组织结构和企业文化外文文献翻译中英文2021

1、 组织结构和企业文化外文文献翻译中英文2021外文文献翻译原文及译文（节选重点翻译）标题：组织结构和企业文化外文翻译中英文 2021-2021文献出处：Jonathan Newton, Andrew Wait, Simon D. Angus. Gamesand Economic Behavior, Volume 118, November 2021, Pages354-365译文字数：4100 多字英文Watercooler chat, organizational structure andcorporate culture Jonathan Newton, Andrew Wait, Sim

2、onAngus AbstractModeling firms as works of employees, occasionalcollaborative decision making around the officewatercooler changes long run employee behavior (corporateculture). The culture that emerges in a given team ofemployees depends on team size and on how the team isconnected to the wider fir

3、m. The implications of the第 1 页 共 23 页 model for organizational structure are e_plored andrelated to trends in the design of hierarchies. Keywords:Collaboration, Teams, Hierarchies, Delayering, works,Evolution Apple is a very disciplined pany, and we havegreat processes. But thats not what its about

4、. Processmakes you more efficient. But innovation es from peoplemeeting up in the hallways or calling each other at 10.30at night with a new idea. Steve Jobs, founder ofApple Inc. IntroductionPeople talk, share ideas, and collaborate when it ismutually advantageous to do so. Workers bring theircolla

5、borative nature with them to the workplace and totheir dealings with their colleagues, withwhom they interact on shopfloors, in meetings, onproduction lines and during coffee and lunch breaks. Inthis paper we consider collaborative decision making inthe social environment of the workplace and, using

6、 asimple model of adaptive decision making, show that thiscan have dramatic and far reaching effects on corporateculture and the optimal internal structure oforganizations. Our model takes the well documented factthat humans are particularly good at mutually beneficial第 2 页 共 23 页 collaboration (Tom

7、asello, 2021), and incorporates thisfact into a noisy variant (Young, 1998) of the bestresponse dynamic that has been the bread and butter ofeconomic modeling since Cournot (1838). We model firms asworks of employees, each of whom can choose asafe action or a risky action. Therisky action represents

8、 innovative, even speculative,behavior within the firm. An employee will only find itin his interest to take the risky action if enough of hisneighbors in the work do likewise. Within firms,employees are divided into teams. A team is a group ofemployees who interact together, although they may alsoi

9、nteract with others outside of the team. The teamrepresents an employees work group, department, or evena corporate board or senior management mittee. Theability of employees to engage in collaborative actionchoice is modeled by the idea of a watercooler, aroundwhich small groups of employees within

10、 a team can chatand form collaborative intentions. Ifthere are no watercoolers, so that employees cannotshare intentions, the model reduces to the canonicalmodel of Young, for which the action profile in which第 3 页 共 23 页 every player chooses the safe action is always a long runequilibrium (Peski, 2

11、0_). This result no longer holdswhen small groups of players can occasionally meet at thewatercooler to form shared intentions, coordinating theiraction choice to their mutual benefit. Instead, byincorporating this basic facet of human nature into themodel, we obtain a diversity of behavior, depende

12、nt onwork topology. We find that in order for members of agiven team to play the risky action in long runequilibrium, some conditions must be satisfied. (i)Firstly, the team must not be too large. The larger ateam is, the less likely that a fi_ed amount ofcollaborative decision making around the wat

13、ercooler willhave an impact on long run behavior. (ii) Secondly,sufficient numbers of employees must be able tocoordinate their strategic choice at the watercooler;that is, munication within the team must be strong enoughto generate enough collaboration to overe the systemicbias in favor of the safe

14、 action. (iii) Thirdly, the teammust not be so small that the influence of its memberse_ternal connections can cause them to play the safeaction, or, if the team is indeed that small, then all第 4 页 共 23 页 members connections outside of the team must be to teamsthat play the risky action. In other wo

