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WhyEuropean

BanksAdjusttheir

DividendPayouts?

MarcoBelloni,MaciejGrodzicki,andMariuszJarmuzek

WP/22/194

2022

SEP

1Theauthorswouldliketothank,withoutimplicating,DesislavaAndreeva,SophiaChen,RupaDuttagupta,JohnFell,PaulHiebert,CsabaMore,DionysiosMylonas,andparticipantsoftheECBseminarforusefulcomments,discussions,andsuggestions.Anyerrorsremainourown.ThepaperwaswrittenwhenMarcoBelloniandMariuszJarmuzekworkedattheEuropeanCentralBank.Anearlier,abridgedversionofthispaperwaspublishedintheECBMacroprudentialBulletinNo.13(June2021).DanielMurphyPinedaprovidedexcellentassistance.TheviewsexpressedinthispaperarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.Equally,theviewsexpressedinthispaperarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheECB,itsExecutiveBoard,orEurosystem.

©2022InternationalMonetaryFund

WP/22/194

IMFWorkingPaper

EuropeanDepartment

WhyEuropeanBanksAdjusttheirDividendPayouts?

PreparedbyMarcoBelloni,MaciejGrodzicki,andMariuszJarmuzek1AuthorizedfordistributionbyRupaDuttagupta

September2022

IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(s)andarepublishedtoelicitcommentsandtoencouragedebate.TheviewsexpressedinthispaperarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.Equally,theviewsexpressedinthispaperarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheECB,itsExecutiveBoard,orEurosystem.

ABSTRACT:UsingapaneldataapproachfortwosamplesoflistedandunlistedEuropeanbanks,thispaperprovidesevidencethat,overadecadeandahalfprecedingthepandemic,bankdividendpayoutswereadjustedinlinewiththemotivationsfoundintheliterature.Bankschangetheirdividendpayoutsbecausetheywouldliketosignalgoodprofitabilitytoshareholderstoaddressinformationasymmetry,orusedividendstomitigatetheagencycosts,orcouldcomeunderpressurefromprudentialsupervisorsandregulatorstoretainearnings.Banksarefoundnottodiscountexpectationsaboutfutureeconomicconditionsortheirownprofitabilitywhenmakingpayouts.Simulationsshowthat,intheabsenceofsupervisorysector-widerecommendationstosuspenddividendpayouts,bankswouldlikelyhavereducedthepayoutsonlyslightlyinthefirstyearofthepandemic.

JELClassificationNumbers:

G21,G35

Keywords:

Bankdividendpolicy,bankingregulationandsupervision,paneldataanalysis.

Author’sE-MailAddress:

marco_belloni@;maciej.grodzicki@ecb.europa.eu;mjarmuzek@

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TableofContents

1.Introduction_____________________________________________________________________________________3

2.RelatedLiterature_______________________________________________________________________________4

3.RegulatoryFrameworkandMeasuresDuringtheCOVID-19Pandemic_____________________6

4.EmpiricalInvestigation_________________________________________________________________________7

5.PolicySimulation_____________________________________________________________________________17

6.Conclusions___________________________________________________________________________________19

Figures

1.DistributionofDividendPayoutRatiosinaPooledSampleandOverTime____________________8

2.DistributionofBankProfitabilityRatios_________________________________________________________9

3.DistributionofLoanLossProvisionsandBankMarketValuation______________________________10

4.DistributionofBankCapitalRatios____________________________________________________________10

5.ResponseofDividendPayoutRatiotoOneStandardDeviationChangeinExplanatory

Variables______________________________________________________________________________________126.CounterfactualDividendPayoutRatiosintheAbsenceofRestrictions,andBanks’Own

PayoutRatiosTargets_________________________________________________________________________18

Tables

1.MainRegressionResults_______________________________________________________________________13

2.RegulatoryRegimeChangeThroughIntroductionofMDA____________________________________14

3.RegressionResultsAccountingforForward-LookingVariables________________________________15

Annexes

1.DataDefinitionandSources___________________________________________________________________20

2.ModellingFundamental-BasedProfitability___________________________________________________21

3.RobustnessChecks____________________________________________________________________________23

References______________________________________________________________________________________29

