国会研究服务部-阿曼：政治、安全与美国政策（英文）-2021.5-23正式版

Oman:Politics,Security,andU.S.Policy

UpdatedMay19,2021

CongressionalResearchService

RS21534

Oman:Politics,Security,andU.S.Policy

TheSultanateofOmanhasbeenastrategicpartneroftheUnitedStatessince1980,whenitbecamethefirstPersianGulfstatetosignaformalaccordpermittingtheU.S.militarytouseitsfacilities.OmanhashostedU.S.forcesduringeveryU.S.militaryoperationintheregionsincethen,anditisapartnerinU.S.effortstocounterterroristgroupsandotherregionalthreats.InJanuary2020,Oman’slong-timeleader,SultanQaboosbinSa’idAlSaid,passedawayandwassucceededbyHaythimbinTariqAlSaid,acousinselectedbyOman’sroyalfamilyimmediatelyuponQaboos’sdeath.SultanHaythimespousespoliciessimilartothoseofQaboosandhasnot

alteredU.S.-OmantiesorOman’sregionalpolicies.

SUMMARY

RS21534

May19,2021

KennethKatzman

SpecialistinMiddleEasternAffairs

DuringQaboos’sreign(1970-2020),OmangenerallyavoidedjoiningothercountriesintheGulfCooperationCouncil(GCC:SaudiArabia,Kuwait,UnitedArabEmirates,Bahrain,Qatar,andOman)inregionalmilitaryinterventions,insteadseekingtomediatetheirresolution.OmanjoinedbutdidnotcontributeforcestotheU.S.-ledcoalitionagainsttheIslamicStateorganization,nordiditarmgroupsfightingSyrianPresidentBasharAlAsad’sregime.ItopposedtheJune2017Saudi/UAE-ledisolationofQatarandhadurgedresolutionofthatriftbeforeitsresolutioninJanuary2021.

Oman’sleadershaveconsistentlyassertedthatengagingIranispreferabletoconfrontation.Oman’stiestoIranhaveenabledittobrokeragreementsbetweentheUnitedStatesandIranforthereleaseofU.S.citizensheldbyIranaswellasU.S.-IrandirecttalksthatlaterproducedtheJuly14,2015,Irannuclearagreement(JointComprehensivePlanofAction,JCPOA).Atthesametime,U.S.officialscreditOmanwithenforcingre-imposedU.S.sanctionsandwithtakingstepstoblockIran’s

effortstoshipweaponsacrossOman’sborderstoIran-backedHouthirebelsinYemen.

Duringhisreign,SultanQaboosdrewconsistentU.S.praiseforgraduallyopeningthepoliticalprocessintheabsenceofevidentpublicpressuretodoso,andforpromotingtheroleofwomeninsociety.TheliberalizationallowedOmanisameasureofrepresentationthroughelectionsforthelowerhouseofalegislativebody,butdidnotsignificantlylimittheSultan’sroleasparamountdecisionmaker.Publicclamorforfasterandmoreextensivepoliticalreform,andresentmentofinadequateemploymentopportunities,producedprotestsinseveralOmanicitiesformuchof2011,andfortwoweeksinJanuary2018,butgovernmentcommitmentstocreatejobsapparentlyhelpedcalmunrestineachinstance.Omanhasincreasedpresscensorshipandarrestedsomecriticswhousesocialmedia,ashavetheotherGCCstatessincethe2011Arabuprisings.

