UNCATD：竞争政策与产业政策之间的相互作用 Interaction between competition and industrial policies

UnitedNations

TD/B/C.I/CLP/69

UnitedNationsConferenceDistr.:GeneralonTradeandDevelopment26April2023

Original:English

TradeandDevelopmentBoard

TradeandDevelopmentCommission

IntergovernmentalGroupofExperts

onCompetitionLawandPolicy

Twenty-firstsession

Geneva,5-7July2023

Item6oftheprovisionalagenda

Interactionbetweencompetitionandindustrialpolicies*

Summary

Competitionpolicyandindustrialpolicyultimatelyaimatachievingthegoalofeconomicgrowthanddevelopment.Theirinteractionmaybecomplementaryorinconflictwitheachother.Nowadays,asnewdemandsforcompetitionandindustrialpoliciesemerge,therelationshipbetweenthesepoliciesneedstobereviewed.Inthisnote,theinteractionbetweencompetitionandindustrialpoliciesisthereforeelaboratedon,reflectingchangesintheeconomyinthelastdecadethatincludedigitalization,sustainabledevelopmentandtheglobaleconomicdownturn.Anoverviewisprovidedofsituationswherecompetitionandindustrialpolicieshavesynergiesandfacetensionsandfollowedbyadiscussionofthegrowingneedforcooperationbetweentheminthecontextofchangesinthecurrenteconomicenvironment.Lastly,policyrecommendationsareprovidedtoimprovetheproductiveinteractionbetweencompetitionandindustrialpolicies.

*MentionofanyfirmorlicensedprocessdoesnotimplytheendorsementoftheUnitedNations.

GE.23-07850(E)

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I.Introduction

1.Competitionpolicyandindustrialpolicyultimatelyaimatachievingthegoalof

economicgrowthanddevelopment.However,ascompetitionandindustrialpoliciesdifferinspecificpolicyobjectives,scopeandmeans,theyinteractwitheachotherinvariouswaysduringpolicymakingandenforcement.Theirinteractionmaybecomplementaryorinconflictwitheachother.

2.Competitionpolicyreferstogovernmentpolicytoincreasecompetitivemarket

pressures.Effectivecompetitionpolicymayleadfirmstobecomemoreefficient,increaseinnovation,andwidenconsumerchoiceandproductquality(TD/RBP/CONF.8/6).Competitionpolicyhastwomajorinstrumentswhicharecompetitionlawandcompetitionadvocacy(TD/B/C.I/CLP/3).Competitionlawprohibitsanticompetitiveactivitiesinprivateandpublicareas,includinganticompetitiveagreements,abuseofdominanceandanticompetitivemergers.Competitionadvocacyreferstotoolstopromotetheuseofpro-competitivemeansandvoluntarycomplianceinprivateareas.

3.Ontheotherhand,industrialpolicyisconsideredasaimingatenablingacountrytoachievestrategicobjectivesbyenhancingdomesticproductivecapabilitiesandinternationalcompetitiveness,thoughthedefinitionvariesacrossstudies.1Industrialpolicyusedtobesimplyconsideredtohaveshort-termgoals,suchasencouragingemployment,enhancinginternationaltradeearningsandenhancingincomeequality,aswellaslong-termindustrialdevelopmentgoals.2Butmodernindustrialpoliciesareincreasinglycoveringnewthemesandincludingobjectivesbeyondconventionalindustrialdevelopment,suchasupgradingglobalvaluechains,developmentoftheknowledgeeconomy,build-upofsectorslinkedtosustainabledevelopmentandcompetitivepositioningforthenewindustrialrevolution.3

4.Industrialpolicyinthetwentiethcenturywasrecognizedasaselectivedevelopmentpolicy,andcriticismaboutitwasmainlybecausegovernmentinterventionintheindustrydidnotcontributetoeconomicdevelopment.4Industrialpolicyinthetwenty-firstcentury,however,goesbeyondsimpleindustrialdevelopmentandaimsformorediversepolicygoals.Thesegoalsincluderespondingtorapidindustrialreorganizationduetodigitaltechnologydevelopment,demandsforsustainabledevelopmentandresponsestothecoronavirusdisease(COVID-19)pandemic.Therearealsodiscussionsthatcompetitionpoliciesmaycomplementothergovernmentpoliciesgiventhedemandsofneweconomicenvironments,suchassustainableandinclusivegrowthanddevelopment(TD/RBP/CONF.8/6).Asnewpolicydemandsforcompetitionandindustrialpoliciesemerge,therelationshipbetweencompetitionpolicyandindustrialpolicy,whichhaveinteractedwitheconomicdevelopment,needstobereviewed.