15、rds, the e_ternalinfluence from those outside of the team who play it safemust be limited. These conditions provideguidance for organizational design: they can be usedto promote or prevent different behaviors in differentpartsofanorganization. Section 5 provides e_les related todelayering and job ro

16、tation. Each of these conditionshelps to e_plain empirical facts. Condition(i) provides an e_planation for why panies seeking topromote innovation create organizational structures basedaround small teams (Cook, 20 xx; Stross, 1996). Condition(ii) helps e_plain the efforts that firms take toincrease

17、spontaneous interaction and facilitate informalmunication between workers; that is, to create largerwatercoolers (Evans, 2021). Condition (iii) helps e_plainwhy organizations seek to foster independence withinteams and even isolate research units from other parts ofthe organization (Sloan, 1964). Re

18、lated literature第 5 页 共 23 页 This paper contributes to several strands ofliterature. The practical contribution is to theliterature on the importance of the workplace socialenvironment the nature and patterns ofinteraction between workers in a firm (see, for e_leBandiera et al., 20_; Gibbons and Hen

19、derson, 2021;Kandel and Lazear, 1992). We demonstrate how thefacilitation of collective agency by the workplace socialenvironment can have a significant effect on corporateculture. Like Kreps (1990)and Hermalin (20_), we modelcorporate culture as an equilibrium oute played in acoordination game. To

20、do this we turn to the literatureon adaptivedecision making and evolution, which allows us todevelop a simple e_planation of some aspects of corporateculture, providing an alternative, even plementary,theory to the shared beliefs model of VanDen Steen (20_). Evolutionary models often focus onlong ru

21、n equilibria. This is similar to how therelational-contracting literature adapts long run folktheorems to study firms (Baker et al., 1999; Levin, 20_;Li et al., 2021), the difference being that evolutionary第 6 页 共 23 页 models impose very low rationality requirements on agents.Such low rationality mo

22、dels have had success ate_plaining laboratory data (Chong et al., 20_) as wellas empirical phenomena as diverse as crop-sharing norms(Young and Burke, 20_) and the wearing of the Islamicveil (Carvalho, 2021). The current paper shows how theincorporation of collective agency into such models canlead

23、to even richer empirical predictions whilstretaining the simplicity and elegance of evolutionarymethodology. The incorporation of collective agency intoperturbed evolutionary dynamics is a relatively new andrapidly growing literature (Newton, 20 xxa, Newton, 20 xxb;Newton and Angus, 2021; Sawa, 2021

24、; Serrano and Volij,20_), although considerable work has been done in theconte_t of matching, where pairwise deviations representintentional behavior by coalitions of size two (Jacksonand Watts, 20_; Klaus et al., 20_; Klaus and Newton,2021; Na_ and Pradelski, 2021; Newton and Sawa, 2021).The procli

25、vity of humans to engage in collective agencyis第 7 页 共 23 页 well documented and recent research in developmentalpsychology has shown that the urge to collaborate is aprimal one, manifesting itself from ages as young as14months(Tomasello,2021; Tomaselloetal.,20_; Tomasello and Rakoczy, 20_). Recentth

26、eoretical work has shown that the ability to act as aplural agent will evolve in a wide variety of situations(Angus and Newton, 2021; Newton, 2021; Rusch, 2021). Theauthors of the current paper believe that the evidence infavor of the incorporation of collective agency intomodels of human behavior i

27、s overwhelming. Furthermore,adaptive/evolutionary frameworks are ideal for this as,in contrast to static analyses, they e_plicitly modelbehavior both in and out of equilibrium. Finally, we notethat work on collective agency in evolutionary dynamicsbuilds on a broader literature on coalitional behavi

28、or ingame- theoretic models. The concept of joint optimization第 8 页 共 23 页 underpins cooperative game theory (see Peleg andSudholter, 20_, for a survey) and also motivates a smallbut established literature at the intersection ofnoncooperative and cooperative game theory (see, for e_leAmbrus, 20_; Au

