英文【世界银行】清洁技术价值链

PublicDisclosureAuthorized

WORLDBANKREPORTONTHEEUROPEANUNION

EUREGULARECONOMICREPORT10

PART2

CleanTech

ValueChains

UsingTradeDatatoGuideaComplexPolicySpace

PublicDisclosureAuthorized

EUREGULARECONOMICREPORT10

PART2

CleanTechValueChains

UsingTradeDatatoGuideaComplexPolicySpace

WORLDBANKGROUP

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Contents

7Acknowledgements

8Abbreviations

8RegionalGroupings

9ExecutiveSummary

15Introductionandcontext

16Theglobalriseoftargetedpoliciesforthegreentransition

19Theobjectiveofthisreport

23Chapter1

TheEUGreenDealIndustrialPlan

anditsimpactonmemberstates

24TheEU’sgreenindustrialpolicyresponse

25Wheredoesthisleavethe4CEEsmemberstates?

37Chapter2

Leveragingtradeandfirmdata

toinformpolicydirection

42The4CEEsalreadyparticipateinthecleantechvaluechains

46The4CEEsshowuntappedpotentialforexportgrowth

47Sizingtheopportunities:ascenarioanalysisofexportexpansion

incleantechvaluechains

54Understandingfirm-levelnetworksinthe4CEEs

61Factorsdrivinginvestmentincleantechmanufacturing

anddeployment

65Chapter3

Considerationsforthepolicymakers

inthe4CEEs:TheWhy,WhatandHow

of(Green)IndustrialStrategies

69Emergingrecommendations

71References

73AnnexAListoftheEUNZIAnetzerotechnologies

74AnnexBIndicatorsacrossdemand,supply,andease

ofmarketaccessandtheiraggregation

Boxes

17BOXI.1Cleantechmanufacturing

investmentsrespondtoindustrialpolicy

24BOX1.1EuropeanUnionlegislation

forboostingdomesticnet-zero(orcleanenergytech)manufacturing

26BOX1.2Emergingresearchpointto

limitedopportunitycosttosubsidiesforcleantechinnovation

29BOX1.3Theriseoftheindustrial

policygloballyandinthe4CEEs,anditscomposition

31BOX1.4Trademattersforgrowth,raisinglivingstandardsandjobcreation

38BOX2.1Emergingcomplexitytoolkitmayhelpanswersomequestionsaboutindustrialstrategydesign

45BOX2.2Usingtradedatatoanalyze

exportopportunitiesincleantechvaluechains

48BOX2.3Simulatinganincreaseinexportpotential:valuechainconstructionand

methodforonshoringanalysis

55BOX2.4Analysisoffirmnetworksincleantechglobalvaluechainsfirm:definitionsandmethodology

Figures

9FIGUREES.1TherewerenotableshiftsinFDIflowsinelectroniccomponentsforenvironmentaltechnologymanufacturingaftertheannouncementoftheIRA.

11FIGUREES.2Numberofcleantechvaluechainproducts,by4CEEexporter

11FIGUREES.3Globalcleantechvaluechainsarecloselyintertwined

17FIGUREI.1Globalcumulative

manufacturingcapacityforselectedcleanenergytechnologiesin2022,anda2030

scenarioinwhichgovernmentsfulfilltheirstateddecarbonizationpledges

17FIGUREBI.1.1Regionalsharesof

manufacturingcapacityforselectedmass-manufacturedcleanenergytechnologiesandcomponents,2021(IEA)

18FIGUREBI.1.2ShiftsinFDIflowsin

electroniccomponentsmanufacturingaftertheannouncementoftheIRA

18FIGUREBI.1.3Shiftsintheoriginanddestinationofcross-continentalinvestment

27FIGUREB1.2.1GlobalreturnstoR&Dsubsidies—weightedaveragesacrosscountries

28FIGURE1.1Selectedstate-aidintheEU,2022–2024

29FIGUREB1.3.1Theuseofindustrialpolicyisontherise…

29FIGUREB1.3.2…includingintheEUandthe4CEEs

30FIGUREB1.3.3Typesofindustrialpolicyinterventions—the4CEEsandtherestofEU

30FIGUREB1.3.4Compositionofthe

industrialpolicytoolsusedinthe4CEEs(2008–2022)

32FIGUREB1.4.1The4CEEsareincreasinglyopentotrade,andincreasinglyintegratedwiththeEU,andcontinuetoincreasetheirexportsophistication

