企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献

企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Measuringthequalityofearnings1.IntroductionGenerallyacceptedaccountingprinciples(GAAP)offersomeflexibilityinpreparingthefinancialstatementsandgivethefinancialmanagerssomefreedomtoselectamongaccountingpoliciesandalternatives.Earningmanagementusestheflexibilityinfinancialreportingtoalterthefinancialresultsofthefirm(OrtegaandGrant,2003).Inotherwords,earningsmanagementismanipulatingtheearningtoachieveapredeterminedtargetsetbythemanagement.Itisapurposefulinterventionintheexternalreportingprocesswiththeintentofobtainingsomeprivategain(Schipper,1989).Levit(1998)definesearningmanagementasagrayareawheretheaccountingisbeingperverted;wheremanagersarecuttingcorners;and,whereearningsreportsreflectthedesiresofmanagementratherthantheunderlyingfinancialperformanceofthecompany.Thepopularpresslistsseveralinstancesofcompaniesengaginginearningsmanagement.SensormaticElectronics,whichstampedshippingdatesandtimesonsoldmerchandise,stoppeditsclocksonthelastdayofaquarteruntilcustomershipmentsreacheditssalesgoal.CertainbusinessunitsofCendantCorporationinflatedrevenuesnearly$500millionjustpriortoamerger;subsequently,CendantrestatedrevenuesandagreedwiththeSECtochangerevenuerecognitionpractices.AOLrestatedearningsfor$385millioninimproperlydeferredmarketingexpenses.In1994,theWallStreetJournaldetailedthemanywaysinwhichGeneralElectricsmoothedearnings,includingthecarefultimingofcapitalgainsandtheuseofrestructuringchargesandreserves,inresponsetothearticle,GeneralElectricreportedlyreceivedcallsfromothercorporationsquestioningwhysuchcommonpracticeswere“front”news.Earningmanagementoccurswhenmanagersusejudgmentinfinancialreportingandinstructuringtransactionstoalterfinancialreportstoeithermisleadsomestakeholdersabouttheunderlyingeconomicperformanceofthecompanyortoinfluencecontractualoutcomesthatdependonreportedaccountingnumbers(HealyandWhalen,1999).MagrathandWeld(2002)indicatethatabusiveearningsmanagementandfraudulentpracticesbeginsbyengaginginearningsmanagementschemesdesignedprimarilyto“smooth”earningstomeetinternallyorexternallyimposedearningsforecastsandanalysts’expectations.Evenifearningsmanagementdoesnotexplicitlyviolateaccountingrules,itisanethicallyquestionablepractice.Anorganizationthatmanagesitsearningssendsamessagetoitsemployeesthatbendingthetruthisanacceptablepractice.Executiveswhopartakeofthispracticeriskcreatinganethicalclimateinwhichotherquestionableactivitiesmayoccur.Amanagerwhoasksthesalesstafftohelpsalesonedayforfeitsthemoralauthoritytocriticizequestionablesalestacticsanotherday.Earningsmanagementcanalsobecomeaveryslipperyslope,whichrelativelyminoraccountinggimmicksbecomingmoreandmoreaggressiveuntiltheycreatematerialmisstatementsinthefinancialstatements(Clikeman,2003)TheSecuritiesandExchangeCommission(SEC)issuedthreestaffaccountingbulletins(SAB)toprovideguidanceonsomeaccountingissuesinordertopreventtheinappropriateearningsmanagementactivitiesbypubliccompanies:SABNo.99“Materiality”,SABNo.100“RestructuringandImpairmentCharges”andSABNo.101“RevenueRecognition”.Earningsmanagementbehaviormayaffectthequalityofaccountingearnings,whichisdefinedbySchipperandVincent(2003)astheextenttowhichthereportedearningsfaithfullyrepresentHichsianeconomicincome,whichistheamountthatcanbeconsumed(i.e.paidoutasdividends)duringaperiod,whileleavingthefirmequallywelloffatthebeginningandtheendoftheperiod.Assessmentofearningqualityrequiressometimestheseparationsofearningsintocashfromoperationandaccruals,themoretheearningsisclosedtocashfromoperation,thehigherearningsquality.AsPenman(2001)statesthatthepurposeofaccountingqualityanalysisistodistinguishbetweenthe“hard”numbersresultingfromcashflowsandthe“soft”numbersresultingfromaccrualaccounting.Thequalityofearningscanbeassessedbyfocusingontheearningpersistence;highqualityearningsaremorepersistentandusefulintheprocessofdecisionmaking.BeneishandVargus(2002)investigatewhetherinsidertradingisinformativeaboutearningsqualityusingearningpersistenceasameasureforthequalityofearnings,theyfindthatincome-increasingaccrualsaresignificantlymorepersistentforfirmswithabnormalinsiderbuyingandsignificantlylesspersistentforfirmswithabnormalinsiderselling,relativetofirmswhichthereisnoabnormalinsidertrading.Balsametal.