外文翻译和原文__物流横向合作的机遇和障碍[1].doc

附件1: 外文资料翻译译文物流横向合作的机遇和障碍Frans Cruijssen, Martine Cools, Wout Dullaert1 绪论全球市场的激烈竞争，产品生命周期的缩短以及顾客期望较高的服务已迫使托运人和物流服务提供商投资来建立彼此之间密切的互惠互利关系。例如纵向的合作，包括了供应商，生产商，配送商，顾客和物流服务提供商，该理论被广泛的学术研究所支持。Gibson et al. (2002)指出该研究主要在于鉴别潜在的机遇（例如Gentry, 1993），关键成功因素法（例如Tate, 1996）和合伙人选择的标准。最普遍和最好的研究是关于托运人雇佣第三方物流服务提供商来完成他们的物料管理和产品配送业务的全部或部分业务的研究(Simchi-Levi et al., 1999)。Tyan et al. (2003)阐述了被第三方物流服务提供商整合的供应链的优势，这种经济规模能够让他们获得单个托运人所不能获得的大规模的设施。Leahy et al. (1995)评定了托运人和第三方物流服务提供商之间纵向合作成功的决定性因素。横向合作被European Union (2001)定义为市场上具有相同水平的公司在运作时的协调惯例。物流中的横向合作所获得的推动主要是在西欧。在比利时和荷兰，欧洲物流中心的引力一书中，作者在书中指出欧洲有30家正式的物流合伙企业。通过紧密的合作，物流服务提供商的合伙人可以提高生产力，例如通过优化运输路线，减少空运里程和降低非核心作业的成本来增加物流网络的竞争力。横向合作方面的物流文献还比较地不成熟，虽然海洋运输(see e.g. Shepperd and Seidman, 2001)和空运行业(Fan et al., 2001; Oum et al., 2002)方面的横向合作的文献比较普遍并且研究也非常的成熟，但是在物流横向合作方面的文献却非常地匮乏。这个问题只被Bahrami (2003), Cruijssen and Salomon (2004), Erdmann(1999), and Vos et al. (2003)研究过，他们研究的重点在于通过仿真研究来确定合作能够带来潜在的节约成本和列举了一些成功的案例。本文阐述了物流横向合作中潜在机遇以及在实践中运作中和维护物流合伙关系的主要障碍，并对此进行了第一次大规模的实验性研究。2 研究综述虽然关于物流横向合作方面的文献比较匮乏，但是在自营公司之间的合作，比如战略联盟和共同经营，这些经验已经被收集到管理类文献作为标准了。该文献构成了物流横向合作的机遇和障碍的一系列研究的基础。这项研究的发展是基于物流服务提供商大量操作员的认识和见解。这份调查中有很多物流服务提供商的总经理阐述了他们对这项研究的看法。2.1 机遇联盟形成的背后的驱动力是联盟成立后对每个合伙人纯粹的积极的影响(Parkhe, 1993)。通过合作，合伙人之间可以产生所谓的相关收益。Dyer and Singh (1998)定义相关收益为“在关系交流中连带地产生的超常规的利润，该利润不能通过孤立的公司而只能通过联盟中某个合伙人的特殊贡献产生。”他们的争议主要集中在合作的公司能否通过特殊关系资产，信息共享程序，缺乏资源时的捐助和有效的管理来产生相关收益。 从一个物流文献的上下文中我们得出相关收益可以是“有形的”（例如经济规模）和“无形的”（例如学习模型）。Bartlett and Ghoshal (2000)提出了可以让参与的公司获得经济规模利益或学习利益的三种方法，这三种方法分别是：（1）共享他们的资源和集中精力从事核心业务；（2）分享其它参与公司的特殊优势和技能；（3）通过彼此之间的贸易和资源的互补来达到共同获利和消除复制的高额成本。Kogut (1988)根据小额交易可以减少合伙人交易的成本，增强合伙人的竞争力和市场的主导权，能够满足合伙人对组织知识的需求和学习等这些条件，总结了合作联盟的优势。合作的潜在优势同样被很多其他的作者提及和研究，例如Hagedoorn(1993), Hamel et al. (1989), Hennart (1988), Ohmae (1989) and Zineldin and Bredenlow (2003).这些高层次的合作机遇为那些想合作的物流服务提供商能够获得很多特殊机遇提供了理论依据。基于这些机遇的讨论，形成了下面很多的主张，这些主张涉及到成本和生产力，服务和市场形势。2.1.1 成本和生产力上文已经提到，横向合作可以为合伙人提供一个组织学习和向其它拥有特殊技能和优势的合伙人学习的平台(Hamel, 1991; Kogut, 1988; Westney, 1988)。通过这种方式，他们可以完善他们自己的运作方法，这也就暗示着横向合作的物流服务提供商能够增强他们控制能力和降低供应链成本的能力(Gibson et al., 2002)。此外，在非核心业务方面的横向合作能够提供潜在的共同采购（例如运输工具，车上电脑和燃料）的机会进而降低采购成本(Dyer and Singh, 1998)。根据核心业务和非核心业务以及降低采购成本降低的研究可以得出下面三种观点：（1）横向合作可以提高公司核心业务的生产力，例如减少空驶，更好地使用仓储设施等等。（2）横向合作可以降低非核心业务的成本，例如组织安全培训，共享燃料设施等等。（3）横向合作可以降低采购成本，例如运输工具，车上电脑，燃料等等。2.1.2 服务合作的专业化对生产力的影响是众所周知的。最优秀的实践价值链可以通过公司间的专业化，进而到允许单独的公司集中从事一些简单的活动以及与其他公司之间的复杂的交流来表现(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Dyer, 1997)。通过这中做法，横向合作不仅能够带来利益和协作效应（例如规模经济，高素质的劳动力，较高的研究水平和高科技的使用权），还能够以较低的成本带来较大的顾客附加价值的增加(Zineldin and Bredenlow, 2003)。此外，联盟还能够使公司间相互学习彼此的技术和能力(Hamel, 1991; Kogut, 1988; Westney, 1988)，这也是另一种以较低的成本改进质量的潜在的方法。我们综合了关于顾客服务的横向合作机遇的理论，得出了以下的两个观点：（4）物流服务提供商在拓宽他们服务的同时还能够从事专门的研究。（5）物流服务提供商能够以较低的价格提供较高质量的服务，例如在速度方面，配送频率方面，覆盖的地理范围方面以及配送时间的可靠性方面等等。2.1.3 市场形势纯粹的数量规模说明了，当为大的工业托运人（例如在石油化工工业）提供物流服务时，个体的单独的物流服务提供商是禁止进入这个服务链条中的。横向合作联盟是一个非常有用的工具，它能够拓展可用的车队，服务的范围以及地理覆盖范围，同样还能够增加他们的顾客影响力(Bleeke and Ernst, 1995)。这个机遇在观点（6）中被列了出来。