33FIGUREB1.4.2Employmentembodiedinexportsasshareoftotalemployment

33FIGUREB1.4.3Sectoralgrowthand

compositionofexport-relatedemployment

34FIGUREB1.4.4Laborproductivityandwageelasticitiesofonlydirectexport

employmentbysector,andoccupationalcompositionofemployment

40FIGURE2.1The4CEEsarehighly

integratedintheGlobalValueChains

41FIGURE2.24CEEsgoodsexportsare

expandinginsectorsrequiringmoreknow-howandsophistication

41FIGURE2.3The4CEEshaveshowcasedincreasedabilitytocompetitivelyexportmoretechnologicallysophisticated

products,includingingreentechnologymanufacturing

42FIGURE2.4The4CEEsalreadyexportgoodsingreenvaluechains,primarilysubcomponents(ratherthanend

products),ofvaryingcomplexity

43FIGURE2.5AnnualExportsofselectedcleantechnologies,bysegmentofvaluechainandcomplexity

44FIGURE2.6Cleantech-relatedproductswithachievedexportcompetitiveness(RCA≥1)bycountry

45FIGUREB2.2.1Mappingthesolarvaluechain

46FIGURE2.7Modelestimatespointtoa

moderategapbetweenpotentialandactualmanufacturingexportsinthe4CEEs,whichhasbeenrelativelystableovertime

49FIGURE2.8Numberofonshoringoppor-tunities,by4CEEcountryandvaluechain

50FIGURE2.9Exportprojections,by4CEEcountryandonshoringscenario

51FIGURE2.10DistributionofexportsofonshoredproductsinNZIAscenario,by4CEEcountry,valuechain,andsegment

52FIGURE2.11Exportsharein2022and

undertheNZIAscenario,by4CEEexportingcountry

53FIGURE2.12ProjectionsofexportsbytypeofimporterunderNZIAscenario;decompositionofdrivers

54FIGURE2.13Estimatedcapitalinvestmentneedsforadditionalmanufacturingcapacity

57FIGURE2.14Cleantechvaluechainsarecloselyintertwinedglobally

58FIGURE2.15The4CEEsdifferintheir

levelsofconnectednesstoothercountriesincleantechvaluechains

59FIGURE2.16Polandisanimportant

intermediaryincleantechvaluechains,

whilefirmsinCroatiaandBulgariatendtooperateondisconnectedislands

63FIGURE2.17Thefindingsoftargetedsurveysinthe4CEEsareconsistentwiththoseofothermajorassessments

69FIGURE3.1TaxonomyofIndustrialPolicyTools

Tables

12TABLEES.1Incentivesareontheradarofinvestorsincleantech,butnotatthetopoftheirlist

