半导体供应链中新兴的弹性-BCGSIA-2024-WN8

EMERGINGRESILIENCEINTHESEMICONDUCTORSUPPLYCHAINMAY2024RAJVARADARAJANJASKARANSINGH/IACOBKOCH-WESERJOSEPHFITZGERALD/CHRISRICHARD///MARYTHORNTONROBERTCASANOVA/DAVIDISAACS/AboutBostonConsultingGroup(BCG)BostonConsultingGroup(BCG)isaleadingglobalmanagementconsultingfirm,withofficesinover50countries.BCGpartnerswithleadersinbusinessandsocietytotackletheirmostimportantchallengesandcapturetheirgreatestopportunities.BCGwasthepioneerinbusinessstrategywhenitwasfoundedin1963.Today,wehelpclientswithtotaltransformation—inspiringcomplexchange,enablingorganizationstogrow,buildingcompetitiveadvantage,anddrivingbottom-lineimpact.AbouttheSemiconductorIndustryAssociation(SIA)TheSemiconductorIndustryAssociation(SIA)isthevoiceofthesemiconductorindustryintheUS,oneofAmerica’stopexportindustriesandakeydriverofAmerica’seconomicstrength,nationalsecurity,andglobalcompetitiveness.Thesemiconductorindustrydirectlyemploysmorethan300,000workersintheUnitedStates,andUSsemiconductorcompanysalestotaled$264billionin2023.SIArepresents99percentoftheUSsemiconductorindustrybyrevenueandnearlytwo-thirdsofnon-USchipfirms.Throughthiscoalition,SIAseekstostrengthenleadershipofsemiconductormanufacturing,design,andresearchbyworkingwithCongress,theAdministration,andkeyindustrystakeholdersaroundtheworldtoencouragepoliciesthatfuelinnovation,propelbusiness,anddriveinternationalcompetition.AbouttheAuthorsRajVaradarajanisaSeniorPartnerEmeritusofBostonConsultingGroup.HehasauthoredseveralreportsonthesemiconductorindustryatBCGandincollaborationwiththeSIA.YoumaycontacthimasthecorrespondingauthorbyemailatVaradarajan.Raj@.IacobKoch-WeserisanAssociateDirectorforGlobalTradeandInvestmentintheBostonofficeofBostonConsultingGroup.Youmaycontacthimbyemailatkoch-weser.iacob@.ChrisRichardisaPartnerandManagingDirectorintheDenverofficeofBostonConsultingGroupandisacorememberofitsTechnology,Media&Telecommunicationspractice.Youmaycontacthimbyemailatrichard.christopher@.JosephFitzgeraldisaPartnerandManagingDirectorintheSanFranciscoofficeofBostonConsultingGroupandisacorememberofitsTechnology,Media&Telecommunicationspractice.Youmaycontacthimbyemailatfitzgerald.joseph@.JaskaranSinghisanAssociateintheDallasofficeofBostonConsultingGroup.Youmaycontacthimbyemailatsingh.jaskaran@.MaryThorntonistheVicePresidentofGlobalPolicyattheSemiconductorIndustryAssociation.Youmaycontactheratmthornton@.RobertCasanovaistheDirectorofIndustryStatisticsandEconomicPolicyattheSemiconductorIndustryAssociation.Youmaycontacthimatrcasanova@.DavidIsaacsistheVicePresidentofGovernmentAffairsattheSemiconductorIndustryAssociation.Youmaycontacthimatdisaacs@.AcknowledgmentsThisreportwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthecontributionsofourBCGColleaguesRamiroPalma,ThomasLopez,TreySexton,CeciJoyPerez,andPeiluChen,andourSIAcolleaguesJenniferMengandAlexGordon.2ContentsExecutiveSummaryIntroduction46TheExpansionofGovernmentIncentives8Resilienceinthe10222728SemiconductorSupplyChainLookingAhead—thePathwaytoGreaterResilienceFutureNeedsoftheIndustryAppendix3ExecutiveSummaryTherearestrengthsandvulnerabilitiesintheglobalsemiconductorsupplychain.OurApril2021reportillustratedthattheTheEuropeanUnion(EU)unveiledtheEuropeanChipsAct,MainlandChinainitiatedthethirdphaseofitsIntegratedCircuit