FTC根据 1976 年《哈特-斯科特-罗迪诺反垄断改进法案》向国会提交的年度报告第 45 次报告（2022 财年）

INTRODUCTION

TheHart-Scott-RodinoAntitrustImprovementsActof1976,Pub.L.No.94-435(HSRActortheAct),togetherwithSection13(b)oftheFederalTradeCommissionActandSection15oftheClaytonAct,enablestheFederalTradeCommission(FTCorCommission)andtheAntitrustDivisionoftheDepartmentofJustice(AntitrustDivisionorDivision)topreventunlawful

mergers,acquisitions,andothertypesoftransactionsandtopreventinterimharmto

competitionassociatedwiththosetransactions.ThepremergernotificationprogramwasinstrumentalinalertingtheCommissionandtheDivisiontotransactionsthatbecamethesubjectsofthenumerousenforcementactionsbroughtinfiscalyear2022.1

TheCommissionandtheAntitrustDivisioncontinuetheireffortstoprotectcompetitionbyidentifyingandinvestigatingthosemergersandacquisitionsthatmayviolatetheantitrust

laws.Together,theFTCandtheDivisionrepresenttheAmericanpeople’sfront-linedefense

againstunlawfulindustryconsolidation,andstoppingillegalmergersiscentraltothatmission.Infiscalyear2022,3,152transactionswerereportedundertheHSRAct,whichisthesecond-highestnumberofreportedtransactionsoverthepasttenyears.Overall,thenumberof

transactionsreportedinfiscalyear2022isstillabout50%higherthanthepriorfiscalyearhighbetween2013and2020.SeeFigure1below.

1Fiscalyear2022coveredtheperiodfromOctober1,2021throughSeptember30,2022.

2

NumberofTransactions

4,000

3,500

3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0

HSRMergerTransactionsReported

FiscalYears2013-2022

3,520

3,152

2,1112,089

2,052

1,832

1,801

1,637

1,663

1,326

201320142015201620172018

FiscalYear

2019

202020212022

(Figure1)

Duringfiscalyear

2022

,theCommissionbrought24mergerenforcementchallenges:2eleveninwhichitissuedfinalconsentordersafterapubliccommentperiod;seveninwhichthetransactionwasabandonedorrestructuredasaresultofantitrustconcernsraisedduringthe

investigation;andsixinwhichtheCommissioninitiatedadministrativeorfederalcourt

litigation.The24mergerenforcementchallengestheCommissionbroughtinfiscalyear2022isthesecond-highestfigureinthelasttenyears.3Theseenforcementactionspreventedunlawfulmergersinnumeroussectorsoftheeconomy,includingconsumergoodsandservices,

pharmaceuticals,healthcare,hightechandindustrialgoods,andenergy.

InDecember2021,theCommissionsuedtostopUnitedStateschipsupplierNvidia’s

proposed$40billionacquisitionofU.K.chipdesignproviderArm.MorethantwomonthsintoitslitigationwiththeFTC,NvidiaabandoneditsacquisitionofArm—representingthefirst

abandonmentofalitigatedverticalmergerinmanyyears.

InJanuary2022,theCommissionissuedanadministrativecomplaintandauthorizedstafftoseekapreliminaryinjunctiontopreventLockheedMartin’sproposedacquisitionof

2Toavoiddouble-counting,thisReportincludesonlythosemergerenforcementactionsinwhichtheCommissionortheAntitrustDivisiontookitsfirstpublicactionduringfiscalyear2022.

;In2020theCommissionbrought28enforcementchallenges.

4

announcedtheirplanstomerge.Thismerger,ifcompleted,wouldhavediminished

competitioninthemanufactureandsupplyoffourtypesofcontainer-handlingequipment.

Thisequipment,whichincludedstraddlecarriers,rubber-tiredgantrycranes,automated

stackingcranes,andrail-mountedgantrytrains,isacrucialpartofmodernoceanfreight

services.TheproposedmergerthreatenedtoharmportandterminaloperatorsintheUnitedStatesthatusedthesemachinestomoveconsumergoods,medicines,andotherimportant

productsthroughouttheglobalsupplychange.InMarch2022,CargotecandKonecranes

announcedthattheyabandonedthismergerinthefaceofapotentialenforcementactionbytheAntitrustDivisionandtheUnitedKingdom’sCompetitionandMarketsAuthority.

