农业保险的再思考外文翻译

农业保险的再思考外文翻译本科毕业论文外文翻译外文题目:CROPINSURANCERECONSIDERED出处:Amer.J.Agr.Econ作者:JOSEPHW.GLAUBERCROPINSURANCERECONSIDEREDJOSEPHW.GLAUBERDuringthelate1980sandearly1990s,therewasmuchdebateoverhowtofixwhatwereperceivedasthe“failures”oftheFederalcropinsuranceprogram.TheFederalCropInsuranceImprovementActof1980madecropinsurancetheprimaryformofdisasterprotectionforagriculturalproducers,replacingastandingdisasterassistanceprogramwithsubsidizedcropinsurance.Toencouragesales,privatecompanieswereenlistedtodelivertheproductandsignificantlyshareintheunderwritingrisks.Almostovernight,thecropinsuranceprogramwasconvertedfromapilotprogramofferinglimitedcoveragetoalimitednumberofcropsnationwide,toanationwideprogramcoveringmostmajorfieldcropsinmostmajorgrowingregions.Theperceivedfailuresofcropinsuranceweremany.Atthetimeofpassageofthe1980Act,Congressenvisionedaparticipationrateapproaching50%ofeligibleacresbytheendofthedecade.Despitepremiumsubsidiesandexpandedcoverage,cropinsuranceparticipationgrewveryslowly.WhenamajordroughtstrucktheMidwestin1988,only25%ofeligibleacreagewasenrolledintheprogramnationwideandparticipationwasevenlessinstatessuchasIllinoisandIndianaChite.WidespreadcroplossesandpoorparticipationintheinsuranceprogrampromptedCongresstopasssupplementaldisasterlegislationthroughoutthedecadeincludingalmost$5billionindisasterassistancetocovercroplossesin1988and1989aloneGlauberandCollinsInadditiontoitsfailuretoreplacedisasterassistance,theactuarialperformanceofthecropinsuranceprogramwasdismalthroughoutthe1980sandearly1990s.Theaggregatelossratio,thatis,totalindemnitiesdividedbytotalpremiumsincludingpremiumsubsidies,exceeded150%over1981?93.PooractuarialperformancewasblamedonexpansionofcoverageintonewareaswithouthavingadequatedatatorateriskswhichcontributedtoadverseselectionproblemsandthedifficultyinmonitoringproducerbehaviorwhichcontributedtomoralhazardissuesU.S.GeneralAccountingOffice1993.Finally,despitelargeactuariallosses,companiessharedlittleoftheunderwritingrisks.Over1981?90,totalindemnitiesexceededtotalpremiumsincludingpremiumsubsidiesby$2.3billion.Overthesameperiod,companiesrecordednetunderwritings“gains”of$102millionGlauberandCollins.ThispromptedrepeatedcriticismfromtheU.S.GeneralAccountingOffice1981,1987,1992thatcompanieswerenotadequatelysharinginrisks.Withintenyearsofthe1980Act,poorperformanceofthecropinsuranceprogrampromptedtheBushAdministrationtoproposeeliminatingthecropinsuranceprogramandreplacingitwithastandingdisasterprogramGardner1994.TheproposalreceivedlittleinterestinCongress,butthecriticismofthecropinsuranceprogramremainedunabatedWidespreadcroplossesduetothe1993floodsintheMidwestpromptedyetanotherdisasterbill.Thistime,however,CongressandtheClintonAdministrationagreedontheCropInsuranceReformActof1994,whichauthorizedadditionalpremiumsubsidiestoincreaseparticipation.Yet,despiteincreasesinparticipation,Congresspassedadhocdisasterlegislationcoveringlossesin1998,1999,and2000.In2000,CongresspassedtheAgriculturalRiskProtectionAct,whichprovidedfurthersubsidiestoencouragecropinsurancepurchases.Now,fifteenyearsandtworeformbillslater,thecropinsuranceprogramboastsan80%participationratewithover215millionacresenrolledandatotalliabilityestimatedinexcessof$46billionfor2004Davidson.OverAmer.J.Agr.Econ.86Number5,2004:1179?1195Copyright2004AmericanAgriculturalEconomicsAssociation1180Number5,2004Amer.J.Agr.Econ.57%ofparticipatingacresareenrolledatcoveragelevelsinexcessof65%.Thelossperformanceofthecropinsuranceprogramhasimprovedaswell.Over1994?2003,theaggregatelossratiofortheprogramwas98%,whichpromptedtheSecretaryofAgriculturetoconclude,“theprogramonanationalscaleisfinanciallysound,properlyrated,andeffectivelymanaged”Glickman.And,newreinsuranceagreementsnegotiatedbetweentheprivatecompaniesandthegovernmenthaveresultedincompaniesretainingmoreriskandfacinglargerpossibleunderwritinglossesineventofwidespreadcroplosses.Yet,havetheprogramreformssince1994reallyaddressedthefundamentalfailuresraisedfifteenyearsago?Despitelargegainsinparticipation,Congresscontinuestopassadhocdisasterlegislation;twoyearsafterpassageoftheAgriculturalRiskProtectionAct,Congresspassedsupplementaldisasterassistancetocover2002croplosses.Thecostsoftheprogramhaverisendramaticallyaswell.Expectedannualcostsoftheprogramareover$3billion?comparedwithlessthanone-thirdofthatcostfifteenyearsago.Increasedsubsidieshave,inturn,raisedconcernsaboutthedistortingeffectsofcropinsuranceonproduction.Whiletheaggregateactuarialperformancehasimproved,largeregionaldisparitiesexist.Finally,asprivatecompanieshavetakenonmorerisks,theyhavecomeunderincreasingcriticismforthelargeunderwritinggainstheyearnfromtheprogram.Inthefollowingsections,thepaperreconsidersthecropinsuranceprogramandtheproblemsofagriculturalinsurancemoregenerally.Itdrawsonthelargeliteraturethathasemergedoncropinsurance,particularlyoverthepasttenyears.EconomicresearchoncropinsurancecanbetracedatleastasfarbackasValgren’s1922studyofprivateinsurancemarkets.2However,theamountofresearchoncropinsurancehasincreaseddramaticallyoverthepasttenyears,parallelingthegrowthntheprogramitself.Forexample,over1981?93,tenjournalarticleswerepublishedintheAmericanJournalofAgriculturalEconomics.Since1994,fifty-onearticleshavebeenpublished,includingovertwentyin2003and2004alone.Thepaperisorganizedasfollows.Thenextsectionexaminesthedemandforcropinsuranceandwhyparticipationinthecropinsur-anceprogramhasdependedonlargesubsidies.Thefollowingsectionexaminestheproblemsofratingagriculturalproductionrisksandhowsubsidiesmaskactuarialperformance.Theunintendedeffectsofsubsidizedcropinsuranceonproductionareconsideredinsection“EffectsofCropInsuranceonProduction.”Thesection“AlternativeCropInsurancePlans”examinesalternativesmeanstomanageproductionrisks,includingareayieldoptionsandweatherderivatives.Summaryandconclusionsareofferedinthefinalsection.TheDemandforCropInsuranceTable1showsthegrowthofthecropinsuranceprogramsince1981.Participationintheprogramgrewslowlyinthe1980s,reachingonly55.6millionacresin1988,about25%ofeligibleacreage.Participationreached40%in1989and1990,largelybecauseofdisasterlegislationthatrequiredrecipientsofdisasterpaymentin1988and1989tobuycropinsuranceinthesubsequentcropyear.By1993,participationhadfallento32%ofeligibleareaGlauberandCollins.Overtheperiod1981?93,participatingproducersreceived,onaverage,about$2inindemnitypaymentsforevery$1ofpremiumpaid.Whythendidparticipationratesintheprogramremainsolowthroughoutthe1980sandearly1990s?Themostoftencitedreasonisadverseselectionsee,e.g.,Miranda.AdverseselectionproblemsarisewhenrisksvaryacrossinsurancebuyersandbuyersknowmoreabouttheriskstheyfacethandoestheinsurerwhosetstheratesHirshleiferandRiley.Thus,producerswhoseexpectedindemnitiesexceedthepremiumscostsaremorelikelytopurchaseinsurance;thosewhosecostsexceedtheirexpectedindemnitiesarelesslikelytopurchase.Second,studiesshowthatfarmersandranchersuseavarietyofrisk-managementstrategiestomitigatetherisksthattheyfaceHarwoodetal.,U.S.GAO1999.EmpiricalstudiesofcropinsuranceparticipationduringthisperiodconfirmedthatmanyofthesepracticeshadnegativeeffectsonparticipationseeKnightandCoble1997.Bytheendofthe1980s,itwascleartopolicymakersthatthesubsidylevelsprovidedunderthe1980Actwerenotsufficienttoachieve50%participationwithouteithermakinginsurancepurchasescompulsoryorincreasingthelevelofthesubsidy.IntheiranalysisoftheU.S.cropinsuranceprogram,GardnerandKramerconcludedthatpremiumswouldhavetobesubsidizedasmuchas50%toachieve50%participation.SimilarconclusionswerereachedbyWrightandHewittandGoodwinandSmith1995.Congressrespondedbybothmakinginsurancecompulsoryandincreasingremiumsubsidies.UndertheCropInsuranceReformActof1994,producersofinsurablecropswereeligibletoreceiveabasiclevelofcoverage,catastrophicriskprotectionCAT,whichinitiallycovered50%ofaproducer’sapprovedyieldat60%oftheexpectedmarketprice.3CATcoveragewasrequiredforproducerswhoparticipatedinthecommoditypricesupportandproductionadjustmentprograms,farmcredit,orotherfarmprograms.WhilethepremiumcostofCATcoveragewasfullysubsidizedbythegovernment,producerswererequiredtopayasign-upfeeequalto$50percroppercounty.Inaddition,the1994Actprovidedadditionalsubsidiesforcoveragelevelsgreaterthan50%buy-uplevels.Over220millionacreswereenrolledintheprogramin1995,over80%ofeligibleacresexcludinghay,withoverhalfoftheseattheCATlevel.Respondingtoproducercriticism,CongresseliminatedthecompulsoryprovisionsforCATcoveragein1996causingenrollmentinCATtodecline.However,enrollmentinbuy-upcoveragecontinuedtoincrease,reaching120millionacresin1998GlauberandCollins.Toencouragefurtherenrollmentinhighercoveragelevels,Congressprovidedsupplementalpremiumsubsidiesinthe1999and2000cropyearsandin2000passedtheAgriculturalRiskProtectionAct,whichincreasedsubsidylevelsformostbuy-uplevelstable2.Enrollmentinthecropinsuranceprogramrosefrom182millionacresinsuredin1998toover217millionin2003,almosta20%increase.Wherelessthan8%ofinsuredacreswereenrolledatcoveragelevelsgreaterthan65%in1998,over53%wereenrolledin2003.Becauseofincreasedenrollmentandenrollmentathighercoveragelevels,totalliabilitywas$40.6billionin2003,a46%increaseover1998levels.Theexperienceofthepasttwenty-fiveyearssuggeststhatwithadequatesubsidies,producerswillbuycropinsurance,butthemarginalcostsarelarge.BecausethedemandforcropinsuranceisgenerallyinelasticwithrespecttopremiumGoodwin,CobleandKnight,themarginalperacrecostsofenrollingadditionalacresintotheprogramarehigh.Figure1showspremiumsubsidiesplottedagainstbuyupacresover1981?2003.Itshowshowthemarginalcostsofenrollingadditionalbuy-upacreshaveincreasedassubsidylevelshaveincreasedundersuccessivecropinsurancereformlegislation.Becausesubsidiesareappliedtoallparticipatingacres,itbecomesmoreandmoreexpensivetocoaxinacreageatthemargin.Estimatedatthemeanbuy-upacreageovertheperiod,themarginalcostperacrein$2000during1981?94was$3.31peracre,comparedtoanaverageperacresubsidyof$2.73.During1995?98,themarginalsubsidycostperacrewas$10.51comparedwithanaverageperacresubsidyof$4.99.From1999to2003,themarginalsubsidycostsareestimatedat$25.99,comparedwithanaverageperacresubsidyof$7.76.Thesecostsincludepremiumsubsidycostsonly.Deliverycostswouldbringperacremarginalsubsidycoststoashighas$30peracre?abouttwicetheaverageperacrepremiumcost.译文:(注:外文题目、出处、作者的英文为TimesNewRoman字体;译文题目字体为黑体小二号,一级标题以三号黑体居中打印;下空一行(行间距22磅)为二级标题,以四号黑体左起空两行打印,三级标题以小四号黑体左起空两行打印,换行后以小四号宋体空两行打印正文。)农业保险的再思考在20世纪80年代末和90年代初,人们对于如何解决被认为“失败”的联邦农业保险计划有很多的争论。1980年颁布的联邦农业保险改进法把农业保险作为农业生产者灾难保护的主要形式,用农业保险补助来替代一个长期的灾难援助计划。为了鼓励销售,私营企业被赞许交付产品,这样很大程度上分担了保险的风险。几乎一夜之间,农业保险计划从一项只提供国家有限范围内,有限数量的农业物的试点计划转变为一项涵盖最主要的农业生产地区的最主要的农作物的全国性计划。被认为失败的农业保险有很多。在1980年通过的法案里,国会预想十年后有将近50%农保参与率的合格农田数。不管额外的保险补贴和扩充的保险范围,农业保险发展的非常的缓慢。1988年的一场干旱,严重影响了美国的中西部,当时只有25%的合格的土地面积,像伊利诺州和印第安那等地方的农业保险参与率则更加少Chite。广泛的农作物损失和低的农业保险参与率使得国会通过补充灾难援助的法条,在十年内花了近50亿美元在灾难援助上,包括1988年和1989年的农作物损失格劳伯和柯林斯。除了替代灾害援助的失败之外,在整个80年代和90年代初,农业保险计划的保险统计的业绩也是相当糟糕的。合计的损失率,即总的赔偿金比上总保险金额(包括保险补贴),在1981到1993年这段时间超过了150%。低的保险统计业绩被归咎于在扩大新的区域的覆盖范围时,没有适当的数据来评估导致逆向选择的问题,也就是在监控农业工人行为上的困难,即由于道德危机(投保人可能不可靠)而形成的风险(美国审计院,1993)。最终,虽然大量的保险损失,但公司只承担了少量的保险风险。在1981-90年间,总的赔偿金超过总的保险金额达23亿,在相当的时期,公司记载的净保险收益为一亿两百万,这个被美国审计院反复提出批评(1981,1987,1992)说公司并没有分担足够的风险。在1980年法案后的十年内,农业保险的差的效果致使布什政府建议废除农业保险计划,用长期的灾难计划来代替(加德纳1994)。这项提议虽然并没引起国会的重大兴趣,但是对农业保险计划的批评并没有减弱。1993年美国中西部的洪灾所引发的广泛的农作物损失引起了另外一种灾难法案。这次,然而,国会和克林顿政府赞成1994年的农业保险改良法,提供进一步附加保险费补贴来增加参与。然而,尽管参与的增加,国会通过了特设灾难立法来替代损失在1998年,1999年和2000年。在2000年,国会通过的农业风险保护法,提供了进一步的补贴来鼓励农业保险购买。现在,15年来的两个改革法案后,农业保险计划已经很成功了,在2004年已经有百分之八十的参与率,登记的合格用地面积超过两亿一千五百万英亩,总负债达到460亿Davidson。在2004年农业经济协会出版的“美国农业经济”中的1180页中提出57%的多人参与英亩被登记在超过65%的覆盖水平上。农业保险的坏的业绩也有所提升。在1994-2003年中,农业保险计划总计的损失率为98%,农业部秘书的结论是:“这个全国规模的计划在有健全的财政,适当的评估,和有效的管理”克曼。政府和私营企业之间的新的再保险金额协议规定在遇到大范围的农作物损失时,企业要保留更大的风险和承担更多的保险损失。然而15年前1994年提出的这个计划的改革真的解决了根本的问题了吗?尽管在参与率上有很大的提高,但国会仍继续通过特设的灾难法规;在通过农业风险保护法的两年后,国会通过了许多附加的灾难援助,包括2002年代的灾难损失。这个计划的花费也同样的剧烈的上升。该计划预期的年度花费超过了30亿美元,不少于15年前的三分之一的成本。增加的补贴反过来使使人们对于产品的农业保险的扭曲效果产生了忧虑。虽然总计的保险统计的业绩提高了,但大的地区差异也形成了。最后,虽然私营企业承担了更多的风险,但是他们因为从这个计划中赚得的巨大的保险收益也使得企业遭受越来越多的批评。在接下来的段落里,这篇论文重新考虑了农业保险和一般农业保险所出现的问题。它运用了大量的关于农业保险的文献,特别是这十年里的。关于农业保险的经济研究最早要追溯到1992年Valgren的私人保险市场的研究中。然而,在过去十年内,随着这个计划本身的增长,相应的关于农业保险的文献研究也剧烈的增加。例如,在1981年到1993年间,在美国农业经济日报上发表了10篇农业保险的文章,而从1994年开始,已经已经有51篇文章发表了,在2003年和2004年间就发表了20多篇。这篇文章的组织如下所示。下一章调查了农业保险的要求和农业保险计划的参与量取决于庞大的补贴。再接着一段分析了评定农业产品风险的问题和补贴如何掩盖了保险统计的业绩。“私营公司和风险共享”这章说了私营部门在计划交付和风险分享中扮演了什么角色。“农业保险对生产的影响”这章说了在生产上补助的农业保险的非计划中的影响。替代农业保险计划说了替代选择对经营生产风险的重要性,包括区域产量期权和露天的衍生产品。摘要和总结构成了最好一章。农业保险的要求表1显示了从1981年以来农业保险计划的增长。该计划的参与量在20世纪80年代增长是十分缓慢的,在1988年只达到了5660万英亩,合格土地面积大约在25%。但在1989年到1990年的参与率达到了40%