组织经济学与管理学ch15-Complement课件

Chapter15ComplementarityGeorgeHendrikseEconomicsandManagementofOrganisations:Co-ordination,MotivationandStrategy

Firmsarecomplexmechanismsforcoordinatingandmotivatingindividuals’activities.Theyhavetodealwithamuchrichervarietyofproblemsthansimplytheprovisionofinvestmentincentivesandtheresolutionofhold-ups.Ownershippatternsarenotdeterminedsolelybytheneedtoprovideinvestmentincentives,andincentivesforinvestmentareprovidedbyavarietyofmeans,ofwhichownershipisjustone.Thus,approachesthatfocusononeincentiveproblemthatissolvedbytheuseofasingleinstrumentgivemuchtoolimitedaviewofthenatureofthefirm,andonethatispotentiallymisleading.FigureVI.1:Positioning

Example:

Marketingandproduction

Boeing“Recordsales,RecordLosses.”EquilibriaMarketing:Low Production:FullcapacityandMarketing:High Production:ExcesscapacityComplementarityDoingmoreofoneactivityincreasesthereturntodoingmoreoftheotheractivity.TopicsConceptoforganisationAlignmentprinciplesDriversofsystemchangeSystemchangepace1.ConceptoforganisationSystemofattributesFigureVI.2:Viewofthefirmfromanalignmentperspective

PartVII:SystemofattributesExamplesofattributesProductstrategyMarketingpolicy ManufacturingpolicyEquipmentchoicePersonnelandcompensationpoliciesSupplierrelationsAccountingmethodsOrganisationscanbeanalysedassystemsofattributeswhichhavetobealigned.

Organisational

consistency/coherencebecomesthemaintheme.ResultThereisnosingle‘best’organisationaldesign,i.e.thereareseveralalignedsystemsofattributes.Complementarities(synergy,fit)leadtopredictablerelationshipsamongactivities.2.AlignmentprinciplesEqualcompensationprincipleLawoflargenumbersOrthogonalityInfluencecosts2.1.EqualcompensationprincipleChapter6Example:

physicaltherapistThreeattributes:x1:Taskfreedom(S(mall)orL(arge))x2:Pieceratewage(L(ow)orH(igh))x3:Ownershipequipment(Y(es)orN(o))Thereareeightpossibleorganisationalformsregardingthephysicaltherapist.Whichorganisationalformsareequilibria?OrganisationB -Taskfreedom:S -Piecerate:L -Ownership:N ‘Employee/Make’OrganisationG -Taskfreedom:L -Piecerate:H -Ownership:Y ‘Independent/Buy’Observation6organisationalformsarenotequilibria!Howdoyourepresenttheseorganisationalformsinafigure?X2X3X1‘Make’‘Make’‘Make’SLLHNY‘Buy’‘Buy’‘Buy’Figure14.19:Asystemwith3attributes2.2.LawoflargenumbersVarianceofsampleaveragedecreaseswhenthesamplesizeincreases.Productiontoorderversus

deliveryfromstockExample:StrategyfordealingwithuncertaintyinventorieslearningdemandbeforeproductionCostinputwastedexpostinformationacquisitionPoolingofuncertaindemands LawoflargenumbersEconomiesofscaleininventoryEquilibria?

Is37%toorderand63%toinventoryanequilibriumpolicy/strategyfordealingwithuncertainty?

No.Eitherallproductionistoinventoryorallistoorder.Nashequilibria/ProfitmaximisingstrategyFigure15.3:Choiceofassortmentanddeliverypolicy

ComparativestatisticsanalysisInventoriesmoreattractivewhen: Productioncostsdecrease Pricesdecrease Marketincreases Costmarketresearchincreases DemanduncertaintydecreasesApplications Publishingindustry Flexibleproductiontechnology Semiconductorindustry Schedulingcoursesinuniversity RestaurantbusinessRealorganisationshavemanymoreattributesthanjustinventoriesandassortmentpolicy.Figure15.4:Massproductionversusleanmanufacturing

Figure15.4specifies16attributesInhowmanydifferentwayscanthisfactory/enterprisebeorganised?Howmanyequilibriaarethere?Answers(wheneachattributehastwopossiblevalues):216~65,000organisationalformsarepossible.Twoequilibria,i.e.twocoherent/consistent/alignedsystemsofattributes.

Everystructureofinfoprocessingentailstheinevitabilityofacertaindistortionofinformation,e.g.architecturechoice(12.6),organisationalstructureandpartitioning(12.3).

