patent premium我的资源Huang Patent premium in weak IPR countries 20180614

HowMuchOwnership,InstitutionsandCompetitionMatterforPatentPremiumsinCountrieswithWeakIntellectualPropertyRightsProtection?,CanHuang,ZhejiangUniversityZheQu,FudanUniversityLanhuaLi,ZhejiangUniversityAugust25,2018,IntroductionHypothesesDataandMethodologyEmpiricalresultsConclusions,Outline,2,DifferentmethodstoprotectinnovationPatent,tradesecret,leadtime,complexity,andcomplementaryassets,etc.Impactofpatentprotectiononthevalueofaninnovation,1.Introduction,3,Thisincrementtothevalueofaninnovationduetopatentprotectionisdefinedaspatentpremium(Aroraetal.,2008).,4,Patentpremiumincountrieswithweakintellectualpropertyprotection,DespitetheweakIPRprotection,patentingactivitieskeepincreasinginChina.,Highopportunitycost;Possiblylowpatentpremium.,QuantifypatentpremiumoffirmsinChina.Wedefinepatentpremiumasthehighertotalfactorproductivity(TFP)apatentingfirmcanachieveafterapplyingforpatenttoprotectitsinnovationthanhaditnotpatented.Howdoesfirmownershipaffectpatentpremium?Howdoinstitutionaldevelopmentandcompetitionintensitymoderatetherelationshipbetweenfirmownershipandpatentpremium?,Researchquestions,5,H1:DespiteweakIPRprotection,patentpremiumexistsforforeignsubsidiariesinhigh-techindustriesinanemergingeconomy.High-techproducts(complextechnologies)aremuchmoredifficulttoimitate;Pro-innovationmeasures(subsidyandtaxcredit,etc.)inChinesehigh-techindustries;Patentscanhelpfirmsinhigh-techindustriesobtainlegitimacy.,2.Hypotheses,6,H2:Pertheliabilityofforeignnesslogic,patentpremiumwillbelowerforforeignsubsidiariesthanfordomesticfirms.Foreignsubsidiariesfaceconsiderableliabilitiesof“foreignness”(Zaheer,1995)and“outsidership”(JohansonMansfieldetal.,1981).Increasestheavailabilityofmorematuremarketintermediaries.Greaterpositiveeffectonforeignsubsidiaries.Institutionaldevelopmentinafirm-locatedregionweakensthechallengesofinstitutionalvoidsandfirmswillrelymoreonformalinstitutionsandcompetitiveadvantagessuchascoretechnologiesandproductquality.Foreignfirmsmayreceiveequaltreatmentastheirdomesticpeersinlegalenforcementandpolicymakingasinstitutiondevelops.,8,2.Hypotheses,H4:Thedecreaseinpatentpremiumduetointensifiedindustrycompetitionwillbelessforforeignsubsidiariesthanfordomesticfirms.Patentpremiumdecreaseswithindustrycompetition.Competitioninducesmoreinnovationandpatenting,andthusthecompetitiveadvantageofholdingpatentsmaydiminish.Decreasesopportunityforpatenttransactionswithmorepatentsavailableforlicensingandselling.Rivalfirmsaremorelikelytoinfringeordirectlychallengeafocalfirmspatentrightsthroughlegalprocesses(LanjouwandSchankerman,2001).SmallernegativeimpactonforeignsubsidiariesForeignfirmshaveoptionstoemploytheirgloballinkagestoprotecttheirinnovations,sotheyarelesssensitivetotheintensifiedinfringementinstanceswhichresultsfrommoreintensivecompetition.Theinformationaldisadvantageofforeignfirmsdiminishesasmoreinformationaboutmarketenvironmentsemergeswithincreasingcompetition(Zhouetal.,2017).,9,2.Hypotheses,AnnualSurveyofIndustrialEnterprises(ASIE)Acensusofallnon-state-ownedfirmswithmorethanRMBfivemillioninrevenueandallstate-ownedfirmsinChinafrom1998to2007.50firm-levelstatisticalindicators,includinginput,output,capitalcomposition,employment,geographicallocation,thefour-digitindustryinwhichafirmoperates,ownershipstatus,andassetsandliabilities.ChinaPatentAbstractDatabase(CPAD)Informationincludespatentapplicationandpublicationnumber,applicationandpublicationdate,patentnumber,title,internationalpatentclassification(IPC)class,abstract,claims,legalstatus.Matchedfirm-patentinformationHe,Z.L.,Tong,T.W.,Zhang,Y.,definetheupperhalfofthesectorswiththesmallerindexesasstrong-competitionsectors.Similarly,thelowerhalfofthesectorsareclassifiedasweak-competitionsectors.InstitutiondevelopmentbyregionsoffirmsRankallprovincesbytheindexesofinstitutionaldevelopment(Fan,Wang&Zhu,2011),anddividethemintooneswithstrongandweakinstitution.,Measuresofmarketcompetition,institutiondevelopmentandownership,14,4.Empiricalresults,1)Patentpremiumestimatedusingthefullsample,2)Patentpremiumofdomesticfirmsandforeignsubsidiaries,3)Patentpremiumofdomesticfirmsandforeignsubsidiariesatdifferentlevelsofinstitutionaldevelopment,4.Empiricalresults,4)Patentpremiumofdomesticfirmsandforeignsubsidiariesatdifferentlevelsofindustrialcompetition,4.Empiricalresults,5.Conclusions,Thisstudydemonstratesthatpatentpremiumdoesexistinalargeemergingmarketi.e.Chinaandyetduetoliabilitiesofforeignnessthispremiumislowerforforeignfirmsthanfordomesticfirms.Interestingly,foreignfirmsgainhigherpatentpremiumfrominstitutionalimprovementthandomesticcounterpartsdo