高盛｜2024年的10个增长风险及为何我们不那么担心 10 Growth Risks for 2024 and Why We Worry Less (Mericle Abecasis)

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14January2024|6:45AMEST

USEconomicsAnalyst

10GrowthRisksfor2024andWhyWeWorryLess(Mericle/Abecasis)

nWeexpectmuchstrongerGDPgrowthin2024thanconsensusandseeamuchlowerriskofrecession.Whatareotherforecastersworriedaboutthatwe

aren’t?ThisAnalystlooksat10risksfor2024thatareoftenhighlightedbyotherforecastersandexplainswhyweworryless.

nRisk1:Aconsumerslowdownlooksunlikelybecauserealincomeshouldgrow

about3%andhouseholdbalancesheetsarestrong.Currentspendingpatternsdonotappearunsustainableandthesavingratedoesnotlookpuzzlinglylowatatimewhenhouseholdwealthisveryhigh.

nRisk2:Risingconsumerdelinquencyanddefaultratesmostlyreflect

normalizationfromverylowlevelsinrecentyears,higherinterestrates,andriskierlending,notpoorhouseholdfinances.

nRisk3:Asharperdeteriorationinthelabormarketisunlikelywithjobopeningsstillhighandthelayoffratestillverylow.Whileafewrecentdatapointshavebeenweaker,morestatisticallyreliablesignalssuchastrendpayrollgrowthandourcompositejobgrowthtrackerremainstrong.

nRisk4:Thenarrowbreadthofjobgrowthisnotindicativeofeitheramismatch

problemorweaklabordemandinmostsectors—jobopeningsarehighinnearlyallsectors—anditshouldnormalizeashiringreboundsinindustriesthatare

particularlysensitivetofinancialconditions.

nRisk5:Risingcorporatebankruptcieslooklessominousandindeedquitelowwhencomparedtopre-pandemiclevels.Morebroadly,thebusinesssectorremainsonasolidfinancialfooting.

nRisk6:Thecorporatedebtmaturitywallwillraisecorporateinterestexpense

withalongerdelaythanusual,buttheresultinghittocapitalspendingandhiringislikelytobequitemodest.

nRisk7:Commercialrealestatebroadlyisnotaproblem,officespecificallyis.

Butofficeloansaccountforonly2-3%ofbanks’loanportfolios,smallenoughforbankstomanagethehit.

nRisk8:Abankcreditcrunchwasavalidconcernlastspring,butthebanking

stresshasnotbeenasseriousasfeared,non-banklenderscutbackonlendingbyless,smallbusinesseshavenotreportedaseverelackofaccesstocredit,andfinancialconditionshavenoweasedmeaningfully.

JanHatzius

+1(212)902-0394|jan.hatzius@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

AlecPhillips

+1(202)637-3746|alec.phillips@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

DavidMericle

+1(212)357-2619|

david.mericle@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

SpencerHill,CFA

+1(212)357-7621|spencer.hill@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

RonnieWalker

+1(917)343-4543|

ronnie.walker@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

ManuelAbecasis

+1(212)902-8357|

manuel.abecasis@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

TimKrupa

+1(202)637-3771|tim.krupa@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

ElsiePeng

+1(212)357-3137|elsie.peng@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

JessicaRindels

+1(972)368-1516|

jessica.rindels@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

Investorsshouldconsiderthisreportasonlyasinglefactorinmakingtheirinvestmentdecision.ForRegAC

certificationandotherimportantdisclosures,seetheDisclosureAppendix,orgoto

/research/hedge.html.

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GoldmanSachsUSEconomicsAnalyst

nRisk9:Somethingfinally“breaking”duetohigherinterestratesisunlikelyatthis

pointbecausethepeakgrowthhitfromhigherratesandtighterfinancialconditionsiswellbehindus.Moreover,withinflationlower,theFOMCisatlibertytocutthefundsratemoreaggressivelyifnecessary.

nRisk10:Fadingfiscalsupportislessrealthanitappears—thefederaldeficit

widenedlastyearforreasonsthatwerenotverystimulative,andthefiscalimpulsetoGDPislikelytoremainroughlysteadythisyear,withabitofdownsideriskfrompotentialautomaticspendingcuts.