TheperiodicunrestmaydemonstratethatOmanishavingdifficultycopingwiththedeclineinthepriceofcrudeoilsincemid-2014.OmanisassessedbyinternationaleconomicobserversasparticularlyeconomicallyvulnerabletotheeconomiceffectsoftheCOVID-19pandemic,whichcausedafurtherdipinoilpricesaswellasaninterruptionoftourismandothersourcesofgovernmentrevenue.Asofmid-May,2021,Omanhasreportedover200,000COVID-19casesandover2,200deathsfromthedisease;nearly275,000vaccinedoseshavebeenadministered.Oman’seconomyandworkforcehasalwaysbeensomewhatmorediversifiedthansomeoftheotherGCCstates,asOmanhasonlymodestenergyresources.Thecountryhassoughttoattractforeigninvestment,includingtofundthedevelopmentofAlDuqmport,whichOmanandseveralpartnercountriesarebuildingintowhatOmanhopeswillbeamajortradinghub.The2006U.S.-Omanfreetradeagreement(FTA)wasintendedtofacilitateOman’saccesstothelargeU.S.economyandaccelerateOman’seffortstodiversify.OmanreceivessmallamountsofU.S.securityassistancefocusedprimarilyonbuildingcapacityofOman’scounterterrorismandborderandmaritimesecurityauthorities.

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Contents

HistoricalBackgroundandU.S.Relations

1

Democratization,HumanRights,andUnrest

3

RepresentativeInstitutions,ElectionHistory,andUnrest

4

UnrestCastsDoubtonSatisfactionwithPaceofPoliticalReform

5

RecentElections

6

BroaderHumanRightsIssues

7

FreedomofExpression,Media,andAssociation

7

TraffickinginPersonsandLaborRights

7

ReligiousFreedom

8

AdvancementofWomen

8

ForeignPolicy/RegionalIssues

9

Iran

9

CooperationagainsttheIslamicStateOrganization(ISIS)andonSyriaandIraq

12

Israeli-PalestinianDisputeandRelatedIssues

13

DefenseandSecurityIssues

14

Oman’sDefenseRelationswithotherMilitaries

15

U.S.ArmsSalesandOtherSecurityAssistancetoOman

15

CooperationagainstTerrorismandTerrorismFinancing

17

Anti-MoneyLaunderingandCounteringTerrorismFinancing(AML/CFT)

18

CounteringViolentExtremism

18

EconomicandTradeIssues

18

U.S.-OmanEconomicRelations

19

Figures

Figure1.Oman

2

Figure2.ThenewSultanHaythimbinTariqAlSaid

4

Tables

Table1.RecentU.S.AidtoOman

17

Contacts

AuthorInformation

20

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HistoricalBackgroundandU.S.Relations

OmanislocatedalongtheArabianSea,onthesouthernapproachestotheStraitofHormuz,acrossfromIran.ExceptforabriefperiodofPersianrule,OmanishaveremainedindependentsinceexpellingthePortuguesein1650.TheAlSaidmonarchybeganin1744,extendingOmaniinfluenceintoZanzibarandotherpartsofEastAfricauntil1861.SultanQaboosbinSa’idAlSaidwastheeighthinthelineofthemonarchy;hebecamesultaninJuly1970when,withBritishmilitaryandpoliticalsupport,hecompelledhisfather,SultanSaidbinTaymurAlSaid,toabdicate.Duringhisfather’sreign,Omanisneededthesultan’sapprovaleventowearspectaclesortoimportcement.UponQaboos’sdeath,HaythimbinTariqAlSaid,acousinofQaboos,becametheninthAlSaidmonarchonJanuary11,2020.

TheUnitedStateshashadrelationswithOmansincetheearlydaysofAmericanindependence.TheU.S.merchantshipRamblermadeaportvisittoMuscatinSeptember1790.TheUnitedStatessignedaTreatyofAmityandCommercewithOmanin1833,oneofthefirstofitskindwithanArabstate.ThistreatywasreplacedbytheTreatyofAmity,EconomicRelations,andConsularRightssignedatSalalahonDecember20,1958.OmansentanofficialenvoytotheUnitedStatesin1840.AU.S.consulatewasmaintainedinMuscatduring1880-1915,aU.S.embassywasopenedin1972,andthefirstresidentU.S.AmbassadorarrivedinJuly1974.OmanopeneditsembassyinWashington,DC,in1973.SultanQabooswasaccordedformalstatevisitsin1974,byPresidentGeraldFord,andin1983,byPresidentRonaldReagan.PresidentBillClintonvisitedOmaninMarch2000.CareerdiplomatLeslieTsoutookupherdutiesasAmbassadoronJanuary10,2020.