TheAntitrustDivision’senforcementeffortsprotectedcompetitionforotherimportantpartsofthesupplychainaswell.InAugust2022,inthefaceofapotentialenforcementaction,ChinaInternationalMarineContainersGroupCo.Ltd.announcedthatithadabandonedits

intendedplantopurchaseMaerskContainerIndustryA/SandMaerskContainerIndustry

QingdaoLtd.Theproposedacquisitionwouldhavecombinedtwooftheworld’sfoursuppliersofinsulatedcontainerboxesandrefrigeratedshippingcontainersandconsolidatedcontrolof

morethan90percentofinsulatedcontainerboxandrefrigeratedcontainerproduction

worldwideinChinesestate-ownedorstate-controlledenterprises.Thiswouldlikelyhaveledtohigherprices,lowerquality,andlessresiliencywithintheglobalsupplychain.

TheCommission’sPremergerNotificationOffice(PNO)website4includesinstructionsforcompletingtheHSRform,informationontheHSRrules,currentfilingthresholds,filingfee

instructions,andproceduresforsubmittingpost-consummationfilings.ThewebsitealsoprovidesfrequentlyaskedquestionsregardingHSRfilingrequirements,thenumberofHSRtransactionssubmittedeachmonth,andcontactinformationforPNOstaff.5

BACKGROUNDOFTHEHSRACT

Section201oftheHSRActamendedtheClaytonActbyaddinganewSection7A,15

U.S.C.§18a.Ingeneral,theHSRActrequiresthatcertainproposedacquisitionsofvoting

securities,non-corporateinterests,orassetsbereportedtotheCommissionandtheAntitrustDivisionpriortoconsummation.Thepartiesmustthenwaitaspecifiedperiod,usually30days(15daysinthecaseofacashtenderofferorbankruptcysale),beforetheymaycompletethetransaction.Whetheraparticularacquisitionissubjecttotheserequirementsdependsonthevalueoftheacquisitionand,incertainacquisitions,thesizeofthepartiesasmeasuredbytheirsalesandassets.Acquisitionsvaluedbelowacertainthreshold,acquisitionsinvolvingpartieswithassetsandsalesbelowacertainthreshold,andcertainclassesofacquisitionsthatarelesslikelytoraiseantitrustconcernsareexcludedfromtheAct’scoverage.

4See

/enforcement/premerger-notification-program

.

5ResourcematerialsareavailableonthePNOwebsite;inaddition,PNOstaffisalwaysavailabletohelpHSRpractitionerscomplywithHSRnotificationrequirements.

5

TheCommission,withtheconcurrenceoftheAssistantAttorneyGeneralforthe

AntitrustDivision,promulgatedfinalrulesimplementingthepremergernotificationprogramonJuly31,1978.Atthattime,acomprehensiveStatementofBasisandPurposewaspublished,

containingasection-by-sectionanalysisoftherulesandanitem-by-itemanalysisofthefilingform.6TheprogrambecameeffectiveonSeptember5,1978.TheCommission,withthe

concurrenceoftheAssistantAttorneyGeneral,hasamendedtherulesandthefilingformonmanyoccasionsovertheyearstoimprovetheprogram’seffectivenessandtolessenthe

burdenofcomplyingwiththerules,whileensuringthattheagenciesgetalltheinformationtheyneedtoanalyzetheunderlyingtransaction.7

Theprimarypurposeofthestatutoryscheme,asthelegislativehistorymakesclear,istoprovidetheantitrustenforcementagencieswiththeopportunitytoidentifyandreview

potentiallyanticompetitivemergersandacquisitionsbeforetheyareconsummated.The

premergernotificationprogram,withitsfilingandwaitingperiodrequirements,facilitatesthisgoal.

