比较商事组织法.ppt

1、Laws on Business Organizations: A Comparative Study,Dr. Prof. Ding DING School of Law University of International Business and Economics (UIBE) ,比较商事组织法法律硕士课程(法学),Bibliography,Any Textbooks you studied before A research paper on any Corporate Law issues Roberta Romano, Foundations of Corporate Law公司

2、法基础(影印本), 法律出版社,北京,2005年3月第一版. Brian R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation林华伟 等译,法律出版社, 北京,2001年4月第一版.,Content,Theory of the Firm and Capital Market Legal Characteristics of the Corporation: Limited Liability The Production and Structure of Corporation Laws Financing the Corporat

3、ion Internal Governance Structures External Governance Structures: The Market for Corporate Control Securities Regulation,What I Expect from you,Class presentation and discussion Off-class Preview and Review Open-minded,(2010-2020)公开征求意见稿 丰田汽车召回 香港华懋集团前董事局主席龚如心遗产案 AVATAR,Theory of the Firm and Capit

4、al Markets (1),为什么有企业/厂商?交易市场和企业/厂商 它们在资本市场的地位和作用 代理成本和交易成本(为什么代理成本在现代企业不可避免?)1929年,Berle和Means的调查表明,当时美国200个最大的公司中,88个是由管理人员控制的. Berle和Means认为,股东对于代理成本的监督是无能为力的,你是否同意这一看法? 授权机制的优势和弊端,Theory of the Firm and Capital Markets (2),为什么股东被称为 “剩余财产的所有者” (Residual Owners)? 股东表决权-集体行为-监督成本-信息取得的代价 (在股权分散的情况下

5、,为什么股东都愿意做消极股东,搭便车-Free Riders 会很普遍?) 如何约束代理人的机会主义行为?(代理成本是所有和控制分离的代价,第7页),Theory of the Firm and Capital Markets (2),股价能否反映公司管理人员的懈怠或其他机会主义行为? 监督机制包括哪些方面?,Theory of the Firm and Capital Markets (3),经理和股东存在利益冲突,代理成本不可能为零;所有者是代理成本的最终承担者,增加代理成本则可以使经理单方面受益,这里就出现了需要法律敢于的现象-成本转嫁(Externality),也界定了法律干预的目标-

6、减少代理成本.因此,检验公司法的合理性,重要的是看它是否减少了代理成本. 方流芳:序言,第3页.Jensen 而且,要约收购者必须就其财务状况和计划，提交更为详细的报告,同时,必须向公众开放其收购要约一个月. 要约收购者在要约期内不得向市场另行购买股票 ,另外,必须以最高的交割按比例买超额售出的股份.,A. Theories and Evidence,Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, pp. 223-224. Why does a Corporate-control market needed?,A. T

7、heories and Evidence,Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, pp.225-228. Free Cash Flow Theory The Role of Debt in Motivating Organizational Efficiency Leveraged Buyouts and Free Cash Flow Theory,A. Theories and Evidence,Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust i

8、n Hostile Takeovers, pp.228-232. What did the authors demonstrate in the article via three examples? A nexus of long-term contracts between shareholders and stakeholders,A. Theories and Evidence,Yakov Amihud and Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers, pp.232-233.

9、What drives a substantial number of firms to engage in conglomerate mergers?,A. Theories and Evidence,Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, pp.233-235.,A. Theories and Evidence,Michael C. Jensen and Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, p

10、p. 235-242.,A. Theories and Evidence,Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley and Jeffry M. Netter, The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, pp. 242-245.,A. Theories and Evidence,Sanjai Bhagat, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, Hostile Takeovers in the 1980s: The Return to Corporate Specialization, pp. 245-248.,州法: 反接管条例,第一代反接管条例: 对本州公司,州官员有出价否决权 第二代反接管条例:只适用于本州公司, “控股条例”或者 “公平价格条例” 第三代接管条例: “企业联合条例” 大约有40个州制定有不同的接管条例,VI. External Governance S