全球粮食安全局+未来的贸易情景及其对农业经济的影响

Futuretradescenariosandtheimpactonagriculturaleconomies

GlobalFoodSecurity(GFS)isamulti-agencyprogramme,hostedbyUK

ResearchandInnovation,bringingtogetherthemainUKfundersofresearch

andtrainingrelatingtofood.GFSpublicationsprovidebalancedanalysisof

foodsecurityissuesonthebasisofcurrentevidence,forusebypolicy-makers

andpractitioners.

TempAgwasaninternationalcollaborativeresearchnetworkestablishedto

increasetheimpactofagriculturalresearchintheworld’stemperateregions.

ThenetworkwasestablishedinApril2015withsupportfromtheOECDGlobal

ScienceForum.Thenetwork’sactivitywasjointlycoordinatedbytheGlobal

FoodSecurity(GFS)programmeandINRA(NationalInstituteofAgricultural

Research,France)

ThisreportdoesnotnecessarilyreflectthepolicypositionsoftheGlobalFood

SecurityProgramme’sindividualpartners.

Furtherinformation

www.foodsecurity.ac.uk

Email:info@foodsecurity.ac.uk

@FoodSecurityUK

C0ntents

ExecutiveSummary2

Introductionandbackground3

Methodology4

Stimuluspaper4

Futurescenariosworkshops4

Thecriticaluncertaintiesandthetwokeyuncertainties5

Fourplausiblescenariosforthefutureofglobaltradeandagri-foodsystems6

Scenario1:Obama’sLegacyorBrexitBelief7

Scenario2:Trump’sTriumphorDistrustandDisruption9

Scenario3:PrecautionaryProgress11

Scenario4:ConservativeNationalismorTheEmpireStrikesBack13

Robustpolicyinterventionsacrossthefourscenarios15

Commonsetofactionsanddecisionstomaximisebenefitsandminimisecosts15

Conclusions17

Annex1:Stimuluspaperonscenariosforthefutureoffood.18

Summary18

Introduction19

1.Abriefhistoryoffoodsystems20

Transformingthefoodsystem21

Theroleoftradeandthe“CheaperFoodParadigm”22

2.Isthefuture‘designed’bytrendsorevents?24

Theroleofeventsinshapingthefuture25

3.Thinkingaboutanuncertainfuture:strategisingunderuncertainty26

SummarisingtheWEFscenarios26

Scenario1:Uncheckedconsumptioninaglobalisedworld28

Scenario2:Sovereign(in)sufficiency28

Scenario3:Global,greenandhealthy29

Scenario4:Localisedandsustainable29

4.Utilisingthescenariosforstress-testingdecisions30

Conclusions30

Annex2:Knownknowns31

Annex3:Workshopattendees31

References32

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Ascenariosexercisewasconductedtoexplorehoweconomic,social,environmentalandpoliticaldriversmayimpactfuturetrade,andhowthisinturnmightshapeagriculturaleconomies,andtheirresearchagendas,globally.

Ensuringanequitablefoodsystemfortheglobalpopulationwillrequireafundamentaloverhaulofthecurrentfood-system;buttheabilityofthefoodsystemtochange,andthewayitcanchange,willbelargelydeterminedbythenatureofdriversinthefuture.Delayingactiontotransformthefoodsystemwillsubsequentlyaccruecostsintothelongterm,andenhancevolatilityinthefoodsystem.Foodproductionmustchange,withalargerfocusonqualityratherquantityofagriculturalproduction.Thiswouldalloware-designofagriculturalsystems,themitigationofriskinsupplychainsandenablediversifieddiets.Thisrequiresagreaterrecognitionoftheneedfordemand-side,ratherthanonlysupply-side,measurestoaffectthistransition.Farmersandproducersneedsupportiveinvestment(throughresearch,subsidies,marketmeasuresandcapacitybuilding)toincentivisetheproductionofhealthyandsustainablefood.Likewise,investmentinthebestwaystoincludecitizensinsuchatransformationisrequired:perhapsthroughincreasingawareness,changingpricesandprovidingotherincentivesandsupporttoencourageconsumerstoconsumeamoreresourceefficient,healthyanddiversedietintheirrespectivefutures.