25TABLE1.1EUStrategicnet-zerogreen

technologiesintheNZIAincludealonglistofbroadsectors

29TABLEB1.3.1Numberoftradeandindustrialpoliciespassed,2008–2022

47TABLE2.12030scenariosforEUcleantechdeploymentandEU-madeequipment

61TABLE2.2Relianceoffirmsinclean

techvaluechainsondomesticvs.foreignsuppliers,bycountry

62TABLE2.3DriversofFDIinclean

technologiesinto4CEEs,asrankedbyinvestorsandprojectdevelopers

63TABLE2.4Heatmapofreported

investmentattractivenessinthe4CEEsacrossidentifieddrivers

66TABLE3.1TheWhy,theWhatandtheHowofIndustrialStrategies

67TABLE3.2TheWhat.Typologyofcriteriaforindustrialtargeting

7

Acknowledgements

ThePart2ofthe10thEditionoftheWorldBankGroupEURegularEconomicReportwasledbyEmilijaTimmisandGregorSemieniuk(bothSeniorEconomistsattheEUProsperityEconomicPolicyunit,WorldBank)andproducedbythefollowingcorejointWorldBank—IFCteam:SamuelRosenow(Economist,IFC)andSarurChaudhary(Consultant)ledthesimulationsfortheEUexportpotentialintheselectedvaluechainsinthe4CEEs;AnneBeck(Economist,WorldBank),GianlucaSantoni(CEPII),DariaTaglioni(ResearchManager,WorldBank)ledthefirmnetworkanalysis,withinputsfromAntonisTsiflis(YoungProfessional,WorldBank),whoalsoconductedanalysisoftheinvestmentimpactoftheglobalpol-icyshifts,complementedbyPaoEngelbrecht(Consultant)withworkonregionalpolicyreviewandstateaiddeploymentanalysis;JadeSalhab(SeniorEconomist,WorldBank),FranciscoMoraesLeitaoCampos(SeniorEconomist,WorldBank),DianaHristova(Consultant),RobertNowakowski(Consultant),YoheiSoma(Contractor)contributedtheanalysisofthefactorsdrivingtheinvestmentneedsintheselectedcleantechvaluechains;MarieThereseKane(Consultant),R.Balaji(ChiefIndustryAdvisor,IFC),AsoganMoodaly(SeniorInvestmentOfficer,IFC),PetrosShayanowako(Consultant),andRubidiumData(Consultant),ledintensivevaluechainmapping,buildingonpreviouseffortsofPenelopeMealy(SeniorEconomist,WorldBank)andSamuelRosenow;AlenMulabdic(SeniorEconomist,WorldBank)conductedtheanalysistradegravitymodeling;DeborahWinkler(SeniorEconomist,WorldBank)andLuisAlejandroAguilarLuna(Consultant)providedtheanalyticsontradeandjobsdevelopments;IsabelEstevez(SeniorExpert)ledtheworkandadvisedonindustrialstrategydesign.LeonardoIacovone(LeadEconomist,WorldBank),MatiasBelacin(Consultant),FabianScheifele(YoungProfessional,WorldBank),LukaszMarekMarc(SeniorEconomist,WorldBank),andMatijaLaco(SeniorFinancialSectorSpecialist,WorldBank)providedcriticalinputsandcollaborativeguidancethroughoutthepreparationofthisreport;RalfMartin(PrincipalEconomist,IFC)andDennisVerhoeven(KULeuven)providedanaly-sisonreturnstoinnovation;RekaJuhasz(UniversityofBritishColumbia)andVerónicaC.Pérez(BostonUniversity)provideddataonindustrialpolicy,analyzedbyVanessa-ParadisOlakemiDovonou(YoungProfessional,WorldBank);EhabTawfik(ResearchAnalyst,WorldBank)conductedmultipleanalysesonthe4CEEtradeevolutionanddescriptivesandprovidedexceptionalresearchassistance.MarcelloArrigo(Consultant)editedthereport.

MarylaMaliszewska,EnriqueAldaz-Carroll(bothSeniorEconomists,WorldBank),andRalfMartin(PrincipalEconomist,IFC)servedaspeerreviewsforthereport.Inaddition,usefulcommentswerereceivedfromCountryTeams,including:CatalinPauna,DesislavaEnikovaNikolova,NathaliePicarelli,andJosipFunda,AndrzejHalesiak,IvaTomic,AndreiSilviuDospinescu,andReenaBadiani-Magnussonatvariousstagesofproduction.Thereportbenefittedfrommultipleinsightsfromcolleagues,includingAntoineCoste,ChiaraCriscuolo,SzilviaDoczi,WilliamHynes,MarianoGonzalez,MariemMalouche,PenelopeMealy,KatherineStapleton,ColletteWheeler,amongothers.

ManagerialguidanceanddirectionwereprovidedbyAnnaAkhalkatsi(CountryDirector,EUmemberstates),AsadAlam(RegionalDirector,Prosperity,EuropeandCentralAsia),andJasminChakeri(PracticeManagerforEconomicPolicy,EuropeandCentralAsia).TheanalyticsinthisreporthavebeensupportedbytheClimateSupportFacilityTrustFund.

