金融学专业外文翻译、中英对照、英汉互译.doc_第1页
金融学专业外文翻译、中英对照、英汉互译.doc_第2页
金融学专业外文翻译、中英对照、英汉互译.doc_第3页
金融学专业外文翻译、中英对照、英汉互译.doc_第4页
金融学专业外文翻译、中英对照、英汉互译.doc_第5页
已阅读5页,还剩6页未读 继续免费阅读

下载本文档

版权说明:本文档由用户提供并上传,收益归属内容提供方,若内容存在侵权,请进行举报或认领

文档简介

毕业论文外文资料翻译 题 目 普通合伙人在私募股权基金 投资业务的缺乏研究探析究 学 院 经济学院 专 业 金融学 journal of chinese economic and business studies, 2012,6(3):10-13.study on the lack of the general partner in the private equity business wang jinghuaabstract: this paper firstly points out the phenomenon and reason of the lack of the general partner (gp) in chinas private equity business, and then discusses the risks caused by the lack of the gp. based on this, the paper puts forward some relevant policy suggestions. this papers innovations lie in analyzing the reasons and risks of the lack of the general partner (gp) in chinas private equity business. this papers contribution is to discuss the pes risk and its controlling from a new angle. the conclusion is that the gp lack is a special phenomenon in the pe development, and the lack will produce many risks, so we should implement various measures to develop gp. key words: private equity, general partners, general partners lackintroductionearly in the development of private equity investment trust, one of the more mainstream view was that it was a realistic choice of the private equity industry (li jianhua, 2007; lee ching yun, 2007), and has gradually become a trust companys new favorite. at the time of trust industry keen on private equity, does the trust company really have a talents advantages, or can it act as a real fund management person? in addition to the trust company, the private equity fund by means of sponsorship is qualified for playing the role of the fund managers.early in the development of china private equity investment industry, the trust company may also be thought to have certain talent advantages. however, with the fast development of the private equity investment activities in china, there emerges a asymmetric phenomenon: one aspect is that there exist a large amount of lp (limited parters) and investment thirst; the other aspect is that gp(the general parters) in the private equity investment business, namely qualified fund manager, is seriously insufficient. it is known that the private equity investment be separated from the experienced fund manager, namely the general partner. this asymmetric problem cannot be solved in the short time. however, the more long this asymmetries last, the more disadvantageous is it for the industry development. the lack of gp may become the bottleneck which influences the healthy and long-term development of the private equity investment, because the implied risk from the lack will became important factors considered by investors, and this judgment may eventually became restricting factors of the long-term development of china private equity investment industry. compared to the history of private equity markets abroad for decades, the development time of china private equity fund, whether security or equity investment, is very short. the training for advanced professional talents required by the private equity investment industry has barely begun. therefore, with such fast development of private equity investment, the talent bottleneck stands out. this paper will firstly analyze the reasons of the lack of gp in china private equity investment, then discuss the risks caused by the lack of gp. based on this, the paper puts forward some relevant policy suggestions.the reason of the lack of gp(general partners)the lack of gp is considered as a specific economic phenomenon in china, it is not a universal one. the gps lack can be explained from the two aspects including demand and supply. one is the excessive demand on investment, the other is the insufficient supply of investment tools and investment goods. the gps supply, which is associated with the supply side, cant meet the growth of the market demand. the reason of the lack of gp is mainly reflected in the following aspects:1. the imbalance of economy developmentin the course of early economy development, the development of the real economy is put emphasized on, the virtual economy development is lagging behind, so there is no gps living space. and it also caused the imbalance in the supply of gp and lp. on the one hand, the development of the real economy forms a large number of potential supply of lp (the second reason in the later); on the other hand, the delayed development