全球经济周评：从更广视角来审视新兴市场增长放缓-2012-11-02.ppt

,高盛国际,2012 年 11 月 1 日 issue no: 12/36 全球经济周评 研究报告 从更广视角来审视新兴市场增长放缓,新兴市场增长缓慢引发结构性放缓担忧 新兴市场近期的增长放缓引发了市场对于本轮放缓更多是周期性（即放缓势头将 在未来几个月逆转）还是结构性（即部分国家将进入增速更低的可持续增长轨 道）的担忧。中国是这些担忧的焦点所在，但韩国、巴西和印度等其他主要新兴 市场也引发了类似担忧。 高速增长经济体的结构性放缓较为普遍 从更广阔的全球视角来看，高速增长经济体的结构性放缓相对普遍，而且通常在 人均 gdp 处于 1.5 万-2.5 万美元间的经济体出现。类似的结构性放缓也出现在我 们的长期增长预测中，这表明增长的趋同性可能自然而然地引发了此类放缓。 中国（和新兴市场）所处周期阶段仍是新兴市场资产的关键所在 中国等许多大型新兴经济体的收入水平仍未达到普遍存在增速放缓的收入下限。 因此对高速增长已至尽头的担心可能为时过早，尽管中国潜在增速的部分放缓已 经在我们的长期预测中出现。在研究中国和新兴市场增长（以及新兴市场资产） 轨迹时，关注所处周期阶段仍十分重要。宏观环比数据几个月以来首次出现耐人 寻味的改善迹象，这表明中国周期（以及中国相关资产）可能企稳。,kamakshya trivedi +44(20)7051-4005 jose ursua (212) 357-2234 高盛集团 george cole +44(20)7552-3779 高盛国际 julian richers (212) 855-0684 高盛集团 多米尼克威尔逊 (212) 902-5924 ,高盛集团 结构性放缓通常出现在人均 gdp 2 万美元左右的经济体 结构性放缓启动的人均 gdp 水平；非石油出口国 (1950-2010),45 40,gdp pc (000) at which structural slowdowns,mean,median,+/- 1sd,35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0,begin,5,000,10,000,15,000,threshold of gdp pc 资料来源： wdi、pwt、高盛全球经济、商品和策略研究 投资者不应视本报告为作出投资决策的唯一因素。 有关分析师的申明和其他重要信息，见信息披露附录，或参阅 /research/hedge.html。 高盛集团,2,2012 年 11 月 1 日,global economics weekly,the em growth slowdown in a broader perspective the recent slowdown in growth in emerging markets (em) especially in some of the larger economies such as china, brazil and india has become an increasingly important topic of discussion within the global macro investment community. a key question here is the degree to which this slowdown is largely cyclical (i.e., it will reverse in the coming months as policy responds) or more structural (i.e., some of these countries are moving to a lower sustainable growth path than witnessed in recent years). china is perhaps the poster-child of these worries, but similar concerns have been raised about other major ems, such as korea, brazil and india. we discussed some of the cyclical explanations behind the poor recent growth performance in some of the larger ems in global economics weekly 12/29, deconstructing our global forecasts and the weakness in large ems. we focused in particular on the impact of the great easing that followed the great recession: in some cases, the ability of policy makers to ease further has been constrained, and in others the effectiveness of easing has been limited. despite substantial heterogeneity in the experience across countries, our overall forecasts for em growth pencil in a reacceleration in 2013 from the lows of 2012 (6.3%yoy in 2013 vs 5.6%yoy in 2012). this suggests that, at least in aggregate, a large part of the slowdown in em growth may prove to be cyclical. indeed, there are signs that a turn in the em cycle may be closer at hand, as discussed in the inaugural edition of the emerging markets macro daily: questions for the em outlook in our inaugural daily, october 29, 2012. these include better than expected trade, ip and profits data in china, and an improvement in the flash pmi, as well as better sequential news from korea and taiwan. what of the structural considerations? in practice, structural and cyclical explanations are notoriously difficult to separate definitively, and the answer is almost certainly different for each country. the first step, however, is to understand the nature of such medium-term or structural slowdowns in previously fast-growing economies. here we examine the incidence of growth slowdowns in history and in the long-term forward projections that we have constructed and published (see global economics paper 208, the brics 10 years on: halfway through the great transformation). the main messages that emerge from these exercises are as follows: structural growth slowdowns in previously rapidly growing economies are relatively common, especially at low- and middle-income levels (roughly between per capita incomes of $15,000 and $25,000). but structural growth slowdowns may, to a large extent, be a function of growth and income convergence dynamics. our projections for global incomes, which illustrate the transformative role of the brics and n-11 in the global economy, envision structural slowdowns at similar levels of income as observed in history. many of the larger ems such as china still lie below the income thresholds where structural growth slowdowns are common, suggesting that concerns about the exhaustion of catch-up growth are premature. nevertheless, our long-term projections do envisage some slowing in chinas high rates of growth as the rate of capital deepening and labour force accumulation