(2003)usesthelevelofdiscretionaryaccrualsasadirectmeasureforearningquality.Thediscretionaryaccrualsmodelisbasedonaregressionrelationshipbetweenthechangeintotalaccrualsasdependentvariableandchangeinsalesandchangeinthelevelofproperty,plantandequipment,changeincashflowfromoperationsandchangeinfirmsize(totalassets)asindependentvariables.Iftheregressioncoefficientsinthismodelaresignificantthatmeansthatthereisearningmanagementinthatfirmandtheearningsqualityislow.Thisresearchpresentsanempiricalstudyonusingthreedifferentapproachesofmeasuringthequalityofearningsondifferentindustry.Thenotionis;ifthereisacompleteconsistencyamongthethreemeasures,ageneralassessmentforthequalityofearnings(highorlow)canbereachedand,ifnot,thequalityofearningsisquestionableandneedsdifferentotherapproachesformeasurementandmoreinvestigationsandanalysis.Therestofthepaperisdividedintofollowingsections:Earningsmanagementincentives,Earningsmanagementtechniques,Modeldevelopment,Sampleandstatisticalresults,andConclusion.2.Earningsmanagementincentives2.1Meetinganalysts’expectationsIngeneral,analysts’expectationsandcompanypredictionstendtoaddresstwohigh-profilecomponentsoffinancialperformance:revenueandearningsfromoperations.Thepressuretomeetrevenueexpectationsisparticularlyintenseandmaybetheprimarycatalystinleadingmanagerstoengageinearningmanagementpracticesthatresultinquestionableorfraudulentrevenuerecognitionpractices.MagrathandWeld(2002)indicatethatimproperrevenuerecognitionpracticeswerethecauseofone-thirdofallvoluntaryorforcedrestatementsofincomefiledwiththeSECfrom1977to2000.Ironically,itisoftenthecompaniesthemselvesthatcreatethispressuretomeetthemarket’searningsexpectations.Itiscommonpracticeforcompaniestoprovideearningsestimatestoanalystsandinvestors.Managementisoftenfacedwiththetaskofensuringtheirtargetedestimatesaremet.Severalcompanies,includingCoca-ColaCo.,IntelCorp.,andGilletteCo.,havetakenacontrarystanceandnolongerprovidequarterlyandannualearningsestimatestoanalysts.Indoingso,thesecompaniesclaimtheyhaveshiftedtheirfocusfrommeetingshort-termearningsestimatestoachievingtheirlong-termstrategies(MckayandBrown,2002).2.2Toavoiddebt-covenantviolationsandminimizepoliticalcostsSomefirmshavetheincentivetoavoidviolatingearnings-baseddebtcovenants.Ifviolated,thelendermaybeabletoraisetheinterestrateonthedebtordemandimmediaterepayment.Consequently,somefirmsmayuseearnings-managementtechniquestoincreaseearningstoavoidsuchcovenantviolations.Ontheotherhand,someotherfirmshavetheincentivetolowerearningsinordertominimizepoliticalcostsassociatedwithbeingseenastooprofitable.Forexample,ifgasolinepriceshavebeenincreasingsignificantlyandoilcompaniesareachievingrecordprofitlevel,thentheremaybeincentiveforthegovernmenttointerveneandenactanexcess-profittaxorattempttointroducepricecontrols.2.3Tosmoothearningstowardalong-termsustainabletrendFormanyyearsithasbeenbelievedthatafirmshouldattempttoreducethevolatilityinitsearningsstreaminordertomaximizeshareprice.Becauseahighlyviolateearningpatternindicatesrisk,thereforethestockwilllosevaluecomparedtootherswithmorestableearningspatterns.Consequently,firmshaveincentivestomanageearningstohelpachieveasmoothandgrowingearningsstream(OrtegaandGrant,2003).2.4MeetingthebonusplanrequirementsHealy(1985)providestheevidencethatearningsaremanagedinthedirectionthatisconsistentwithmaximizingexecutives’earnings-basedbonus.Whenearningswillbebelowtheminimumlevelrequiredtoearnabonus,thenearningaremanagedupwardsothattheminimumisachievedandabonusisearned.Conversely,whenearningwillbeabovethemaximumlevelatwhichnoadditionalbonusispaid,thenearningsaremanageddownward.Theextraearningsthatwillnotgenerateextrabonusthiscurrentperiodaresavedtobeusedtoearnabonusinafutureperiod.Whenearningsarebetweentheminimumandthemaximumlevels,thenearningsaremanagedupwardinordertoincreasethebonusearnedinthecurrentperiod.2.5ChangingmanagementEarningsmanagementusuallyoccursaroundthetimeofchangingmanagement,theCEOofacompanywithpoorperformanceindicatorswilltrytoincreasethereportedearningsinordertopreventorpostponebeingfired.Ontheotherhand,thenewCEOwilltryshiftpartoftheincometofutureyearsaroundthetimewhenhis/herperformancewillbeevaluatedandmeasured,andblamethelowearningatthebeginningofhiscontractontheactsofthepreviousCEO.3.EarningsmanagementtechniquesOneofthemostcommonearningsmanagementtoolsisreportingrevenuebeforethesellerhasperformedunderthetermsofasalescontract(SEC,SABNo.101,1999).AnotherareaofconcerniswhereacompanyfailstocomplywithGAAPandinappropriatelyrecordsrestructuringchargesandgeneralreservesforfuturelosses,reversingorrelievingreservesininappropriateperiods,andrecognizingornotrecognizinganassetimpairmentchargeintheappropriateperiod(SEC,SABNo.100,1999).Managerscaninfluencereportedexpensesthroughassumptionsandestimatessuchastheassumedrateofreturnonpensionplanassetandtheestimatedusefullivesoffixedassets,alsotheycaninfluencereportedearningsbycontrollingthetimingofpurchasing,deliveries,discretionaryexpenditures,andsaleofassets.3.1Bigbath“BigBath”chargesareone-timerestructuringcharge.Currentearningswillbedecreasedbyoverstatingtheseone-timecharges.Byreversingtheexcessivereserve,futureearningswillincrease.Bigbathchargesarenotalwaysrelatedtorestructuring.InApril2001,CiscoSystemsInc.announcedchargesagainstearningsofalmost$4billion.Thebulkofthecharge,$2.5billion,consistedofaninventorywritedown.Writingoffmorethanabilliondollarsfrominventorynowmeansmorethanabilliondollarsoflesscostinthefutureperiod.Thisanexampleofwhatultra-conservativeaccountinginoneperiodmakespossibleinfutureperiods.3.2AbuseofmaterialityAnotherareathatmightbeusedbyaccountantstomanipulatetheearningistheapplicationofmaterialityprincipleinpreparingthefinancialstatements,thisprincipleisverywide,flexibleandhasnospecificrangetodeterminewheretheitemismaterialornot.SECusestheinterpretationruledbythesupremecourtinidentifyingwhatismaterial;thesupremecourthasheldthatafactismaterialifthereisasubstantiallikelihoodthatthefactwouldhavebeenviewedbyreasonableinvestorashavingsignificantlyalteredthe“totalmix”ofinformationmadeavailable(SEC,SABNo.99,1999).TheSEChasalsointroducedsomeconsiderationsforaquantitativelysmallmisstatementofafinancialstatementitemtobematerial:.whetherthemisstatementarisesfromanitemcapableofprecisemeasurementorwhetheritarisesfromanestimateand,ifso,thedegreeofimprecisioninherentintheestimate;.whetherthemisstatementmasksachangeinearningsorothertrends;.whetherthemisstatementhidesafailuretomeetanalysts’consensusexpectationsfortheenterprise;.whetherthemisstatementchangesalossintoincomeorviceversa;.whetherthemisstatementconcernsasegmentorotherportionoftheregistrant’sbusinessthathasbeenidentifiedasplayingasignificantroleintheregistrant’soperationsorprofitability;and.whetherthemisstatementinvolvesconcealmentofanunlawfultransaction.3.3Cookiejar“Cookiejar”reserve–sometimeslabeledrainydayreserveorcontingencyreserves,inperiodsofstrongfinancialperformance,cookiejarreserveenabletoreduceearningsbyoverstatingreserves,overstatingexpenses,andusingone-timewrite-offs.Inperiodsofweakfinancialperformance,cookiejarreservescanbeusedtoincreaseearningsbyreversingaccrualsandreservestoreducecurrentperiodexpenses(Kokoszka,2003).ThemostfamousexampleofuseofcookiejarreservesisWorldComInc.InAugust2002,aninternalreviewrevealedthatthecompanyhad$2.5billionreservesrelatedtolitigation,uncollectibleandtaxes.Thecompanyusedmostoftheminaseriesofso-calledreservereversalsinordertohavehigherearnings.Source:KhaledElMoatasemAbdelghany,2005.“Measuringthequalityofearnings”,ManagerialAuditingJournal,vol.20,no.9,pp.1001–1015.