of virtual economy leads gp supply shortage.in recent years, the development of the capital market and virtual economy not only promotes forming a large number of lp, but also trains a number of securities investment funds and their corresponding senior manager. but from the strict perspective of pe, they are not full sense of the gp. because the private equity investment not only includes securities investment, but also other risk investment business. therefore, with the rapid development of pe, some original securities investment funds and their executives are starting to turn to pebusiness, even so it cannot meet the needs of gp from pe funds.2.the lagging development of the private equity marketfrom the proportion of private equity fund investment in the gdp annually, the united statess private equity fund is 0.6% of gdp for the year, the europeans and the asias is 0.35% and 0.2% respectively, while in china the ratio is less than 0.1%. gdp in china is 3 times that in india and in australia, but the size of the private placement market is generally close to theirs. currently, more than 95% of the private equity funds in chinas capital market is characteristic with foreign-funded background, and only less than 5% of the private equity funds is really local private equity funds. delayed development of the private equity market is an important reason for the lack of gp.3.the lagging specification of the relevant laws and regulationsat the beginning, the private equity fund controls consciously the risk according to the principles of industry self-regulation, which has been continued until happening of the subprime crisis. in the industry, there are different views on whether we should make a independent legislation toward the private equity fund. some people think it is not necessary to make legislation. and they think although pe has developed hundreds of years in foreign countries, there is still no specific regulation. they mainly depend on reputation mechanismsself-regulation mechanisms to regulate the pes behaviour, so there is no need for the separate legislation. therefore they think we should not make independent legislation toward the private equity fund. this situation also leads to the lagging specification of the relevant laws andregulations on a private equity investment, and the lag restricts the development of the gp. however, as the lack of the trust culture and external market regulation mechanism in china, it is obviously not sufficient to only rely on the individual creditas the primary means of controlling the principal-agent risk.risks arising from the lack of gpthe foregoing analysis shows there are many factors which cause the lack of gp. then what is the influence of the lack of gp. in the following, the paper will make a in-depth and concrete analysis on the risk caused by the lack of gp. the concrete risks are shown as follows:1. risk of the potential-transfer-trustas the development of pe in china, pe investment activities appear increasingly active. the general investors, qualified institutional investors, even financial institutions such as the trust company, bank and insurance company, are paying close attention to huge commercial opportunities and rich return from pe investments, and having certain investment impulse. however, the supply of gp as a important role related to pe investment activities is seriously insufficient, and is difficult to meet the demand of investors and pe funds. especially, when the sponsor itself is not enough to be competent for gp, and not willing to abandoned such market opportunities at the same time, some institutions complete gps investment and management function by cooperating with the third-party investment consultants and the main way is to employ the third-party investment consultants. under this condition, the gps function is decomposed, the delegate-agent relationship between sponsors and investment consultants is comparatively fuzzy. and the employing relationship is substituted for the delegate-agent relationship, while the duty and risk-bearing of the employing and the delegate-agent are different. in actual operation, some institutions implement transfer-trust in the name of employing, this is really a potential-transfer-trust. in the process of the potential-transfer-trust, both parts of the transfer-trust do not bear decision risks, and transfer the risk duties. which will finally damage the investors interests(wang, 