8|Cleantechvaluechains

Abbreviations

AIBPM5

BPM6

4CEEs

CCS CEE CO2CCUS ECESPC

EUEU27 EV FDIFSRUGDPGTAGVCsGVCE

ArtificialIntelligence

BalanceofPaymentsManual,fifthedition

BalanceofPaymentsManual,sixthedition

FourCentralandEasternEuropeancountries

CarboncaptureandstorageCentralandSoutheastEuropeCarbondioxide

Carboncapture,utilizationandstorageEuropeanCommission

EnergySavingsPerformance

Contracting

EuropeanUnionEuropeanUnionElectricvehicles

ForeignDirectInvestment

FloatingstorageandregasificationunitGrossDomesticProduct

GlobalTradeAlert

GlobalValueChains

GreenValueChainExplorer

HS IEA IRA ITOASOECD

OEMsNZIA PCI PVR&DRCARERSMESTEP

TCTF

USUS$ VCWBG

HarmonizedSystem

InternationalEnergyAgency

InflationReductionAct

Informationtechnology

OnshoringattractivenessscoreOrganisationforEconomic

Co-operationandDevelopment

Originalequipmentmanufacturers

NetZeroIndustryAct

ProductComplexityIndexPhotovoltaics

ResearchandDevelopment

RevealedComparativeAdvantageRegularEconomicReport

Smallandmedium-sizedenterpriseStrategicTechnologiesforEuropePlatform

TemporaryCrisisandTransitionFramework

UnitedStatesUSdollars

Valuechain

WorldBankGroup

RegionalGroupings

FourCentralandSoutheasternEuropeanountries(4CEEs):

Bulgaria(BG),Croatia(HR),Poland(PL),Romania(RO)

9

ExecutiveSummary

Asmultiplecriseserodethehard-wongainsofinclusivegrowth,policymakersturntotheopportuni-tiesarisingfromtheclimateagendatorevitalisegrowthandjobprospects.Fortheworldtoreachnet-zeroemissionsby2050,thedeploymentofcleanenergytechnologies1—suchassolarphotovoltaic(PV),windturbines,electricvehicles(EVs),andheatpumps—mustacceleratedramatically,witharesultingglobalmarketestimatedtobeworthtrillionsofeurosperyear.Developingexportcompetitivenessinmanufacturingproducts—particularlythosethataremoretechnologicallysophisticated—hasbeenlinkedtoawiderangeofeconomicbenefits,suchashighereconomicandemploymentgrowth,produc-tivityincreasesandtechnologicalupgrading.

TheEUandotherlargeeconomieshaverecentlyannouncedsignificantpolicyshiftsaimingtoboostdo-mesticproductionandinnovationinspecificsectors,includingcleanenergytechnologies.Despitewell-documentedrisksassociatedwithtargetingspecificsectors,policymakersincreasinglyregard‘horizon-talpolicies’(whichaimtostrengthentheeconomyoverallwithoutprovidingadirection)asnecessarybutnotsufficienttoaddressthechallengesthattheircountriesfacearoundinclusion,competitiveness,

resilience,orclimatechange.Theylookadditional-lyto‘vertical’or‘targeted’policiesthatspecificallyaimtostrengthencertainfirmsorsectorsoveroth-ers.Industrialpolicy—i.e.,policyaimedatchang-ingthestructureoftheeconomyinspecificwaysbasedoneconomic,security,geopoliticaloroth-ermotives—isthereforemakingacomeback.andoneofthetargetsiscleanenergytechnologies.2

Majorpolicyshifts,aimingatactivelydirectingthestructureoftheEUeconomy,arepromptingitsmemberstatestorethinktheirnationalap-proachessoastobenefitfromthepotentialop-portunities.TheenactmentoftheInflationRe-ductionAct(IRA)intheUShasfueledthedebateinEuropeaboutboostingdomesticmanufactur-ing;moreover,shiftsinForeignDirectInvestment(FDI)flowsinsectorstargetedbytheIRAandrelat-edUSlegislationcanbeobserved(FigureES.1).Fol-lowingthesignificantchangeinEUpoliciesaimingtoincreasethedomesticproductionofcleanen-ergytechnologies(amongotherstrategicproductsandcriticalrawmaterials),andtherelaxationofstateaidrules,memberstatesareseekingtoboost

FIGUREES.1Therewerenotableshifts

inFDIflowsinelectroniccomponentsfor

environmentaltechnologymanufacturingaftertheannouncementoftheIRA.

ShareofFDIinelectroniccomponentmanufacturingforenvironmentaltechnology

NorthAmerica

Asia

Europe

Oceania

SouthAmerica

Africa

020406080

Percent

Pre-IRAPost-IRA

Source:WorldBankcalculationsusingFTFDiMarketdata,

EnvironmentalTechnologyCluster.Note:‘Pre-IRA’correspondstoJanuary2019–August2022;‘post-IRA’toSeptember

2022–November2023.

1Inthisreport,productsthateitherproduce,store,ordeliverlow-carbonenergyarereferredtoas‘cleanenergytechnolo-

gies’or‘cleantech’,aspertheIEA’sdefinition.TheEU’snomenclatureincludes‘cleantechnologies’,‘netzerotechnologies’,

and‘greentechnologies’,amongothers.Pertheemergingnomenclature,‘technologies’areintendedasproducts—i.e.,capi-talgoods,consumergoods,andintermediategoods—notas‘productive’knowledge.