Ifeitherreviewingagencydeterminesduringthewaitingperiodthatfurtherinquiryisnecessary,thereviewingagencyisauthorizedbySection7A(e)oftheClaytonActtoissuea

requestforadditionalinformationanddocumentarymaterial(SecondRequest).8TheSecondRequestextendsthewaitingperiodforaspecifiedperiodoftime(usually30days,but10daysinthecaseofacashtenderofferorbankruptcysale)afterallpartieshavecompliedwiththe

SecondRequest(or,inthecaseofatenderofferorbankruptcysale,aftertheacquiringpersoncomplies).Thisadditionaltimeprovidesthereviewingagencywiththeopportunitytoanalyzetheinformationandtotakeappropriateactionbeforethetransactionisconsummated.Ifthereviewingagencybelievesthataproposedtransactionmaysubstantiallylessencompetition,

theagencymayseekaninjunctioninfederaldistrictcourttoprohibitconsummationofthetransaction.TheCommissionalsomaychallengethetransactioninadministrativelitigation.

ASTATISTICALPROFILEOFTHEPREMERGERNOTIFICATIONPROGRAM

TheappendicestothisReportprovideastatisticalsummaryoftheoperationofthepremergernotificationprogram.AppendixAshows,fortheten-yearperiodcoveringfiscalyears2013-2022:thenumberoftransactionsreported;thenumberoffilingsreceived;thenumberofmergerinvestigationsinwhichSecondRequestswereissued;andthenumberoftransactionsinwhichrequestsforearlyterminationofthewaitingperiodwerereceived,

643Fed.Reg.33450(July31,1978).

7See

/enforcement/premerger-notification-program/statute-rules-and-formal

-interpretations/statements-basis-purpose.

815U.S.C.§18a(e)(1)(a)(“TheFederalTradeCommissionortheAssistantAttorneyGeneralmay,priortothe

expirationofthe30-daywaitingperiod(orinthecaseofacashtenderoffer,the15-daywaitingperiod)…requirethesubmissionofadditionalinformationordocumentarymaterialrelevanttotheproposedacquisition”).

6

granted,andnotgranted.9AppendixAalsoshowsthenumberoftransactionsinwhichSecond

Requestscouldhavebeenissued.AppendixBprovidesamonth-by-monthcomparisonofthenumberoftransactionsreportedandthenumberoffilingsreceivedforfiscalyears2013

through2022.

Thestatisticssetoutintheseappendicesshowthatthenumberoftransactions

reportedinfiscalyear2022decreased10.5percentfromthenumberoftransactionsreportedinfiscalyear2021.Infiscalyear2022,3,152transactionswerereported,while3,520were

reportedinfiscalyear2021,butthenumberofreportedtransactionsremainedsignificantly

abovetheten-yearmedian.10Ofthe3,152reportedtransactions,SecondRequestscouldhavebeenissuedin3,029ofthem.TheabsolutenumberofSecondRequestshasremainedfairly

consistentacrossthelastdecade,including48SecondRequestsin2020,65in2021,and47in2022.11

ThestatisticsinAppendixAshowthatinfiscalyear2022,earlyterminationwas

requestedin44.4percent(1,345)oftheadjustedtransactionsreported.Infiscalyear2021,

earlyterminationwasrequestedin62.2percent(2,124)ofthetransactionsreported.The

percentageofrequestsgrantedoutofthetotalrequesteddecreasedfrom19.6percentinfiscalyear2021to0.4percentinfiscalyear2022,duetoasuspensionofthegrantingofearly

terminationinFebruary2021,exceptinsituationswheremergingpartiesenteredintoaconsentorderorthepartiesresolvedtheinvestigatingagency’sconcernspriortofullycomplyingwithaSecondRequest.12

Thetables(TablesIthroughXI)inExhibitAcontaininformationregardingtheagencies’enforcementactivitiesfortransactionsreportedinfiscalyear2022.Thetablesprovide,for

example,variouscharacteristicsoftransactions,thenumberandpercentageoftransactionsinwhichoneantitrustagencygrantedtheotherclearancetocommenceaninvestigation,andthenumberofmergerinvestigationsinwhicheitheragencyissuedSecondRequests.TableIIIof

ExhibitAshowsthatinfiscalyear2022,theagenciesreceivedclearancetoconductaninitial

investigationin9.2percentofthetotalnumberoftransactionsreported.Thetablesalso

providethenumberoftransactionsbasedonthedollarvalueoftransactionsreportedandthe

9Theterm“transaction,”asusedinAppendicesAandBandExhibitAtothisReport,doesnotreferonlyto

individualmergersoracquisitions.Aparticularmerger,jointventure,oracquisitionmaybestructuredsuchthatitinvolvesmorethanonefilingthatmustbemadeundertheHSRAct.