2011).2.risks of investors interestgenerally, the investor pays more attention to high return on investment. if gp is in the lack, and the current gp can not be qualified for fund managers responsibilities, investors profits will not get effective protection. this is mainly because the current gp in the field of venture capital investment lacks professional abilities. compared with the pes risks in internationally mature markets, operational risks from the gps lack may be greater. therefore, the lack of gp further increases the risk of pes investments, which finally makes the investors interest risk greater.3. gp credit riskgp is the key factor which influences the success of private equity investments. in the long run, gps fundraising capacity will be influenced by the successful investment performance in the early phase, and it can be said that obtaining an absolute income is the root survival factor, because customers requirements for absolute income is very high. therefore, once the private equitys performance declines sharply and even losses, customer loyalty will be greatly reduced, the private equity will face a survival dilemma. obviously, there exists reciprocal causation relationship between gps historical performance and its market reputation. therefore, the lack of the qualified gp or the fund manager required by the private equity investment will inevitably affect the investment performance of gp, leading to the credit risk.conclusions and policy recommendationsthe above analysis shows the gps lack may cause many risks, such as the risk of the potential-transfer-trust, risks of investors interest, gp credit risk, and restraints on the capital market development. and these risks are an inevitable phenomenon accompanying the process of economy development. if we can formulate appropriate policies and regulations, and take appropriate regulatory measures, risks from the gps lack can be controlled. to control radically the risk of the gps lack, we should firstly solve the problem of the gps lack. therefore, it is necessary to establish a mature and effective mode for training gp, to increase the supply of qualified gp.from the requirements and training mode for qualified managers of the foreign mature private equity, we can draw the following conclusions: in addition to the basic job conditions, for future managers, the management ability, grasping ability for investment opportunities, financing ability, investment decision ability, risk recognition and control ability, and product innovation ability are paid close attention to. however, the ability which is related to the private equity management is difficult to obtain from books, and they must obtain them through the continuous accumulation in practice. only by that, a qualified fund manager can be trained successfully. certainly, the entire process may take many years.similarly, it may take a lot of years to build a talent market or talent pool of the private equity manager to meet the investors needs. therefore, it is an effective way to set up a training model from top to bottom, to strengthen the training for gp. the concrete suggestion is as follows:1. with the strict legislation and industry regulations to determine employees this is a requirement for the employees basic condition. without the corresponding conditions, the employee should not be allowed to enter the industry. at present, there are some regulations on employees qualification for the private security investment, but there is no strict rules on employees qualification for the private equity investment. and it is necessary to note that as the risk from the private equity investment is greater than the private security investment, the qualification identification of the private equity investment should be much stricter.2. building the trust culturethe means of managing financial affairs of the private equity fund is in essence a means of the financial management of the trust. under the condition that the trust culture has not been established, the construction of the trust culture has a subtle effect on talents cultivating. therefore, we should strengthen the trust culture building, and use the cultural influences to improve the gps training, to increase the supply of gp.3.building the training platform in the industrytheir own training platforms constructed by industry associations are quite different from the platform of the production-education-research cooperation in colleges