Climatechangewillincreasethenumberandimpactofbothslowandfast-onsetclimateimpacts.Failuresofcropproductionhaveinthepastgeneratedsystemwideshocks,andinfuturesucheventsmaybecomemoresevereandmorefrequent.Agriculturaleconomieswillhavetoadoptinnovativeadaptationmeasuresandensuremitigationfromtheagriculturalsectorinordertotackleclimatechange,andimport-dependentcountriesneedanincreasingfocusonbuildingresilienceoftheirfoodsystemtosuchshocks.

Climatechangeisamajorthreattoproductionandtradeinagriculturaleconomies,duetoimpactsonproduction,ontradeandmarkets,andthewiderwaythatclimateimpactsmaydrivegeopoliticalenvironmentstounderminethecurrentsystem.Thecurrenthighlyconnectedsystemisparticularlyvulnerablebecauseofrelianceonasmallnumberofcropsfromalimitednumberofproductiveregionsacrosstheworld,

anditunderpinsdietsthatinmanyareasunderminethegoalsofpublichealth(whichinturnundermineseconomicgrowth).Anincreaseindiversityoffoodproductionandinthefoodbasketregionscouldincreasetheresilienceofthesystemtoinevitableshocksaswellasimprovetheoutcomesfromthesystem.

Thescenariosindicatethatthepath-dependencyofthefuturesuggestsrelianceon‘silver-bullet’techno-optimism

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maybearisk.Recentliteratureoninnovationinfoodsystems(Barrettetal2020a;Barrettetal2020b)reinforcesthispoint:asingletechnologyisrarelygoingtoworkatscalewithoutimpactingnegativelyonsomeimportantaspects(suchasinequality,healthorenvironmentaloutcomes)indifferentcontexts.Theavailabilityofadvancedtechnologiesforagriculturalproduction,differentialimpactsofclimatechangeinvariousregionsandcountries,preferentialtradelinksbetweenHICsandadvantageousbilateralagreementswillexacerbateinequalitybetweencountriesandregions,withoutintervention.Investmentdecisionsfortechnologicaldevelopmentneedtofactorintheneedforamultiplicityofsolutionsfortherangeofgoodsproduced,inarangeoffarmingsystems,contextdependenciesandgeographies,aswellasthemultipleobjectives(sustainability,equity,nutritionalhealth,economics),ratherthanfocusonafewsilver-bulletsolutionsformajorcommoditieswithinintensiveagriculture.

Aswellastheexactpathaheadbeinguncertain,andthereforedifficulttopredictwhattoolswillbeneeded,thescenariosemphasisetheunpredictabilityandvolatilityofthefuture.Needswillchangeinshortorder,anddecisionsaboutpoliciesandinvestmentsinthetechnologyecosystemneedtoincreasinglyaddressthis,aswellasanynormativevisionforthefuture.

Executivesummary

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Introductionandbackground

The2030AgendaforSustainableDevelopmentrecognises

internationaltradeasanengineforinclusiveeconomicgrowth

andpovertyreduction.Traderelationshipscontributeto

shapingagricultureandfoodsystems,includingpolicyand

researchagendas.Thepastfewyearshavedemonstratedthat

thepost-wararchitectureofmultilateralcooperationisatrisk

duetonational,inwardlookingagendas,andamovetowards

competitionratherthancooperationbetweenstates.Ifthe

lastfewyears’eventsareprojectedforwards,therewillbe

potentiallyfar-reachingconsequences,includingontheway

tradebetweennationsdevelops.

TheTempAgnetworkcommissionedChathamHouse

andNewZealand’sOurLandandWaterNationalScience

Challengetoconductascenariosexercisetoexplorehow

economic,social,environmentalandpoliticaldriversmay

impactfuturetrade,andhowthisinturnmightshape

agriculturaleconomies,andtheirresearchagendas,globally.