slow in future years. structural slowdowns are common, especially at low- and middle- income levels one of the striking features of the recovery from the global financial crisis (gfc) and associated global recession has been the swift return to strong growth across the em world. with developed markets growing at only modest rates, typical of post-housing bust economies, this strong growth in ems has been a key pillar supporting growth in the global economy. but growth has slowed in the em world since 2011, partly as some of the unprecedented fiscal and monetary stimulus after the gfc was withdrawn. as that slowdown has persisted, and deepened in some cases through 高盛全球经济、商品和策略研究,0,3,2012 年 11 月 1 日,global economics weekly 2012, there are more questions about whether the slowdowns represent something more fundamental or structural, and therefore are longer-lasting than in the typical economic cycle. given the multi-year nature of any structural slowdown in economic growth, it may be useful to place the present economic slowdown within historical cross-country perspective. therefore, we take a step back to examine the incidence of economic slowdowns over the past 50 years. economic slowdowns are relative phenomena: literally, a comparison of growth rates across periods divided at a certain point. a systematic approach to identifying and understanding such slowdowns requires drawing lines over fixed thresholds, which are reasonable and intuitive but cannot avoid some degree of arbitrariness. our baseline definition follows that of a paper by eichengreen, park and shin (when fast growing economies slow down: international evidence and implications, asian development bank, june 2011), which defines slowdowns as episodes satisfying three conditions: growth in the seven years prior to the structural slowdown should be at least 3.5%. a structural slowdown requires that the average growth during the subsequent seven years be at least 2ppt lower. slowdowns are restricted to countries with gdp per capita of at least $10,000 (in constant 2005 international dollars). in simple terms, we are interested in capturing instances of slowdowns when growth decelerates from a rapid rate, by a meaningful amount, and over a sizeable length of time. the income threshold ensures that only countries that are on the path to development are included (so as to rule out very low-income countries with a high degree of output volatility). given that many of the ems we care about today have per capita incomes below $10,000, we consider lower (and higher) thresholds of gdp per capita as well. our historical sample comes from the latest version of the penn world tables, covering almost 190 countries from 1950 through 2010. we focus primarily on non-oil exporting countries, occasionally referring to a narrow sample where, in addition to the historical data, we have projections through to 2050 (based on global economics paper 208).,exhibit 1: number of structural slowdowns declines at higher income levels identified episodes by threshold of gdp pc and sample,exhibit 2: examples of structural slowdown episodes identified by our algorithm cases according to gdp pc at time of slowdown (2005 intl. $),140,number,all countries,$5,000 belize,1990-95,$10,000 argentina 1997-98,$15,000 bahamas 1982-85,120 100 80 60 40 20,non-oil exporters (broad sample) non-oil exporters (narrow sample),brazil bulgaria dom. rep. slovakia guatemala lebanon malaysia poland tonga,1973-80 1987-89 1998-99 1998 1977-78 1995-97 1993-98 1977-79 1982-88,austria cyprus gabon hungary iran israel mexico spain suriname,1961 1989-93 1994 1977-80 1971-77 1971-76 1979-81 1966 1977-81,barbados belgium denmark hong kong iceland japan portugal singapore seychelles,1969-73 1974-75 1969-70 1990-94 1982 1989-92 1990-92 1980-84 1998,5,000,10,000,15,000,uruguay,1995-98,taiwan,1992-93,usa,1968-69,threshold of gdp pc,source: wdi; pwt; goldman sachs global ecs research. 