and universities. industry associations can do many important works to carry out the vocational training, and they can also employ foreign counterparts and experts to promote the professional vocational training. these will make a difference for the training of the qualified gp.4. establishing the professional talent pool of private wealth managementthe employee unit should actively take the initiative to provide all relevant learning opportunities to train the employee capacity, to build their own talent pool. for example, when the trust company carries out the private equity business, it can make use of its existing talent to purposefully develop their own professional managers of private equity. at the same time, the trust company can take advantage of cooperation opportunity with other investment adviser companies, or to attract the best talents, or to absorb some excellent investment consultants. through that way, the trust company can establish the appropriate talent pool, and improve its investment advisory capacity.5. employees learning by doingwhat the training of the unit or the industry can provide is only a learning opportunity. but whether the trainees can learn and become qualified top fund managers or qualified gp depends finally on their own learning abilities. therefore, the employee must be down-to-earth, be strict with themselves, cultivate their own trust sense, and improve their capacities of risk investment and management.references 1 can kut, risk management in european private equity funds: survey evidencej. the journal of private equity, summer 2006b.2 li jianhua, zhang liwen. private equity investment trust and the development of chinas private equity marketj. the world economy, 2007 (5): 74-84.3 lee ching yun, trust: the realistic choice of chinas private equity fund, china urban economy j, 2007:87-89.journal of chinese economic and business studies, 2012,6(3):10-13.普通合伙人在私募股权基金投资业务的缺乏研究探析王景华摘 要 本文首先指出,在中国的私募股权投资业务的普通合伙人(gp)缺乏的现象和原因,然后讨论的gp缺乏造成的风险。在此基础上,提出了一些相关的政策建议。本文的创新在于,在中国的私募股权投资业务的普通合伙人(gp)缺乏的原因分析和风险。本文的贡献是站在pe的风险及其控制从一个新的角度来讨论。得出的结论是,gp缺乏是一个特殊的现象,在pe发展,缺乏会产生很多风险,因此我们应该采取各种措施发展gp。关键词 私募股权基金;普通合伙人;普通合伙人缺乏 一、前言 早在私人股权投资信托的发展,更多的主流观点之一是,它是一个现实的选择私募股权行业(2007年李建华,李菁云,2007),并已逐渐成为信任公司的新的最喜欢的。当时热衷于私募股权投资信托业,信托公司是否真的有一个人才的优势,它可以作为一个真正的基金管理人,除了信托公司,私募基金通过赞助资格扮演的基金经理。 早在中国私募股权投资行业的发展,信托公司也可能被认为是有一定的人才优势。然而,随着中国私募股权投资活动的快速发展,出现不对称的现象:一个方面是,存在大量的lp(有限parters)和投资口渴,另一个方面就是,gp(一般parters )的私募股权投资业务,即合资格的基金经理,是严重不足。据了解,私募股权投资经验丰富的基金经理,即普通合伙人分开。在很短的时间,这种不对称的问题不能得到解决。然而,这种不对称最后,更为不利的是它的产业的发展。 gp缺乏可能会成为瓶颈,从而影响健康和长远发展的私募股权投资,因为缺乏隐含风险将成为重要的投资者,而本判决考虑的因素可能最终成为中国私募股权投资行业的长远发展的制约因素。相比国外私募股权投资市场的历史,几十年来,中国私募股权投资基金的发展时间,是否安全或股本投资,是很短的。由私人股权投资行业所需的高级专业人才的培训才刚刚开始。因此,私募股权投资的快速发展,人才瓶颈脱颖而出。本文将首先分析gp在中国私募股权投资缺乏的原因,然后讨论的gp缺乏所造成的风险。在此基础上,提出了一些相关的政策建议。二、原因缺乏gp(一般合伙人) gp缺乏被视为中国的一个特定的经济现象,它是不是一个通用的。从需求和供给两个方面,其中包括gp缺乏可以解释。一个是过度的投资需求,另一种是投资工具和投资品的供给不足。 gp的供应,这是与供应方,不能满足市场需求的增长。 gp缺乏的原因主要体现在以下几个方面: (一)经济发展的不平衡 在早期经济发展的过程中,强调把发展实体经济,虚拟经济发展相对滞后,所以有没有gp的生活空间。这也造成在gp和lp的供应失衡。一方面,实体经济的发展形成了大量的潜在供应lp(在以后的第二个原因),另一方面,虚拟经济的发展导致的延迟gp供应短缺。近年来,资本市场和虚拟经济的发展不仅促进形成了大量的lp,但也培养了一些证券投资基金和其相应的高级经理,但是,从严格的角度来讲,pe不是完全意义上的gp。由于私募股权投资,不仅包括证券投资,还包括其他的风险投资业务。因此,pe的快速发展,一些原有的证券投资基金及其高管开始转向pe,即便如此,它不能满足需要从pe基金的gp。 (二)发展滞后的私募股权投资市场 从私人股权基金投资在每年的国内生产总值所占的比例,美国的私人股权基金是国内生产总值的0.6为一年,在欧洲的和亚洲的0.35和0.2分别,而在中国的比例是小于0.1 。中国国内生产总值的3倍,在印度和澳大利亚,但私募市场的大小一般是接近他们的。目前,超过95的私募股权投资基金在中国资本市场的特点是具有外资背景的,只有不到5的私募股权投资基金是真正本土私募基金。延迟的私募股权投资市场的发展是gp缺乏的一个重要原因。 (三)相关法律法规的滞后规范 在初期,私募股权投资基金有意识地控制风险的原则,行业自律,一直持续到发生次贷危机。在行业内,我们是否应该做一个独立的立法,向私募基金有不同的看法。有些人认为它是没有必要制定法律。他们认为,虽然pe已经开发了数百多年在国外,但仍然没有具体规定。他们主要依靠“口碑”机制 - 自我调节机制,以规范pe的行为,因此没有必要单独立法。因此,他们认为,我们不应该向私募基金的独立的立法。这种情况也导致私募股权投资的有关法律,法规规范的滞后和滞后制约了发展的gp。然而,由于缺乏信任文化和外部市场监管机制,在中国,这显然是不够的,只能依靠个人信用委托代理风险控制的主要手段。三、从gp缺乏所带来的风险 以上分析表明,导致gp缺乏的因素有很多。那么,什么是gp缺乏的影响。下面,本文将做一个深入和具体分析的gp缺乏造成的风险。具体风险如下: (一)潜在转入信托风险 pe在中国的发展,出现pe投资活动日益活跃。一般的投资者,合格的机构投资者,甚至是信托公司,银行和保险公司等金融机构,密切关注从pe投资巨大的商业机会和丰厚的回报,具有一定的投资冲动。然而,gp作为一个重要的角色,pe投资活动有关的供应严重不足,难以满足投资者和私募股权基金的需求。特别是,当赞助商本身是不足够主管gp,和不愿意以放弃了这

温馨提示

  • 1. 本站所有资源如无特殊说明,都需要本地电脑安装OFFICE2007和PDF阅读器。图纸软件为CAD,CAXA,PROE,UG,SolidWorks等.压缩文件请下载最新的WinRAR软件解压。
  • 2. 本站的文档不包含任何第三方提供的附件图纸等,如果需要附件,请联系上传者。文件的所有权益归上传用户所有。
  • 3. 本站RAR压缩包中若带图纸,网页内容里面会有图纸预览,若没有图纸预览就没有图纸。
  • 4. 未经权益所有人同意不得将文件中的内容挪作商业或盈利用途。
  • 5. 人人文库网仅提供信息存储空间,仅对用户上传内容的表现方式做保护处理,对用户上传分享的文档内容本身不做任何修改或编辑,并不能对任何下载内容负责。
  • 6. 下载文件中如有侵权或不适当内容,请与我们联系,我们立即纠正。
  • 7. 本站不保证下载资源的准确性、安全性和完整性, 同时也不承担用户因使用这些下载资源对自己和他人造成任何形式的伤害或损失。

评论

0/150

提交评论