Scenariosaresetsofplausibleassumptionsaboutthehowtheworldmightworkinthefuture;typicallypresentedasrich,dialoguedrivennarratives.Scenarioexercisesattempttodisruptourlinearthoughtpattern,throughtheexplorationofpossiblefuturesinordertoinformpresent-daydecision-making.Scenarioexercisesdonotaimtopredictthefuture.Rather,bydiscussingarangeofplausiblefutures,theyenablethediscussionofhowtoday’sdecisionsmayplayoutif,andwhen,theworldchanges.Asanexerciseitforcesustoacknowledgethattoday’strendsmaynotbeshapingourworldin20or30years,butthattoday’spoliciesmaynonethelessbeinfluentialinshapingtheoptionsavailabletousinthefuture.Insomecases,today’sdecisions,madefortoday’spriorities,maylockusintocertainwaysofdealingwiththefuture’sproblems.Therefore,thinkingthroughalternativefuturescanhelptoensurethattoday’sdecision-makingisrobust.Scenariosalsoforceustothinkaboutaccentuatingwhatmightbepositiveinthefuture,andallowustocourse-correct.

‘Futuresthinking’isimportantbecauseofthelong-termnatureofaddressingbigchallenges,suchasprovidinghigh-qualitydietstoallfromtheglobalfoodsysteminasustainableway.Inshort,scenarioplanningisaboutthinkingthroughwhatcouldhappen,andwhattheimpactmightbe.

Governments,privatesector,civilsocietyandacademicshavewidelyused‘futures’researchapproachestounderstandandassesstheirdevelopmentneeds,wherescenariosabouthowtheworldmightbeinthefuturearegeneratedandusedto‘stresstest’theinstitutionalabilitytocopewiththeunexpected,define‘pathways’ofdecisionmakingtoavoidundesirablefuturesandtodefineinnovationneedsbasedonsetsofassumptions.

Humansystemsareincreasinglyinterconnected(acrosssectorsandspace)(Liuetal.,2015),sothatsignificantsocialdeterminants(likefood)inanyonecountrydependonaccesstoland,water,energy,finance,transport,ITandsatellitesandmoreatmultiplespatialscales(Benton,2019).Giventherapidlychanginglandscapearoundfood,itsenvironmentalandhealthimpacts,theimpactofclimatechangeandgeopoliticsonproductionandtradenetworks,andpotentialchangesininternationalrules-basedcooperation,plausiblescenariosthatarenotbasedon“businessasusualthinking”areincreasinglyusefulandrequired.Thescenariosliteratureemphasisesthattheyaremostusefulwhenthereisuncertaintyaboutsomeofthefactorsthatmayshapethefutureandwhenarangeofoutcomesmaybeplausible,astheyprovidethebasisforchallengingembeddedwaysofthinkingthatmayconstrainpreparednessforalternativefutures.Giventheunsustainabilityofthecurrentfoodsystem,andtheuncertaintysurroundinghowitmayevolve,scenario

analysiscanbeausefultoolforimaginingplausiblefuturesasanaidtounlocking‘businessasunusual’perspectives(Benton,2019).

Thescenariosexercisedescribedinthisreportprovidedanopportunitytoconsiderarangeofplausiblefuturesandtheirimplicationsforthetradesystem,andsubsequentimpactsonlocalagricultureandresearch.Theoutcomewasasetofplausiblescenariosandanexplorationoftheinterventionsthatmighthelptominimisenegativeimpactsandmaximisepositiveimpacts.

Thefollowingsectionsdetailthescenariosexercise

methodologyandoutcomes,concludingwithasetof

interventionsapplicableacrossallscenarios.

Thescenariosexerciseconsistedofthreeworkshopsandapre-circulatedstimuluspaper.

