微观经济管理学与财务知识分析规划(英文版)

IntermediateMicroeconomics,Introduction,Contents,InstructorandTAsRequirementsCourseoutlineAnexample:marketforapartments,Textbook,IntermediateMicroeconomics:AModernApproach(SixthEdition)byHalR.VarianW.W.Norton，2003,TheTheoryofEconomicsdoesnotfurnishabodyofsettledconclusionsimmediatelyapplicabletopolicy.Itisamethodratherthanadoctrine,anapparatusofthemind,atechniqueofthinkingwhichhelpsitspossessortodrawcorrectconclusions-JohnMaynardKeynes,IsEconomicsUseful?,AthinkingmachineChangesthewayyouviewlifeandunderstandproblemsAnallroundmajor,EconomicsGraduates,JobsforEconomists,BusinesseconomistsGovernmenteconomistsAcademiceconomists,Microeconomics,TheoryApplicationsLaboreconomicsEconomicsofeducationAgriculturaleconomicsIndustrialorganizationsHealtheconomics,CourseOutline,Consumertheory(1-15)Producertheory(18-27)Marketequilibrium(16-17,30-32)Specialtopicsonequilibrium,EconomicModeling,Whatcauseswhatineconomicsystems?Atwhatlevelofdetailshallwemodelaneconomicphenomenon?Whichvariablesaredeterminedoutsidethemodel(exogenous)andwhicharetobedeterminedbythemodel(endogenous)?,ModelingtheApartmentMarket,Howareapartmentrentsdetermined?Supposeapartmentsarecloseordistant,butotherwiseidenticaldistantapartmentsrentsareexogenousandknownmanypotentialrentersandlandlords,ModelingtheApartmentMarket,Whowillrentcloseapartments?Atwhatprice?Willtheallocationofapartmentsbedesirableinanysense?Howcanweconstructaninsightfulmodeltoanswerthesequestions?,TwoPrinciplesinEconomics,Optimization:Eachpersontriestochoosethebestalternativeavailabletohimorher.Equilibrium:Marketpriceadjustsuntilquantitydemandedequalsquantitysupplied.,ModelingApartmentDemand,Demand:Supposethemostanyonepersoniswillingtopaytorentacloseapartmentis$500/month.Thenp=$500QD=1.Supposethepricehastodropto$490beforea2ndpersonwouldrent.Thenp=$490QD=2.,ModelingApartmentDemand,Theloweristherentalratep,thelargeristhequantityofcloseapartmentsdemandedpQD.Thequantitydemandedvs.pricegraphisthemarketdemandcurveforcloseapartments.,MarketDemandCurveforApartments,p,QD,ModelingApartmentSupply,Supply:Ittakestimetobuildmorecloseapartmentssointhisshort-runthequantityavailableisfixed(atsay100).,MarketSupplyCurveforApartments,p,QS,100,CompetitiveMarketEquilibrium,“low”rentalpricequantitydemandedofcloseapartmentsexceedsquantityavailablepricewillrise.“high”rentalpricequantitydemandedlessthanquantityavailablepricewillfall.,CompetitiveMarketEquilibrium,Quantitydemanded=quantityavailablepricewillneitherrisenorfallsothemarketisatacompetitiveequilibrium.,CompetitiveMarketEquilibrium,p,QD,QS,100,CompetitiveMarketEquilibrium,p,QD,QS,pe,100,CompetitiveMarketEquilibrium,p,QD,QS,pe,100,Peoplewillingtopaypeforcloseapartmentsgetcloseapartments.,CompetitiveMarketEquilibrium,p,QD,QS,pe,100,Peoplewillingtopaypeforcloseapartmentsgetcloseapartments.,Peoplenotwillingtopaypeforcloseapartmentsgetdistantapartments.,CompetitiveMarketEquilibrium,Q:Whorentsthecloseapartments?A:Thosemostwillingtopay.Q:Whorentsthedistantapartments?A:Thoseleastwillingtopay.Sothecompetitivemarketallocationisby“willingness-to-pay”.,ComparativeStatics,Whatisexogenousinthemodel?priceofdistantapartmentsquantityofcloseapartmentsincomesofpotentialrenters.Whathappensiftheseexogenousvariableschange?,ComparativeStatics,Supposethepriceofdistantapartmentrises.Demandforcloseapartmentsincreases(rightwardshift),causingahigherpriceforcloseapartments.,MarketEquilibrium,p,QD,QS,pe,100,MarketEquilibrium,p,QD,QS,pe,100,Higherdemand,MarketEquilibrium,p,QD,QS,pe,100,Higherdemandcauseshighermarketprice;samequantitytraded.,ComparativeStatics,Supposethereweremorecloseapartments.Supplyisgreater,sothepriceforcloseapartmentsfalls.