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1.Introduction

AttheoutsetoftheCOVID-19pandemic,prudentialauthoritiestookahighinterestinbankdividendpoliciesinviewoftheexpecteddeteriorationofbankassetquality,whichwasconsideredathreattostabilityofthebankingsector.Banksfaceachoicebetweenpayingoutdividendstoremunerateshareholders,andretainingearningstoabsorbpotentialfuturelossesorprovideregulatorycapitalnecessarytosupportlending.Shareholdersandbankmanagersmayhaveanincentivetopayoutdividends,inparticularwherealternativeinvestmentopportunitiesavailableinthefinancialmarketofferaprospectofhigherreturnsthanthoseprovidedbybankequities.Inadownturn,thismight,ifuncheckedbyregulators,weakenbankbalancesheetsandleavethemlesswellequippedtohandlelosses.Unlikeintheglobalfinancialcrisis,intheCOVID-19pandemicEuropeanregulatorsrecommendedthatallbanksshouldnotmakedistributionsinordertopreventanoutflowofregulatorycapitalfromthebankingsectorbeforethematerialisationofcrisis-inducedlosses.

ThispaperinvestigatesthedriversofbankdividendpoliciesintheeuroareaandattemptstoshedlightonapossiblecounterfactualreactionofbankstotheCOVID-19pandemic.Someeconomiccommentatorssuggestedthatthedividendrestrictionshavedepressedbankstockvaluations,andthatbankscouldhavebeenallowedtomaintaindistributionsinordertofacilitatetheiraccesstocapitalmarkets.Thesecommentatorsarguedthatbankswouldactprudentlyandtaketheirdividendpayoutdecisionlookingforwardtothepotentiallosses.Thiswouldleadtolowerdividendpayoutswithoutaneedforsupervisoryintervention.Astherestrictionshavebeenaddressedtotheentirebankingsector,andanoverwhelmingmajorityofbankscomplied,thereisnonaturalcontrolgroupthatwouldallowfortestingsuchclaims.Thispaperthereforeaimstoidentifytheeconomicandfinancialdriversofbankdividendpayouts,andtoinvestigatewhetherbanksinthepasthavetakenintoaccounttheexpectedfutureeconomicconditionswhenmakingdecisionsonpayouts.Onthisbasis,thepapercarriesoutacounterfactualanalysistorevealhowlargeeuroareabankswouldhaverespondedtothepandemic,shouldtherehavebeennorestrictionsondividendpayouts.ItscontributionisthatitanalysestheimpactofeconomicprospectsanduncertaintyondividendpoliciesandfocusesontwosamplesofEuropeanbanks.

Ouranalysisidentifiestheeconomicandfinancialdriversofbankdividendpayoutsandsuggestsanimportantroleplayedbysupervisorsduringthemostuncertainphaseofthepandemic.Europeanbanksarefoundtohavepaidoutalargershareoftheirprofitsasdividendswhentheyhavebeenmoreprofitableandbetter-capitalised.Higherdividendpayoutsarealsoassociatedwithlargerbanksandwithsuperiorshareholderprotections,bothinlinewiththeagencycosthypothesis.However,banksdonotseemtosystematicallyaccountforfutureexpectedeconomicdevelopments,economicuncertaintyorfortheirownearnings’prospectswhenmakingdecisionsaboutdividendpayouts.Counterfactualsimulationscarriedoutwiththemodelsembeddingkeydriverssuggestthatsomereductionindividendspaidoutcouldhavebeenexpectedin2020,butitwouldhavelikelybeenlimitedinsize.Thisimpliesthatthesupervisoryrecommendationshaveplayedanimportantroleinretainingcapitalinthebankingsectorduringthemostuncertainphaseofthepandemic,thusincreasingitslossabsorptioncapacity.

Theremainderofthepaperisorganisedasfollows.Section2reviewsthemainfindingsfromtheeconomicliteraturecoveringdividendpayoutdecisionsbybanks.Section3outlinesthekeyelementsoftheregulatoryframeworkgoverningbanks’dividendpayouts,andsummarisesthe

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variousrestrictionsintroducedbytheeuroarearegulatorsin2020.Section4describesthedataandtheempiricalmethodology,andSection5discussestheresultsandthecounterfactualsimulations.Thefinalsectioncollectsthekeyconclusionsfromthepaper.