Stimuluspaper

Aheadoftheworkshops,astimuluspaperwasdevelopedanddistributedtoparticipants(Annex1).ThepaperwasstructuredaroundthefuturedriversforagriculturaleconomiesinEuropeandAustralasia,withaparticularfocusonthefutureoftrade,andhowitwilllikelyshapetheagriculturalsector(anditsresearchneeds)withinthebroadercontextofcountries’foodsystems.Thepaperpresentsbackgroundmaterialaboutthecurrentgloballyintegratedfoodsystem,whichhasdevelopedonthebasisthatcheaperfood–throughmaximisingproduction–isapublicgood,withintensificationandliberalisedtradeastwoprincipalmechanismsforachievingit.Thepaperhighlightsthattheworldiscurrentlychangingveryfast,andtheinternationalstabilitytakenforgrantedinrecentdecadesisnowlessassured(fromthecombinationofenvironmental-change-inducedshocksandchanginggeopoliticalandsocialdrivers),andthatrobustdecisionmakingrequiresconsiderationofarangeofplausiblefutures.

Futurescenariosworkshops

Thescenariosexercisewasconductedviathreeonlineworkshops,overthreedaysfrom15-19March2021.Eachworkshoplasted2.5hours,with30participantsfromindustry,civilsociety,academia,andNGOsbasedintheUK,EUandNewZealand.Theaimwastoexplorehoweconomic,social,environmentalandpoliticaldriversmayimpactonfuturetrade,andshapeagriculturaleconomiesgloballyoverthenextfewdecades.Theworkshopswerestructuredaroundplenaryandbreak-outsessions,withanadditiveflowofcontentandactivitiesdesignedtoculminatewithasetofplausiblefuturescenariosandrelatedtradeimplications–followingthefourstagestypicallyusedinscenarioplanning(figure1).

Thefirstworkshopsetoutthebackgroundfromthestimuluspaperandtheworkshopmethods,includingthescenariobuildingprocess.Participantsproducedasetofkeydriversof thefutureandclassifiedtheminto‘knownunknowns’and‘knownknowns’.

Thekeydriversacrosssocial,technical,economicandenvironmentaldomainsthatwillimpingeoninternationalfoodtrade(includingtradepolicy)–suchaschangingdemand,changingpolicies,changingdisruptionsfromclimatechangeorgeopoliticaltrends–werediscussed.Thesekeydriverscouldbenormative(e.g.actionstoshifttowardssustainable/healthydiets);couldresultfromaneconomicorpolicydriver(e.g.maximisingGDP,mitigatingclimate

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Develop

plausible

scenarios

Figure1:Fourstagesofscenarioplanning.

change),orcouldresultfromanevent(peaceorwar).Thesedriverswerecategorised,throughdiscussion,intothosethatarepredictablewithsomeaccuracyasthe‘knownknowns’(e.g.increasingpopulationsize)–withacriticalassessmentofwhatis‘known’versuswhatisprojectedbasedontoday’sassumptionsthatmaynothold.Theknownknownsareausefulcomponentinplausiblescenarios,astheyhelptoshapethecontext(e.g.anagingpopulation)(seeannex2forthefulllistofknownknowns).

Driversthatarelikelytobeimportantshapersoftradeandagri-foodsystems,butareunpredictable(e.g.geopoliticalstability),werelistedas‘knownunknowns’.Aswiththeknownknowns,theycouldbenormative,resultfromaneconomicorpolicydriver,orresultfromanevent.Theinitiallistwasedited inaparticipatorywaytogroupsimilarconceptstogether(e.g.‘changingconsumerpreferences’groupedtogetherdrivers includingachangeindemandformeat,changetowardshealthydiets,andanutritiontransition).