,MarketEquilibrium,p,QD,QS,pe,100,MarketEquilibrium,p,QD,QS,100,Highersupply,pe,MarketEquilibrium,p,QD,QS,pe,100,Highersupplycausesalowermarketpriceandalargerquantitytraded.,ComparativeStatics,Supposepotentialrentersincomesrise,increasingtheirwillingness-to-payforcloseapartments.Demandrises(upwardshift),causinghigherpriceforcloseapartments.,MarketEquilibrium,p,QD,QS,pe,100,MarketEquilibrium,p,QD,QS,pe,100,Higherincomescausehigherwillingness-to-pay,MarketEquilibrium,p,QD,QS,pe,100,Higherincomescausehigherwillingness-to-pay,highermarketprice,andthesamequantitytraded.,TaxationPolicyAnalysis,Localgovernmenttaxesapartmentowners.Whathappenstopricequantityofcloseapartmentsrented?Isanyofthetax“passed”torenters?,TaxationPolicyAnalysis,Marketsupplyisunaffected.Marketdemandisunaffected.Sothecompetitivemarketequilibriumisunaffectedbythetax.Priceandthequantityofcloseapartmentsrentedarenotchanged.Landlordspayallofthetax.,ImperfectlyCompetitiveMarkets,Amongstmanypossibilitiesare:amonopolisticlandlordaperfectlydiscriminatorymonopolisticlandlordacompetitivemarketsubjecttorentcontrol.,AMonopolisticLandlord,WhenthelandlordsetsarentalpricepherentsD(p)apartments.Revenue=pD(p).Revenueislowifp0RevenueislowifpissohighthatD(p)0.Anintermediatevalueforpmaximizesrevenue.,MonopolisticMarketEquilibrium,p,QD,Lowprice,Lowprice,highquantitydemanded,lowrevenue.,MonopolisticMarketEquilibrium,p,QD,Highprice,Highprice,lowquantitydemanded,lowrevenue.,MonopolisticMarketEquilibrium,p,QD,Middleprice,Middleprice,mediumquantitydemanded,largerrevenue.,MonopolisticMarketEquilibrium,p,QD,QS,Middleprice,Middleprice,mediumquantitydemanded,largerrevenue.Monopolistdoesnotrentallthecloseapartments.,100,MonopolisticMarketEquilibrium,p,QD,QS,Middleprice,Middleprice,mediumquantitydemanded,largerrevenue.Monopolistdoesnotrentallthecloseapartments.,100,Vacantcloseapartments.,PerfectlyDiscriminatoryMonopolisticLandlord,Imaginethemonopolistkneweveryoneswillingness-to-pay.Charge$500tothemostwilling-to-pay,charge$490tothe2ndmostwilling-to-pay,etc.,DiscriminatoryMonopolisticMarketEquilibrium,p,QD,QS,100,p1=$500,1,DiscriminatoryMonopolisticMarketEquilibrium,p,QD,QS,100,p1=$500,p2=$490,1,2,DiscriminatoryMonopolisticMarketEquilibrium,p,QD,QS,100,p1=$500,p2=$490,1,2,p3=$475,3,DiscriminatoryMonopolisticMarketEquilibrium,p,QD,QS,100,p1=$500,p2=$490,1,2,p3=$475,3,DiscriminatoryMonopolisticMarketEquilibrium,p,QD,QS,100,p1=$500,p2=$490,1,2,p3=$475,3,pe,Discriminatorymonopolistchargesthecompetitivemarketpricetothelastrenter,andrentsthecompetitivequantityofcloseapartments.,RentControl,Localgovernmentimposesamaximumlegalprice,pmaxpe,thecompetitiveprice.,MarketEquilibrium,p,QD,QS,pe,100,MarketEquilibrium,p,QD,QS,pe,100,pmax,MarketEquilibrium,p,QD,QS,pe,100,pmax,Excessdemand,MarketEquilibrium,p,QD,QS,pe,100,pmax,Excessdemand,The100closeapartmentsarenolongerallocatedbywillingness-to-pay(lottery,lines,largefamiliesfirst?).,WhichMarketOutcomesAreDesirable?,Whichisbetter?RentcontrolPerfectcompetitionMonopolyDiscriminatorymonopoly,ParetoEfficiency,VilfredoPareto;1848-1923.AParetooutcomeallowsno“wastedwelfare”;i.e.theonlywayonepersonswelfarecanbeimprovedistoloweranotherpersonswelfare.,ParetoEfficiency,Jillhasanapartment;Jackdoesnot.Jillvaluestheapartmentat$200;Jackwouldpay$400forit.JillcouldsublettheapartmenttoJackfor$300.Bothgain,soitwasParetoinefficientforJilltohavetheapartment.,ParetoEfficiency,AParetoinefficientoutcomemeansthereremainunrealizedmutualgains-to-trade.Anymarketoutcomethatachievesallpossiblegains-to-trademustbeParetoefficient.,ParetoEfficiency,Competitiveequilibrium:allcloseapartmentrentersvaluethematthemarketpricepeormoreallothersvaluecloseapartme