2.RelatedLiterature

TheMiller-Modiglianidividendirrelevanceframeworkhasservedasabenchmarkforresearchondividendpolicy.LeveragingonthefindingsofLintner(1956)whoanalysedcorporatedividendpayoutpolicybasedonasurveyofmanagers,thetheoreticalmodeldevelopedbyMillerandModigliani(1961)demonstratesthatfirmdividendpolicyhasnoimpactonitsvalue,undertheassumptionsofperfectandcompletecapitalmarketsandaneutraltaxsystem.Oncetheseassumptionsarerelaxed,dividendpolicyhasabearingonthevalueoffirms.Theliteraturedepartingfromthedividendirrelevanceconceptshedslightonfactorsshapingdividendsofnon-financialandfinancialcorporates(AllenandMichely,2003).

Theasymmetricinformationstrandhingesontheideathatinsidershavebetterinformationthanoutsiders.Accordingtothesignallingtheory,managersmayknowmoreaboutthetruevalueoftheirfirmcomparedtoinvestors,sothatdividendscanbeusedtoextractsignalsaboutfuturecashflows.ThemodeldevelopedbyBhattacharya(1979),whichwassubsequentlyextendedbyMillerandRock(1985)andJohnandWilliams(1985),showsthatdividendannouncementsconveyinformationaboutcurrentandfutureearnings,withlargerthanexpectedearningsimplyinghigherdividends.Deshmukh(2003)suggeststhatthepeckingordermodelsdevelopedbyMyersandMajluf(1984)implythatgrowingfirmsretainprofitstoensurethattheirinvestmentplansarefunded.Thisso-calledgrowthopportunitiesphenomenonresultsinlowerdividends.Banksareinmanywaysdifferentfromnon-financialfirms.Oneofthemisthatthelargeproportionofbankcreditorsisinsuredbypublicguaranteeschemes,makingmonitoringbanks’policieslessimportantforthesecreditors(Wardhana,2016).Theotheroneisthatbankstendtobemoreopaquethanothernon-financialfirms,sohavehigherinformationasymmetry(Morgan2002;Caprioetal.2007).

Theempiricalstudiesprovidesupportfortheasymmetricinformationstrand.Buildingonthesignallingtheory,Benartzietal(1997)showthatnon-financialfirmswithhighercurrentearningstendtopayhigherdividends.EvidencefromBoldinandLeggett(1995)forUSbanksandFortiandSchiozer(2015)forBrazilianbanksconfirmstherelevanceofcurrentearningsforexplainingdividendpayouts.1Recently,Gambacortaetal(2020)notethatbankswithalowprice-to-bookratio(significantlybelowone)payhigherdividendsastheirinvestorsmayanticipateadeteriorationinfutureearningsandpreferreceivingcashdividendstoholdingthestock.Theyarguethatbankmanagerswouldhaveastrongincentivetomeetsuchpreferencesaslowerequitybasewouldhelpthemmeetthereturntargetsexpectedbytheinvestors.

Theincompletecontractstrandsuggeststhatifcontractsareunenforceable,theremightbesomeagencycostsassociatedwithaconflictbetweenstockholders,management,andbondholdersoverdividendpolicy.JensenandMeckling(1976)showthatlargecorporatestendtopayhighdividendstomitigatetheagencycostproblem.Theargumenthingesonthatmanagersinlargercorporates

1Someauthorsalsonotethatdividendsarestickytothedownside,asmanagersareoftenreluctanttocutdividends,whichmaybeperceivedbyinvestorsasmanagementfailure(Bravetal,2005).

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tendtohavegreaterdecision-makingpowercomparedtoshareholders,withthelatterhavingaccesstominimalpublicinformationandalimitedabilitytomonitorcorporatebehaviour,resultinginhighagencycosts.Separately,butbuildingonthemodelbyJensenandMeckling(1976)anditsrefinements,LaPortaetal(2000)demonstratethatcorporatesincountrieswithsuperiorinvestorprotectiongeneratehigherdividendpayoutscomparedtocorporatesincountrieswithlowerinvestorprotection,withaneffectivelegalsystemprovidinginvestorswiththeopportunitytoreduceagencycostsbyforcingmanagerstopayoutdividends.Dickensetal(2002)andJohnetal(2010)providesupportfortheagencycosthypothesisforUSbanks.