10ThisReport,likepreviousReports,alsoincludesannualdataon“adjustedtransactionsinwhichaSecond

Requestcouldhavebeenissued”(adjustedtransactions).SeeAppendixA&AppendixAn.2(explainingcalculationofthatdata).Therewere3,029adjustedtransactionsinfiscalyear2022,andthedatapresentedintheTablesandthepercentagesdiscussedinthetextofthisReportarebasedonthisfigure.Thenumberoftransactionsinfiscal

year2021wasanall-timehighand2022’sfiguresstillrepresentthesecond-highesttotalinatleastadecade.

11Asnotedinpriorreports,anddescribedinAppendixA,thetotalnumberofSecondRequestshasremainedfairlyconsistentoverthelastdecade–47in2013,51in2014,47in2015,54in2016,51in2017,45in2018,61in2019,

48in2020,65in2021,and47in2022.

12

/enforcement/competition-matters/2021/03/hsr-early-termination-after-second-request

-issues.

8

DEVELOPMENTSWITHINTHEPREMERGERPROGRAM

1.ThresholdAdjustments

The2000amendmentstotheHSRActrequiretheCommissiontopublishadjustments

totheAct’sjurisdictionalandfilingfeethresholdsintheFederalRegisterannually,foreach

fiscalyearbeginningonSeptember30,2004,basedonthechangeinthegrossnational

product,inaccordancewithSection8(a)(5)oftheClaytonAct.TheCommissionamendedthe

rulesin2005toprovideamethodforfutureadjustmentsasrequiredbythe2000amendments,andtoreflecttherevisedthresholdscontainedintherules.TheCommissionusuallypublishestherevisedthresholdsannuallyinJanuary,andtheybecomeeffective30daysafterpublication.

OnJanuary24,2022,theCommissionpublishedanotice15toreflectadjustmentofthereportingthresholdsasrequiredbythe2000amendments16toSection7AoftheClaytonAct,

15U.S.C.§18a.Therevisedthresholds,includinganincreaseinthesizeoftransaction

thresholdfrom$92millionto$101million,becameeffectiveFebruary23,2022.Thethresholdsarecalculatedbasedontheprioryear’sGNP.

2.Compliance

TheCommissionandtheAntitrustDivisioncontinuedtomonitorcompliancewiththe

premergernotificationprogram’sfilingandwaitingperiodrequirementsandinitiatedanumberofinvestigationsinfiscalyear2022.Theagenciesuseseveralmethodstooverseecompliance,includingmonitoringnewsoutletsandindustrypublicationsfortransactionsthatmaynothavebeenreportedinaccordancewiththeHSRAct’srequirements.Industrysources,suchas

competitors,customers,andsuppliers,interestedmembersofthepublic,and,incertaincases,thepartiesthemselves,alsoprovidetheagencieswithinformationabouttransactionsand

possibleviolationsoftheAct’srequirements.

UnderSection7A(g)(1)oftheAct,anypersonthatfailstocomplywiththeAct’s

notificationandwaitingperiodrequirementsisliableforacivilpenaltyofupto$46,517for

eachdaytheviolationcontinues.17Theantitrustagenciesexaminethecircumstancesofeach

1587Fed.Reg.3541(Jan.23,2022).

1615U.S.C.§18a(a).SeePub.L.No.106-553,114Stat.2762.

17DollaramountsspecifiedincivilmonetarypenaltyprovisionswithintheCommission’sjurisdictionareadjustedforinflationinaccordancewiththeFederalCivilPenaltiesInflationAdjustmentActImprovementsActof2015,

Pub.L.No.114-7(Nov.2,2015).Theadjustmentshaveincludedanincreaseinthemaximumcivilpenaltyfrom

$10,000to$11,000foreachdayduringwhichapersonisinviolationofSection7A(g)(1)(61Fed.Reg.54548(Oct.21,1996),correctedat61Fed.Reg.55840(Oct.29,1996)),to$16,000effectiveFebruary10,2009(74Fed.Reg.857(Jan.9,2009)),to$40,000effectiveAugust1,2016(81Fed.Reg.42476(June30,2016)),to$43,792effectiveJan.13,2021(86Fed.Reg.2880(Jan.13,2021))andto$46,517effectiveJanuary10,2022,(87Fed.Reg.1070

(Jan.10,2022).