高盛全球经济、商品和策略研究,source: wdi; pwt; goldman sachs global ecs research.,4,2012 年 11 月 1 日 exhibit 3: structural slowdowns tend to occur at gdp pc levels of around $20,000 gdp pc of slowdown starts; non-oil exporters (1950-2010),global economics weekly exhibit 4: growth shortfall during structural slowdowns averages around 3ppt avg. growth before and during slowdowns; non-oil exporters,45 40 35,gdp pc (000) at which structural slowdowns begin,mean,median,+/- 1sd,6.0 5.0,%,previous,during slowdown,30 25 20 15 10 5,4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0,3ppt,0,5,000,10,000,15,000,0.0,5,000,10,000,15,000,threshold of gdp pc source: wdi; pwt; goldman sachs global ecs research.,threshold of gdp pc source: wdi; pwt; goldman sachs global ecs research.,after running the algorithm as described above, the first observation is that structural slowdowns are quite frequent; put differently, it is not that common for countries to sustain high rates of growth for prolonged periods. exhibit 1 shows the number of slowdown episodes in our three basic samples and by the threshold of gdp per capita after which slowdowns are accounted for. we found 70 episodes in our $10,000-onward baseline case, but this number rises to almost 120 when the threshold is lowered to $5,000. these include many episodes that are often thought to embody the notion of em economies slowing down after a period of rapid growth, such as brazil (1973-80), argentina (1997-98), poland (1977-79), and mexico (1979-81). exhibit 2 provides more examples of slowdown episodes. a second observation is that, while the average gdp per capita at which structural slowdowns tend to occur depends, obviously, on the threshold one chooses, it hovers around $20,000 (in 2005 international ppp dollars). for our baseline $10,000 threshold, the mean and median are at $22,513 and $19,693, respectively (exhibit 3). for lower thresholds, say $5,000, the mean and median fall to $16,435 and $12,878. in contrast, for the higher thresholds, the average income level at which slowdowns start can be higher than $26,000. the third observation relates to the average pre-slowdown and during-slowdown growth rates captured by our algorithm. once more, for the $10,000 threshold baseline, the average pre- slowdown growth rate is 5.3% (mean) and 4.8% (median), which means that growth is indeed high before slowdowns begin. during slowdowns, growth hovers around 2.6% (mean) and 2.3% (median). therefore, on average, structural slowdowns imply a difference with respect to previous growth rates of almost 3ppt. unlike the number or starting income level of slowdowns, their severity in terms of the difference between pre- and during-slowdown growth rates does not depend much on the threshold one chooses to account for these phenomena (exhibit 4). structural slowdowns tend to occur between $15k and $25k gdp pc to gain a firmer sense of whether todays large em economies are at risk of a structural growth slowdown, as we have defined it, we would like to know if there is any tendency for such slowdowns to bunch around particular income levels. in exhibit 5 we depict the relative frequencies of slowdowns for the benchmark case where the sample is restricted to slowdowns above $10,000. this does suggest that slowdowns are centred around the $20,000 mark, and that the danger zone for countries falling into structural growth slowdowns lies between $15,000 and $25,000 gdp per capita levels. 高盛全球经济、商品和策略研究,10-12.5,12.5-15,15-17.5,17.5-20,20-22.5,22.5-25,25-27.5,27.5-30,30-32.5,32.5-35,35-37.5,37.5-40,40-42.5,42.5-45,45-47.5,47.5-50,7.5-10,5-7.5,10-12.5,12.5-15,15-17.5,17.5-20,20-22.5,22.5-25,25-27.5,27.5-30,30-32.5,32.5-35,35-37.5,37.5-40,40-42.5,42.5-45,45-47.5,47.5-50,5,2012 年 11 月 1 日,global economics weekly this conclusion is pretty robust to altering the criteria for defining structural slowdowns in various ways. varying income thresholds so that we include slowdowns at lower income levels starting at $5,000 increases by construction the sample size and the frequency of occurrence at low income levels. but the tendency to cluster at gdp per capita between $15,000 and $25,000 is visible here too (exhibit 6). other aspects of the criteria can also be varied. in exhibit 7, we leave the income threshold fixed at our benchmark level of $10,000, but alter the required size of pre- slowdown growth (which we bump up to 5% from 3.5%), and the length of the pre-slowdown growth period (which we raise to 10 years instead of 7 years). in both cases, slowdowns are still centred around the $20,000 gdp per capita level and the deceleration in growth still amounts to approximately 3ppt. so, our results on growth slowdowns are robust to considering slowdowns where the pre-slowdown growth was stronger, or if the pre-slowdown period of strong growth lasted longer. our long-run projections envision similar structural slowdowns the structural slowdowns that we have identified in the historical data may be triggered by shocks or crises that dislocate