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Figure1.Oman

People Population:3.6million,ofwhichabout46%areexpatriates(2019est.)

Religions:Muslim(ofwhichIbadhisandSunnisareover90%,and5%areShia)86%;Christian6.5%;Hindu5.5%;Buddhist0.8%(2010est.)

Economy

GDPpurchasingpowerparity(PPP):$137billion

GDPpercapita(PPP):$31,101(2020)

GDPrealgrowthrate:-0.5%(2019):-6.2%(2020)

InflationRate:-0.9%(2020)

UnemploymentRate:3%YouthUnemployment:15.6%;FemaleUnemployment:10.2%(2021)

ForeignExchange/GoldReserves:$15billion(2020)

ExternalDebt:$75.4billion(2020)

Energy

OilProduction:951,000barrelsperday(2020);Reserves:4.8billionbarrels;Exports:722,000

barrelsperday(bpd)

NaturalGasProduction:875billioncubicfeetperyear;Reserves:30trillioncubicfeet;Exports:407

billioncubicfeetperyear

EnergySectorStructure:PetroleumDevelopmentOman(PDO)—apartnershipbetweenthe

Omanigovernment(60%),RoyalDutchShell,Total,andPartx(2%)controlsmostoilandnatural

gasresources

Trade

MajorPartners:China(mostlyoil),UAE,SouthKorea,Japan,India,UnitedStates,SaudiArabia

Source:GraphiccreatedbyCRSwithinformationfromCIA,TheWorldFactbook;WorldBank:Oman’sEconomicUpdate—May2021;EconomicIntelligenceUnitreportMarch2021;S&PGlobal;U.S.DepartmentofState,2020ReportonInternationalReligiousFreedom:Oman,May12,2021.

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Democratization,HumanRights,andUnrest

OmanremainsamonarchyinwhichdecisionmakinghasbeenconcentratedwiththeSultan.ThegovernmentreflectsthediversebackgroundsoftheOmanipopulation;manyofficialshavelong-standingfamilyconnectionstopartsofEastAfricathatOmanoncecontrolled,andtotheIndiansubcontinent.

Alongwithpoliticalreformissues,thequestionofsuccessionhaslongbeencentraltoobserversofOman.SultanQaboos’sbriefmarriageinthe1970sproducednochildren,andtheSultan,whowasborninNovember1940,hadnoheirapparentwhenhepassedawayonJanuary11,2020,afteralongillness.AccordingtoOmaniofficials,successionwouldbedecidedbya“RulingFamilyCouncil”ofhisrelativelysmallAlSaidfamily(about50malemembers)and,ifthefamilycouncilcouldnotreachagreementwithinthreedays,itwastoselectthesuccessorrecommendedbyQaboosinasealedlettertobeopeneduponhisdeath.1Uponhisdeath,theFamilyCouncilandaseparateDefenseCouncil,inatelevisedceremony,openedQaboos’sletterandnamedhischoice,HaythimbinTariqAlSaid,asthenewSultan.

Haythim,anOxford-educatedcousinofQaboos,isabout65yearsofage(bornOctober13,1954).Hehadservedsince2002asMinisterofHeritageandCultureandpreviouslyservedinseniorpositionsinOman’sforeignministry.Haythim’sselectionbypassedhistwoolderbrothers—AsadbinTariqandShihabbinTariq—whomanyexpertsconsideredweremorelikelysuccessorsthanHaythim.Uponassumingtheleadership,SultanHaythimindicatedacommitmenttocontinueQaboos’spolicies.2

“Explainer:HowOman’ssuccessionworkstodeterminethenextSultan,”AlArabiya,January11,2020.