译文：衡量盈利质量1、引言一般公认会计原则（GAAP）提供准备一定的灵活性的财务报表，给财务经理一定的自由空间进行选择会计政策和方案。收入管理使用中的灵活性的财务报告改变公司（奥尔特加和格兰特，2003年）的财务结果。换句话说，收入管理是操纵收益达到预定目标的管理设置。这是有目的的干预外部报告过程并获得一些私利的意图（席佩尔，1989）。莱维特（1998）盈余管理的定义是一个灰色地带，其中会计核算是不恰当的；其中，管理人员偷工减料；并在财报反映了管理层的意愿，而不是潜在的财务业绩公司。大众媒体列出了几个公司从事盈利实例的管理。先讯美资电子对其所售商品加盖装运日期和时间，在一季度的最后一天停止了其时钟，直到客户出货量达到其销售目标。胜腾公司的某些业务部门为了合并虚增收入近5亿美元；随后，圣达特重申和与SEC同意改变收入确认方法。AOL重申收益为3.85亿美元包括递延不正当的营销费用。1994年，华尔街日报详细介绍通用电气平滑收益的许多方法，包括资本收益和使用重组费用和储备的时机。以回应文章中，通用电气据说受到其他公司的质疑-为什么这样约定俗成的做法会变成“头版”的消息。收入管理发生在管理者判断财务报告和结构性交易时，为了改变财务报表，误导有关该公司的基本经济表现的一些利益相关方或影响会改变合同结果的会计数据（希利和惠伦，1999年）。马格拉斯和威尔德（2002）指出，一开始从事设计滥用盈余管理和欺诈行为的收益管理方案主要是为了“平稳”，以满足内部或外部强加的盈利财报预测和分析师的预期。即使盈余管理并没有明确违反会计准则，但它是一个道德上有问题的做法。其盈利的管理组织发送给它的员工的消息是弯曲的真相，但却是一个可以接受的做法。高管这种做法创造一个道德氛围，谁参加就不会出现在其他可能可疑的活动中。一位经理问销售人员，如果你以丧失1天道德来帮助加快销售，那么另一天你就会被批评质疑。盈余管理也处在一个十分危险的境地,而相对次要的会计花招越来越咄咄逼人,直到他们创建的财务报表出现重大错报（克利克曼，2003年）。美国证券交易委员会（SEC）发出了三名员工的会计公报（SAB）以此来对一些会计问题提供指导，以防止有不恰当的盈余管理活动在上市公司中出现：SAB99号“实质性”，SAB第100号“重组费用和资产减值”和SAB第101号“收入确认”。盈余管理行为可能会影响会计盈余质量，该报告是由席佩尔和温深特（2003）所作，为一定程度反映盈利忠实的代表Hichsian的经济收入，这是量能食用期间（即支付股息），而离开公司在开始和期间的结束同样富裕。评估收益质量的要求有时就会变成操作现金的分离和收益,收益越不对现金操作,收益质量就越高。由彭曼（2001）指出，会计质量分析的目的是区分“硬”的数字现金流和权责发生制所带来的“软”的数字。盈利质量可以通过关注盈利持续性进行评估；高品质的市盈率可以让企业做出更持久和更有用的决策。班尼胥和瓦古斯（2002）调查内幕交易信息是关于是否使用收益持久性的收益质量作为衡量收益的质量，他们发现，相对于没有异常内幕交易的公司，收益更持久的公司内存在异常内幕购买和异常内部销售。贝奥森（2003）使用可操纵应计利润水平来衡量盈利质量。审计师变更模型是基于回归总收益作为因变量，改变销售和物业，厂房及设备，并且改变现金流运作和公司规模(总资产)作为独立的变量。如果在此模型中的回归系数是显著的，这意味着有收入管理，表示该公司的收益质量低下。这项研究提供了一个实证，使用三种不同的方法衡量收入在不同行业的质量。这一概念是；如果这三项措施有一个完整的一致性，质量评价收益（高或低）可以达到总体水平，如果没有，表面盈利质量有问题的，需要不同的其他方法进行测量，调查和分析。本文的其余部分被分为以下几个部分：盈余管理激励，盈余管理技术，发展模式，采样和统计结果，与结论。2、盈余管理的激励2.1满足了分析师的预期一般而言,分析师预期和公司财务业绩的预测倾向于解决两个高调的组件:营运收入和利润。满足收入预期的压力尤为激烈，管理人员从事的盈余管理行为可能是主要的催化剂，导致不良或欺骗性的收入确认的做法。马格拉斯和威尔德（2002）表明，从1977年到2000年提交给美国证券交易委员会(SEC)的收入报表中，其中收入确认方法不恰当的，有三分之一都是自愿或被迫的。有讽刺意味的是,这往往是企业自己创造这种压力来满足市场的盈利预期。这是公司为分析师和投资者提供收益预期的常见的做法。管理层经常面临的任务就是确保他们的目标得到满足。有几家公司，其中包括可口可乐公司，英特尔公司和吉列公司，以相反的立场，不再提供季度和年度的盈利预测。这样一来，这些公司声称他们已经把他们的注意力从短期的盈利预测转移了，以实现其长期战略（曼克凯和布朗，2002）。2.2为了避