2Criscuolo,C.,etal.(2022a),“AnindustrialpolicyframeworkforOECDcountries:Olddebates,newperspectives”,OECDScience,TechnologyandIndustryPolicyPapers,No.127,OECDPublishing,Paris,

/10.1787/0002217c-en.Juhasz

,Lane

andRodrik(2024).

10|Cleantechvaluechains

investmentintheirrespectiveeconomiestobenefitfromopportunitiesinthenewlandscape.Notably,theEU’sNetZeroIndustryAct(NZIA)setsbenchmarksforthedomesticmanufacturingofawiderangeofproductsthatproduceorusecleanenergy,amountingtotheequivalentof40percentofEUdemandby2030,and15percentofglobaldemandby2040.

AmidtheprojectedexpansionofthemarketforcleantechundertheNZIA,theopportunitiesforEUmemberstates—includingthe4CEEs—couldbeconsiderable.Simulationsbasedonfine-grainedtradedatashowthatthefourCentralandEasternEuropeancountries(4CEEs)coveredinthisreport—Bulgaria,Croatia,Poland,andRomania—couldboosttheirexportsinselectedcleantechvaluechainsmappedinthisreport,namelythosefor:electricvehicle(EV)batteries,heatpumps,windenergy,solarPV,andelectrolyzers.Dependingontheirexistingperformanceintheselectedvaluechains,aswellasdemand,supply,andeaseofmarketaccess,the4CEEscouldpotentiallytripletheirexportsincleantechvaluechainsiftheymaintaintheircurrentmarketshare;andquadruplethem,ormore,iftheambitiousEUtargetsundertheNZIAareachieved,allelsebeingequal.

However,alackofcoordinationandfundingattheEUlevelpromptsaneedfornationalinitia-tives,andriskscausingdivergenceamongmemberstates.AlthoughtheEU’sTemporaryCrisisandTransitionFramework(TCTF)allowsforstateaidtostrategiccleantechprojects,theabsenceofbloc-widecoordinatingmechanismsandfundingforsucheffortsexacerbatestheriskofunevenimple-mentationanddivergenceamongmemberstates(well-coveredintherecentTheFutureofEuropeanCompetitivenessreportledbyMarioDraghi,andTheFutureoftheSingleMarketreportledbyEnricoLetta).Elevatedandunevenfiscalandpolicycapacityconstraintsacrossmemberstatesunderscoresuchrisks(notably,PolandandRomaniamustreckonwithsubstantialbutnecessaryfiscalconsol-idation).Asaresult,whileEUpolicyoffersananswertothewhyoftargetedeffortstoreshoreman-ufacturingforresilienceandgrowth,theimplementationofthisagenda—thewhatandhow—fallsonnationalpolicymakers.

ThechallengeofturningtargetedEUpolicyintosuccessfulnationalandEU-wideeconomicoutcomesrequirescarefulanalysisbynationalpolicymakers.Thisentailsconsideringwhatindustriestotar-get,andwhethertotargetanyatall.TheEUemphasizesastrategicfocuson19cleanenergytechnolo-gies,butintoday’sfragmentedandcomplexvaluechains,understandingwhereacountrymayhaveacompetitiveedgethatpolicymakerscouldpotentiallystrengtheniskey.Nationalpolicymakersmustalsoanalyzehowtoadministersupport,choosingandcombiningpoliciesfromabroadtoolkitthatisnotlimitedtosubsidies—whicharecostlyandhaveacheckeredrecord,especiallyifnotwellcoordi-natedwithcomplementarypolices.Thisanalysisisinherentlychallenging,butitbenefitsfrominsightintotheexistingindustrialstructureandframeworksofeacheconomy,aswellasfromanunderstand-ingofavailablestatecapacity.

Emergingdataandanalyticscanenhancetheunderstandingoftheexistingpolicyspaceandthecapa-bilitiesofeacheconomy,whichiscriticaltothedesignofsuccessfulhorizontalorverticalpolicies.Increasingeconomiccomplexity,andtradepatternsthatfragmenttheproductionofgoodsacrosscoun-tries,poseagrowingchallengetotheaccuratetrackingandassessmentofanycountry’svalueadditionintheproductionofcomplexgoods.Thisreportshowcaseshowfine-grainedtradeandfirm-leveldata,togetherwithAI-enabledaswellastraditionalqualitativeanalysis,canyieldinsightsintothe4CEEs’currentparticipationincleantechvaluechains,howtheirfirmsarelinkedtootherfirmsabroadorathome,andwhatfactorsinvestorsconsiderwhendecidingwheretomanufacturecleantech.

