外语文献综述报告_第1页
外语文献综述报告_第2页
外语文献综述报告_第3页
外语文献综述报告_第4页
外语文献综述报告_第5页
全文预览已结束

下载本文档

版权说明:本文档由用户提供并上传,收益归属内容提供方,若内容存在侵权,请进行举报或认领

文档简介

LiteratureReviewReport

ResearchontheCoordinationofFashionClothingDual-channel

SupplyChain

Introduction

Internetisthegreatestrevolutioninthe20thcentury.Notonlychangespeoplessocialcontactmannerofworkingandlifestyles,butalsoitchangesthemodelofproduction・Withthehelpofinternettechnology,e-commercedevelopsarapidgrowth.Thesellercanmakeuseofnetworktodisplayproductsbythewaysofimages,video,andcharacter.Thebuyercanmakeuseofnetworktotakecomparisonofseveralproducts,choosingproductsinthehighestutilityvalue.Aftermakingthedecision,consumersusingonlinepaymentsoftwaretobuytheproducts.Consumersreceiveproductsbyexpressdelivery.Thentheprocessofpurchaseiscompleted.Inthisprocess,Consumersdon*thavetochooseproductsfacetoface.Consumerscansavetimecostandtravelcost>improvetheconvenienceexpandthescopeoftheproductstochoose.Thisisthenetworkmarketingchannel.

Withtherapiddevelopmentofinformationtechnology,thenetworkismakingmoreandmoreinfluenceonthepeople.WiththedevelopmentandapplicationoftheInternet,e-commerceisboomingasanewbusinessmodel.Nomatterfromtheperspectiveofenterprise'sowndevelopmentorfromtheperspectiveofmeetingcustomerneeds,theimplementationofthedual-channelstrategyisamustforenterprisestocompeteandsurvive.Theenterprisesoftheimplementationofdoublechannelmodel,successbeyondcount.Manyenterpriseshasexploredthemethodtoeasetheconflictbetweenelectronicchannelsandtraditionalchannels,andtakeaseriesofeffectivemeasurestoachievecoordinationandbalancebetweenchannels,suchasEsteeLauderCo,IBM,CISCOandNike.Itnotonlyimprovesthemarketshareandpenetration,butalsoprovidesasuccessfulexampleforthenewvaluetransfermodebroughtbytheelectroniccommerce.

However,theintroductionofelectronicchannelswillbringaseriesofproblems.Themainsourceoftheseproblemsliesinthedamagetotheinterestsofmembersofotherchannels,sotraditionalretailerstendtoagainstthemanufacturertointroduceelectronicchannels,andwilltakemeasurestopreventtheintroductionofelectronicchannels,leadingtocontradictionbetweensupplychainmembers.

Singlesupplychaincontracthasbeenunabletosolvethecoordinationproblemofdualchannelsupplychain.Onlyaccordingtotheactualsituation,usingacombinationofbuybackcontract,revenuesharingcontractandwholesalepricecontract,onlythentobeabletoachievealongtimeofdualchannelsupplychaincoordination,toimprovetheoverallbenefitofthesupplychain,tomakemanufacturersandretailerstoachieveawin-winsituation.

Inthispaperthecharacteristicsoffashionclothingareanalyzedincludingseasonal>personalized>fashionandsensitivetofashiontrends.Acceptanceoffashionclothingfornetworkchannelsareanalyzedinthispaper.Puttingforwardthethecoordinationoffashionclothingdual-channelsupplychainissue.Dependingonthesubjectofthenetworkmarketingchannel,Therearethreestructures:thestructureofdual-channelsupplychainbytheleadingofmanufacturexthestructureofdual-channelsupplychainbytheleadingofretailer^thestructureofdual-channelsupplychainbytheleadingofe-commerceretailer.Inthispaperwediscussthestructureofdual-channelsupplychainbytheleadingofmanufacture.Namely,onthebasisoftraditionalretailchannels,manufacturersestablishthenetworksaleschannels.Thispaperestablishesthemodelsofmanufacturersandretailersandanalyzedthemodels.Thenthispaperdiscusseshowtogainmoreprofitformanufacturersandretailersinthecoordinationofdual-channelsupplychain.

ResearchStatusofOverseasandDomestic

Therearethreekindsofdualchannelsupplychainstructure,accordingtothedifferentchannelsofelectronicchannels.Inthispaper,wemainlydiscussthestructureofdual-channelsupplychainbytheleadingofmanufacture.Thestructureisbasedontheoriginaltraditionalchannels,establishtheself-onlinedirectmarketingchannels,toformatadual-channelstructure.