capital or labour markets, or downward shifts in productivity growth that countries are unable to reverse either because of policy failures or simply because as countries converge towards the frontier they have limited scope for catch-up growth. one way of examining this question is to run our slowdown algorithm over our long-run income projections through to 2050 to see whether a similar pattern of slowdowns is envisaged. the projections are based on estimates of total factor productivity growth, capital accumulation and labour force dynamics, so should capture slowdowns that are based solely on their equilibrium growth and convergence dynamics. combining our baseline sample of non-oil exporters with our growth projections through 2050 reduces the sample to about 70 countries, but it allows us to cover 100 years of data, half of which are observed and half of which are projected. the most notable result is that the mean and median threshold levels for projected figures are similar to those from past observations. for the $10,000 threshold, the mean is slightly lower ($19,047 vs. $20,901) but the median is slightly higher ($18,721 vs. $17,729), exhibit 8. therefore, in both cases, the average gdp per capita at structural slowdown starts is still close to $20,000. because our projections abstract from cyclical fluctuations, the standard deviation bands are narrower in this case ($7,535 vs. $12,366). moreover, the average decline in growth is closer to the prescribed condition of 2ppt, going on average from about 5.0% before the slowdown to 3.0%.,exhibit 5: starts of slowdowns bunch at gdp pc between $15k and $20k . relative frequencies of slowdowns at gdp pc starting at $10k,exhibit 6: .even if lower levels of gdp pc are included in the sample relative frequencies of slowdowns at gdp pc starting at $5k,0.16 0.14,rel. freq.,0.25,rel. freq.,slowdowns starting at 5k slowdowns starting at 10k,0.12,0.10 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.00 gdp pc (000) at which structural slowdowns begin source: wdi; pwt; goldman sachs global ecs research. 高盛全球经济、商品和策略研究,0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 gdp pc (000) at which structural slowdowns begin source: wdi; pwt; goldman sachs global ecs research.,6,2012 年 11 月 1 日,slower potential growth in china is baked into our brics forecasts,global economics weekly,many of the key economies at the centre of recent em slowdown concerns china, for example have per capita incomes well below the levels where sustained growth slowdowns are typical. in this limited sense, the concerns about the exhaustion of catch-up growth are very premature. nevertheless, even our long-term projections that describe the transformative role of the bric and em economies in the world do envisage slower (but still high) rates of growth in china in the years ahead as the rate of capital deepening and labour force growth slows. so a slowing in growth in china is factored into our brics projections, which still see china surpassing the us to become the worlds largest economy by the mid-2020s. the exhibit on the left shows recent growth rates in china, alongside a trend growth rate calculated using a hp filter, and the annual growth projection from our structural model. slower potential growth in china,it illustrates that a slowing in gdp growth of thekind we have seen recently is not that far away from the slowing trajectory that would be predicted from a simple structural model. and as the exhibit shows, there may be more gradual slowing ahead. the exhibit on the right shows the different contributors to the slowing growth in the years ahead (from tfp and factor accumulation). both the long-term growth projections and the hp trend abstract from a number of country-specific considerations and should not be considered forecasts as such. but even the more detailed recent work by li cui and our china economists suggests that chinas potential growth has moved lower, to between 7.5% and 8.5% (see asia economics analyst 12/16, china: shifting to a lower gear). this is not dissimilar to the 7.5% growth projected for the forthcoming decade 2010-2019 for china in our structural model for long- term growth. as we move through the next two decades,16.0 14.0 12.0 10.0,annual growth (%),16 14 12 10,ppts,average growth contributions capital labour productivity growth real gdp growth,8,8.0 6.0,6 4,4.0 2.0,china hp trend china real gdp growth china long-term projection,2 0,0.0,1995,2000