5.ForthetenthsessionoftheIntergovernmentalGroupofExpertsonCompetitionLawandPolicyin2009,UNCTADsecretariatpreparedabackgrounddocumenttitled“Therelationshipbetweencompetitionandindustrialpoliciesinpromotingeconomicdevelopment”(TD/B/C.I/CLP/3).Thebackgrounddocumentcontainedasummaryofapproachofcompetitionauthoritiestowardsanticompetitivepractices,mergers,exclusionsandexemptionsinvolvingindustrialpolicyconsiderations,aswellastheroleofcompetitionadvocacy.Thesynergiesandtensionsofbothpolicieswerealsoexamined,consideringtheeconomicsituationatthattime.

6.BuildingonpreviousUNCTADwork,inthepresentdocument,theinteraction

betweencompetitionandindustrialpoliciesiselaboratedon,reflectingthechangesinthe

1UNCTAD,2018,WorldInvestmentReport2018:InvestmentandNewIndustrialPolicies(UnitedNationspublication,SalesNo.E.18.II.D.4,NewYorkandGeneva).

2BrooksDH,2007,Industrialandcompetitionpolicy:Conflictorcomplementarity?,ADBIResearchPolicyBriefNo.24.

3UNCTAD,2018.

4UNCTAD,2021,TradeandDevelopmentReport2021:FromRecoverytoResilience-TheDevelopmentDimension(UnitedNationspublication,SalesNo.E.22.II.D.1,Geneva).

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economyinthelastdecade,includingdigitalization,sustainabledevelopmentandtheglobaleconomicdownturn.

7.Thefollowingchaptersareorganizedasfollows:inchapterII,thediscussionisfocusedonsomepointswherecompetitionandindustrialpolicieshavesynergiesandfacetensions.InchapterIII,thediscussionisplacedinthecontextofchangesinthecurrenteconomicenvironment.InchapterIV,somepolicyrecommendationsareraisedtoimprovetheproductiveinteractionbetweencompetitionandindustrialpolicies.

II.Synergiesandtensions

A.General

8.Inthepast,whenindustrialpolicywasmainlyamethodofselectiveindustrial

development,therewerecaseswhereindustrialpolicyandcompetitionpolicyseemedtoconflict(TD/B/C.I/CLP/3).AfterWorldWarII,manydevelopingcountrieslaunchedindustrialpoliciestofostertheirownindustries.Inparticular,theexperienceofEastAsiancountriesinthelatetwentiethcenturyshowedthatindustrialpolicycancontributetoeconomicdevelopment.EastAsianindustrialpolicyaimedatfosteringinternationallycompetitiveindustriesbyselectivelydevelopingcapitalandtechnology-intensivecapabilities(TD/RBP/CONF.8/6).Ina1993study,theWorldBankconcludedthatselectiveinterventionscouldcontributetogrowthinsomeeconomiesifseveralpreconditionsweremet.5Ina1998UNCTADreport,itwasstatedthatsomefactors,suchastechnologicalmasteryandinstitutionalandadministrativecapacity,wererelatedtothesuccessofindustrialpolicies(TD/B/COM.2/EM/10/REV.1).However,industrialpoliciesofselectiveinterventionssometimesrestrictedmarketcompetitionbylimitingproductionand/orthenumberoffirmsinthemarket(TD/RBP/CONF.8/6).

9.Sincethe1980s,tradeliberalizationandmarketopeninghavechangedthe

environmentofglobalmarkets,andmanycountrieshaveshiftedtheirpoliciestowardsboostingproductivitybypromotingcompetitionintheprivatesector.Inthiscontext,competitionpolicyisnotseparatefromindustrialpolicybutratherplaysanimportantroleinit.Thereisnowaglobalconsensusthatcompetitionpolicyisindispensableforeconomicgrowthandprosperity.Thenumberofjurisdictionshavingcompetitionlawhasdramaticallyincreasedfrom12in1970toaround140today.6