Dual-channelSupplyChain

Theearlyresearchonthedual-channelsupplychainhastwodecisionmakers,themanufacturerandtheretailer.Retailersandmanufacturersinaccordancewiththe

Stackelberggamemodeltomakedecisions.Inearlytwenty-firstCenturyKevinChiangWei-yuputforwardtheearlypricingmodelofdualchannelsupplychain.Inordertobeclosertotherealityofthemarketsituation,inthemathematicalmodeling,KevinChiangWei-yutointroducecustomerstothedegreeofacceptanceofdirectmarketingchannels.Themathematicalmodelofcentralizeddecisionmakingandthemathematicalmodelofdistributeddecisionmakingundertheconditionofsupplier'sleading.Throughtheanalysisoftheresultscanbefoundthatregardlessofthelevelofcustomeracceptance,theintroductionofdirectmarketingchannelsareabletointroducecompetitionmechanism,topreventretailerstosettheretailpricetoohigh.

Whenmanufacturersintroducedirectsaleschannels,competitionwillbeintroduced.Thismakenotonlytherelationshipbetweenmanufacturersandretailers,alsocompetitionbetweenthem.TsayAexaminesthemainfactorsthatleadtochannelconflict,andfindsthatchannelconflicthasledtoareductionintheprofitsofmanufacturersandretailers.Manufacturersandretailerscanincreasetheirmarginalprofitsbycoordinatingthepricesymmetrybetweenchannels.

Kay・Yutunderstandsthatthecompetitionbetweenmanufacturersandretailersismainlyduetothehomogeneityoftheproducts.Becauseoftheadvantagesanddisadvantagesofdirectmarketingchannelsandretailchannels,retailersandmanufacturersusedifferenttypesofservicestoreducetheimpactofthechannels.

Kay-Yutismainlyfromtheperspectiveofservicecompetitiononthedualchannelsupplychainanalysis.

ZhongMingusedtheexpectedvariancemodeltostudythedecisionmodelofthedualchannelsupplychainundertheconditionofriskaversion.Hefoundthattheriskaversionofthedualchannelsupplychainproductpriceswillbelowerthantheriskofneutraldualchannelsupplychainproductprices.Comparedwiththecentralizeddecision-makingsupplychain,verticalandhorizontalcompetitionindecentralizeddecision-makingsupplychaincanleadtoinefficientchannel.

PengJingetal.Studytheinfluenceofthedemandchangeonthedual-channelsupplychain.Theresultsshowthatthesizeofthedemanddisturbanceandthedegreeofconsumeracceptanceoftheelectronicchannelhaveimportantinfluenceonthepricing,productiondecisionandcoordinationcontractofthedual-channelsupplychainsystem.Inaddition,thegreaterthemagnitudeofthechangeofdemanddisturbancemomentum,thegreaterthedifferenceinprofitbeforeandaftertakingmeasures.

ZhouYongweifsstudywasbasedontheretailer(Q,R)andreplacedthestockreplenishmentdual-channelsalesmodelofsupplychain.ThroughtheestablishmentoftheMarkovprocessmodel,theincomefunctionofcentralizedcontroltypesupplychainanddecentralizedcontrolsupplychainisobtained.Heprovedthattheremustbeanoptimalstandardstockleveltomakethesupplychainbenefittothebest.

TheCoordinationofDual-channelSupplyChain

Channelcompetitionbetweenmanufacturersandretailerswillreducetheprofits.Therefore,withthedevelopmentofsupplychainmanagement,channelcoordinationinsupplychainmanagementhasbecomeanimportantdirectionofsupplychainmanagementresearch.Contractcoordinationstrategyofsupplychainsystemisthecorecontentofsupplychainmanagement.Pasternack(1985)proposedtheconceptofsupplychaincontractforthefirsttime,andprovidedtheoptimalwholesalepricepolicyandthebuybackstrategyofperishableproducts.Thecommonsupplychaincontractsincludewholesalepricecontract,buybackcontract,revenuesharingcontractandelasticquantitycontract.

Pricecompetitionhasalwaysbeenthecoreandfundamentalofsupplychaincompetition.Gangshu(George)CaiwereanalyzedandcomparedwiththeretailerledSteinberggame,themanufacturerledSteinberggameandNashequilibriumgame.Hefoundthattherewasapricediscountwhenthecontractwasbetterthanwhentherewasnocontract.Thisismainlybecausethemanufacturerandtheretailusepricecontracttocarryonthecooperationtobeabletoreducethecompetitioncostwhichthechannelcompetitionproduces.Thisarticleshowsthatstrengtheningcooperationbetweenmanufacturersandretailerscanincreasetheirprofits.