The4CEEsalreadyparticipateincleantechvaluechains,albeittoavarieddegreeandacrossdifferentsegments.Careful—ifnotcaveat-free,especiallyasthemeasuresrelyongrosstradedata—mappingofthefivecleantechvaluechainsandusingfine-graineddatashowsthat4CEEsshowcaseconsiderable

ExecutiveSummary|11

BG

HR

RO

exportcompetitivenessandfacerobustexportgrowthratesinsomeoftheselectedvaluechains(FigureES.2).Thissignalstheirpotentialtocapital-izeonthetransitiontothegreeneconomy—withdifferencesstemmingfromtheirrespectiveeco-nomicstructures.The4CEEstendtofocusonsub-componentsandproductsofmediumcomplexity,pointingtogrowingsophisticationandamid-tierpositioninginthevaluechainsconsidered.How-ever,thediversemixofproductsandstagesofpro-ductionlinkedtocleantechvaluechainsinthesecountrieshighlightsthedifficultyofappropriate-lydevisingtargetedpolicies.

EUfirms,includingthoseinthe4CEEs,arehighlyin-tegratedintoglobalcleantechvaluechains,high-lightingrisksfrominward-lookingpolicies(Figure

FIGUREES.2Numberofcleantechvaluechainproducts,by4CEEexporter

PL

Uniquevaluechaincomponentswithhighonshoringattractivenessscore(ExportstootherEUcountries).

050100150200250300350400

Numberofcleantechvaluechainproducts

ElectrolysersEVBatteriesHeatpumps

SolarWind

Source:WorldBankcalculations.

ES.3).Firmnetworkanalysisintheselectedcleantechvaluechainsconsidersfirms’linkstotheirbuyersandsuppliersaroundtheworld,andtheirpositioninthevaluechain.Amongthe4CEEs,Polandemerg-esasanimportantintermediaryincleantechvaluechains,whilefirmsinCroatiaandBulgariatendtooperateinlessconnectedislands.PolandandRomaniahavelargedomesticsupplierbases,showinggreaterpotentialforjobcreation,policyimpact,andinvestmentattraction.Incontrast,BulgarianandCroatianfirmsincleantechvaluechainsimportmostoralloftheirinputs,highlightinglimitedintegra-tionwiththedomesticeconomyandpointingtothecomplementaryimportanceofhorizontalpolicies.

FIGUREES.3Globalcleantechvaluechainsarecloselyintertwined

Networkrepresentationofbuyer-sellerrelations,countryaggregates,globallevel

FI

NOSE

PL

UKFR

DKDE

ROBG

ES

HRIT

US

CN

KR

JP

HL

IN

Source:WorldBankcalculationsusingFactSet.

Note:BluenodesrepresentEUbuyers/suppliers,greennodes—non/EUbuyers/suppliers.Thearrowsindicatethedirectionofthe

buyer-sellerrelationships,withthethicknessofthearrowsrepresentingtherelativeimportanceofthesupplier’scountryoforigintothedestinationcountry.Thesizeofeachnodereflectsthebetweennesscentrality(i.e.thenumberofshortestpathsthroughthenode).

Whenmakinginvestmentdecisionsincleantechvaluechains,privateinvestorsreportconsideringmultiplefactors,includingbutnotlimitedtogovernmentincentives.Thescale-upinproductionnec-essarytodrivescale-upinexportsrequiressubstantialupfrontinvestment—particularlyfromthepri-vatesector.Forthefivecleantechvaluechainsconsidered,achievingexportvolumescale-upinline

12|Cleantechvaluechains

withsimulationsbasedonEUpolicytargetswouldrequireestimatedinvestmentsinmanufacturingofbetweenUS$1billion(inBulgaria,Croatia,andRomania)andUS$5billion(inPoland).Whilegovern-mentincentivesarecertainlyontheradarofpotentialinvestors,targetedsurveysshowthatequip-mentmanufacturersprioritizefactorssuchassuppliernetworkstrength,availabilityofskilledlabor,andR&Decosystems.Ontheotherhand,projectdevelopers(i.e.,thebuyer