29、mann, 1959; Bernheim et al., 1987;Konishi and Ray, 20_). However, despite the notedlimitations of methodological individualism in economics(Arrow, 1994), the use of coalitional concepts ineconomics has not attained the same level of popularityas, for e_le, the use of the concept of beliefs, e_ceptin

30、sofar as the concepts of the household andthe firm assume a sharing of intentions on the partof the individuals within those structures. The contrastis interesting, as developmental studies of childrenindicate that they collaborate at earlier ages than theycan understand beliefs. One of the goals of

31、 the currentpaper is to show how a weakening of methodologicalindividualism can lead to simple and striking economicpredictions that flow from some of the deepest currentsof human nature. Firm structure and designSo coalitional behavior can lead to heterogeneouschoices by teams within a firm dependi

32、ng on their size.第 9 页 共 23 页 This effect is not necessarily monotonic. Large teamsplay the safe action, medium-size teams the risky action.In the absence of neighbors, small teams can easily solvethe coordination problem and play the risky action, butthe presence of neighbors playing safe is enough

33、incentive for very small teams to choose the safe action.By e_ploiting the internal and e_ternal pressures thatdrive these results, a firm owner or manager canmanipulate the structure of the firm to achieve desiredoutes. If the manager would like the safe action to betaken by a small workgroup, she

34、will ensure it has stronglinks to a division that will definitely be playing thesafe action typically a large department. On theother hand, if the manager would like a team to play therisky action this group could be the firmsresearch group this teamshould be small and either have limited links to t

35、herest of the firm, or only link to other teams that playthe risky action. Entrepreneurs do indeed realize thepotential cost of too much munication. As Slone (2021)records, the founder of Amazon., Jeff Bezos, hassuggested第 10 页 共 23 页 “We should be trying to figure out a way for teamsto municate les

36、s with each other, not more”. An e_le ofthis ma_im being put into practice is the Palo AltoResearch Center (PARC), established by _ero_ to createthe innovations of the future. The PARC was deliberatelygeographically isolated from _ero_s headquarters ande_isting research laboratory in New York. Given

37、 itsintended role, it was important that the PARC wasseparated from the main bureaucratic processes andculture of _ero_, which was conservative and focused onits traditional copier business (Regani, 20_). E_le:delayeringThere has been a trend in recent decades fororganizations to shorten the lengths

38、 of their hierarchies.Moreover, many of these firms have also increased thespan of control of the senior management group; there hasbeen a notable increase in the number of individuals whodirectly report to the CEO. While there can be otherdrivers for such changes Guadalupe and Wulf (20_)emphasize t

39、he impact of product-market petition frominternationalization here we use Theorem 2,Theorem第 11 页 共 23 页 3 to look at a possible relationship betweenwatercooler chat and delayering. The elimination of TeamC does not affect Team E, which is large enough that itsdecision to play the risky action canno

40、t be outweighed bye_ternal influence. However, Team F is now in directcontact with Head Office, which plays the safe action. Itfollows from the third statementof Theorem 3 that all employees in Team F will alsonow play the safe action. The e_ternal contact here iscrucial as it allows the senior mana

41、ger to switch thebehavior of a small unit. The analysis of this sectionshows how delayering can create opportunities for aprincipal to e_ercise her influence by creating differentsized teams in her organization and linking them tocreate the right balance between e_ternal and internalpressures. In th

42、is way, different behavior can begenerated in separate parts of an organization, wheneverthis is a required ponent of the organizations strategy.E_le: job rotationFirms might choose to rotate workers through tasksfor a variety of reasons. Here we show that rotation canact as a mechanism to allow the

43、 culture of one part of an第 12 页 共 23 页 organization to contage another part of the organization.Specifically, we show how even relatively short spans oftime spent working in a small team can shape anemployees behavior. When rotated back to a larger team,the employee will, for a while, retainthe beh

44、avior to which he became accustomed in thesmall team. The periodic arrival of such employees isenough to change the long run culture of the large teamfrom safe to risky. Now, from any state, the state _=Ncan be reached without random shocks. To see this,consider that the following sequence of events