10.Inthetwenty-firstcentury,industrialpolicyischangingnotonlytofosterspecificindustriesbutalsotoaimforbroaderpolicygoals.Inparticular,theCOVID-19pandemichasthreatenedtheglobaleconomyoverthepastfewyearsandservedasanawakeningtotheneedforsuchnewindustrialpolicies.Thepandemichasresultedinvariousadverseeffectsontheglobaleconomy,suchassupplychaindisruptions,suspensionofinternationaltransportandshrinkingofserviceindustries.Hence,Governmentshavetakenanactiverolenotonlyinreducingtheshort-termeconomicdamagefromthepandemic,butalsoinpromotingastrong,sustainableandinclusivelong-termrecovery(TD/B/C.I/CLP/58).ThistrendcanalsobeseenintheexpansionofsubsidiesandStateaidbyGovernmentstosupportbusinessesacrosssectorsinavarietyofways,includinggrants,subsidizedloansandtaxadvantages,tomitigatetheimpactofthepandemic.7Forexample,theGovernmentofBangladeshprovided$8.5billioninsubsidizedloanstosmallandmedium-sizedenterprises;theGovernmentofElSalvadorprovided$500millioninlow-interestloansandwagesubsidiestosmallandmedium-sizedenterprises;andtheGovernmentofKazakhstan

5WorldBank,1993,TheEastAsianMiracle:EconomicGrowthandPublicPolicy,vol.1,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford.

6SeeUnitedStatesofAmerica,FederalTradeCommission,

/policy/international/competition-consumer-protection-agencies-worldwide

(accessed24April2023).

7See

/views/AID-

COVID19/Overview?%3Aembed=y&%3AisGuestRedirectFromVizportal=y&%3Adisplay_count=n

&%3AshowAppBanner=false&%3Aorigin=viz_share_link&%3AshowVizHome=n.

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provided$920millioninsoftloanstolocalbusinesses.8SomeGovernmentsareconsideringindustrialpoliciestorespondtochangesintheeconomicstructure,suchasdigitaleconomyandsustainabledevelopment.9

11.Competitionandindustrialpoliciesmaybecomplementary,creatingsynergyinrespondingtonewgoalsrequiredbychangesintheglobaleconomicenvironmentandenhancingthecredibilityofGovernmentandefficientuseoflimitedgovernmentresources.Butsometimesthesepoliciesarealsoinatenserelationship.Inorderforcompetitionandindustrialpoliciestoworkpositively,acooperationsystembetweentheauthoritiesthatimplementeachpolicyisimportant.TheCOVID-19pandemichaswelldemonstratedtheneedforsuchcooperation.AnUNCTADreportin2022recommendedthatcompetitionauthoritiesandauthoritiesoverseeingmicroenterprisesandsmallandmedium-sizedenterprises(MSMEs)worktogethertoovercomethepandemic-causedcrisisforMSMEs.10Inthischapter,examplesarereviewedoftoolsforeffectivecooperationbetweencompetitionpolicyandindustrialpolicyinthethreemainareasofcompetitionlawenforcement,andamodelofdesirableinteractionisexplored.

B.Interactionframeworksbetweencompetitionandindustrialpolicies

1.Competitionpolicyasanindustrialpolicy

12.Competitionpolicyitselfplaysadirectandanindirectroleinindustrialpolicy.Thecompetitionprocessandmarketefficiencypursuedbycompetitionpolicyarenotonlyessentialforindustrialdevelopment,butalsooftenplayanimportantroleinachievingtheothervaluespursuedbyindustrialpolicies.Earlyin2023,theKoreaFairTradeCommission,thecompetitionauthorityoftheRepublicofKorea,caughtandsanctionedcartelsofautomakersthatcolludedregardingpollutantemissions.11TheEuropeanCommissionalsofinedautomakersforsimilarrestrictivecompetitioninemissioncleaning.12Thiskindoflawenforcementismeaningfulforsustainabledevelopmentaswellascompetition.Competitionenforcementalsoprovidesguidelinesinvariousdigitaleconomyfields,suchasbigdata,personalinformationandonlineadvertising.13

13.Sometimeseasingtheenforcementofcompetitionlawshasindustrialpolicyimplications.Forexample,“safeharbour”14incompetitionenforcementforMSMEssupportsthembyreducingthelevelofscrutinyfortheiractivities.ThecompetitionauthoritiesofMalaysiahaveintroducedasafeharbourpolicythatpresumesthatagreementsorconductbyMSMEswithamarketshareoflessthan20percentdonotaffectmarketcompetitionunlesstheyareseriouscartels.Thiskindofexemptionissometimesusedtoovercomeacrisis.TheCompetitionCommissionofSouthAfricagaveblockexemptionstohorizontalandverticalagreementsofcompaniesinthehealth-care,retailpropertyandbankingsectors,excludingprices,duringtheCOVID-19period.15

8Ibid.