观点（7）反映了横向合作是在不确定市场状况下保护公司利益、增强公司竞争力和市场主动权的一种服务方式。 (Kogut, 1988)。（6）横向合作能够使单独的物流服务提供商在更大的合同框架下为大的托运人提供服务。（7）横向合作能够帮助保护公司的市场份额。这七种关于横向合作的机遇的观点被总结在表1中。表1 关于横向合作机遇的七种观点编码 观点（1）横向合作可以提高公司核心业务的生产力，例如减少空驶，更好地使用仓储设施等等。（2）横向合作可以降低非核心业务的成本，例如组织安全培训，共享燃料设施等等。（3）横向合作可以降低采购成本，例如运输工具，车上电脑，燃料等等。（4）物流服务提供商在拓宽他们的服务的同时还能够从事专门的研究。（5）物流服务提供商能够以较低的价格提供更高质量的服务，例如在速度方面，配送频率方面，覆盖的地理范围方面以及配送时间的可靠性方面等等。（6）横向合作能够使单独的物流服务提供商在更大的合同框架下为大的托运人提供服务。（7）横向合作能够帮助保护公司的市场份额。2.2 障碍文献中很少有关注这种密切合作关系的负担和不好的方面(Zineldin and Bredenlow, 2003)。横向合作通常是作为一种不确定性的保证，而这种不确定性主要是指很难来策划一些必需的业务和估量已实现的产出。因此拥有可信赖的关系就显得非常重要了(van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000; Tomkins, 2001)，但是这种机遇的风险依然存在。这种相关风险的一个典型的来源就是合伙人的机会主义的行为，也就是该合伙人不遵守该协作组织的规则(Williamson, 1985; Das and Teng, 1998)。我们找到了横向合作中与障碍相关的四个方面的观点：合伙人的选择，利益的决定和分配，合伙人中不平等的谈判地位以及信息和通讯技术。2.2.1 合伙人的选择分析一个潜在的合伙人的战略和组织的能力是需要与它相关的物质资产的数据，同样还需要无形资产和组织能力方面的数据(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2000)。寻找潜在的贸易合伙人和评价他们的适合性和可靠性，是成为中小型物流服务提供商参与横向合作的一个巨大障碍(Bleeke and Ernst, 1995; Williamson, 1985; Hennart, 1993; North, 1990)。此外，最近的实验证据(Chalos and OConnor, 2004)证明了合伙人的不确定性，是使该组织管理复杂性的一个主要原因。物流服务提供商选择合伙人的两个障碍如下：（8）很难找到一个同等规模，能够跟自己在（非核心）核心业务方面合作的物流服务提供商。（9）很难找到一个可靠的团体来协调合作，使所有的参与者都满意。2.2.2 利益的决定和分配大部分联盟的狭窄范围阻止了他们对这种组织的自然属性，广度，以及在合伙企业改革中可能产生的风险和酬金的分配，甚至阻止了对每个合伙人的角色和任务定义的全面理解(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2000)。预期和非预期的成本的公平分配的重要性同样被强调在内（Gibson et al. 2002)。观点（10）,（11）,（12）包括了关于横向合作利益的决定和分配的阻碍因素。（10）由于横向合作的原因合伙人很难预先决定利润和运营收入。（11）合伙人事先很难保证对分配的工作的利益公平分配。（12）一个公平的利益分配原则对一个成功的合伙企业的所有合伙人来说都是必要的。2.2.3 合伙人中不公平的谈判地位Gibson et al. (2002)解释了合伙人的相关议价能力是怎样发展和演化的，而这正是理解一个联盟是否有可能进行兼并的关键因素。相关的议价能力主要依靠三个因素：合伙人最初的优势和劣势，随着时间的变化这些优势和劣势是如何变化的以及竞争对手的发展潜力。得益于操作员的观点，下面是三个关于合伙人中不公平谈判地位导致的潜在的竞争对手的观点：（13）当一个物流服务提供商和一个同等规模的公司合作时，它会发现辨别自己更加地困难。（14）随着时间的推移，合伙企业中的小的公司可能会失去顾客并被完全地挤出市场。（15）当利益不能以一种公平的方式被分享时，其中较大的合伙人将成为最大的受益者。2.2.4 信息和通讯技术活跃在物流中的公司大部分都是一些中小型的公司(SMEs)。由于SMES有落后于信息和通讯技术系统的实施的趋势(Gunasekaran and Ngai, 2004)，这将阻碍那些需要大量数据交流的合作团体的形成。我们的操作员观点表明信息和通讯技术主要是一个中等层次横向合作组织协议的一个问题。低层次的横向合作组织通常不需要特别的信息和通讯技术投资，而高层次的横向合作组织能够主动产生足够的收入来补偿所需的信息和通讯技术方面的投资。观点(16)总结了信息和通讯技术实施的阻碍因素:(16)合作的形成受到所必需的信息和通讯投资的巨大的阻碍。本文的目的在于把物流公司的特征和他们对于那些被提出的横向合作的机遇和障碍的态度联系在一起。由于这是第一次把这方面的观点呈现给大量的物流服务提供商，该研究中探测因素分析法被用来鉴别在一系列机遇和障碍的观点中的并不引人注目的因素。表2总结了在本部分提出的有关横向合作障碍的九大观点。表2 关于横向合作障碍的观点编码 观点（8）很难找到一个能够跟自己在（非核心）核心业务方面合作的同等规模的物流服务提供商。（9）很难找到一个可靠的团体来协调合作使所有的参与者都满意。（10）由于横向合作的原因合伙人很难预先决定利润和运营收入。（11）合伙人很难事先保证对已分配工作的公平的利益分配。（12）一个公平的利益分配机制对一个成功的合伙企业的所有合伙人来说都是必要的。（13）当一个物流服务提供商和一个同等规模的公司合作时，它会发现辨别自己更加地困难。（14）随着时间的推移，合伙企业中的小的公司可能会失去顾客并被完全地挤出市场。（15）当利益不能以一种公平的方式被分享时，其中较大的合伙人将成为最大的受益者。(16)合作的形成受到所必需的信息和通讯投资的巨大的阻碍。