9

violationtodeterminewhethertoseekpenalties.18Duringfiscalyear2022,74post-

consummation“corrective”filingswerereceived,andtheagenciesbroughttwocivilpenaltyactions,resultinginapproximately$1.89millionincivilpenalties.

InUnitedStatesv.ClarenceL.Werner,19thecomplaintallegedthatMr.Werner,the

founderoftheOmaha,Nebraska-basedtruckloadcarrierWernerEnterprises,Inc.,violatedtheHSRActbyfailingtofileforanacquisitionofadditionalvotingsecuritiesofWernerInc.when

hisholdingscrossedtherelevantthreshold.Mr.WernerhadpreviouslyfailedtofileHSRFormsforacquisitionsofWernerInc.votingsecuritiesaspartofhiscompensationpackage.Underthetermsofanegotiatedsettlement,Mr.Werneragreedtopaya$486,900civilpenalty.OnApril20,2022,theU.S.DistrictCourtfortheDistrictofColumbiaenteredthefinaljudgment.

InUnitedStatesv.BiglariHoldings,20thecomplaintallegedthatrestaurantchainownerandinvestmentfundoperatorBiglariviolatedtheHSRActbyfailingtofileforanacquisitionofadditionalvotingsecuritiesofCrackerBarrelOldCountryStore,Inc.Underthetermsofa

negotiatedsettlement,Biglariagreedtopaya$1.4millioncivilpenalty.OnMay9,2022,theU.S.DistrictCourtfortheDistrictofColumbiaenteredthefinaljudgment.

MERGERENFORCEMENTACTIVITY21

TheDepartmentofJustice

Duringfiscalyear2022,theAntitrustDivisionworkedtoblockanticompetitivemergerswhereitconcludedtheeffectmaybesubstantiallytolessencompetitionortendtocreatea

monopolyifallowedtoproceedasproposed.TheDivision'senforcementeffortsdirectly

impacted26mergertransactions.Insixcases,theDivisionfiledlawsuitsinfederalcourtto

blockthetransactions;infourotherstheDivisionfiledacomplaintandsettlement

simultaneously.IntenproposedtransactionsthepartiesabandonedthetransactioninthefaceofquestionsfromtheDivision,andinsixothersthepartieschangedthestructureoftheir

transactionsuchthattheDivisionchosenottobringanenforcementactionatthattime.

TheDivisionfiledthefollowingsixcasesthatresultedinactivelitigation.

18Ifpartiesinadvertentlyfailtofile,theagenciesgenerallywillnotseekpenaltiessolongasthepartiespromptlysubmitcorrectivefilingsafterdiscoveringthefailuretofile,submitanacceptableexplanationoftheirfailuretofile,andhavenotpreviouslyviolatedtheAct.

19UnitedStatesv.ClarenceL.Werner,No.1:21-cv-03332(D.D.C.filedonDec.22,2021),

/legal-library-browse/cases-proceedings/211-0004-clarence-l-werner-us-v

.20UnitedStatesv.BiglariHoldings,Inc.,No.1:21-cv-0331(D.D.C.filedonDec.22,2021),

/legal-library/browse/cases-proceedings/2110040-biglari-holdings-inc

.

21Thecaseslistedinthissectionwerenotnecessarilyreportableunderthepremergernotificationprogram.GiventheconfidentialityofinformationobtainedpursuanttotheAct,itwouldbeinappropriatetoidentifythecases

initiatedundertheprogramexceptinthoseinstancesinwhichthatinformationhasalreadybeendisclosed.