Duringthesecondworkshop,participantsbuiltthefuturescenariosbygroupingkeydriversofchangeandselecting(throughroundsofvotinginamodifiedDelphimethod)thetwomostcriticaluncertaintiesorknownunknowns(definedasthemostimportantdriversshapingthefutureoffoodtrade,butwhicharehighlyuncertainorcontestedintermsofhowthedriverswoulddevelop).Pairingthesetwoaxestogetherprovidedamatrixwithfourscenariosforthefutureofglobaltradeandagri-foodsystems.Duringthefinalworkshop,thefourscenariosweredevelopedthroughdiscussionofplausiblewaysthateachscenariowould‘work’–particularlytheagri-foodsystem,trade,governancemechanismsandeconomy.Thefinalactivitywastodiscusspotentialdecisionsaroundresearchinvestmentandpolicychoicesthatwouldmaximisethebenefitsandminimisethecostswithineachscenario.Decisionsandactionsthatwouldberobustacrossallfourfuturescenarioswerealsoidentified.

Identify

Identify

Discuss

implicationsandpaths

driving

critical

forces

uncertainties

Meth0d0l0gy

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Thecriticaluncertaintiesandthe

twokeyuncertainties

•Changingmovementofpeople

-Climatemigrants/refugees

-Economicmigrants

-Insurgency

•Changinginequality

-Growthofpopulism

-Peoplemovement

-Growingwealthgap

Fromthislonglist,twocriticaluncertaintiesemerged,throughthemodifiedDelphiprocess,asmostimportant-havingpotentiallythebiggestimpactdependingonhowtheydevelop.Thesewere‘changinggeopolitical(andcorporate)powerandtensions’and‘technologydevelopmentandadoption’:

•Changinggeopolitical(andcorporate)powerandtensions:Dependingonhowthefutureplaysout,itisplausibletoimagineaworldoflowtension,whichisstable,cooperative,andwherecountriesareincreasinglyinter-connectedthroughtrade,andwhereconsolidationinthebusinesssectormeansthatmajorcorporateplayerswieldsignificantpower.Inessence,thiswouldbea‘businessasusualfuture’imaginedinthefirstdecadeofthiscentury.Alternatively,followingthelastdecades’disruptions:climateimpacts,COVID-19,greater‘GreatPowers’tensionsandtheriseofpopulistpolicies,contributingtotradewarsandincreasingconflict,thefuturemaybea

worldofintegrativehightension,competitiveratherthancooperative,frequentlydisrupted,unstable.ThisisafuturethatisTurbulent,Uncertain,NovelandAmbiguous(TUNA)(Annex1).

•Technologydevelopmentandadoption:Technology

developmentandadoptionwillpresentnewwaystotacklemanyoftoday’sandfuturechallenges.However,widespreadadoptionofnewtechnologiesareoftenmiredincontroversyaboutdesirability,safetyandaccessibilityforwhom–thesociallicense–andtheregulatoryandgovernanceframework.Furthermore,theimpacts(benefitsandcosts)ofnewtechnologiesareunlikelytobeevenlydistributed.Assuchthefutureroleoftechnologyplausiblyrangesfromapacenotunlikethatofscalinguptechnologiessuchasnewgenetictechnologiesforfood,toamoretechno-optimisticrapiddeployment,underpinnedbygreaterinvestmentinfindingandadoptingtechnologicalsolutions.

Thetwokeyuncertaintiesdefineamatrixoffourplausiblescenariosforthefutureofglobaltradeandagri-foodsystems(Figure2).

Thedriversthatareexpectedtoshapethefutureofthefood

systemandtheroleoftrade,yetaredifficulttopredicthow

theywilldevelop,wereidentifiedas:

•Changingdemandfordifferentfoods

-Dietarychange(morefruitsandvegetables,lessmeat)

-Consumerattitudes/increasedawarenessofhealthandsustainabilityissues

-Increased/decreasedagency

•Newtechnologiesandimpactondemand/supply

-Digitaltechnologiesdevelopment/penetration

-Biotechnologiesdevelopment/penetration

-Impactsofdigitalisationonmarkettransparency

-Theregulationandenvironmentalimpactsofalternativemeattechnologies(e.g.,cellularmeat)

•Climaterisksanddisruptions/emergingdiseaserisksanddisruptions

-Climaterisks&responses

-Biodiversityrisks&responses

-Mitigatingtheimpactsofagricultureonclimatechangeandbiodiversity

•Shifttowardssustainableeconomies

-Movementtocirculareconomies(cities,countries,trade)

