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本 科 生 毕 业 论 文外 文 资 料 翻 译 专 业 财务管理 班 级 074 姓 名 指导教师 所在学院 管理学院 附 件1.外文资料翻译译文;2.外文原文高管报酬与企业绩效 摘要：我们利用意大利公司案例中一组调查数据来分析高管报酬的决定因素。据所知这是目前就意大利高管们的报酬进行的首次实证研究。我们首要的假设是：意大利资本市场和公司治理的特点及银行和公司间的特殊关系，意味着占小部分的奖金都会超过高管们的报酬以及奖金与稳固业绩间的低敏感性。这种假设是有根据的。经评估得出一个公司净利润增加一百万里拉（意大利货币）的同时高层和中上层管理者们的薪水仅增加了31000里拉，而这个数字又远远高于底层管理者的增长量（6000里拉）。除此以外，意大利公司薪酬与业绩间的敏感性高于意大利的外资公司，上市公司和跨国公司的关联公司。关键词：高管薪酬、委托代理、公司治理一、简介 无论公众，学者还是决策者都对高管报酬有浓厚兴趣。高管行头价值百万美元成为头版新闻标题。在近期的政策，“利益相关者资本主义”与“股票持有者资本主义”话题中除其他问题的辩论之外最为显著的是管理者就外部当事人的责任。众多研究高管报酬的理论和实证文献通常使用代理机构框架形式。因为特别地，管理者也被看作是聘请他们来经营公司的股东的代理人。而当管理者明显比股东更加了解公司运营状况时，潜在的利益冲突就发生了。代理理论提供了若干预报，而这些预报是经日益发展壮大的实证研究者们广泛试验过的。 1. 股东和管理者的利益可以部分达成一致，通过使管理支付取决于公司的经营表现可见的措施。无数研究发现了这样一种关系的存在但同时又发现管理者报酬和股利之间的敏感性非常低。 2.一个更强有力的关系通常是高层管理人员之间的薪酬和企业规模的发现。 3这里的想法是，如果有个人才能与控制生产力之间存在互补性，这就能更大的控制有效地分配到更多的人才。因此，这种人才竞争局面将配置人才在更大的公司里人更高的职位。 4一个组织的奖励可以是将薪酬与表现挂钩，也可以是提供从少到更有价值的垂直流动的就业机会。当企业有一个层次结构并且以事业阶梯的形式组织工作时，事业的关注和推广工作的概率是强有力的激励策略。而对事业的的担忧的存在意味着针对高级主管和接近退休的经理们的激励方案的力度应该更多一些例如薪酬替代奖励计划等方面，因为高层没有进一步提升的可能性。 5代理理论还预测说，高管薪酬最好以业绩考核为依据这种最大的效能的措施，因为业绩是尽可能可以得知的（霍姆斯特罗姆，1979年）。这为相对性的业绩评价提供了理论基础，即在考虑基准的前提下关注公司的业绩。与绝对绩效相比，相对绩效提供奖励，并在用一时间，使管理者远离影响公司及其他竞争对手的共同的不确定因素。对高管薪酬的模式，大部分是为了适合人的现实资本主义而发展起来的，这种资本主义当中的严格披露制度使关于高管薪酬的数据唾手可得，而除了这两个国家（我估计这两个国家指的是英美）之外其他国家高管薪酬的情况能得知的就很少了。但这些模式不足以反映意大利资本主义的主要特征，这些特征在一些重要的方面都是不同与盎格鲁撒克逊及德日模式的。这篇论文是关于意大利高管报酬的一个初步调查，样本信息依据是由在意大利的抽样公司（非代表性）中的低、中、高层管理者薪酬信息组成的一个独特的数据库。据我们所知，这是第一次对意大利高管薪酬所做的经济性的计量研究。简单地说，意大利资本主义往往由家族控制为特点的，通过锥行群体的重要性（金字塔型家族控制），相对的，在敌意收购的情况下，一个欠发达的资本市场和主要银行间的关系的一个主要不足。 因为这些（以及其他）特征使意大利的体系与盎格鲁撒克逊模式及德日模式都有很大的不同，在如此环境下所做的关于管理者薪酬的调查有其特殊性，这是超出具体个案研究的。特别是，我们假设金字塔型的家族控制是介于家族企业和上市公司间的一种控制形式，这就意味着更少范围的奖金。虽然我们的数据库还做不到一个明确的比较分析，我们利用的样品可以得到的关于抽样公司的所有制结构的信息来研究管理者薪酬与公司绩效间的关系是否受意大利独特的经济环境影响。审视我们的主要结果，通过衡量人均实际会计利润我们发现管理薪酬与公司绩效正向相关，与和利润相关的半弹性支付没有多少关系。特别是，我们估计公司净利润每增长10亿里拉会带动中高层管理者薪酬而增加31000千里拉，而这个数字远比底层管理者增加的六七里拉多得多。重要的是，我们也发现了当公司由外国资本所掌控或是附属于在证券交易所上市的跨国集团，管理薪酬和公司绩效间的敏感性会比较大。因为由外国资本掌控或是附属于跨国集团的公司不太可能受到意大利资本主义的主要特征的影响。这是支持意大利的经济环境导致了管理薪酬与公司绩效间的低敏感性这种观点的积极发现。论文的结构如下：第二部分概述了意大利资本主义的主要特征及其对管理薪酬的影响。第三部分展现了关于意大利管理薪酬的几个调查结果。第四部分介绍数据库。第五部分总结经验。第六部分呈现并讨论我们的观点。第七部分总结了一些可能的扩展。二、意大利的资本运营体制以及对管理层薪酬的影响 管理者的报酬，聘用，提升和解雇是广泛层面上公司治理的有效必要的组成部分。一个高效的公司治理是依存于某些大股东的监督和对小众投资者的充分法律保护监测的有效结合（施莱弗和维什尼，1996）。出于对这一准则的考虑，意大利的公司治理是有别于盎格鲁-撒克逊式的市场导向模式和德日的关系导向模式，而且意大利的模式在对少数投资者的法律保护上尤其脆弱。 意大利资本体制的一个主要特点就是公司控制资本。这有别于实行盎格鲁-撒克逊体制国家的上市公司采用的例外的控制体制。直到19世纪90年代中期，意大利才有了仅此一家的真正意义上的上市公司，一家有着复杂产权却被管理层控制的意大利最大的保险公司，忠利保险有限公司。虽然在当今私有化进程的大潮下，一大把的像意大利电信这样的公司都成了上市公司。但更普遍的方式是分层控制体制大部分的大中公司都属于一个由控股公司控制一个或多个子公司从而控制更多的子公司的金字塔式管理体制，而控股公司往往是被一个家族通过信任投票和与别的家族的交叉持股的方式所控制。家族控制的金字塔结构即使在意大利最大的一些企业内也十分普遍（像菲亚特，贝纳通，和直到如今的好利获得公司）。在意大利相对而言集团内部的交叉持股是较少的（法律限制了这类持股方式的信任投票权力）而集团间的交叉持股是非常普遍和牢固的。 我们假设这种通过金字塔式集团的控制是一种来自家族企业和上市公司之间紧密相连的中间形态。在一方面，操控的家族和管理集团有着紧密联系并且保持着密切地监察外层管理者们。在另一方面，持有控股权的股东们之间由于协通机制操控着比其他股东更多的投票权，从而一种牢固的杠杆机制在金字塔集团内部建立起来（施莱弗和维什尼，1996；巴卡，1996）。这种保证控制就像在上市公司里一样是通过分散小的投票权来实现的。