9TheUnitedStatesdecidedtosubsidizethesemiconductorindustry,andtheEuropeanCommission

easedsubsidyregulationsforindustriesrelatedtosustainabledevelopment.SeeUnitedStates,

DepartmentofCommerce,2023,

Biden–HarrisAdministrationlaunchesfirstCHIPSforAmerica

fundingopportunity,

28February,andEuropeanCommission,2023

,Stateaid:Commissionadopts

TemporaryCrisisandTransitionFrameworktofurthersupporttransitiontowardsnet-zeroeconomy,

9March.

10UNCTAD,2021,TheCOVID-19PandemicImpactonMicroenterprisesandSmallandMedium-

SizedEnterprises(UnitedNationspublication,Geneva).

11See

https://www.ftc.go.kr/www/selectReportUserView.do?key=10&rpttype=1.

12See

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_3581.

13SeeOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD),2022,

OECDHandbookon

CompetitionPolicyintheDigitalAge.

14“Safeharbour”isageneralexpressionthatreferstomechanismsthatmakeithardertoestablish

liabilityforcertainbusinesspractices.Itmayincludelegalassumptions,legalconcepts,evidentiary

assessmentsandsoon.SeeOECD,2017,

Safeharboursandlegalpresumptionsincompetitionlaw:

Backgroundnotebythesecretariat,

DAF/COMP(2017)9.

15SouthAfrica,CompetitionCommission,2021,

ImpactassessmentreportontheimpactofCOVID-19

blockexemptionsandCommission’senforcementduringthepandemic.

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2.Competitionadvocacytoothergovernmentpolicies

14.Competitionauthoritiesthatpresentopinionsonothergovernmentpoliciesplayanimportantpartintheinteractionbetweencompetitionandindustrialpolicies.Competitionpolicycanplayaroleincheckingandbalancingindustrialpolicythatslowsdownthelong-termdevelopmentofthemarketbyfocusingonshort-termstakeholderinterests.Theprinciplethatgovernmentactivitiesshouldnotdistortmarketcompetitionisalsocalled“competitionneutrality”;theOECDannouncedarecommendationforcompetitionneutralityin2021.16Forthesefunctionstoworkproperly,competitionadvocacyactivitiesbycompetitionauthoritiesneedtobeestablished.IntheRepublicofKorea,competitionlawrequiresthatministriesshouldconsultwiththecompetitionauthority(KoreaFairTradeCommission)whenrevisingregulationsthatlimitmarketcompetition.17Competitionadvocacyissometimesrelatedtosubsidization.Forexample,EuropeanUnioncompetitionlawprohibitsanyaidprovidedbyamemberStatethatdistortsorthreatenstodistortcompetition,withafewexceptionsthatcanbeseenascompatiblewithinternalmarkets.18Ontheotherhand,theUnitedStateshasrecentlybeendiscussinglegislationtostrengthenthemonitoringofforeignsubsidiesinmergerreviews.Thismovehasindustrialpolicyimplications,asitaimsatpreventingthedomesticmarketfrombeingdisturbedbyforeignsubsidies.TheMergerFilingFeeModernizationActof2022,underdiscussionintheCongressoftheUnitedStates,requiresthatcompaniesmergingintheUnitedStatesprovideinformationonsubsidiespaidbyforeignGovernmentstocompetitionauthorities.19

3.Cooperationwithcompetitionauthoritiesandministriesofindustry

15.Competitionauthoritiescanseekcooperationwithothergovernmentagenciesintheprocessoflawenforcement,andthiscooperationcanalsobeseenasaninteractionbetweencompetitionandindustrialpolicies.Competitionauthoritiesmayhaveproceduresforconsultingwithcompetentauthoritiesdealingwithcompetitionissuesinaparticularfield.Theseconsultationprocedurescancontributetoutilizingtheexpertiseofministriesofindustryandincreasingtheconsistencyoflawenforcementbetweengovernmentagencies.InthePhilippines,thePhilippineCompetitionCommissionshouldgothroughtheprocessofhearingopinionsfromotheragencieswhenthereareconcernsfromthesectorregulator.20TheCompetitionCommissionofSouthAfricasignedamemorandumofagreement(2004)withtheNationalEnergyRegulatorofSouthAfricaforcooperation,accordingtowhichthetwoauthoritiesmayconsulteachotherinrespectofcomplaintsreceived.21