14January20242

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USEconomicsAnalyst

GoldmanSachs

10GrowthRisksfor2024andWhyWeWorryLess

WeexpectmuchstrongerGDPgrowthin2024thanconsensusandseeamuchlowerriskofrecession(Exhibit1).Whatareotherforecastersworriedaboutthatwearen’t?Thisweek’sAnalystlooksat10risksfor2024thatareoftenhighlightedbyother

forecastersandexplainswhyweworryless.

Exhibit1:WeAreWellAboveConsensuson2024GDPGrowthandWellBelowonRecessionRisk

PercentUS2024Q4/Q4GDPGrowthForecastsPercentPercentUS12-MonthAheadRecessionProbabilityPercent

2.52.5100100

GSBloombergConsensus

2.02.08080

1.51.56060

x

x

1.01.04040

0.50.52020

0.00.00

0

BloombergConsensusFOMCGSMar-22Jul-22Nov-22Mar-23Jul-23Nov-23

Source:Bloomberg,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Risk1:Aconsumerslowdownifunsustainablespendingends,thesavingraterisesfromalowlevel,orhouseholdsrunoutofexcesssavings

Weexpect2%consumptiongrowthin2024becauserealwagegrowthshouldremainpositiveasnominalwagegrowthandinflationcomedowninparallel,hiringshould

remainhealthywithjobopeningsstillplentiful,andlaborincomeshouldthereforegrowaround2%andtranslateroughlydollar-for-dollartoconsumerspending.Totalreal

incomeshouldriseabout3%thankstoanadditionalboostfrominterestincome,thoughthatshouldliftspendingbyless,andwealtheffectsshouldturnpositive.

Skepticshighlightthreerisks.First,isn’tthecurrentpaceofconsumption

unsustainable,eitherbecauseitreflectsthereleaseofpent-uppandemicdemandorbecauselow-incomefamiliesthatbenefittedfrompandemicstimulusarespendingmorethantheycanafford?Weseefewsignsofthis.Spendingonairtravelhas

surged,butthatisnottrueofmostservicesthatconsumersavoidedduringthepandemic(Exhibit2,left).Andwhilespendingbylow-incomehouseholdswhoseincomeswereboostedmostbypandemicstimulusinitiallyroseabovetrend,it

normalizedawhileago(Exhibit2,right).

14January20243

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PersonalSavingRate(%ofdisposableincome)

GoldmanSachs

USEconomicsAnalyst

Exhibit2:WeSeeFewRemainingSignsofUnsustainableSpending,EitheronServicesforWhichThereWasPent-upPandemicDemandorbyLow-IncomeFamiliesThatBenefittedfromPandemicStimulus

PercentPercent

0.5CurrentAbove-TrendSpendingonPandemic-Depressed0.5

Serivces,as%ofTotalSpending

0.40.4

0.30.3

0.20.2

0.10.1

0.00.0

Foodservices

Airtransport

Membershipclubs

Gambling

Museums&libraries

Accomodations

Movies

Liveentertainment

Packagetours

Spectatorsports

Amusementpark

TotalExcessSpending

Index(2020Q1=100)Index(2020Q1=100)170HouseholdIncome<20thPercentile170

160160

150150

140140

130130

120120

110110

100100

9090

80RealCreditCardSpending80

RealDisposableIncome

7070

Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3

2020202120222023

Source:DepartmentofCommerce,OpportunityInsights,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Second,isn’tthesavingratehistoricallylowandlikelytomeanreverthigher?Itislow,butthisistobeexpectedwithhouseholdwealthnearanall-timehigh(Exhibit2)andtheriskofjoblossverylow.Asaresult,wemakeonlyamodestallowancefora1ppriseinthesavingratein2024.