附件2：外文原文原文出处：Source: Horizontal cooperation in logistics: Opportunities and impediments. Frans Cruijssen, Martine Cools, Wout Dullaert. Transportation Research Part E 43 (2007) 129142.Horizontal cooperation in logistics: Opportunities and impediments1. Introduction Fierce competition in global markets, the introduction of products with shorter life cycles, and the heightened expectations of customers have forced shippers and Logistics Service Providers (LSPs) to invest in developing stronger and mutually benecial relationships with each other. Such as vertical cooperation, involving suppliers, manufacturers, distribution centers, customers and LSPs, is supported by extensive academic research. As indicated by Gibson et al. (2002), research has mainly focused on identifying potential benets (e.g. Gentry, 1993), the critical success factors (e.g. Tate, 1996) and partner selection criteria. The most common and best-studied type of vertical cooperation involves shippers hiring third-party LSPs (3PLs) to perform all or part of their materials management and product distribution function (Simchi-Levi et al., 1999). Tyan et al. (2003) describe the supply chain advantages of consolidation of logistics ows by 3PLs. The increased economies of scale make it for example possible to acquire large equipment that would have been too expensive for the individual shipper. Leahy et al. (1995) assess the determinants for a successful vertical cooperation between shippers and a 3PL.Horizontal cooperation is dened by the European Union (2001) as concerted practices between companies operating at the same level(s) in the market. Horizontal cooperation in logistics is mainly gaining momentum in Western Europe. In Belgium and the Netherlands, the European logistics centers of gravity, the authors are aware of over 30 formal logistics partnerships. Through close collaboration, the partnering LSPs aim at increasing productivity, e.g. by optimizing vehicle capacity utilization, reducing empty mileage and cutting costs of non-core/supporting activities to increase the competitiveness of their logistics networks.The literature on horizontal cooperation in logistics is, however, still in its infancy. While for maritime shipping (see e.g. Shepperd and Seidman, 2001) and the airline industry (Fan et al., 2001; Oum et al., 2002) horizontal cooperation is quite common and well studied, the literature on horizontal logistics cooperation is scarce. This matter has only been studied by Bahrami (2003), Cruijssen and Salomon (2004), Erdmann(1999), and Vos et al. (2003), where the emphasis is on (1) quantifying the potential cost savings through cooperation by means of simulation studies and on (2) reporting a limited number of successful cases.This paper describes the rst large-scale study on empirical evidence on the potential benets of horizontal cooperation in logistics, as well as on the major impediments for starting and maintaining logistics partnerships in practice. 