16.Informationsharingcanbeanothercooperationmethodbetweenacompetitionauthorityandaministryofindustry.ThecompetitionauthorityinKenyahasinplacememorandumsofunderstandingwithseveralindustrialagencies,includingthecommunications,insuranceandenergysectors.Accordingtothememorandumsofunderstanding,theagenciescanshareconfidentialinformation,particularlywhenconductinginvestigations,tosavetimeaswellastoensurethatdecisionsmadearebackedbyverifiabledata.22TheMalaysiaCompetitionCommissionandnineothersectoralindustrialagenciesincludingtelecommunications,landtransport,financeandenergy,establishedacommitteein2012todiscussvariousissuesaffectingcompetitioninmarketsinvolvingdifferentsectors.23

16See

/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0462

(accessed24April2023).17See

https://www.ftc.go.kr/eng/contents.do?key=503

(accessed24April2023).

18SeeOfficialJournaloftheEuropeanUnion,2012,

ConsolidatedVersionoftheTreatyonthe

FunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion,

article107(C326/51).

19OECD,2022a

,Subsidies,CompetitionandTrade,

OECDCompetitionPolicyRound-table

BackgroundNote.

20Philippines,

PhilippineCompetitionAct,

section32.

21Availableat

pcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Signed-Memorandum-of

-

Agreement-Between-NERSA-and-CCSA.pdf

.

22SeeCompetitionAuthorityofKenya,2020,

Ushandani,Issue5,

biannualnewsletter.

23MalaysiaCompetitionCommission,2019,

AnnualReport.

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C.Tensionsbetweencompetitionpolicyandindustrialpolicies

17.Thecooperationbetweencompetitiveandindustrialpoliciesisnotalwayssmooth.First,evenifpolicieshaveacommongoalatahighlevel,theymaynotprioritizethesameobjectives.Competitionpoliciesareoftenaimedatpromotingcompetitioninthemarketplace,whileindustrialpoliciesoftenpursueavarietyofpublicinterests,suchasbuildingtheinfrastructureneededforindustry,maintainingadequatesupplyandstabilizingemployment.Second,competitionpolicyisusuallyenforcedbycompetitionauthorities,whileindustrialpolicyisenforcedbyministriesofindustry.Thisimpliesthattheremaybeoverlappingjurisdictionsinmanaginganissue,whichmayleadtoconflictingdecisions.InTunisia,thecompetitionauthorityandthetelecommunicationsauthoritymadeadualinvestigationinthesamecasein2012.Followingthis,bothauthoritiessignedamemorandumofunderstandingin2015topreventjurisdictionconflict.24Third,thereisadifferenceinthepolicyenforcementmethodsusedbyeachauthority.Ministriesofindustryusuallysupportmarketplayerswithsubsidiesortaxbenefits,whileacompetitionauthoritymonitorsandsanctionsmarketplayersagainstanticompetitiveconduct.Becauseofthis,ministriesofindustryusuallymaintaincooperativerelationshipswithmarketplayersineacharea,whilecompetitionauthoritiesoftenmaintaintensionwiththem.InCostaRica,adirectivebytheNationalTreasurythatfavouredpublicenterprisesonpublicprocurementwasrevokedfollowingtheadvocacyeffortsofthecompetitionauthority.25

18.Competitionauthoritiesindevelopingcountriestendtobemoreexposedtotheseproblemsastheyfacechallengesinenforcingcompetitionlawsandhavefewerresourcesforcompetitionadvocacy.Accordingtoresearchfrom2019bytheInternationalCompetitionNetwork,63percentoftheyoungauthorities(lessthan15yearsafterestablishment)experiencedchallengesrelatedtotheapplicationofpoliciespromotingcompetitionwithinaGovernmentthathinderthecorrectenforcementofcompetitionpolicy.26ThecompetitionauthorityofColombiaraisedtheissuethatsomeothergovernmentagenciesdidnotknowandoverlookedthemandatorylegalproceduresforadvocatingcompetition.ThecompetitionauthorityofUkraineidentifiedthatothergovernmentagencies’lackofunderstandingoftheroleofthecompetitionauthoritycouldnegativelyaffecttheactivitiesofpromotingmarketcompetition.27

D.Cooperationinenforcementcases

1.Mergercontrol

19.Mergercontrolisanimportantaspectofcompetitionpolicyaimedatpreventinganticompetitivemergersandacquisitions.Inmanydevelopingcountries,industrialpolicysometimesencouragestheintegrationofindustriesandsectorstoincreaseinternationalcompetitiveness.Thiscansometimesleadtomergersandacquisitionsthatcanreducecompetitioninthemarketandhaveanticompetitiveeffects.Competitionpolicyandindustrialpolicycaninteractintwoways.First,competitionpoliciescanhelppreventmergersandacquisitionsfromhavinganticompetitiveconsequencesbyrequiringcompaniestodisposeofassetsortakeothercorrectiveactionstopreservecompetition.Ontheotherhand,industrialpoliciescanprovideincentivesforcompaniestomergeandintegratetoachieveeconomiesofscaleandmakeanindustryinternationallycompetitive.

20.Inthecontextofmergercontrol,theinteractionbetweencompetitiveandindustrialpoliciescanleadtobothsynergyandtension.Competitivepolicycanpreventmergersandacquisitionsfromhavinganticompetitiveconsequences,whileindustrialpoliciescan

24OECD,2022b

,OECDPeerReviewsofCompetitionLawandPolicy:Tunisia.

25OECD,2020,

CostaRica:AssessmentofCompetitionLawandPolicy2020.

26InternationalCompetitionNetwork,2019,

LessonstobeLearntfromtheExperienceofYoung

CompetitionAgencies:Anupdatetothe2006Report.

27Ibid.

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provideincentivesforcompaniestomergeandconsolidatetoachievetheirobjectives(seebox).28

Examplesofmergercontrol

Whenreviewingmergers,acompetitionauthoritymayconsiderthefactorsofindustrialpolicytogether.Inthiscase,theopinionsofindustrialauthoritiesareoftenconsideredintheprocessofmergerreview.In2021,thecompetitionauthorityofChileapprovedthemergeroftheelectricpowercompanyunconditionally,consideringthatregulationsontheelectricityindustryhavealreadyrestrictedtheformationofmarketdominanceinthemarket.aTheNamibianCompetitionAct,enactedin2003,gavetheauthoritytoconductmergerreviewstothecompetitionauthorityofNamibia,requiringittonegotiatewithindustryauthoritiesthatpreviouslyhadmergerreviewauthority.AccordingtothememorandumofagreementsignedbythecompetitionauthorityofNamibiaandtheBankofNamibia,whichhadenjoyedtheauthoritytoreviewmergersofbanksbefore,mergerreviewsrelatedtocompetitionshouldbeconductedunderthecompetenceofthecompetitionauthorities,whiletheyshouldconsultwiththeNamibianbankstoreachaconclusion.b

Insomecases,theconclusionsofeachauthoritymayvarywhenthecompetitionauthorityandindustrialauthoritiessimultaneouslyconductmergerscreeningaccordingtotheirrespectivepolicygoals.InBrazil,thecompetitionauthorityclearedamergerofthecountry’slargestrailroadcompanyandalogisticscompany,subjecttobehaviouralremedies,suchassettingpricestandardsandrestrictingthesharingofsensitiveinformation,eventhoughthetransportauthorityhadformerlyclearedthecaseunconditionally.c

Indevelopingcountries,therearecaseswhereaclearconclusionhasnotbeenreachedonthejurisdictionofmergerreviewbetweenindustrialpolicyauthoritiespreviouslyinchargeofmergerscreeningandanewlyestablishedcompetitionauthority.InBangladesh,thetelecommunicationsregulatoryauthorityreviewedthemergerbetweentwotelecommunicationoperatorsin2016.Representativesfromthetelecommunicationsregulatoryauthoritybelievethattheauthorityistheprimaryagencyresponsibleforthepromotionofcompetitioninthetelecommunicationssector,whilethecompetitionauthorityofBangladeshmaintainsthatthecompetitionlawauthorizesthecountry’scompetitionauthoritytoapproveordisapprovemergersinthetelecommunicationssector.dInthecaseofBrazilaswell,thecompetitionauthorityandtheCentralBankofBrazilsignedamemorandumofunderstandingin2018toresolvetheambiguityofmergerreviewauthoritybetweenfinancialentities.e

aAvailableat/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Resolucion-F255-2020.pdf.

bSeeNamibia,NamibianCompetitionCommission,2012,Noticeintermsofsection67(3)ofthe

CompetitionAct,2003(ActNo.2of2003),GovernmentGazette

,memorandumofagreement.

cBrazil