分散所有权和控股在这里产生了两个层面的代理问题：一是在于控股人和管理层之间，二是在于小投资者（他们联合成整体就会拥有大多数的投票权）和能获得非控股人所获得不了的好处的控股人。第一层的代理问题被通过对最高管理层的密切监督和控股人的积极管理以及激励工资等方式有效的缓和下来了。 为了给控股人营造一个运作良好的市场去管理公司，那么对少数派持股人的足够法律保护就是题中之意了。然而，大量的证据表明在意大利公司控股的市场和对小投资人的法律保护都是十分脆弱的。 首先，这种金字塔集团和联合控制的体制让通过少量投票权来获得对公司的控制成为可能的同时也为控股集团建立起了一套防止外部恶意收购的盾牌。为把现任管理层驱除而实行的恶意收购和委托权争夺在意大利事实上是不可能实现的。依据于意大利金融报纸24矿（1997）的说法，在1995年米兰证券交易所60%的资本总额都是被那些只从事于一个领域的大企业所持有着的，同时由于注册权或者公司里控制股权的股东联盟的问题另外40%的资本无法成为恶意收购的目标对象。 其次，米兰证券交易所无论如何股票市值还是股票交易量都是七国集团里与本国的GNP国民生产总值（gross national product）一样同样都是排名最低的（Barca et al.，1995）。米兰证券交易所处于相对边缘角色的原因可以被部分解释为由于意大利对处于少数派的股票持有者缺乏足够的法律保护( La Porta et al.，1997)。比如说，披露规则体制被非常有限的设计和执行着。此外，意大利股票市1场直到最近意大利出现主权债务危机，其作为股权交易地点的角色直到最近意大利出现主权债务危机一直在传统意义上被严格限制了同时它吸引公众储蓄的能力也被过分的遮盖。 第三点，意大利的团体投资人并不是积极的投资者仅仅掌握了意大利公司很小的一部分资产净值。往往的情形是银行控制的共同基金却掌握了属于结盟团体的意大利公司的大主要资金并对结盟团体母公司提出的公司战略行驶着投票权。大部分的公司救援计划都是由州政府，结盟团体（财团）和米兰投资银行共同设计出来的。而后者米兰投资银行作为意大利主要资金的供应者本身就与公司间股权持有者有着千丝万缕的联系。国际工业组织杂志19卷，1-2期，2001年1月，133-161页高管薪酬披露的影响1、 介绍 过高的高管薪酬最近引起了很大的争议，许多工业化国家，包括美国、英国和加拿大。对于这个标题他们分别认为：“疯狂的高管薪酬”和“老板取得的比付出的多”。另一方面，作者还宣布，“”高层管理人员都应该得到他们该得到的。值得注意的是，高管薪酬不同于艺人和专业运动员的报酬，例如，高管薪酬是要承受强烈的压力和怀疑的审议。本文探讨这种关注的原因之一是：高管薪酬代理声明所需的细节披露。 我首先概述高管薪酬周边的主要问题，以便更好的提供在必要背景下，更详细的披露工作考核的重点。高管薪酬的经济重要性，以及在其治理的潜在问题，将是第一重要的。于是我研究旨在帮助减少在赔偿问题上固有的治理的有效政策之一：披露。高管薪酬的两个基本要素吸引了关注：如何管理高层人员的工资也就是说，在工资、奖金、股票期权等代替品组成的报酬方式；和管理人员的工资多少。这些披露都会产生影响。一些评论家认为，由于政治压力，披露的薪酬低于它本来的工资和不敏感的公司业绩。也就是说，因为非常高的薪酬方案，使企业不愿意支付最优激励的最佳数量，虽然利润最大化，但这将有不良的政治影响。通过明确的条例或者增加政治成本这种该公司关系来高薪聘请无法得知薪酬合同的当事人，如公司的非管理层员工或消费者。另一方面，这如我一下所讨论的，在评论之前所介绍披露的规则在加拿大已被普遍接受，披露将会对工资的膨胀产生影响，并指出这种效应的反对规则。这些意见促使部分的分析。我考核的各种通货膨胀趋势已有评论家指出，或许表明披露规则和高管薪酬管理存在缺陷。我认为，披露可能自然倾向于增加补偿，但这一趋势并不一定显示虚弱与政权执政后披露的高管薪酬。更好的理解一些披露的潜在通货膨胀的影响因素，这可以帮助引导政治辩论远离有关过度的高管薪酬和危险干涉的效益补偿合同的简单化的结论。我的分析避免了讨论政治力量，而重点在如何披露可能影响经济行为者直接参与执行赔偿：管理人员和业主。我首先讨论为什么披露将可以预料有关于如何影响高层管理人员的工资，披露关于薪酬的敏感性绩效有正面影响往往是先进的，是作为披露的理由。第二，我研究为何披露可能还会影响高管人员工资的多少，最后，我要讨论政策影响的分析。4、 结论：政策的影响 我在本文已经讨论了与高管薪酬披露的有关几种现象。披露预计将增加股东对高管支付方式的控制。披露将降低股东的监督成本和行政补偿设定的积极宣传结果，从而鼓励股东的监督，特别是因为最近上身的机构投资者。此外，披露迫使董事解释为何选择选择薪酬结构，因此董事关心的名誉将认真考虑如何支付噶曾管理人员的工资。从政策角度来看，更好的调整薪酬和执行者与股东的愿望是或否一致是披露的重要方面。有证据表明，采用奖励薪酬对公司的业绩有显著的提高，对股东的价值有重要的积极作用。例如，布里克利，巴加特和租赁发现，通过一项长期的激励计划能增加股东回报的2%。作为国家的经济学家，薪酬对管理行为可以产生巨大的影响作用。这是值得得到的权利，披露有助于股东权利的得到。另一方面，披露也可能对薪酬水平有影响。本文试图解释各种独立弱小的趋势在公司治理中，评论家与高管薪酬设置有联系的原因。政策的结论是通过这次讨论政治的干预都不是基于具体的信息披露和高管薪酬一般的随机推论。部分通货膨胀的影响，我认为是因为披露对股东支付的影响。如果股东决定薪酬与工作表象密切的联系一起，按照公司业绩增加工资这可能需要更高的薪水，以提供上当的奖励。此外，增加管理人员的薪酬差额将增加数据包的成本风险。高层管理人员的厌恶风险是一个以较高的薪酬来弥补更高的风险的协商的情况。鉴于更好的的披露薪酬与股东意愿保持一致，如果在这里是负责高薪的，就不应毫不犹豫的确认披露制度的可取性。股东将采用浮动薪酬，创造财富，将接受较小的在分配，与高层管理人员相吻合。 更难回答的是从负面看待的政策角度时候对披露的信息造成影响。其他因素推动更高薪酬是取决于一个社会的需求过度到按照业绩增加工资，而信息化的影响，如果真的是这样，薪酬激励理想的变化时其独立发展的结果。这影响其他中层以下的管理人员的工资多少，而不影响高层管理人员的薪酬。这一政策对社会财富分配方面的程度，是很可能简单的提供一个成为更富裕的社会的不可取的富裕方式。另一方面，一个社会利益可能产生于劳动力市场提供的额外信息的管理体制。正如本文所介绍的，评论家认为披露可能释放，借以限制提供给高层管理人员的合同效率的政治压力。我在本文中解释了几种关于为什么高管薪酬设置各种如下观察到的披露现象可能不一定是由于管理架构缺陷导致的原因，而是可能发生对抗模式。披露可能有一个自然倾向膨胀薪酬，但是这可能主要是由于一个理想的过度到浮动薪酬。这种分析警告不要在政治上高管薪酬，这不同于与其他任何行业的高薪设置，如娱乐和体育业。即使在更高的薪酬披露的结果中，这可能是对社会理想的发展需求，例如有更有效地依赖奖励薪酬，因此这不值得谴责。作者：Lacobucci 爱德华来源：多伦多大学法学期刊，98卷，Vol.48期4月 P32-482摘要：在考察了在加拿大的代理行政赔偿细则报表所需的披露。周边的高管薪酬的主要为题，经济的重要性和行政赔偿的潜在治理问题；行政赔偿的吸引审议。Executive compensation and firm performanceAbstract：We use survey data to investigate the determinants of executive pay in a sample of Italian firms. To the best of our knowledge this is the first empirical study on the compensation of Italian executives. Our key hypothesis is that the characteristics of the Italian capital market, corporate governance and the specific relationship between banks and firms imply a low fraction of incentive pay over total compensation and a low sensitivity of incentive pay to firm performance. We find evidence that supports this hypothesis. We estimate that an increase of real profits per firm by 1 billion lire increases the pay of upper and middle managers by only 31 thousand lire, more than the increase found for lower management (6 thousand). Furthermore, payperformance sensitivity is higher in foreign-owned firms, in listed firms, and in firms affiliated to a multinational group.Keywords: Executive compensation; Principal-agent; Corporate governance1.IntroductionThe compensation of executives attracts considerable interest from the public, scholars and policy makers. Executive compensation packages worth millions of dollars make the news headlines. The broader issue of “stake-holder capitalism” vs. “share-holder capitalism” in the recent policy debate deals with, among other issues, the responsibility of managers with respect to outside parties.A large theoretical and empirical literature has investigated executive compensation, often using an agency framework. In particular, managers are viewed as agents of shareholders, who hire them to run firms. As managers are typically better informed about firm conditions than shareholders, a potential conflict of interest arises. Agency theory offers several predictions that have been widely tested by an extensive and growing body of empirical research.1 The interests of the shareholders and the managers can be partly aligned by making managerial pay dependent on observable measures of firms performance. Numerous studies supports the presence of such a relationship but find that the sensitivity of pay to stock returns is fairly low.2 A stronger relationship is commonly found between top executive pay and firm size.3 The idea here is that if there are complementarities between individual talent and the productivity of control, it is efficient to assign greater control to more talented people. Thus a competitive market allocates talented people to higher level positions in larger firms.4 Incentives in an organization can be provided not only by linking pay to performance but also by vertical mobility from less to more rewarding jobs. When the firm has a hierarchical structure and organizes jobs into career ladders, career concerns and the probability of promotion are powerful incentive devices. The presence