Exhibit3:WithHouseholdWealthNearanAll-TimeHigh,ItIsUnsurprisingThattheSavingRateIsLow

25

%ofdisposablepersonalincome%ofdisposablepersonalincome

1200HouseholdNetWorth*1200

OtherAssets

ResidentialRealEstate

1000

1000

Denotesperiodof"forcedsavings"in2020and2021

Equities

20

Liabilities

NetWorth

800

800

15

600

600

400

10

400

Q4estimate

200

200

5

0

0

-200

-200

0

197019801990200020102020

1960

400500600700800

*DottedanddiagonallinesindicateGSforecastbasedonincome,saving,andassetreturnassumptions

HouseholdNetWorth(%ofdisposableincome)

Source:FederalReserve,DepartmentofCommerce,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Third,won’tconsumptionfallwhenhouseholdsexhausttheirlastdollarofexcess

savings?Wethinkthisexaggeratestheirimportance.Excesssavingsmatteredmostforsupportingspendingbylow-incomefamilieswhousuallylackappreciablesavings

whenhighinflationcausedrealincometofallin2022.Butthelowest-incomefamilies’liquidfinancialassetsnormalizedandrealincomestartedrisingawhileago.Atthis

point,theremainingpandemicsavingsarebestviewedasatinyadditiontothetotalwealthofmiddle-andupper-incomehouseholds,tobespentgraduallyovertimelikeotherformsofwealth.

14January20244

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GoldmanSachs

USEconomicsAnalyst

Exhibit4:DelinquencyandDefaultRatesHaveRisen,ThoughtheIncreaseIsLargelyaNormalizationfromVeryLowRatesEarlyinthePandemicWhenIncomeWasElevatedandSpendingNeedsWereLow

Percent5

Percent

5

DelinquencyRateForCreditCardBorrowers,byIncomeQuartile

4

4

Lowest

Second

Third

Highest

3

2

1

3

2

1

0

0

2017

2019

2021

2023

2015

Percent60DayLoanDelinquencyRates

0.7

PrimeAutoLoans(left)

0.6

SubprimeAutoLoans(right)

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0.0

200620082010201220142016201820202022

Percent

4.5

4.0

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

Source:FederalReserve,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Butmostoftheincreaseissimplynormalizationfromverylowdelinquencyratesearly

inthepandemic,whenfiscalstimulusliftedhouseholdincomeandspendingneeds

werelower,leavingmoremoneytopaybills.Therestappearstobemainlyduetomuchhigherinterestratesandcarprices,whichsubstantiallyraisedmonthlypayments,or

riskierlendingthatismostclearlyvisibleinhighdelinquencyratesoncreditcardloan

vintagesfromearlyinthepandemic,whenfiscalsupporttemporarilyappearedtoboostborrowers’creditworthiness(Exhibit5).

Exhibit5:FactorsOtherThanHouseholdFinancialWeakness,SuchasHigherInterestRatesorRiskierLending,AlsoAccountforSomeoftheIncreaseinConsumerDelinquencyandDefaultRates

Percent

24

22

20

18

16

14

12

10

CommercialBanksInterestRate

forCreditCards

Percent

24

22

20

18

16

14

12

10

Percent6

Percent6

CreditCard30+DelinquencyRate

byVintageYear

Average2017-2018

5

5

2019

2020

2021

2022

4

4

3

2

1

3

2

1

8

1990

8

19941998200220062010201420182022

0

2017

20182019202020212022

2023

0

2024

Source:FederalReserve,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Reassuringly,therecentriseindelinquencyratesdoesnotappeartohavebeencausedmainlybyunsustainablespending,weakhouseholdfinances,orlabormarketdistress—afterall,thelayoffrateisstillverylow.Themainexceptionislow-incomehouseholds

whohavesuddenlyhadtorestartstudentloanpayments,buttheimpactonconsumer

14January20245

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GoldmanSachs

USEconomicsAnalyst

spendinglooksmodestandisreflectedinourforecasts.

Risk3:Asharperdeteriorationinthelabormarket

Thelabormarkethasreturnedtoroughlyitspre-pandemicstateandappearstohavestabilized,asuccessfulreversaloftheoverheatedconditionsof2022(Exhibit6).

Exhibit6:LaborMarketTightnessAppearstoBeStabilizingAfteraSuccessfulReversalofOverheating

Z-scores

4

2

0

MeasuresofLaborMarketTightness

Z-scores

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6

JOLTS:QuitsRate

ConferenceBoard:LaborMarketDifferential

NFIB:%ofFirmsWithPositionsNotAbletoFillJobs-WorkersGap*

UnemploymentRate(inverted)

Average

-2

-4

-6

2018201920202021202220232024*For2020-present,usesaveragejobs-workersgapimpliedbyJOLTS,Indeed,andLinkUp.