2. Research propositionsAlthough the literature on horizontal cooperation in logistics is scarce, cooperation between autonomous rms, such as strategic alliances and joint ventures, has received extensive attention in the management literature. This literature forms the basis of a set of propositions regarding opportunities and impediments for horizontal cooperation in logistics. The development of these propositions is also based on a series of ve pilot interviews with LSPs. For the survey a large number of managing directors of LSPs were asked about their opinion on these propositions.2.1 OpportunitiesThe driving force behind the formation of alliances is each participants expectation of a net positive value to the expected alliance outcomes (Parkhe, 1993). By cooperating, partners can generate so-called relational rents. Dyer and Singh (1998) dene relational rent as a supernormal prot jointly generated in an exchange relationship that cannot be generated by either rm in isolation and can only be created through the joint idiosyncratic contributions of the specic alliance partners. They argue that collaborating rms can generate relational rents through relation-specic assets, knowledge-sharing routines, complementary resource endowments and eective governance.In a logistics context, relational rents can be hard(e.g. economies of scale) and soft (e.g. learning). Bartlett and Ghoshal (2000) mention three ways in which strategic alliances and networks allow participating rms to reap the benets of scale economies or learning: by (1) pooling their resources and concentrating on (core) activities, by (2) sharing and leveraging the specic strengths and capabilities of the other participating rms, and by (3) trading dierent or complementary resources to achieve mutual gains and eliminate the high cost of duplication. Kogut (1988) summarizes the advantages of cooperative alliances in terms of reducing the transaction costs resulting from small number bargaining, enhancing the competitive position or market power of the partners, and fullling the partners quest for organizational knowledge and learning. The potential advantages of cooperation have also been mentioned and studied by many other authors, e.g. Hagedoorn(1993), Hamel et al. (1989), Hennart (1988), Ohmae (1989) and Zineldin and Bredenlow (2003).These high-level opportunities of cooperation support the identication of a number of specic opportunities that cooperating LSPs can benet from. Based on a discussion of these benets, a number of propositions are formulated below. These propositions relate to Costs and Productivity, Service and Market position.2.1.1 Costs and ProductivityAs mentioned above, cooperation provides a platform for organizational learning, giving rms access to the skills and capabilities of their partners (Hamel, 1991; Kogut, 1988; Westney, 1988). In this way, they can improve their own operational processes. It implies that cooperating LSPs can increase their ability to control costs and to reduce the costs of the supply chain (Gibson et al., 2002). Moreover, collaboration on non-core activities oers the potential of joint purchases (e.g. of vehicles, onboard computers and fuel) in order to reduce the purchasing costs (Dyer and Singh, 1998). The opportunities for cost reduction in terms of core and non-core activities and purchases are captured in the following three propositions:(1) Horizontal cooperation increases the companys productivity for core activities, e.g. decrease in empty hauling, better usage of storage facilities etc.