45、 will occurwith positive probability. First, all current members ofthe small team meet at the small teams watercooler,where they will agree to play the risky action. Second,the members of the small team switch places, one by one,with members of the large team. This gives at least fourmembers of the

46、large team who are now playing the riskyaction. Third, the other four members of the large teammeet at the large teams watercooler and agree to switchto the risky action. They are happy to do this as theremaining four members of the team are already playingthe risky action. Finally, the new members

47、of the small第 13 页 共 23 页 team all meet at the small teams watercooler and switchto the risky action. We have reached the state _=N. Allemployees are playing the risky action. Concluding mentsWhile the boundaries of a firm are defined by itsphysical assets (Hart and Moore, 1990), socialinteractions

48、between workers characterize the way thingsget done in an organization. Workers idly sharingscuttlebutt around the watercooler might seem like thebane of an employers life, but these informalinteractions could engender collectiveactions that enhance firm productivity. This paperhas e_amined how a ma

49、nager can tinker with anorganizations structure and the physical workenvironment to harness workers informal interactions forthe firms advantage. Although the direct applicationconsidered in this paper is the design of a firm, it isclear that adaptive/evolutionary models that incorporatesome degree

50、of collective agency should also beapplicable to other problems in applied economics. Inparticular, the implications of collective agency may beof particular importance whenever formal structures in anorganization can facilitate informal interactions. This第 14 页 共 23 页 is true for academic conferenc

51、es, where informalinteractions are typically of more import than organizedpresentations, and also for diplomacy, where formalmeetings are acpanied by informal, less structured,discussions in which parties are often more able to findmon ground and create shared intentions.中文饮水机旁聊天组织结构和企业文化乔纳森牛顿 安德鲁怀特

52、 西蒙安格斯 摘要将公司建模为员工网络办公室里的偶尔协作决策会改变长期的员工行为（企业文化）。给定员工团队中出现的文化取决于团队规模以及团队与更广泛公司的联系方式。探索了该模型对组织结构的影响并将其与层次结构设计的趋势相关联。关键字：合作团队层次结构延迟网络演化苹果是一家纪律严明的公司我们的流程非常好但这不是主要的。流程使我们更高效但是创新来自人们在走廊上聊天或晚上10:30 互相交流产生的新想法苹果公司创始人史蒂夫乔布斯。引言当人们由共同的利益追求时人们会互相交流分享想法并进 行协作。员工将他们的协作性带入工作场所并与同事打交道他 们在车间会议生产线以及咖啡和午餐休息时间与他们进行互动。在本

53、第 15 页 共 23 页 文中我们考虑了工作场所社交环境中的协作决策并使用简 单的自适应决策模型表明这可能对公司文化和组织的最佳内部结 构产生巨大而深远的影响。我们的模型采用了有据可查的事实即人类特别擅长互利合作（Tomasello2021 年）并将这一事实整合到了最佳响应动态的嘈杂变量中（Young1998 年）这一直是经济建模的基础。自古诺 （1838）起。我们将公司建模为员工网络每个员工都可以选择 ”;安全”行动或“风险”行动。冒险行为代表了公司内部的创新行为甚至是投机行为。员工只有在网络中足够多的邻居也这样做的情况下才发现采取冒险行动符合他的利益。在公司内部员工分为团队。团队是一群互

54、相协作的员工尽管他们也可能与团队之外的其他人互动。该团队代表员工的工作组部门甚至是公司董事会或高级管理委员会。员工参与协作行动选择的能力以”;水冷却器”的概念为模型冷却器使团队中的一小群员工可以聊天并形成协作意图。如果没有 水冷却器使员工无法分享意图则该模型将简化为 Young 的规范模型在该模型中每个参与者选择安全行动的行为模式始终是长期均衡的（Peski20_ 年）。当少数玩家偶尔在水冷却器上见面以 形成共同的意图协调他们的行动选择以达到共同的利益时这种结果将不再成立。取而代之的是通过将人性的基本面纳入模型中我们可以根据网络拓扑获得多种行为。第 16 页 共 23 页 我们发现为了使给定团