(IC)IndustryInvestmentFund,andvariousotherincentiveprogramsemergedorexpandedinTaiwan,SouthKorea,Japan,India,andothercountries.Inparallel,companieshavemade1globallyintegratednatureofthesemiconductorsupplychainhasrealized$45billion–$125billionincostefficiencieseachyear,contributingtoprices35%–65%lowerthantheywouldotherwisebewithsignificantinvestments,inbothestablishedandnewfullylocalizedsupplychains,resultinginenhancedadoptionofdownstreamproductsandservices.Butwealsoshowedthattheindustryhasbecomeregions.Weprojectaround$2.3trillioninprivatesectorinvestmentinwaferfabricationin2024–2032,comparedwith$720billioninthe10yearspriorvulnerabletogeographicconcentration—withatleasttoenactmentoftheCHIPSAct(2013–2022).The50pointsacrossthesupplychainwhereoneregionheldover65%ofglobalmarketshare.Disruptions,suchaspandemics,naturaldisasters,materialsshortages,orconflicts,couldsubstantiallyimpacttheglobalchipsupplychain.USisprojectedtocapture28%ofthesecapitalexpenditures,asopposedtothepre-CHIPSActpaceofinvestment,inwhichtheUSwouldhavecapturedjust9%ofglobalcapitalexpenditures.Waferfabricationwillbecomemoreresilient.By2032,wepredictleading-edgewaferfabricationcapacitytodiversifybeyondTaiwanandSouthKoreatoincludetheUS,Europe,andJapan.WeexpecttheUStoincreaseitsfabcapacityby203%between2022and2032,thelargestincreaseintheworld.Asaresult,theUnitedStateswillreverseadecades-longdownwardtrajectoryandraiseitsshareofglobalaggregatefabcapacityfrom10%todayto14%in2032.Intheabsenceofaction,theUSsharewouldhaveslippedfurtherto8%by2032.Governmentsandcompaniesaretakingconcertedactiontoincreaseresilience.TheUSCHIPSAct,signedintolawinAugust2022,committed$39billioningrantincentivesanda25%investmenttaxcredit(ITC)forsemiconductormanufacturing.Newmarketsandinnovativetechnologycansupportresilienceinassembly,test,andpackaging(ATP).InATP,MainlandChinaandTaiwanwillcontinuetoholdthelargestshareofglobalcapacity.Butwithsupportfromgovernmentsandforeigninvestors,weexpectcountriesinSoutheastAsia,LatinAmerica,andEasternEuropetoexpandATPactivity.TheUSStateDepartmentissupportingtheseeffortsthroughInternationalTechnologySecurityandInnovation(ITSI)fundingundertheCHIPSAct.EmergingmarketgovernmentsareactivelypursuingtheirownstrategiestoattractATPinvestment.Inparallel,thedevelopmentofadvancedpackaging—andassociatedinnovationsinchiplets—isalsodrivingleadingplayerstobuildATPcapacityintheUnitedStatesandEurope,proximatetonewwaferfabricationcapacity.4Otherpartsofthesupplychainarealsoachievingabetterbalance.Indesign,coreIP,andIndustrialpolicieshavethepotentialtocreateadditionalbottlenecksthatincreasesupplychainrisk.Certainsegmentsofthesemiconductorsupplychainareatriskifincentiveprogramsandlarge-scaleindustrialpoliciesleadtonon-market-basedinvestment,whichcanresultinoverconcentrationoroversupply.Governmentincentivesshouldfocusonenablingtargeted,distributed,market-basedinvestments.ElectronicDesignAutomation(EDA),companiesarediversifyingwheretheyhire,locate,andtraintalent.Insemiconductormanufacturingequipment(“tools”),currentindustryleadersareestablishingR&Dandtrainingcentersindifferentregions.AlthoughmaterialsproductionremainsconcentratedinEastAsia,weexpectittofollowfuturefabcapacitytotheUnitedStatesandEuropetorealizecostandR&Dbenefits.Sustainedsupportforresilienceisneeded.Overthecomingdecade,thesemiconductorsupplychainwillcontinuetofacechallenges,includingindustrycyclicalityandtherapidevolutionofdownstreamdemand(forexample,inAI,EVs,industrialautomation,androbotics).Supply-demandimbalancesinmaturenodecapacitycouldbecomemoreevident.ItwillbecriticalforpolicymakersintheUnitedStatesandelsewhereto“staythecourse”byextendingcurrentsupportaswellasconsideringadditionalmeasurestostrengthenresilience.Astrongglobaltalentpipelineisasimportantasever.Assemiconductorcompaniespursueambitiousdevelopmentplansinthecontextofatightlabormarket,theyrelyonaccesstoengineersandtechnicianstofillbothhigh-andmid-skillpositions.Improvingworkforcedevelopmentacrossestablishedandemergingregions,whilealsoadvancingimmigrationpoliciestofosterglobaltalentflows,willbevitaltothesemiconductorindustry’sfutureresilience.Scaleandopennessarecriticalforresilience.Toensurenewanddiversifiedsemiconductorfacilitiescanoperateatoptimalcapacityutilizationratestogenerateapositivereturnoninvestment,itisvitalforchipcompaniestomaintaincontinuedaccesstoglobalcustomersandaglobalnetworkofsuppliers.Governmentsareincreasinglyimposingconstraintsonwherechipcompaniescanselltheirproductsandservices,orwheretheycansourceinputsandequipment.Fortunately,globaltradeinsemiconductorscontinuestogrowatarapidpace,reflectingtheglobalinterconnectednessoftheindustry.TheUnitedStatesandalliedgovernmentsneedtomaintainopentradeandcooperationbyrecognizingthatextremeindustrialpolicies,suchasfullcountry-level“self-sufficiency,”willundermineresilience,addcost,andstifleinnovation.5SIntroductionemiconductorspowertoday’seconomy,fromvehiclesandmobiledevicestodatacenters,medicalequipment,cleantechnologies,and,ofcourse,theupcomingAIrevolution.Theinventionoftheintegratedcircuit(IC)startedtheUnitedStatesonapathtoearlyleadershipindesignandmanufacturing.Beginninginthe1980s,chipmanufacturingrapidlyshiftedfromNorthAmericatoJapanandEastAsia.WhiletheUnitedStatesremainedpreeminentinequipmentandchipdesign,EastAsianeconomiesincreasedtheirshareofwaferfabricationcapacity,highlightedbytheriseofSouthKoreainmemoryandTaiwaninthepure-playfoundrybusinessforallothersemiconductors.Thisconfigurationenabledrapidadvancesandspecialization,butovertime,ledtosupplychainconcentration.2InStrengtheningtheGlobalSemiconductorSupplyChaininanUncertainEra(April2021),weanalyzedthesemiconductorsupplychaintounderstanditsvaluefortheglobaleconomy,whilealsoidentifyingpointsofvulnerability.Werecommendedpoliciesandotheractionstoimprovesupplychainresiliencethroughgreatergeographicdiversification.Sincethen,theglobalsupplychainhasevolvedrapidly,withmajorprivatesectorinvestmentsinmultiplegeographiesandpublicsectorpoliciesandsupportprogramsdirectedattheindustry.TheUSCHIPSAct,signedintolawinAugust2022,committed$39billioningrantsandloansforsemiconductormanufacturing.Likewise,theEuropeanUnionunveiledtheEuropeanCHIPSAct,MainlandChinainitiatedthethirdvintageofitsICIndustryInvestmentFund,andvariousotherincentiveprogramsemergedacrossAsiaandotherregions.Inparallel,over100newsemiconductormanufacturinginvestmentshavebeenannouncedtomeetincreasedmarketdemand,dispersedworldwideacrosseverymajorregion.6Inthisreport,weprovideanupdatedviewontheimpactofpoliciestodayonfutureinvestmentintheglobalsemiconductorsupplychainandtheimplicationsforresilience.Wedefineresilience,broadlyspeaking,asimprovedgeographicdiversificationofthesupplychain.Webeginbyreviewingpublicandprivatesectorstrategiesacrossmajorgeographies,withadditionaldetailprovidedintheAppendix.Wethenassessthelikelyeffectsofthesetrendsoverthecomingdecade,specificallyforecastingchangesindistributionofwaferfabricationandATPcapacity.Wealsoconsidergeographicdiversificationinothersegmentsofthesupplychain,3includingdesign,coreIP,andEDA,equipment,andmaterials.Ourreportthenhighlightsthepathtowardgreaterresilience,includingsustaininggovernmentsupport,guardingagainstsupply-demandimbalances,integratingnewcountries,maintainingvibrantglobaltrade,andfosteringglobaltalent.Asgeopoliticalfrictionspersist,itisimportanttomaintainaglobalsupplychainandsupportamorediverseglobalproductionfootprint.Accordingly,wecloseourreportbyhighlightingfutureneedsoftheindustry.7TheExpansionofGovernmentIncentivesSemiconductorcompaniesweighmanyfactorswhenmakinginvestmentdecisions,includingoverallbusinessconditions,suppliernetworks,siteavailability,infrastructure,andworkforce—butasignificantoverarchingfactorisgovernmentpolicy.Well-craftedanddurableincentiveprograms,alongwithanenablingregulatoryenvironmentandeffectivetalentdevelopmentinitiatives,alsosignalagovernment’scommitmenttotheindustry’slong-termsuccess.Forindividualcompanies,effectivepoliciescanimprovethecostandefficiencyofconstructingandoperatingafacility.SinceourreportinApril2021,governmentsaroundtheworldhavemadesubstantialeffortstoincreasetheirsupportforthesemiconductorindustry(seeExhibit1;formoreinformationonincentiveprogramsineachkeyregion,seetheAppendix).TheUnitedStatespassedtheCHIPSActtoincentivizegrowthofthesemiconductorecosystemthroughbothdirectgrantsanda25%ITCforsemiconductormanufacturing,andseveralstateshaveenactedincentiveprogramstosupplementthefederalefforts.$11billionofthe$52billionappropriatedintheCHIPSActistobeusedtodevelopUSleadershipinsemiconductorR&D,emphasizingtheimportanceofanall-encompassingindustrialpolicytosuccess.IntheEUandJapan,governmentshaveappropriatedlargegrantfundstobeallocatedonanationalandproject-specificbasis,coupledwithtaxincentives.TheSouthKoreanandTaiwanesegovernmentsareofferingcomparativelylargertaxincentiveprogramsandR&Dsupport—forexample,intheTaiwanChipInnovationProgramandSouthKorea’sK-CHIPSAct.Thesedirectincentivesarecomplementedbyindirecttoolstoattractinvestment,suchasinfrastructuresupport,low-costaccesstoland,andstreamlininggovernmentapprovals.8MainlandChina’slargeandwide-rangingsupportforthesemiconductorindustryalsowillimpacttheglobalsupplychaininthecomingyears.AlargeportionofMainlandChina’ssupporthascomeintheformofequityinfusionsandtheoperationoffundsthatmixgovernmentandprivatecapital.Otherfactors,suchasoverseastalentacquisition,theformulationofdomesticstandards,stateownership,andthepreferencegiventodomesticallyproducedchips,furtheracttosupportMainlandChina’ssemiconductorindustry.EXHIBIT1Governmentincentivesbymajorregion(lefttorightbysizeofGDP)USTargetAchieveresiliencyReach70%Gain20%globalEarn$112Bshareby2030salesby2030SecurefootholdinLogic,bolsterfableadershipBreakthrough1nmby2030insemiconductorself-sufficiencysupplychainby2025ꢀGuidingpolicyCHIPSandNationalICDigitalCompassStrategyforK-BeltꢀAngstromScienceAct,100-DaySupplyChainReviewOutline,14thFiveYearPlanꢀ2030ꢀSemisꢀandtheDigitalIndustrySemiconductorꢀStrategySemiconductorInitiative,MoonshotprogramKey$39Bingrants$142Binequityfunds$47Bingrants$17.5Bingrants$55B$16BIncentiveamounts1intaxincentivesintaxincentives4Key25%investmentBigFundI,II,IIIGrantsandloansunderEUChipsActNationalfiscalTaxincentivesFinancialsubsidiesInitiativestaxcreditandlocalfundsfundingunderK-ChipsActundertheChipInnovationProgramGrantsunderState-ownedLeading-EdgeSemiconductorTechnologyCenterPrivate-publiceducationtheCHIPSActenterpriseleadersTaxcreditsIndustry-programsacademiaꢀco-op,taxꢀcreditsState-levelNationalStateaidsupportsciencefundallowances2Newfab&ATP26~3058437investmentssince202031.$39Bformanufacturing;$13.2BforR&Dandworkforcedevelopment2.ImportantProjectsofCommonEuropeanInterest(IPCEI)3.ComprisesfabandATPprojectsthathavebeenannounced,started,orcompletedsince20204.25%taxcreditpledgingtogiveback$2.25Bperannumover7years.5.MayundercountthetotalnumberofsitesinChina.Source:Gartner;SIA;Pressreleases;Companydisclosures;Governmentwebsites;BCGanalysis9ResilienceintheSemiconductorSupplyChainTheglobalsemiconductorsupplychainishighlyspecialized(seeExhibit2).Differentregionshavestrengthsindifferentareas.diversification,mainlyintwoareastostartwith:(i)waferfabrication,particularlyinadvancedlogicand(ii)ATP,withadiversificationofactivitiesoutsideMainlandChinaandTaiwantoincludesubstantialgainsfornewmarkets.ItisunlikelythatATPwilllocateintheUnitedStates,duetocostpressures,theexceptionbeingcertainadvancedpackagingfacilitiesnearnewfabsites.Toalesserextent,wealsoexpectgreaterdiversificationindesign,asmarketleaderssourcetalentglobally,andmaterials,asvendorsfollownewfabcapacitytodifferentregions(seeExhibit3).InequipmentaswellasEDAandcoreIP,meaningfuldiversificationwillprovechallenginggiventhehighdegreeofspecializationandvendorconcentrationtoday,aswellasthelessernecessityofco-locatingwithfabsites.Forexample,US-headquarteredcompaniesleadindesign,coreIP,andEDA;theUnitedStates,EU,andJapanjointlyleadinequipment;companiesheadquarteredinMainlandChina,Japan,Taiwan,andSouthKorealeadinmaterials;SouthKorea-andTaiwan-headquarteredcompaniesleadtheworldinadvancednodefabrication(sub-10nanometerchips);andATPfootprintisconcentratedinMainlandChinaandTaiwan.Specializationbyregionhasbeenenabledbythegloballyintegratednatureofthesupplychain,whichhasallowedeachspecializedcompanytoaccesstheglobalmarket.Butithasalsocreatedvulnerabilitiesintermsofgeographicconcentration.Lookingahead,weexpectsignificantgeographicBelowwediscussthesetrendsindepthforeachsegmentofthesupplychain.EXHIBIT2Semiconductorindustryvalue-addedbyactivityandregion,2022(%)EDA&68%25%3%3%5%4%6%PrecompetitiveResearchCoreIP3%Logic30%65%9%4%3%11%EDADesignCoreIP•Logic•DAODAO17%41%17%18%4%5%9%•MemoryMemory9%25%7%60%4%3%MfgEquipmentMaterialsManufacturingequipment47%18%26%18%3%3%2%10%12%Materials5%•Waferfabrication•Assembly,testand9%6%8%12%18%28%Waferpackagingfabrication19%10%17%17%18%24%7%ATP6%3%3%6%9%28%30%20%11%Overallvaluechain100%38%11%12%12%11%5%USAEUJapanSouthKoreaTaiwanMainlandRoWChinaNotesonregionalbreakdown:EDA,design,manufacturingequipment,andrawmaterialsbasedoncompanyrevenuesandcompanyheadquarterslocation.WaferfabricationandAssembly&testingbasedoninstalledcapacityandgeographiclocationofthefacilities.1.IncludesIsrael,Singapore,andtherestoftheworldSource:IPnest;WolfeResearch;Gartner;SEMI;BCGanalysis10EXHIBIT3DiversificationbySupplyChainSegmentMethodDistribution,2022Geodiversification4%10%9%13%8%6%••BarrierstoentryduetohighR&DspendHQ1Design151%Diversificationofwherecompanieshire,locate,andtraintalentforR&Dandengineeringrevenue3%•••UseofAIindesignprocessforefficiencyGrowingdomain-specificarchitectureFocusonpower,performance,andareaEDA&coreIPHQ268%25%26%revenue3%3%••BarrierstoentryduetospecializationandR&DintensityEquipment&toolsHQ347%18%ModeratediversificationofgeographicfootprintofR&Dandtrainingcentersbycurrentmarketleadersrevenue3%••Increasedco-locationnearnewfabsHQ45Materials9%6%12%18%28%18%18%10%Continualvulnerabilitiesinspecificmaterialscategoriesandrelatedcriticalmineralsrevenue••GovernmentincentiveprogramstoattractfabinvestmentWaferSite10%8%17%17%24%7%SubstantialCapExacrossdestinationregionsbymajorcompanies,withthebulkinadvancedlogicFabricationcapacity3%••PolicysupportforconventionalpackaginginnewmarketsinSoutheastAsia,LatinAmerica,andEuropeSite6ATP6%9%3%28%30%20%capacityDisruptiveimpactofchipletsinadvancedpackagingUSKoreaJapanTaiwanEUOthersUnchangedModerateSubstantialMainlandChina1.RepresentsbothfablessandIDMdesignSource:SEMI;YoleGroup;BCGAnalysisAsia:Investmentscontinueatpaceacrosstheregion.LocalcompaniesinTaiwanhaveannouncedplanstostandupsevennewfabsontheislanditself.TSMCisalsopartneringwithSony,DENSO,andToyotatoboostmanufacturingcapabilitiesinKumamoto,Japan,andJapaneseofficialsarehelpingdomesticstartupRapidussetupproductionlinesforcutting-edge2nanometerchipsatanewsiteinHokkaido.SouthKoreahasannouncedaplantoinvest$471billionthrough2047tobuild16newfabsinamegachipclusterinGyeonggiProvince,involvingSamsung,SKHynix,andotherchipcompanies.4InMainlandChina,domesticChinesecompaniesaremakingnewinvestmentsinfabsinShenzhen,Tianjin,andShanghai.WaferFabricationWebeginwithwaferfabrication,whichexertsa“pull”effectoninvestmentinothersegmentsofthesupplychain.Giventhecapitalrequirementsandsubstantialleadtimetobringprojectsonline(upwardsoffiveyearsinsomecases),waferfabricationiswheregovernmentandindustryeffortshavefocusedsubstantiallytodate.Weprojectaround$2.3trillioninprivatesectorinvestmentinwaferfabricationin2024–2032,comparedwith$720billioninthe10yearspriortoenactmentoftheCHIPSAct(2013–2022).Theover100majorsemiconductormanufacturingecosystemprojectsthathavebeenannouncedsinceourpriorreportarespreadout—botharoundtheglobeandtonewlocationswithineachmajorregion(seeExhibit4).UnitedStates:Between2020andyear-end2023,80newsemiconductormanufacturingprojectswereannouncedacrosstheUnitedStatesalone,projectedtocreate50,000directnewjobs.5Aportionoftheseinvestmentsisgoingtoareaswithamaturesemiconductorfootprint,suchasTexas,Arizona,NewYork,andCalifornia.ButtherehavealsobeensubstantialinvestmentsinGreenfieldsandcapacityexpansionsinnewerregions,suchasNewAlbany,Ohio.11Europe:TherehasbeensubstantialinvestmentinnewcapacityinEurope,withsevenmajorwaferfabinvestmentsannouncedsince2020.Thelion’sshareofthiscapacityisbeingbuiltineasternGermany,includingIntel’sinvestmentinMagdeburgandTSMC’sjointinvestmentwithleadingEuropeansemiconductormanufacturerstoconstructanewfacilityinDresden.Still,themomentumisnotlimitedtoGermany;inthesouthofFrance,GlobalFoundrieshaspartneredwithSTMicroelectronicstobuilda$3.1billionfabinCrolles,andPolandispoisedtohostanewInteladvancedpackagingfacility.Between2020andyear-end2023,80newsemiconductormanufacturingprojectswereannouncedacrosstheUnitedStatesaloneInconsequence,weexpectsignificantinvestmenttoflowbetweenregionsbetweennowand2032(seeExhibit5).EXHIBIT4MajornewfabandATPinvestmentsannouncedacrosstheworldsince2020ASIAUSAEUROPESKHynixFabSonyFab5(Yongin,KR)(Isahaya,JP)PolarSemiFabSKHynixM15XFabTSMC,SonyFab(Bloomington,MN)SKHynixATPGlobalFoundriesFabIntelATPFactory(Cheogju,KR)(Kumamoto,JP)(WLafayette,IN)(Dresden,DE)(Wroclaw,PL)SamsungP3FabMicronFab(Pyeongtaek,KR)RenesasKofuFactory(Boise,Idaho)NhancedIntelFabSTMicroelectronicsSiCFactoryMicrochipFabSemiconductorsATP(Odon,IN)SMICFab(Magdeburg,DE)(KaiCity,JP)(Gresham,OR)(Tianjin,CN)Texas(Catania,IT)Kioxia,WesternDigitalFabInstrumentsFab(Lehi,UT)IntelFabWolfspeedFabAnalogDevicesFabSMICFab(NewAlbany,OH)(Saarland,DE)(Beaverton,OR)(Shanghai,CN)(Yokkaichi,JP)MicronATPFactoryBoschFabMicronFabMicrochipFab(Xi’an,CN)(Roseville,CA)(Clay,NY)(COSprings,CO)HuaHongSemiconductorFabGlobalWestern(Wuxi,CN)FoundriesFab(Malta,NY)DigitalFab(Fremont,CA)STMicroelectronics,SananFab(Chongqing,CN)SMICFabPSMCP5Fab(Shenzhen,CN)(Maoli,TW)ChinaResourcesMicroelectronicsFab(Shenzhen,CN)NanyaFab4WolfspeedFab(NewTaipei,TW)(SilverCity,NC)TSMCFab(Kaohsiung,TW)PallidusFabISMCFabUMCFab12P6Intel(RockHill,SC)(Karnataka,IN)(Kaohsiung,TW)Fab52Fab62(Chandler,AZ)InfineonSiCPowerFab(Kulim,MY)EMPShieldFabWinSemiFab(Burlington,KS)(Kaohsiung,TW)TSMCFab21TSMCFab14X-FabGlobalWaferFabASEATP(Phoenix,AZ)Plants4and5AmkorATPFactory(Tainan,TW)(Lubbock,TX)(Sherman,TX)(Penang,MY)(BacNinh,VN)AmkorIntegraTexasInstrumentsFabsSM1,SM2,SM3,SM4(Sherman,TX)STTSMC,Infineon,Bosch,NXPFab(Dresden,DE)ATPFactory(Peoria,AZ)TechnologiesFab(Wichita,KS)Microelectronics,GlobalFoundriesFab(Crolles,FR)IntelATPFactorySiliconBoxATP(Penang,MY)(SG)IntelFabMicronATPFactoryUMCFab12iP3SamsungFab/ATPTexasInstrumentsFab(RioRancho,NM)InfineonSmartPowerFab(Gujarat,IN)(SG)(Taylor,TX)(Richardson,TX)AlediaFabNXPFab(Champagnier,FR)(Dresden,DE)(Austin,TX)PlannedStartedCompletedInvestmentsize($)$2BNote:Includesinvestmentsover$100Mfrom2020onwardsinFabsandATPfacilities.Source:Gartner;SIA;pressreleases;companydisclosures;BCGanalysis12EXHIBIT5FutureflowsofCapExfromcompanyHQregiontodestinationregion,2024-2032F631%28%13%10%7%7%3%$716B$646B$300B$222B$156B$154B$72B11%$2.3TTotalCapEx30%37%66%64%42%HQregion100%US98%98%6%46%28%32%25%6%TaiwanUSAKoreaJapanMainlandEuropeOthersChina1Destinationregion1.OthersincludesIsrael,Malaysia,Singapore,Indiaandtherestoftheworld2.MainlandChinaꢀSource:SEMI;BCGAnalysisAdvancedlogiccurrentlycomprisesprocessesnewerthan10nanometers.Weexpectthedefinitionof“leading-edge”capacitytocompriseprocessesnewerthan3nanometersby2030.7Advancedlogicwillattractalargershareofinvestment,drivenbydatacenters,networkingequipment,PCs,smartphones,smart“edge”deviceswithmachinelearningandartificialintelligence(ML/AI)capabilities,andautomotiveadvanceddriver-assistancesystems(ADASs),amongotherapplications.8Indeed,nearly70%ofCapExwillgotowardchipsmanufacturedonsub-10nanometertechnologies,becausetheyaresubstantiallymoreexpensivetoproduce.Thist