Theregulatorystrandsuggeststhatbanksareconstrainedbyregulatorsintheirdividendpayoutspolicy.Bakeretal(2008)andGroppandHeider(2010)demonstratethatfinancialcorporateshavedifferentcapitalstructurescomparedtonon-financialcorporates,giventhattheformertypicallyhavedepositsasadominantsourceoffinancing,whicharegenerallynotavailabletothelatter.Theimportanceofdeposit-takingrolealongwiththecriticalityofbanksintermsoffinancialintermediationmakesthemsubjecttoregulation.Regulatoryinfluencelimitsdividendpayoutsbybankswithlowercapitalstandards(seesection3fordetailsoftheapplicableframework),implyingthatbankswithhighercapitalizationpayhigherdividends.TheisandDutta(2009)providesupportfortheregulatoryhypothesisforUSbanks.

Beyondasymmetricinformation,agency,andregulatorystrands,otherfactorsmayalsohavesomebearingondividendpolicyofbanks.Kanas(2013)investigatestherelevanceofriskinessoftheloanportfoliofordividendpayoutpolicyofUSbanks,hypothesizinganegativerelationshipbetweencreditriskanddividendpayouts.Intheirseminalcontributions,Lintner(1956)andFamaandBabiak(1968)analyseifpastdividendpayoutsreflectthepreferenceofcorporatestooptforastabledividendpolicy,whichhasbeenextendedtoUSbanksbyDickensetal(2002)andTheisandDutta(2009).CaseyandDickens(2000)examinetheroleoftaxesforUSbanks’dividendpayoutsandfindthatanincreaseinincometaxratesondividendsrelativetothatappliedtocapitalgainsisassociatedwithlowerdividendpayoutratios.

Whiletheliteratureonbankdividendpayoutpolicyisabundantandgrowingfurther,thereareimportantlimitations,whichthispaperattemptstoaddress.EarlierempiricalstudiesemployeddataforUSorglobalbanks,withnoexplicitanalysisoftheEuropeanbankinglandscape,whichhasundergonesignificantchangesfollowingtheGlobalFinancialCrisisandEuropeanSovereignDebtCrisis.Specifically,previousstudiesdonotcovertheaftermathofthecrises,withtheexceptionofGambacortaetal(2020).However,thatstudyfocusesonglobalbanks,notexaminingexplicitlyiftherewasanystructuralbreakassociatedwiththecrises.Incontrast,thispaperfocusesontwosamplesofEuropeanbanks,coveringeitherlistedbanks,whichtendtobelargerandmorecomplex,orallbanksincludingthosewhicharenotlisted–ofwhichthevastmajorityisrelativelysmall,simpler,anddomestically-oriented.Thisgivestheconclusionsanadditionaldegreeofrobustnessandallowstoidentifydivergencebetweenunderlyingdriversofpayoutsbythesetwogroupsofbanks.Furthermore,althoughCollinsetal(1994)andTheisandDutta(2009)analyzetheimpactoftheprice-to-bookratioondividendpayouts,whichcantoacertainextentcapturefutureeconomicprospects,toourknowledge,nostudyhasexplicitlyandsystematicallyexaminedtheimpactofeconomicprospectsanduncertaintyondividendpayouts.

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3.RegulatoryFrameworkandMeasuresDuringtheCOVID-19Pandemic

Bankingregulationisrelevantforbankdividendpolicies,asbanksupervisorsareoftengrantedspecialpowerswithrespecttorestrictingdividendpayoutsonthegroundsofprudence.Internationalstandards,agreedbytheBaselCommitteeforBankingSupervision,requirethatthebankingsupervisorsshouldhaveanappropriaterangeofsupervisorytoolstoactwhenabankundertheirsupervisionisnotcomplyingwiththelaws,regulations,orsupervisoryactions,orengagesinunsoundbusinesspractices,oractivitiesthatcouldthreatenthestabilityofthebankorthebankingsystem.Thesetoolsincludeexplicitlyapossibilitytoimposerestrictionsonpayoutofdividendandsharebuybacks(BCBS,2019,chapterRBC30).Supervisorsshouldactearly,ideallyanticipatingtheriskofabankbreachingitsminimumcapitalrequirements.

Theglobalfinancialcrisisdemonstratedthatsuchdiscretionaryrestrictionswereinsufficientwhenacrisiswouldrapidlyunfold.Manybankswhichsubsequentlyfailedcontinuedpayingdividendsinspiteoftheclearsignsoffinancialdistresshavingalreadyemerged.Amongthose,LehmanBrothers–whosefailureinSeptember2008promptedtheacutephaseofthecrisis–paiditslastdividendonlyafewweeksbeforefilingforbankruptcy.