of career concerns implies that, because at the top of the hierarchy there are no further possibilities of promotion, alternative incentive schemes such as pay for performance should be stronger for top executives and in general for managers close to retirement.5 Agency theory also predicts that executive pay should be optimally based on measures of performance that are as informative as possible (Holmstrom, 1979). This provides the theoretical foundation for relative performance evaluation, that focuses on firm performance relative to a benchmark. Compared to absolute performance, relative performance provides incentives and, at the same time, insulates managers from common sources of uncertainty that affect the firm and its competitors. 6Most of the models of executive pay have been developed to fit the reality of Anglo-Saxon capitalism, where stringent disclosure rules make data on top executives compensation readily available, and less is known about executive pay outside these two countries. It is not obvious that these models are flexible enough to encompass the main features of Italian capitalism, which differs in important ways both from the Anglo-Saxon and from the GermanJapanese models.This paper is a preliminary investigation on the compensation of executives in Italy, based upon a unique data-set that includes information on the pay of lower, middle and top level executives employed by a (non representative) sample of firms operating in Italy. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first econometric study of executive compensation in Italy. Very briefly, Italian capitalism is often characterized by the importance of family control through pyramidal groups, the relative absence of hostile takeovers, an underdeveloped capital market and the lack of a main bank relationship. Because these (and other) features make the Italian system quite different both from the Anglo-Saxon model and the German and Japanese models, investigating executive compensation in such an environment has implications that go beyond the specific case study. In particular, we assume that family control through pyramidal groups is an intermediate form of control between closely held family businesses and public companies and that this entails a lower scope for incentive pay.While our data-set precludes an explicit comparative analysis, we exploit available information on the ownership structure of the firms included in the sample to investigate whether the relationship between managerial pay and firm performance is influenced by the specific Italian economic environment. To preview our main results, we find that managerial pay is positively affected by firm performance, measured by real accounting profits per head; the semi-elasticity that relates pay to profits, however, is small. In particular, we estimate that an increase of real profits per firm by 1 billion lire increases the pay of upper