战略经济学(四)

战略经济学(四)EconomicsofStrategyChapter3VerticalBoundariesoftheFirmBesanko,Dranove,ShanleyandSchaeferVerticalChainBeginswiththeacquisitionofrawmaterialsEndswiththesaleoffinishedgoods/servicesIncludessupportservicessuchasfinanceandmarketingOrganizingtheverticalchainisanimportantpartofbusinessstrategyVerticalBoundariesoftheFirmWhichstepsoftheverticalchainaretobeperformedinsidethefirm?Whichstepsoftheverticalchaintobeout-sourced?Choicebetweenthe“invisiblehand”ofthemarketandthe“visiblehand”oftheorganization(MakeorBuy)VerticallyIntegratedFirmsInaverticallyintegratedfirm,manyofthestepsintheverticalchainareperformedin-house.Exle:UIBESomefirmschoosetooutsourcemanyoftheverticalchaintasksandbecomeverticallydisintegrated.Exle:NikeMakeversusBuyDecisiondependsonthecostsandbenefitsofusingthemarketasopposedtoperformingthetaskin-houseOutsidespecialistsmayperformataskbetterthanthefirmcanIntermediatesolutionsarepossible(Exles:Strategicallianceswithsuppliers,Jointventures)上游下游SupportServicesAccountingFinanceLegalSupportMarketingPlanningHumanResourceManagementSupportServicesSupportservicescanbemajorsourcesofvaluecreationUPS–LogisticsToyota–HumanResourceManagerNike-MarketingDefiningBoundariesFirmsneedtodefinetheirverticalboundariesConsiderationsEconomiesofscaleachievedbymarketfirmsValueofmarketdisciplineEaseofcoordinationofproductionflowsin-houseTransactionscostswhendealingwithmarketfirmsSomeMake-or-BuyFallaciesFirmshouldmakeratherthanbuyassetsthatprovidecompetitiveadvantagesOutsourcinganactivityeliminatesthecostofthatactivityBackwardintegrationcapturestheprofitmarginofthesupplierBackwardintegrationinsuresagainsttheriskofhighinputpricesItmakessensetotieupthedistributionchannelinordertodenyaccesstotherivalsReasonstoBuyratherthanMakeMarketfirms(outsidespecialists)mayhavepatents/proprietaryinformationthatmakeslowcostproductionpossibleMarketfirmscanachieveeconomiesofscalethatin-houseunitscannotMarketfirmsaresubjecttomarketdiscipline,whereasin-houseunitsmaybeabletohidetheirinefficienciesbehindoverallcorporatesuccess(Agencyandinfluencecosts)EconomiesofScaleMake-or-BuyinInsuranceBuyinginsuranceutilizeseconomiesofscaleavailabletoinsurersLargefirmswithsufficientcapitalcan“self-insure”案例：Self-InsurancebyBritishPetroleumBPself-insureslargelossesbutbuysinsuranceforsmalllossesWhyAgencyandInfluenceCostsTheincentivestobeinefficientandinnovativeareweakerwhenataskisperformedin-houseAgencycostsareparticularlyproblematicifthetaskisperformedbya“costcenter”withinanorganization忽视代理成本优于消除代理成本ItisdifficulttointernallyreplicatetheincentivesfacedbymarketfirmsInfluencecostsInadditiontoagencycosts,performingataskin-housewillleadto“influencecosts”aswell“InternalCapitalMarkets”allocatesscarcecapitalAllocationscanbefavorablyaffectedbyinfluenceactivitiesResourcesconsumedbyinfluenceactivitiesrepresent“influencecosts”为什么在过去几十年里，GM在拥有世界上最高生产量的同时，它的许多零部件供应部门的成本也是最高的ReasonstoMakeCostsimposedbypoorcoordinationReluctanceofpartnerstodevelopandsharevaluableprivateinformationTransactionscostthatcanbeavoidedbyperformingthetaskin-houseEachproblemcanbetracedtodifficultiesincontractingRoleofContractsFirmsoftenusecontractswhencertaintasksareperformedoutsidethefirmContractslistthesetoftasksthatneedtobeperformedtheremediesifonepartyfailstofulfillitsobligationContractsContractsprotecteachpartytoatransactionfromopportunisticbehaviorofother(s)Contracts’abilitytoprovidethisprotectiondependsonthe“completeness”ofcontractsthebodyofcontractlawCompleteContractAcompletecontractstipulateswhateachpartyshoulddoforeverypossiblecontingencyNopartycanexploitothers’weaknessesTocreateacompetecontractoneshouldbeabletocontemplateallpossiblecontingenciesOneshouldbeableto“map”fromeachpossiblecontingencytoasetofactionsOneshouldbeabletodefineandmeasureperformancesOneshouldbeabletoenforcethecontractCompleteContract(Continued)Toenforceacontract,anoutsideparty(judge,arbitrator)shouldbeabletoobservethecontingencyobservetheactionsbythepartiesimposethestatedpenaltiesfornon-performanceReallifecontractsareusuallyincompletecontractsIncompleteContractsIncompletecontractsInvolvesomeambiguitiesNeednotanticipateallpossiblecontingenciesDonotspelloutrightsandresponsibilitiesofpartiescompletelyFactorsthatPreventCompleteContractingBoundedrationalityDifficultiesinspecifying/measuringperformanceAsymmetricinformationBoundedRationalityIndividualshavelimitedcapacitytoProcessinformationDealwithcomplexityPursuerationalaimsIndividualscannotforeseeallpossiblecontingenciesSpecifying/MeasuringPerformanceTermslike“normalwearandtear”mayhavedifferentinterpretationsPerformancecannotalwaysbemeasuredunambiguouslyAsymmetricInformationPartiestothecontractmaynothaveequalaccesstocontract-relevantinformationOnepartycanmisrepresentinformationwithimpurityContractLawContractlawfacilitatestransactionswithincompletecontractsPartiesneednotspecifyprovisionsthatarecommontoawideclassoftransactionsLimitationsofContractLawDoctrinesofcontractlawareinbroadlanguagethatcouldbeinterpretedindifferentwaysLitigationcanbeacostlywaytodealwithbreachofcontractLitigationcanbetimeconsumingLitigationweakensthebusinessrelationshipCoordinationofProductionFlowsForsuccessfulcoordinationonepartyneedstomakedecisionsthatdependonthedecisionmadebyothersAgoodfitshouldbeaccomplishedinseveraldimensions.Someexlesare:TimingSizeColorSequenceCoordinationProblemsWithoutgoodcoordination,bottlenecksariseintheverticalchainToensurecoordination,firmsrelyoncontractsthatspecifydeliverydates,designtolerancesandotherperformancetargetsDesignAttributesDesignattributesareattributesthatneedtorelatetoeachotherprecisely;significantlossineconomicvalueresultsSomeexlesSequencingofcoursesinMBAcurriculumFitofautosunroofglasstoapertureTimelydeliveryofacriticalcomponentDesignAttributesIfcoordinationiscritical,administrationcontrolmayreplacethemarketmechanismDesignattributesmaybemovedin-houseLeakageofPrivateInformationandOutsourcingWell-definedpatentscanhelpbutmaynotprovidefullprotectionContractswithnoncompeteclausescanbeusedtoprotectagainstleakageofinformationInpracticenon-competeclausescanbehardtoenforce例如竞业禁止条款TransactionsCostsIfthemarketmechanismimprovesefficiency,whydosomanyoftheactivitiestakeplaceoutsidethepricesystem?(Coase)Costsofusingthemarketthataresavedbycentralizeddirection–transactionscostsTransactionsCostsOutsourcingentailcostsofnegotiating,writingandenforcingcontractsCostsareincurredduetoopportunisticbehaviorofpartiestothecontractandeffortstopreventsuchbehaviorTransactionscostsexplainwhyeconomicactivi