10

InUnitedStatesv.BertelsmannSE&Co.KGaA,PenguinRandomHouse,LLC,

ViacomCBS,Inc.,andSimon&Schuster,Inc.,22theDivisionfiledalawsuittoblockPenguin

RandomHouse’sproposedacquisitionofSimon&Schuster.Asallegedinthecomplaint,the

proposedacquisitionwouldhaveenabledPenguinRandomHouse,thelargestbookpublisherintheworld,toexertoutsizedinfluenceoverwhichbookswouldbepublishedintheUnited

Statesandhowmuchauthorswouldbepaidfortheirwork.Theproposedacquisitionwouldhaveputthecombinedfirmincontrolofnearlyhalfofthemarketforacquiringpublishing

rightstoanticipatedtop-sellingbooks,leavinghundredsofindividualauthorswithfewer

optionsandlessleverage.OnNovember7,2022,afterathirteen-daytrialonthemerits,theU.S.DistrictCourtfortheDistrictofColumbiaenjoinedthemerger.

InUnitedStatesv.UnitedStatesSugarCorp.,UnitedSugarsCorp.,ImperialSugarCo.,

andLouisDreyfusCo.LLC,23theDivisionfiledachallengetoUnitedStatesSugarCorporation’sproposedacquisitionofImperialSugarCompany.Thecomplaintallegedthattheproposed

acquisitionwouldfurtherconsolidateanalreadyconsolidatedindustry,resultinginaduopoly—UnitedStatesSugarsandAmericanSugarRefining(alsoknownas“Domino”)—controllingthevastmajorityofrefinedsugarsoldintheSoutheast.Asaresult,thecomplaintallegedthattheacquisitionwouldeliminateasignificantcompetitorleadingtohigherpricesandincreasethe

likelihoodof,orenable,successfulanticompetitivecoordinationintheproductionandsaleof

refinedsugartocustomersintheSoutheast,aswellasinGeorgiaanditsborderingstates.OnSeptember28,2022,theU.S.DistrictCourtfortheDistrictofDelawareruledinfavorofthe

Defendants.TheU.S.CourtofAppealsfortheThirdCircuitaffirmedthedistrictcourt’sdecisiononJuly13,2023.

InUnitedStates,StateofMinnesotaandStateofNewYorkv.UnitedHealthGroupInc.,

andChangeHealthcareInc.,24theDivision,togetherwiththeAttorneysGeneralofMinnesotaandNewYork,filedsuittoblockthe$13billionproposedacquisitionofChangeHealthcareInc.byUnitedHealthGroupInc.Thecomplaintallegedthattheproposedmergerwouldgive

UnitedHealthGroup,whichownsthelargesthealthinsurerintheUnitedStates,controlover

ChangeHealthcare’selectronicdatainterchangeclearinghouse,acriticaldatahighwaythroughwhichabouthalfofallAmericans’healthinsuranceclaimspasseachyear.Asaresult,the

acquisitionwouldallowUnitedHealthcaretouseitsrivals’competitivelysensitiveinformation

togainanunfairadvantageandharmcompetitioninhealthinsurancemarkets.Additionally,

thecomplaintallegedthattheproposedtransactionwouldeliminateUnitedHealthGroup’s

onlymajorrivalforfirst-passclaimseditingtechnology,acriticalproductusedtoefficiently

processhealthinsuranceclaims,andgiveitamonopolyshareinthemarket.OnSeptember19,2022,theU.S.DistrictCourtfortheDistrictofColumbia,whileacknowledgingthevalidityofthe

22UnitedStatesv.BertelsmannSE&Co.KGaA,PenguinRandomHouse,LLC,ViacomCBS,Inc.,andSimon&Schuster,Inc.,1:21-cv-02886(D.D.C.filedNov.02,2021).

23InUnitedStatesv.UnitedStatesSugarCorp.,UnitedSugarsCorp.,ImperialSugarCo.,andLouisDreyfusCo.LLC,1:21-cv-01644-UNA(D.Del.FiledNov.23,2021).

24UnitedStates,StateofMinnesotaandStateofNewYorkv.UnitedHealthGroupInc.,andChangeHealthcareInc.,1:22-cv-00481(D.D.C.filedFeb24,2022).

11

plaintiffs’data-usetheory,ruledinfavoroftheDefendants,declinedtoenjointhetransaction,andorderedthedivestitureofChangeHealthcare’sfirst-passclaimseditingbusiness.