LinQiangconsiderthemarketdemandisnonlinearandrandomandthegeneralsituationoftheretailer'sefforts,theintroductionoftheobjectiveexistenceofthechannelmembersofthepsychologicalcharacteristicsofthefairnesspreference.Hedesignthebuybackcontracttoimprovetheimplementationofdualchannelsupplychaincoordination•Becausethetraditionalbuybackcontractcan'tcoordinatethesupplychainthatdependsontheretailefseffort,theeffortcostsharingparameterisintroducedinthebuybackcontractmodel,whichistheeffortcostofthemanufacturertosharethepartoftheretailer.Theresultsshowthatthedualchannelsupplychaincoordinationcanbeachievedwiththeimprovementofthebuybackcontractaslongastheparametersareproperlyvalued.

LiXiangxiangetal.Studyonthestrategyofthemanufacturertoimplementthepricedifferencecompensationtotheretailerdirectly,inordertomakethewholesupplychaintoachievetheoptimal.Butthisapproachhasharmedtheinterestsofthemanufacture匚Sotheextraprofitthatcanbemadebytheretailertoimplementthecontractistomakeupforthelossofthemanufacturer'sprofits,andthengivebacktothemanufacturerforacertainproportionoftheproceeds.Thisapproachcanimproveboththeretailerandthemanufacturersprofit,andfinallyrealizethecoordinationofthedualchannelsupplychain.

TanYanhuafsresearchresultsshowthat:thepricereferenceeffectnotonlyaffectsthepricingstrategyofitsownchannel,butalsoaffectsthepricingstrategyofthedualchannelsupplychain.Theconclusioncanprovidereferenceandreferenceforhowtoeffectivelypricethedual-channel.Dual-channelsupplychaincannotachievecoordinationundernormalcircumstances,buttheuseofthetwocontractcanachievecoordination.

DanBinetal.Constructedadual-channelsupplychainmodelconsistingofasinglemanufacturerandasingleretailer,andstudiedtheoptimalpriceofthedualchannelsupplychainunderthecentralizeddecisiomakinganddecentralizeddecision・making.Fromthepointofviewofcooperationbetweenelectronicchannelandtraditionalchannel,thecompensationstrategyofsupplychaincoordinationisdiscussed.Heprovedthatthiscompensationstrategycanpromotethecoordinationofdual-channelsupplychain,andcanguaranteethesupplychainmembersofawin-winsituationinacertainrange.Finally,anumericalexampleisanalyzedtofurtherverifytheeffectivenessofthecompensationstrategyforthecoordinationofdual-channelsupplychain.

Double-channelcoexistencewillappearthefreeriderphenomenonbasedontheinformation.Informationservicesneedcost,andanyoneofthechannelsofinformationserviceshaveapositiveexternalityforotherchannel.Sowhenthetraditionalchannelsandelectronicchannelstogethertosellthesamemanufacturersproducts,whichprovidesopportunitiesforotherchannelsoffreeriders.MaKai,ZhaoQianrudiscussedthenfreerider1'problemcausedbythecompetitionofservice,andestablishedthe"freeridernmodelafterthetra

温馨提示

  • 1. 本站所有资源如无特殊说明,都需要本地电脑安装OFFICE2007和PDF阅读器。图纸软件为CAD,CAXA,PROE,UG,SolidWorks等.压缩文件请下载最新的WinRAR软件解压。
  • 2. 本站的文档不包含任何第三方提供的附件图纸等,如果需要附件,请联系上传者。文件的所有权益归上传用户所有。
  • 3. 本站RAR压缩包中若带图纸,网页内容里面会有图纸预览,若没有图纸预览就没有图纸。
  • 4. 未经权益所有人同意不得将文件中的内容挪作商业或盈利用途。
  • 5. 人人文库网仅提供信息存储空间,仅对用户上传内容的表现方式做保护处理,对用户上传分享的文档内容本身不做任何修改或编辑,并不能对任何下载内容负责。
  • 6. 下载文件中如有侵权或不适当内容,请与我们联系,我们立即纠正。
  • 7. 本站不保证下载资源的准确性、安全性和完整性, 同时也不承担用户因使用这些下载资源对自己和他人造成任何形式的伤害或损失。

评论

0/150

提交评论