“MeetOman’sNewSultan.HowWillHeNavigatetheRegion’sTurmoil?”WashingtonPost,January15,2020.

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Figure2.ThenewSultanHaythimbinTariqAlSaid

Source:TimesofOman.

RepresentativeInstitutions,ElectionHistory,andUnrest

ManyOmanis,U.S.officials,andinternationalobserverscreditedSultanQaboosforestablishingconsultativeinstitutionsandelectoralprocessesbeforetherewasevidentpublicpressuretodoso.Undera1996“BasicLaw,”Qabooscreatedabicameral“legislature”calledtheOmanCouncil,consistingoftheexistingConsultativeCouncil(MajlisAsShura)andanappointedStateCouncil(MajlisAdDawla).3TheConsultativeCouncilwasformedin1991toreplacea10-year-oldall-appointedadvisorycouncil.AMarch2011decreeexpandedtheOmanCouncil’spowerstoincludequestioningministers,selectingitsownleadership,andreviewinggovernment-draftedlegislation,butitstilldoesnothavethepowertodraftlegislationortooverturntheSultan’sdecreesorgovernmentregulations.AsintheotherGCCstates,formalpoliticalpartiesarenot

3BasicLawoftheSultanateofOman,November6,1996.

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allowedbut,unlikeBahrainorKuwait,well-defined“politicalsocieties”(de-factoparties)havenotdevelopedinOman.In2011,Qaboosinstitutedelectionsformunicipalcouncils.

ElectedConsultativeCouncil.Thesize,scopeofauthority,andtheelectorateforOman’selectedlegislaturehavegraduallyexpanded.Whenitwasformedin1991,theConsultativeCouncilhad59seats,andithasbeengraduallyexpandedsincetoitscurrentsizeof86seats.Inthe1994and1997selectioncyclesforthecouncil,“notables”ineachofOman’sdistrictsnominatedthreepersonsandQaboosselectedoneofthemtooccupythatdistrict’sseat.ThefirstdirectelectionswereheldinSeptember2000;holdersofahighschooloruniversitydegree,businessmen,andnotablescouldvote—anelectorateofabout25%ofthepopulationover21yearsofage.FortheOctober4,2003,election,votingrightswereextendedtoallcitizens,maleandfemale,over21yearsofage.Priorto2011,theSultanselectedtheConsultativeCouncilchairman;sincethen,thechairmanandadeputychairmanhavebeenelectedbytheCouncilmembership.ThemorerecentConsultativeCouncilelectionsarediscussedbelow.

TheStateCouncilremainsanall-appointedbody,andarguablyactsasacounterweighttotheConsultativeCouncilbybeingabletoblocklegislativeinitiativesoftheConsultativeCouncil.Itssizehasexpandedfrom53membersatinceptionto86members—equaltotheConsultativeCouncil.Appointeesareusuallyformerhigh-rankinggovernmentofficials,militaryofficials,triballeaders,andothernotables.

UnrestCastsDoubtonSatisfactionwithPaceofPoliticalReform

Despitethegradualreforms,prominentOmanispetitionedSultanQaboosin2010fora“contractualconstitution”thatwouldprovideforafullyelectedlegislature.InFebruary2011,afterpro-democracyprotestssweptthroughseveralArabcountries,protestsbrokeoutinOmanaswell.Manyprotesterscalledformorejobopportunitieswhereasotherscalledforafullyelectedlegislature,buttherewerenoevidentcallsfortheSultantoresign.Thegovernmentcalmedtheunrest—whichspannedmostof2011—throughacombinationofreformsandpunishments,includingexpandingthepowersoftheOmanCouncilandcreatingadditionalpublicsectorjobs.Thejournalists,bloggers,andotheractiviststhatwerearrestedduringtheunrestfor“defamingtheSultan,”“illegalgathering,”orviolatingthecountry’scyberlawswerepardonedandthosewhoweredismissedfrompublicandprivatesectorjobsforparticipatinginunrestwerereinstated.4