InUnitedStatesv.GrupoVerzatecS.A.deC.V.,StabilitAmerica,Inc,CraneCo.,andCraneComposites,Inc.,25theDivisionfiledsuittoenjoinGrupoVerzatecS.A.deC.V.frombuyingitsclosestcompetitor,CraneComposites,Inc.Thecomplaintallegedthatthe

transactionwouldhavecreatedamonopolyinthemarketfortheproductionandsaleofpebbledfiberglassreinforcedplasticwallpanels,whoseproductandperformance

characteristicsmakeitthewallcoveringofchoiceformanyrestaurants,grocerystores,

hospitals,andconveniencestoresacrosstheUnitedStates.OnMay26,2022,thepartiesabandonedtheproposedacquisition.

InUnitedStatesv.BoozAllenHamiltonHoldingCorp.,BoozAllenHamiltonInc.,

EverwatchCorp.,ECDefenseHoldings,LLC,andAnalysis,Computing&EngineeringSolutions,Inc.,26theDivisionfiledsuittoblockBoozAllenHamiltonHoldingCorporation’sproposed

acquisitionofEverwatchCorporation.Thecomplaintallegedthatthecompanies’merger

agreementharmedcompetitionforanimminentgovernmentrequestforproposalstoprovidesignalsintelligencemodelingandsimulationservicestotheNationalSecurityAgency.The

complaintallegedthatBoozAllenandEverwatch,weretheonlycompetitorsforthisproject,

andthatthecompanieswerecompetingvigorouslytowinthecontractbeforeagreeingto

merge.Oncethecompaniesagreedtomerge,accordingtothecomplaint,theynolongerhadanincentivetobidaggressivelyagainsteachotherbecausenomatterwhichcompanyNSA

selected,themergedfirmwouldultimatelyownthecontractandreaptherewards.AlthoughrecognizingthatthelitigationmayhaveaccomplishedsomeoftheDivision'sgoals,onOctober11,2022,theU.S.DistrictCourtfortheDistrictofMarylanddeniedtheDivision’sMotionforaPreliminaryInjunction.

InUnitedStatesv.ASSAABLOYABandSpectrumBrandsHoldings,Inc.,27theDivision

filedsuittoenjoinASSAABLOYfromacquiringitsresidentialdoorhardwarerival,adivisionofSpectrumBrandsHolding.Thecomplaintallegedthatacquisitionwouldcombinetwoofthe

threelargestproducersofresidentialdoorhardwareintheconcentrated$2.4billionindustry.Asaresult,theacquisitionlikelywouldhaveresultedinhigherprice,lowerquality,reduced

innovation,andpoorerserviceinthesaleofatleasttwotypesofresidentialdoorhardware:

premiummechanicaldoorhardwareandsmartlocks.OnMay5,2023,followingmorethan

sevenmonthsoflitigationandseveraldaysoftrial,theDivisionfiledaproposedfinaljudgmentrequiringASSAABLOY,amongotherthings,todivestassetstoFortuneBrandsInnovation,Inc.andtosubmittofiveyearsofoversightbyamonitoringtrustee.TheproposedfinaljudgmentprovidedgreaterreliefthanearlieroffersbytheDefendants,althoughtheDivisiondidnot

25UnitedStatesv.GrupoVerzatecS.A.deC.V.,StabilitAmerica,Inc,CraneCo.,andCraneComposites,Inc.,1:22-cv-01401(N.D.Ill.FiledMar.17,2022).

26UnitedStatesv.BoozAllenHamiltonHoldingCorp.,BoozAllenHamiltonInc.,EverwatchCorp.,ECDefense

Holdings,LLC,andAnalysis,Computing&EngineeringSolutions,Inc.,1:22-cv-01603-CCB(D.MD.FiledJune29,2022).

27UnitedStatesv.ASSAABLOYABandSpectrumBrandsHoldings,Inc.,1:22-cv-02791-ABJ(D.D.C.Nov.03,2022).

12

contendthatthereliefobtainedwouldfullyeliminatetheriskstocompetitionallegedinthecomplaint.Theproposedfinaljudgmentisdesignedtotrytopreservec