(2) Horizontal cooperation reduces the costs of non-core activities, e.g. organizing safety trainings, joint fuel facilities, etc.(3)Horizontal cooperation reduces purchasing costs, e.g. vehicles, onboard computers, fuel etc2.1.2 ServiceThe impact of cooperative specialization on productivity is well known. Best practice value chains are characterized by interrm specialization allowing individual rms to focus on a narrow range of activities and engage in complex interactions with other rms (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Dyer, 1997).In doing so, cooperation not only oers benets and synergy eects such as economies of scale, skilled labor force, high R&D level and access to superior technology, but also generates greater customer value added at lower cost (Zineldin and Bredenlow, 2003). Moreover, alliances enable companies to learn from each others skills and capabilities (Hamel, 1991; Kogut, 1988; Westney, 1988), which is another potential source of quality improvement at lower costs. We integrated the opportunities of horizontal cooperation regarding customer service into the following two propositions:(4) LSPs can specialize while at the same time broadening their services.(5) LSPs can oer better quality of service at lower costs, e.g. in terms of speed, frequency of deliveries, geographical coverage, reliability of delivery times etc.2.1.3 Market position The sheer size of the volumes involved in serving large industrial shippers (e.g. in the (petro) chemical industry) sometimes prohibits individual LSPs from entering the tendering process on an individual basis. Alliances are a useful tool to expand the available eet, service range and geographic coverage, and, as a result, to increase their customer reach (Bleeke and Ernst, 1995). This opportunity is captured in proposition(6). Proposition (7)reects the potential for horizontal cooperation to serve as a means to protect companies under uncertain market conditions and to enhance the competitive position or market power (Kogut, 1988)(6) Horizontal cooperation enables individual LSPs to tender with large shippers on larger contracts.(7) Horizontal cooperation helps to protect the companys market share.The seven propositions regarding opportunities of horizontal cooperation are summarized in Table 1.Table 1Propositions about opportunities of horizontal cooperationCode Proposition(1) Horizontal cooperation increases the companys productivity for core activities, e.g. decrease in empty hauling, better usage of storage facilities etc.(2) Horizontal cooperation reduces the costs of non-core activities, e.g. organizing safety trainings, joint fuel facilities, etc.(3Horizontal cooperation reduces purchasing costs, e.g. vehicles, onboard computers, fuel etc(4)LSPs can specialize while at the same time broadening their services.