SmalldemonstrationsoccurredagainfortwoweeksinJanuary2018.Protestersgenerallycitedwhattheydescribeasalackofjobopportunitiesratherthandemandingpoliticalreform.Inresponse,thegovernmentreiteratedanOctober2017plantocreate25,000jobsforOmanicitizensandbannedtheissuanceofnewvisasforexpatriateworkersin87privatesectorprofessions.ThegovernmenthasalsotakenstepstoincreasethenumberofOmaninationalsinprivatesectorjobsbyincreasingthefeesforsponsoringexpatriateemployeesandreservingcertainprofessionsforcitizens.AftertheoutbreakoftheCOVID-19pandemic,thegovernmentencouragedcompaniestoreplaceforeignworkerswithnationals,andurgedprivatefirmstoasksomeexpatriatestoleavethecountrypermanently.5TheWorldBankreportsthatbetweenJanuaryof2020and2021,thenumberofexpatriatesemployedintheprivatesectordecreased14%,comparedtojust3.1%fornationalsoverthesameperiod.6Thegovernmentinstituteditsfirst-everunemploymentinsuranceschemeinNovember2020tocoverallOmaniworkersinthe

JamesWorrall.“Oman:The‘Forgotten’CorneroftheArabSpring,”MiddleEastPolicy,September2012.

“Omantellsstatefirmstofireexpats,hirelocals:ONA,”AlJazeera,April29,2020.

WorldBank,“Oman,”MacroPovertyOutlook,April2021.

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public,private,militaryandsecuritysectorswhohavelosttheiremploymentinvoluntarily,ameasurethatanalystsexpectwillhelpthecountryrespondtotheeconomicshockscausedbyCOVID-19.7

RecentElections

TheOctober15,2011,ConsultativeCouncilelectionswentforwardamidsttheunrest.PerhapsbecauseoftheenhancementoftheOmanCouncil’spowers,about1,330candidatesappliedtorun—a70%increasefromthe2007vote.Arecord77candidateswerewomen;onewomanwaselected.Somereformistswereheartenedbythevictoryoftwopoliticalactivists,SalimbinAbdullahAlOufi,andTalibAlMaamari,andtheselectionofarelativelyyoungentrepreneurasspeakeroftheConsultativeCouncil(Khalidal-Mawali).IntheStateCouncilappointments,theSultanappointed15women,bringingthetotalfemaleparticipationintheOmanCouncilto16—over10%.8

In2012,thegovernmentalsoinitiatedelectionsfor11municipalcouncils,bodiesthatmakerecommendationstothegovernmentondevelopmentprojects,butdonotmakefinalfundingdecisions.Thechairmananddeputychairmanofeachmunicipalcouncilareappointedbythegovernment.IntheDecember22,2012municipalelections,therewere192seatsupforelection.Thereweremorethan1,600candidates,including48women.About546,000citizensvoted.Fourwomenwereelected.

AnotherelectiontotheConsultativeCouncilwasheldonOctober25,2015.Atotalof674candidatesappliedtorun,although75candidateswerebarred,apparentlybasedontheirparticipationinthe2011unrest.Therewere20womencandidates.Theoneincumbentwomanwasreelectedbutnootherwomanwaselected.

OnDecember25,2016,thesecondmunicipalelectionswereheldtochoose202councilors—anexpandednumberfromthe2012municipalelections.Therewere731candidates,ofwhom23werewomen.Sevenwomenwereelected.