and middle rank executives by only 31 thousand lire, more than the increase found for lower management (6 thousand). Importantly, we also find that the sensitivity of pay to performance is higher when the firm belongs to a multinational group, is owned by foreign capital and is listed in a stock exchange. Since firms owned by foreign capital and/or affiliated to a multinational group are less likely to be affected by the main features of Italian capitalism, we interpret this finding as supportive of the view that the specific Italian economic environment leads to a lower sensitivity of managerial pay to firm performance.The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the key features of Italian capitalism and their implications for executives compensation. Section 3 reports the findings of several surveys on executive compensation in Italy. Section 4 introduces the data-set and Section 5 outlines the empirical strategy. In Section 6 we present and discuss our estimates. Section 7 concludes by pointing out some possible extensions.2.Italian capitalism and implications for executive compensation2.1. Corporate governanceManagerial compensation, recruiting, promotion and firing are essential components of the broader mechanism of corporate governance. An effective mechanism of corporate governance relies on some combination of monitoring by large shareholders and of adequate legal protection of minority investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1996). With respect to this criterion, corporate governance in Italy differs both from the market oriented Anglo-Saxon model and from the relationship oriented German and Japanese models 7, and is particularly weak in the legal protection of minority investors.One key feature of Italian capitalism is the form of control of firms. Unlike in the Anglo-Saxon countries, public companies are the exception. Until the middle of the 1990s there was only one truly public company in Italy, Assicurazioni Generali, the largest Italian insurer, which has a very fragmented ownership and is controlled by management. As a result of the privatizations currently under way there are now a handful of public companies, among which Telecom Italia. Much more common is control through hierarchical groups. Most large and medium sized companies belong to a group organized as a pyramid with a holding company at the top controlling one or more subsidiaries that, in turn, control other subsidiaries and so on.8 The holding company is often controlled by a family through voting trusts and cross shareholding with allied groups. Family control of pyramidal groups is common even among the largest Italian firms (e.g. FIAT, Pirelli, Benetton, and until recently, Olivetti). There are relatively few intra-group cross shareholdings (the law limits the voting rights of those shares) but there are very strong inter-group cross shareholdings.We assume that control through