Source:DepartmentofLabor,NationalFederationofIndependentBusinesses,TheConferenceBoard,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Pessimistspointtoscatteredsignsofweakness—weakeremploymentgrowth

measuredbythehouseholdsurvey,asharpdropintheISMnon-manufacturingsurvey’semploymentcomponent,adeclineinthehiringrate,orthenarrowbreadthofjob

growth(discussedbelow).Butpayrollgrowthprovidesamuchbettersignalthanthenoisierhouseholdsurveymeasureofemploymentgrowth,andweputmoreemphasis

onbroadermeasureslikeourjobgrowthtrackerthatincorporatearangeoflabormarketdata(Exhibit7).Bothimplythatjobgrowthisstillrunningfarabovethebreakevenrate.

Absentsomeshock,thehighstartinglevelofjobopeningsandtheverylowlayoffratesuggestthat2024shouldseecontinuedsteadyjobgainsandalowunemploymentrate.

14January20246

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GoldmanSachs

USEconomicsAnalyst

Exhibit7:DespiteScatteredSignsofWeaknessinSomeLaborMarketIndicators,OurCompositeJobGrowthTrackerIsRunningatDoubletheBreakevenRateNeededtoStabilizetheUnemploymentRate

Thousands

JobGrowthTracker,3mavg.

Thousands

800

ChangeinNonfarmPayrollEmployment,exCensus,3mavg.BreakevenRate

800

700

700

600

600

500

500

400

400

300

300

200

200

100

100

0

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

0

Source:DepartmentofLabor,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Risk4:Thenarrowbreadthofjobgrowth

Jobgrowthhasbeendominatedbyhealthcare,government,andleisureandhospitalityrecently(Exhibit8),raisingconcernsaboutexcessivecoolingoflabordemandora

jobs-workersmismatchproblem.

Exhibit8:JobGrowthHasBeenDominatedbyaFewIndustriesRecently,RaisingConcernsAboutExcessiveCoolingofLaborDemandoraJobs-WorkersMismatchProblem

Thousands,3mavg.Thousands,3mavg.

500MonthlyPayrollGrowthEx-Healthcare,Government,500

andLeisureandHospitality

400MonthlyPayrollGrowthforHealthcare,Government,400

andLeisureandHospitality

300300

200200

100100

0

0

-100-100

Jun-21Dec-21Jun-22Dec-22Jun-23Dec-23

Source:DepartmentofLabor,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Wearelessconcernedforseveralreasons.First,jobopportunitiesarehighinnearly

everyindustry,andunemployedworkersarefindingsjobsatanelevatedrate(Exhibit9).Second,thethreeindustriesthathavedominatedhiringarenotsmall—theyaccountfor40%ofemployment—andindustriesaccountingfor70%oftotalemploymenthave

14January20247

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GoldmanSachs

USEconomicsAnalyst

continuedtoaddjobsonnet.Third,thesethreeindustrieswerebadlyunderstaffedanddominatedjobgrowthinpartbecausetheyraisedrelativecompensation,notbecause

openingselsewherewereillusory.Fourth,catch-uphiringhasfurthertogo,especiallyinhealthcare.Fifth,jobgrowthfellmainlyinindustriesthatarethemostsensitiveto

tighterfinancialconditions,whichhaverecentlyeasedsignificantly.Andsixth,someindustriesthatreducedheadcountasdemandnormalizedfromelevatedpandemic

levelsappearlikelytorestarthiringsoon.

Exhibit9:JobOpeningsAreHighinNearlyEveryIndustry,andUnemployedWorkersHaveFoundJobsatanElevatedRate

TransportationConstruction HealthcareEducation

Manufacturing

Acc.andFoodServ.

ProfessionalServ.