2019Elections9

ThemostrecentConsultativeCouncilelectionswereheldonOctober27,2019.OnJuly7,2019,thegovernmentissuedapreliminarylistof767candidates,including43women,butthefinalapprovedlistcontained637candidates,ofwhich40werewomen.Therewere713,000eligiblevoters.Turnoutwasdescribedashigh,andtwowomenwonseatsinthefinalresults,whichwereannouncedOctober29,2019.KhalidbinHilalal-MawaliwaselectedtoathirdtermasspeakeroftheConsultativeCouncil,andoveralltheCouncilappearedtorepresentcontinuityinOman’spoliticalprocessratherthandramaticchange.OnNovember8,2019,QaboosappointedthemembersoftheStateCouncil,including15women.ThenextelectionsforConsultativeCouncilarescheduledfor2023.

InternationalLabourOrganization,“Omaninstitutesitsfirstunemploymentinsurancescheme,”news,October16,

2020.

“15WomeninNewOmaniStateCouncil,”AlSharqAlAwsat,November8,2019.

See“15WomeninNewOmaniStateCouncil,”Op.cit.

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BroaderHumanRightsIssues10

AccordingtothemostrecentStateDepartmentreportonhumanrights,theprincipalhumanrightsissuesinOmanare:“restrictionsonfreeexpression,thepress,andtheinternet,includingcensorship,siteblocking,andcriminallibellaws;substantialinterferencewiththerightsofpeacefulassemblyandfreedomofassociation;requiredexitpermitsforforeignworkers;restrictionsonpoliticalparticipation;andcriminalizationofconsensuallesbian,gay,bisexual,transgender,andintersexconduct.”

Thelawprovidesforanindependentjudiciary,buttheSultanchairsthecountry’shighestlegalbody,theSupremeJudicialCouncil,whichcanreviewjudicialdecisions.TheOmanHumanRightsCommission,aquasi-independentbutgovernment-sanctionedbody,investigatesandmonitorsprisonanddetentioncenterconditionsthroughsitevisits.

FreedomofExpression,Media,andAssociation

Omanilawprovidesforlimitedfreedomofspeechandpress,buttheStateDepartmentassessesthatthegovernmentgenerallydoesnotrespecttheserights.InOctober2015,OmanfollowedtheleadofmanyoftheotherGCCstatesinissuingadecreeprohibitingdisseminatinginformationthattargets“theprestigeoftheState’sauthoritiesoraimedtoweakenconfidenceinthem.”Thegovernmenthasprosecuteddissidentbloggersandcyber-activistsunderthatandotherlaws.11Omanilawprovidesforfreedomofassociationfor“legitimateobjectivesandinapropermanner,”enablingthegovernmenttorestrictsuchrightsinpractice.AssociationsmustregisterwiththeMinistryofSocialDevelopment.

Privateownershipofradioandtelevisionstationsisnotprohibited,buttherearefewprivatelyownedstations.Satellitedisheshavemadeforeignbroadcastsaccessibletothepublic.Still,accordingtotheStateDepartmentreport,therearesomelegalandpracticalrestrictionstointernetusage,andmanyinternetsitesareblockedforcontentthegovernmentdecidesisobjectionable.

TraffickinginPersonsandLaborRights

AccordingtotheStateDepartmentTraffickinginPersonsreports,OmanisadestinationandtransitcountryformenandwomenprimarilyfromSouthAsiaandEastAfricawhoaresubjectedtoforcedlaborand,toalesserextent,sextrafficking.The2018,2019,and2020TraffickinginPersonsreportsratedOmanasTier2,basedonthegovernment’sinvestigating,prosecuting,andconvictingmoresuspectedtraffickersthaninpreviousyearsandinstandingupaspecializedanti-traffickingprosecutorialunit.12Thegovernmentalsodeveloped,funded,andbeganimplementinganewfive-yearnationalactionplantocombattraffickinginpersons.