Thepost-crisisregulatoryreformsarelikelytohaveaffectedtheprobabilitythatabankwouldbeconstrainedinitsdividendpolicybyregulatoryfactors.Comparingtothepre-crisistimes,thelevelsofcapitalatwhichregulationactsasabrakeonpayoutshavebecomemuchhigher.Bank-specificautomaticrestrictionswereintroducedaftertheglobalfinancialcrisistogetherwithacapitalbufferframeworkthataimsatstrengtheningthebankcapitalbaseandreducingtheriskofbankfailures.Themacroprudentialcapitalbuffersconsistofthecapitalconservationbuffer,setto2.5%ofrisk-weightedassetsforallbanks,countercyclicalbufferappliedtospecificexposures,firm-specificbuffersforglobalandothersystemicallyimportantinstitutions,aswellas,insomecountries,systemicriskbuffers.Thesebuffersareasofterconstrainttobankcapitalthantheminimumcapitalrequirements,andshouldbeusedwhenbanksarefacingfinancialdistresstoabsorblossesandmaintainlending.However,theuseofmacroprudentialcapitalbufferscomeswitharangeofconstraintsonbankingactivity.Inparticular,distributionofprofitstoshareholders,aswellaspaymentofcouponsonAdditionalTier1(AT1)capitalinstruments,isautomaticallyrestrictedonceabankwoulduseapartofitscapitalbuffers.Thisrestrictionisdesignedasacap,alsocalledthe‘maximumdistributableamount’(MDA).TheMDAdecreasesinincrementsof20percentagepointsinlockstepwiththeamountofcapitalbufferswhichhavebeenused,sothatabankwhichhascompletelyexhausteditscapitalbufferswouldnotbeallowedtopayoutanydividendsorcouponsonAT1instruments(SvoronosandVrbaski,2020).

Inpractice,duringtheglobalCovid-19pandemic,restrictionstodividendpayoutsmaterialisedalreadybeforebankcapitaldroppedbelowtheMDAcaps.Facedwiththeextremeuncertainty,theeuroarearegulatorsrecommendedbankstorestrictdividendpayoutsmoretightlythanimpliedbytheMDArulesinMarch2020.TheMDAruleswouldresultinlowerdividendpayoutsonlyafterthematerialisationoflosses,andthereforewouldnothaveboundthedistributionsmadefrom2019profits,whichwouldstillbesubjecttotheMDAthresholdscalculatedonthebasisofpre-crisisend-2019capitalratios.IntheCovid-19crisis,someofthemicro-andmacroprudentialcapitalrequirementswerereducedtofacilitatelending,temporarilyreducingthethresholdbeyondwhichtheMDAruleswouldapply.Atthesametime,supervisorsassessedthatitishighlylikelythatthe

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bankingsectorwouldbefacedwithelevatedcreditlosses,therecognitionofwhichwouldbedeferredbytheextensivepublicsupportschemestostrugglingborrowersaswellasshort-termregulatoryforbearance.Therefore,withtheaimofboostingbanks’capacitytoabsorblossesandsupportlending,theECB,actinginitscapacityasthebankingsupervisorfortheEUcountriesparticipatinginthesinglesupervisorymechanism,issuedarecommendationon27March2020thatbanksshouldrefrainfrompayingdividendsandbuyingbacksharesatleastuntilend-September2020.TheEuropeanSystemicRiskBoardadoptedasimilarrecommendation,targetingallfinancialfirmsintheentireEuropeanUnion(ESRB,2020).

Aseconomicuncertaintyslowlydeclined,regulatorsallowedbankstoresumedividendpayouts,althoughsubjecttotightrestrictionsonquantityofdistributions.AfterextendingitsrecommendationtobanksinJuly2020untilend-2020,inDecember2020theECBacknowledgedthattheeconomicuncertaintyhaddeclined.Nevertheless,thefullimpactofthepandemiconbankbalancesheetshasnotmanifesteditselfyet,owinginparttosuccessfulpolicysupport.On15December2020,theECBupdateditsrecommendation,askingbankstoexerciseextremeprudenceintheirdecisionsconcerningdividendpayoutsandsharebuybacksuntil30September2021.TheECBexpectedbanksnottodistributemorethan15%oftheircumulative2019and2020profits,andtolimitpayoutstolessthan0.2%ofthetotalrisk-weightedassets(ECB,2020).SimilaractionsweretakenbyotherEuropeansupervisors,mostnotablyinDenmark,SwedenandtheUK.