2.3.OrthogonalityTheshortsightednessentailedbythechoiceofoneattributeiscompensatedforbytheshortsightednessofthechoiceoftheotherattribute.PracticeUseseveralcontrolsystemsatthesametime.Mostinformationisgeneratedbyarranginginformationchannelsinanorthogonalway.

ExampleDivisionalstructure:Profitabilityofproductknown.Functionalaccounting:Discussionaboutcharacteristicsoftheproductsbetweendivisions.Figure15.5:Organisationalstructureandaccountingsystem

Figure15.6:AmericanandJapaneselabourcontracts

JapanversusUnitedStatesEquilibria1. J-wayA-wayJ-way:EmphasisoninformationexchangeA-way:Emphasisoneconomicsofscale.Choiceoforganisation?Figure15.7:Innovation,uncertaintyandorganisation

2.4.InfluencecostsCostsofactivitiesaimedatcapturingorganisationalrents(chapter8).

Example:

physicaltherapistThreeattributes:x1:Labourmarket(F(lexible)orR(igid))x2:Salarydifferentials(L(arge)orS(mall))x3:Decisionmaking(P(articipative)or N(ot))Figure15.8:Labourmarket,salarydifferencesanddecisionmaking

TwoEquilibriaOrganisationA -Labourmarket:F -Salarydifferentials:L -Decision-making:N ‘A-way’OrganisationH -Labourmarket:R -Salarydifferentials:S -Decision-making:Y ‘J-way’3.DriversofsystemchangeRepeatedinteractionconsiderationsCostsoftradeexpansionStabilityoftheenvironment3.1.RepeatedinteractionsFolktheorem(chapter10)indicateswhatdeterminestheattractivenessoflong-termrelationships.Figure15.9:Twocoherentsystemsoftheverticalrelation

Choiceoforganisation?ReductioninICTcostshascausedashiftfrom‘Make’to‘Buy’.Figure15.10:Asystemwith3attributes

X2X3X1Figure15.11:Asystemwith8attributes

‘Make’‘Make’‘Make’‘Make’‘Make’‘Make’‘Make’‘Make’‘Buy’‘Buy’‘Buy’‘Buy’‘Buy’‘Buy’‘Buy’‘Buy’X7X3X1X4X2X83.2.CostsoftradeexpansionRelationshipbetweenwholesalersandrepresentatives.Howdodifferentmonitoringandenforcementtechnologiesfunctioninvarioussettings?Evaluatetheeffectivenessofformalandinformalinstitutions/contracts.12thcenturyMediterraneanNorthernAfrica:relation-based(Maghribi)tradingsystemGenoaregion:rule-basedtradingsystemMaghribi:

DescendantsofJewishmerchantswholeftthepoliticallyunstableBaghdadofthetenthcenturyforNorthernAfrica.

Maghrib:

WesternmostpartoftheMuslimworld.MultilateralreputationmechanismAlltraderscollectivelypunishsomeonewhodoesnotabidebytherules.Thesocialandcommercialnetworkgeneratedtherequiredinformationtodetectfraudandtospreadthenews.Newtraderswereonlyrecruitedfromthelocalcommunity.

(Itwasaclosedcommunity.)Twowaysofcreatingconsensusregardingcheating:CultureHierarchy,i.e.authorityrelationship.DifferencesCulture:learnexante,nocommunicationrequiredexpostHierarchy:nolearningexante,communicationrequiredexpostFigure15.12:Twoalignedtradingsystemsinthetwelfthcentury

Choiceoforganisation?Relation-basedGovernancecostsRule-basedMarketsizeAnincreaseinmarketsizemadetheMaghribitradingsystemobsolete.

3.3.StabilityoftheenvironmentAlignmentoforganisationandstrategyExploiterandexplorerprofilesChoiceoforganisation?NatureoftheenvironmentStableenvironment:ExploiterRapidlychangingenvironment:Explorer4.SystemchangepaceBig-BangchangeGradualchange4.1Big-bangchangeUndesirabilityofgradualchangeDifferentpaceofchangeofvariousattributesDrivingattributesofchangeA.UndesirabilityofgradualchangeExample:

changingtrafficrulesSupposetheUKswitchestothecontinentaltrafficsystemof‘keepingright’.Isa‘gradual’changeor‘Big-bang’changedesirable?TrucksCarsLeftRightLeftRight(1,1)(-10,-10)(-10,-10)(1,1)Thesystemofattributesviewadvocatesa

Big-bangchange!

Implication:

Apolicyof‘best-practice’isundesirablebecauseitignoresthecomplementaritiesbetweenthevariousattributes.B.Differe