Onbroadlaborrights,Omaniworkershavetherighttoformunionsandtostrike(exceptintheoilandgasindustry),howevernoindependentorganizedlaborunionsexist.Onegovernment-backedfederationoftradeunionsexists—theGeneralFederationofOmanTradeUnions.Thecallingofastrikerequiresanabsolutemajorityofworkersinanenterprise.Thelaborlawspermitcollectivebargainingandprohibitemployersfromfiringorpenalizingworkersforunionactivity.LaborrightsareregulatedbytheMinistryofManpower.

Muchofthissection,includingitssubsections,isderivedfromtheStateDepartment’scountryreportonhumanrightspracticesfor2020;oninternationalreligiousfreedom(2020)andontraffickinginpersons(2020).

“Omaniauthoritiesrestrictfreeexpressionthroughcensorshipandarrestsofactivists,”Monitor:TrackingCivicSpace,September6,2017.

U.S.DepartmentofState,2020TraffickinginPersonsReport:Oman,June25,2020.

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Somemeasurestoreformthekafalaorvisa-sponsorshipemploymentsystemhavebeenimplemented,suchastheJune2020removalofarequirementformigrantworkerstoobtaina“no-objection”certificatefromtheircurrentemployerbeforechangingjobs.However,theStateDepartmentreportsthat“migrantworkers,employedasdomesticworkersoraslow-skilledworkersintheconstruction,agriculture,andservicesectors,facedworkingconditionsindicativeofforcedlabor,includingwithholdingofpassports,restrictionsonmovement,usuriousrecruitmentfees,nonpaymentofwages,longworkinghourswithoutfoodorrest,threats,andphysicalorsexualabuse.”13Migrantlaborersconstituteapproximately80%ofthelaborforceinOman.

ReligiousFreedom14

Omanhashistoricallyhadahighdegreeofreligioustolerance,particularlycomparedtosomeoftheotherGCCstatessuchasBahrainandSaudiArabia.Anestimated45%-75%(governmentfigure)ofOmanisadheretotheIbadhisect,arelativelymoderateschoolofIslamcenteredmostlyinOman,EastAfrica,andinpartsofAlgeria,Libya,andTunisia.15About5%ofOman’scitizensareShiaMuslims,andtheyareallowedtoadjudicatefamilyandpersonalstatuscasesaccordingtoShiajurisprudence,outsidethecivilcourtsystem.

TheStateDepartmentreligiousfreedomreportnotesnoknowninstancesofsocietalabusesordiscriminationbasedonreligiousaffiliationorpractice.Non-Muslims,whoaremostlyexpatriatesworkinginOman,arefreetoworshipattemplesandchurchesbuiltonlanddonatedbythegovernmentbut,accordingtolaw,offendingIslamoranyAbrahamicreligionisacriminaloffense.InJanuary2018,anewpenalcodesignificantlyincreasedpenaltiesforblasphemyandforpromotingareligionotherthanIslam.

AllreligiousorganizationsmustberegisteredwiththeMinistryofEndowmentsandReligiousAffairs(MERA).Amongnon-MuslimsponsorsrecognizedbyMERAaretheProtestantChurchofOman;theCatholicDioceseofOman;thealAmanaCenter(interdenominationalChristian);andtheHinduMahajanTemple.Buddhistsareabletoworshipinprivatespaces,buthavenotbeenabletobuildseparateplacesofworship.MembersofallreligionsandsectsarefreetomaintainlinkswithcoreligionistsabroadandtraveloutsideOmanforreligiouspurposes.MERAhasallowedconstructionofanewbuildingforOrthodoxChristians,withseparatehallsforSyrian,Coptic,andGreekOrthodoxChristians,andithasapprovedworshipspaceforBaptists.AnewCatholicchurchwasinauguratedinSalalahinSeptember2019.TheChurchofJesusChristofLatterDaySaints(Mormons)hasnotreceivedapprovaltoestablishanindependentplaceofworship.ThereisnoindigenousJewishpopulation,andprivatemediahaveoccasionallypublishedanti-Semiticeditorialcartoons.

AdvancementofWomen

Duringhisreign,SultanQaboosemphasizedth