Inadditiontosupervisoryactions,restrictionsondividendpayoutsarealsolikelytobeimposedincaseswherethecompanyreceivedstatesupport.TheEuropeanUnionstateaidframeworkforbanksgenerallyrequiresbankstorefrainfrompayingdividendsinordertopreventtheoutflowofcapitaltoprivateshareholdersandlimitthecostofpublicinterventiontothetaxpayers.Theserestrictionsshouldbeintroducedassoonascapitalshortfallthatwouldlikelyresultininterventionofthestateisidentified(EuropeanCommission,2013).

4.EmpiricalInvestigation

4.1.Data

Theanalysisisbasedonannualbank-leveldata.Weusetwocomplementaryunbalancedpanelsofeuroareabanks.Thefirstpanelcoversasampleof69listedbanksobservedover2005–2019,withthedatacollectedfromSNLFinancial.Thesecondpanelcoversabout1,400banks,alargemajorityofwhichareunlisted,overashorterperiod(2010–2019)andwascollectedfromOrbisBankFocus.DrawingonBakerandDeRidder(2018),thisstudyemploysasadependentvariablearatiooftotaldividendpaidovertotalafter-taxearnings.Inordertolimittheeffectofoutliers,andinparticulartoexcludebankswhichmaybesubjecttonon-disclosedsupervisoryrestrictionsondistributions,2bankswithnegativeafter-taxearningsandcapitalratiosareexcluded.

2Asmentionedintheprevioussections,supervisorshavepowerstoprohibitdividendpayoutsbybankswhichareinbreachofcapitalrequirements.Itfollowsthatsuchdistressedbankswouldnotadjusttheirdividendpoliciesinlinewiththeeconomicfactorsasothers,morehealthybankswoulddo.

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ExplanatoryvariablesaredividedintogroupsreflectingthemainhypothesesoutlinedinSection2.3Inlinewiththeempiricalresearch,theasymmetricinformationhypothesisisrepresentedbyprofitabilitymeasuredbyreturnonassets(ROA)andreturnonequity(ROE),aswellasbyopacityandgrowthopportunities.Similarly,theagencyhypothesisisapproximatedbythelogofassetsandmarketcapitalisation,aswellasbytheindexofshareholder’slegalprotectioncompiledbytheWorldBank.Highervaluesoftheindexindicatethattheoutsiderminorityshareholdershavehigherlegalprotectionandtheinsidersarelesslikelytoexpropriatetheoutsiders’wealthinthebanks.GDPgrowththatismeanttocontrolexplicitlyforthebusinesscycleissourcedfromtheECBStatisticalDataWarehouse.DatadefinitionsandsourcesaredescribedinTableA1.

4.2.DescriptiveAnalysis

Bankdividendpayoutshavevariedinaseeminglyprocyclical–albeitheterogeneous–wayoverthebusinessandfinancialcycle.Thenatureofthedividendpayoutsissuchthatitistruncatedatzero,asasignificantnumberofbankschoosenottopaydividends(Chart1),withthefractionofbankswithnopayoutsfluctuatingovertime.Dividendpayoutsreachedahighpointimmediatelypriortotheglobalfinancialcrisis,anddeclinedinitsaftermathasregulatoryrequirementsweretightenedandbanks’profitabilityfell.Yet,therehasbeenahighcross-sectionalvarianceatanypointintime,indicatingthatbank-specificcircumstancesplayalargeroleindeterminingpayoutpolicies(Chart1).

Figure1:DistributionofDividendPayoutRatiosinaPooledSample(leftpanel)andOver

Time(rightpanel)

Source:SNLFinancial,authors’calculations.

Note:thedividendpayoutratioisrepresentedinpercentagesonbothpanels.

3Othercategorizationsofexplanatoryvariablesarealsousedintheliterature.Forexample,FamaandFrench(2001)andAbreauandGulamhussen(2013)divideexplanatoryvariablesintoasymmetricinformationhypothesisvariablesandagencycosthypothesisvariables,andothercontrolvariablesthatincludee.g.sizeandgrowthopportunities.ThispaperfollowsBernatzietal(1997)andDesmukh(2003)andconsidersearningsandgrowthopportunitiesaspartoftheasymmetricinformationhypothesis

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Thisdescriptiveanalysissuggeststhattwooffsettingfactorsmayhaveinfluencedbankdividendpayouts,andcontributedtothehighobserveddispersionofpayout

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