EntertainmentOtherServices FinanceInformation

Retail

JobOpenings,vs.Jan.2020

Percent40

Percent40

FlowsFromUnemploymentIntoEmployment,

asaShareofUnemployedWorkers3-MonthAverage

Monthly

35

35

3030

25

25

JOLTS

Indeed

20

20

15

15

10

10

0

50

150

100

200

1990199520002005201020152020

Source:DepartmentofLabor,Indeed,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Risk5:Risingcorporatebankruptcies

Mediareportssometimeshighlighttheriseincommercialbankruptciessince2022,butzoomoutabitanditlooksfarlessominous—thecurrentlevelisstillwellbelowthe

pre-pandemiclevel.Whilelargecompanybankruptciesaresomewhathigher,theyhaveonlyreturnedtotheir2019levels(Exhibit10).

14January20248

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GoldmanSachs

USEconomicsAnalyst

Exhibit10:CommercialBankruptciesHaverRisenbutRemainBelowPre-PandemicLevels

Thousands

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

CommercialBankruptcies

AllCommercialBankruptcies,AmericanBankruptcyInstitute(left)

CompaniesWithLiabilities>$50M,BloombergBankruptcyIndex(rihgt)

Index

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

200720092011201320152017201920212023

Source:AmericanBankruptcyInstitute,Bloomberg,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Morebroadly,bothlargeandsmallbusinessareonsolidfinancialfooting.Thecorporate

andunincorporatedbusinesssectors’financialbalances—thedifferencebetweentheirtotalincomeandtotalspending—arebotharoundpre-pandemiclevels,andthereisnosignofthelargeprivatesectorfinancialdeficitsthatprecededthe2001and2008

recessions(Exhibit11).Whilecompaniesthattookonmoreleverageareundersomepressurefromhigherinterestrates,ourcreditstrategistsexpectdefaultratesforbothhighyieldandleveragedloanissuerstodeclineoverthenextyear.

Exhibit11:BusinessesAreonSolidFinancialFooting

PercentofGDP

5

PercentofGDP

5

4

FinancialBalanceofUSBusinesses

NonfinancialCorporates(left)

NonfinancialUnincorporatedBusinesses(right)*

4

3

3

2

1

2

0

-1

1

-2

0

-3

1990199520002005201020152020

*Adjustedforpassthroughofsmallbusinessearningstothehouseholdsthatownthem.

Note:NBERrecessionsshaded.Dataexcludecreditunions,realestate,andotherfinancials.

Source:DepartmentofCommerce,FederalReserve,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Risk6:Thecorporatedebtmaturitywall

Companiesissuedalargeamountofdebtandextendedtheaveragematurityoftheir

14January20249

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GoldmanSachs

USEconomicsAnalyst

debtearlyinthepandemicbeforetheFedstartedhiking,andthishasdelayedthe

transmissionofhighermarketinterestratestocorporateinterestexpense.Ifinterestratesremainhigh,companieswillneedtodevoteagreatershareoftheirrevenuetocoverrisinginterestexpenseastheyrefinance(Exhibit12,left).

Buttheimpactontheeconomyshouldbemodest.Weestimatethathighercorporateinterestexpensewillreducecapexgrowthby0.1ppin2024and0.25ppin2025and

hiringby5kjobsamonthin2024and10kjobsamonthin2025(Exhibit12,right).Theeffectissmallinpartbecausetheincreaseininterestexpenseshouldonlybemoderateandinpartbecauseincreasesininterestexpensehaveonlymodesteffectsoncapital

investmentandhiring.Theeffectonthesmallbusinesssectorshouldbeevensmallerbecausesmallbusinesseshavemorevariable-ratedebtandhavealreadyfeltmuchoftheimpact.

Exhibit12:BusinessInterestExpenseWillIncreaseinComingYearsasCompaniesRefinanceatHigherRates,ButWeEstimateThatThisWillGenerateOnlyaModestDragonCapexandHiring

PercentPercentofGDP

40CumulativeIncreaseinInterestExpense2.0

35

30

1.5

25

201.0

15

100.5

5

00.0

20242025202620272028202920302031203220332034

PercentofGDP0.00

PercentofGDP

0.00

IncrementalImpactofHigherInterest

-0.01

-0.01

ExpenseFromBondsMaturingon...

Capex

LaborCosts

-0.02

-0.02

-0.03

-0.03

-0.04

-0.04

-0.05

-0.05

-0.06

-0.06

-0.07

-0.07

-0.08

-0.08

20242025202620272028202920302031203220332034

Source:GoldmanSach