

32、 indies, and burma had come under japanese military occupation, while thailand became the subservient client state of tokyo. the war was brought to an end when the ally army captured berlin and two nuclear bombs were dropped in hiroshima and nagasaki of japan, forcing germany and japan unconditional

33、ly surrender to the u.s. and ally force. (keylor, 2001:137-247) q7: is the international security system constituted by the rules of social arrangement? frederking: yes. these social arrangements war, rivalry, collective security, security community constitute global security in the way that the rul

34、es of chess constitute chess; participants use them to “go on” and act in intelligible ways. sometimes one social arrangement is more institutionalized than the others; sometimes the social arrangements are more institutionalized in different geographical areas. (p.367) mearsheimer: no. the internat

35、ional system is portrayed as a brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other, and therefore have little reason to trust each other. daily life is essentially a struggle for power, where each state strives not only to be the most powerful actor in the system, but al

36、so to ensure that no other state achieves that lofty position. (p. 9)q8: are genuine cooperation and global peace feasible in the international politics? frederking: yes. in security communities, agents identify each other as friends committed to the peaceful resolution of conflict (rule1). agents i

37、n security communities have a strong consensus about the obligation to follow the rules of their community (rule 2) and they engage in peaceful, multilateral decision making to ensure security through political relationships (rule 3). the directive rule to follow the rules of community does exist in

38、 security communities (rule 4), but enforcement does not include the possibility of force (rule5 and 6). (p. 368-9) mearsheimer: no. genuine peace, or a world where states do not compete for power, is not likely. state inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the where

39、withal to hurt and possibly to destroy each other. states are potentially dangerous to each other. a states military power is usually identified with the particular weaponry at its disposal, although even if there were no weapons, the individuals of a state could still use their feet and hands to at

40、tack the population of another statestate can never be certain about the intention of other states. specifically, no state can be certain another state will not use its offensive military capability against the first they may miscalculate from time to time because they operate in a world of imperfec

41、t information, where potential adversaries have incentives to misrepresent their own strength or weakness and to conceal their true aims. (p. 9-10)q9: is the relationship between agents and social structures a two-way relationship? frederking: yes agents and structures construct each other. rules ma

42、ke agents and agents make rules. the (social) world is made by people, who in turn are made by that (social) world. (p. 364) mearsheimer: no those rules reflect state calculations of self-interest based primarily on the international distribution of power. the most powerful states in the system crea

43、te and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it. in this view, institutions are essentially “arenas for acting out power relationships.” in short, the balance of power is the independent variable that explains war; institutions are merely an interv

44、ening variable in the process. (p. 13)q10: is it likely that states self-interest and freedom of actions are limited by the shared responsibility? frederking: yes. in collective security arrangements, agents states are citizens whose sovereignty is limited by obligation to follow community rules and

45、 to use multilateral military force to ensure compliance with those rules. (p. 369) o.d.: no. table 3: wars 1990-2002countriestype of warsite of warwar begancombat status 2002united kingdominterstate clashesregional civil warinterstate warintervention in sierra leonintervention in afghanistaniraqnor

46、thern irelandkuwait / iraqsierra leonafghanistan19981969199120002001continuingsuspended by agreement 1994suspended by agreement 1991withdrew 2001continuingunited statesinterstate clashesinterstate warinterstate warintervention in afghanistan iraqkuwait / iraqyugoslaviaafghanistan1998199119992001cont

47、inuingsuspended by agreement 1991suspended by agreement 1999continuing(smith, dan. 2003)q11: can the types of social rules be detected by looking at the validity claims that the disputing parties assert and challenge? frederking: yes. in the post-cold war construction of collective security, the mea

48、ning of the use of force is defined by how agents understand the act. how will the international community interpret the use of force? does it invoke collective security rules or war rules? in both the kosovo and iraq debates, both sides asserted the validity of collective security rules but differe

49、d on whether u.s. use of force actually invoked those rules. (p. 376) o. d.: no. iraq war is not embedded in collective security rule. charles a. duelfer: mr. hussein ended his nuclear program in 1991, and there was no evidence he tried to restart it activities at a storage depot cited by secretary

50、of state colin l. powell at the united nations security council were not related to chemical weapons iraqs last banned weapons facility, a biological weapons plant called al hakam, was destroyed in 1996. (qtd. in jehl, 2004) amnesty international has said the terms of the iraqi special tribunal need

51、ed to be changed. the statute, it said, did not prevent arbitrary arrest or the torture of detainees to extract confessions. it also suggested there was a lack of expertise among iraqi judges in tackling cases involving human rights and crimes against humanity. other human rights groups noted there

52、is no requirement for proof beyond a reasonable doubt./headlines04/0702-02.htm 08/02/04q12: can it be assumed that the global security rule is unlikely to be changed by single event such as a terrorist one? frederking: yes. a terrorist event, even a horrific one, cannot aut

53、omatically change the rules of global security. even u.s. foreign policy, although tremendously important, cannot unilaterally construct a war social arrangement through declarations of a “war on terrorism” or even by invading iraq. (p. 376) o.d.: no the pearl harbor attack american full-fledged int

54、ervention in the second world war two nuclear bombs dropped in hiroshima and nagasaki. (keylor, 2001) september 11 events u.s. declared war on terrorism grand strategy shatter old world order new world order: rivalry or war?countries where al qaeda has operatedalbaniaalgeriaafghanistanazerbaijanaust

55、raliaaustriabahrainbangladeshbelgiumbosniaegypteritreafrancegermanyindia iranirelanditalyjordankenyakosovolebanonlibyamalaysiamauritanianetherlandspakistanphilippinesqatarrussiasaudi arabiasomaliasouth africasudanswitzerlandtajikistantanzaniatunisiaturkeyugandaunited arab emiratesunited kingdomunite

56、d statesuzbekistanyemen/products/pubs/terrornet/12.htm 10/8/2004 jorge castaneda, mexicos former foreign minister: the change came with the sep. 11 attacks. my sense is that mr. bush lost and never regained the gift he had shown for making you feel at ease. he became aloof, brusque, and on occasion abrasive. the brusqueness had a clear message: the united states is at war, it needs everybodys support and that support is not negotiable. (quoted