pyramidal groups is an intermediate form between closely held family business and public companies. On the one hand, the controlling family has strong ties in group management and exercises close monitoring on the outside managers. On the other hand, a strong leverage effect arises in pyramidal groups since a share of the controlling shareholder controls more voting rights than other shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1996; Barca, 1996). This guarantees control with a small fraction of the voting shares, as in public companies. Separation of ownership and control here generates two levels of agency problems: between controlling shareholders and management, and between small investors (who as a whole have the majority of the voting shares) and controlling shareholders, who can obtain benefits that non-controlling shareholders cannot have access to. 9 The first agency problem is mitigated by the close monitoring of top management, by the active involvement in management of the controlling shareholders, and by incentive pay.To discipline controlling shareholders a well functioning market for corporate control and adequate legal protection of minority shareholders are required. A number of factors indicate, however, that both the market for corporate control and legal protection of small investors are weak in Italy. First, the system of pyramidal groups and coalitional control offers the possibility of obtaining company control with a small fraction of the voting rights and shields the controlling group from the threat of hostile takeovers. Hostile takeovers and proxy fights aimed at removing incumbent management are virtually absent in Italy. According to the Italian financial newspaper Sole 24 Ore (1997), in 1995 60% of the capitalization of the Milan Stock Exchange was held by companies controlled by only one subject and the remaining 40% could not become the target of hostile takeovers either because of their corporate charter or because of alliances among shareholders with controlling stakes in the firm.Second, the Milan Stock Exchange is by all measures the least developed among the G7 countries and ranks last both for capitalization and for volume of transactions as a percentage of GNP (Barca et al., 1995). The relatively marginal role of the Milan Stock Exchange can be explained in part with the limited legal protection of the rights of minority shareholders ( La Porta et al., 1997). For example, disclosure rules are poorly designed and enforced. 10 Furthermore the role of the stock market as the venue where controlling blocks of shares are exchanged has traditionally been quite limited and its ability to attract public savings has been overshadowed until recently by the huge market for government debt. Overall, stock returns are a notoriously noisy indicator of firm, let alone managerial, performance.Third, Italian institutional investors hold a small fraction of the