-Transitiontolowcarboneconomies(includingimpactonfoodsupplychainsviachangingenergycosts,e.g.aviation,coldchain)

-Changingattitudesandagencyofindividualstowardssustainablelifestyles

•Landuse/resourceallocationtofood,energy,andclimatechangemitigation

-Competitionforresourceinputsforagricultureversusothersectors/purposesandimpactonfoodsupply

•Changinggeopoliticalstabilityandtensions

-Changein“greatpowerpolitics”(e.g.ChinaversusUS)

-Futureofmultilateralism

•Changingmetricsofeconomicgrowth

-Lessreliance/shiftawayfromGDPtoincludenaturalcapitalandwellbeing

•Changingarchitectureofinternationaltrade

-Competitionversusfragmentation

-Fragmentationversusintegration

-Growingdesireforfoodsovereignty/regionalisation/de-globalisation

-Changingfood/agriculturalsubsidies

•Degreetowhichenvironmentalconsiderationswillbebuiltintotradeagreements

-Moveawayfromtariffsto“standards”

-Inclusionofenvironmentalstipulations

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Technologydevelopmentandadoption

TRUMP’STRIUMPH

Deregulated,unstable,changeable,Trumpian‘business-as-usualfuture’

•Countrieswithlargeendowmentswillfocusonself-sufficiency.Hasbigimpactontrade,andwhatisproduced.Inturnimpactingconsumerdiets.

•Couldproducemorehighresourcefoodssuchasanimalproductsduetotechinnovation.

•

Lessabilitytoholdandmaintainstrongpositions–competitiveandinnovativeenvironment.

PRECATIONARYPROGRESS

EUpre-COVIDprecautionarybusinessasusualfuture

•Directiveinvestments,focusingonsocial-optimaloutcomes,strategicdecision-making.

•Developwiderangeofcropsratherthanyieldmaximisinginsub-setofcrops.

•Highvaluelowfootprintproductstradedongreencredentials.

•Supra-nationalcoordinationontrade,productionoptimisations.

•(-ve)inequalities–slowincreaseinproductivity.

Fourplausiblescenariosforthefutureofglobaltradeandagri-foodsystems

Thenarrativescenarios,describedindetailbelowandsummarisedinFigure2,weredevelopedbasedon:(i)keycharacteristics(whatthescenariowouldplausiblylooklike)

(ii)transitionfromthecurrentsituation(howthescenariodeveloped)(iii)Europeanandantipodeanagri-foodeconomycharacteristics(iv)thevisionforagri-foodand(v)thedecisionsthatpolicy-makers,industry,academia,andcitizensneedtomakeoverthenextfewyears.

RAPIDCHANGE

OBAMA’SLEGACYORBREXITBELIEF

UK,post-Brexit,deregulated

‘business-as-usual’future

•Productivitydriven,SI,landsparing,exportdriven.

•NZ:inaglobaltradedworld,NZbecomesprimeglobalexporterwithveryhighintensity/techdrivenagricultureANDcouldbedisruptedbyplant-basedsubstitutes,andperhapsslowshifttowardshighvaluecrops(egkiwi)ANDmoretreeplanting?

•SubstantialshiftsinCompAdvsoneedtobuildflexibility/adaption.

LOWTENSION

Cooperative

Integrative

Bigcorporate

powerstable

HIGHTENSION

CompetitiveDisruptiveUnstableTUNA

Changinggeopolitical(andcorporate)powerandtensions

CONSERVATIVENATIONALISM

ORTHEEMPIRESTRIKESBACK

‘Theoldwaysarethebest,changeisriskyandtheworldshouldrespectusforwhoweare(orwere).’

•LimitedtradewouldleadtoreductionoflivestockinNZ.

•Verylittleinnovationintermsofagriculture.

•Goingbackwardstolivestockproducedonland,quantityoflivestockproducedintensivelydecreases.