(5) LSPs can oer better quality of service at lower costs, e.g. in terms of speed, frequency of deliveries, geographical coverage, reliability of delivery times etc.(6)Horizontal cooperation enables individual LSPs to tender with large shippers on larger contracts.(7)Horizontal cooperation helps to protect the companys market share.2.2 ImpedimentsThe literature pays little attention to the burdens and dark sides of close relationships (Zineldin and Bredenlow, 2003). Horizontal cooperation often is an uncertain undertaking in which it is dicult to plan the required activities or measure the realized output. Therefore, having a trustworthy relationship is vital(van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000; Tomkins, 2001), but the risk of opportunism remains real. A typical source of relational risk is opportunistic behavior of the partners, i.e. actions of the partner that do not comply with the spirit of the cooperation (Williamson, 1985; Das and Teng, 1998). We develop propositions relating to impediments to horizontal cooperation in four areas: partner selection, determining and dividing the gains, unequal negotiation positions of partners, and Information and Communication Technology.2.2.1 Partner selectionAnalyzing a potential partners strategic and organizational capabilities requires data on its physical assets, as well as on less-tangible assets and organizational capabilities (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2000). The search costs incurred to nd potential trading partners and to evaluate their aptness and reliability can be a very big hurdle for small and medium sized LSPs (Bleeke and Ernst, 1995; Williamson, 1985; Hennart, 1993; North, 1990).Furthermore, recent empirical evidence (Chalos and OConnor, 2004) conrms that partner unreliability is a major source of the managerial complexity of cooperation. Two partner selection impediments for LSPs are formulated below:(8) It is hard to nd commensurable LSPs with whom it is possible to cooperate for (non-)core activities.(9) It is hard to nd a reliable party that can coordinate the cooperation in such a way that all participants are satised.2.2.2 Determining and dividing the gainsThe narrow scope of most alliances prevents full understanding of the nature, extent, and distribution of risks or rewards that might accrue in the course of the partnerships evolution, or even a clear denition of each partners roles and tasks (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2000). The importance of a fair distribution of expected and unexpected costs is also stressed in Gibson et al. (2002). The propositions (10), (11), and(12) contain the impediments concerning the determination and division of gains from horizontal cooperation.(10)It is hard for the partners to determine the benets or operational savings due to horizontal cooperation beforehand.(11) Partners nd it hard to ensure a