55、队的成员在长期均衡中发挥冒险作用必须满足一些条件。（1）首先团队不能太大。团队越大围绕水冷却器进行的固定数量的协作决策对长期行为的影响的可能性就 越小。（2）其次必须有足够数量的雇员在水冷却器上协调其战略选择；也就是说团队内部的沟通必须足够强大以产生足够的 协作以克服系统偏见而采取安全行动。（3）再次团队规模不能太小以免其成员的外部联系的影响导致他们采取安全行动 或者如果团队确实如此小则团队外部的所有成员联系都必须参 加冒险行动的团队。换句话说必须限制来自团队外部成员的外部 影响。这些条件为组织设计提供了指导：它们可用于促进或预防组织不同部分的不同行为。这些条件中的每一个都有助于解释经验事实。

56、条件（1）解释了为什么寻求促进创新的公司围绕小团队建立组织结构（Cook20 xx； Stross1996）。条件（2）有助于解释企业为增加自发性互动和促进工人之间的非正式沟通所付出的努力；也就是说 制造更大的水冷却器（Evans2021年）。条件（3）有助于解释为什么组织要在团队中促进独立性甚至将研究部门与组织的其他部分隔离开来（Sloan1964）。文献综述第 17 页 共 23 页 本文对多方面的文献有所贡献。实际的贡献是关于工作场所社 会环境的重要性的文献企业中工人之间互动的性质和模式（例如 参见 Bandiera 等 20_； Gibbons 和Henderson2021； Kand

57、el 和 Lazear1992）。我们证明了工作场所社会环境对集体代理的促进如何对公司文化产生重大影响。像Kreps（1990）和 Hermalin（20_）一样我们将企业文化建模为在协调博弈中发挥 的均衡结果。为此我们转向有关自适应决策和演化的文献这使 我们能够对企业文化的某些方面进行简单的解释为范登斯汀 （Van Den Steen）（20_）的共同信念模型提供替代甚至互补的理论。进化模型通常关注长期均衡。这类似于关系契约文献如何将长期的民间定理应用于研究公司（Baker 等人1999; Levin20_; Li 等人 2021）不同之处在于进化模型对企业的合理性要求极低。如此低的理性模型

58、已经成功地解释了实验室数据（Chong 等 20_）以及经验现象如农作物共享规范（Young and Burke20_）和伊斯兰面纱的佩戴（Carvalho2021）。当前的研究显示了将集体代理结合到这样的模型中如何在保持进化方法的简单性和优雅性的同时 可以导致更丰富的经验预测。将集体代理纳入扰动的演化动力学是一个相对较新且发展迅速的文献（Newton20 xx； Newton20 xx； Newton 和 Angus2021；Sawa2021；第 18 页 共 23 页 Serrano 和 Volij20_）尽管在配对的背景下成对偏差代表规模为 2 的联盟的有意行为（Jackson 和 Wa

59、tts20_; Klaus 等20_;Klaus 和 Newton2021; Na_ 和 Pradelski2021; Newton 和Sawa2021）。人类参与集体代理的倾向性已得到充分证明最近发展心理学的研究表明合作的冲动是一种原始的冲动这种冲动从 14个月的年龄就开始显现出来 （Tomasello2021； Tomasello 等20_Tomasello 和 Rakoczy20_ 年）。最近的理论工作表明在多种情况下充当多元 主 体 的 能 力 将 不 断 发 展 （Angus 和Newton2021； Newton2021； Rusch2021）。本研究的作者认为赞成将集体代理纳入人类行为模型的证据是压倒性的。此外自适应/进化框架对此非常理想因为与静态分析相反它们明确地对处于平衡状态和处于平衡状态的行为进行建模。最后我们注意到在进化动力学中关于集体代理的工作建立在关于博弈论模型中的联盟行为的更广泛文献上。联合优化的概念是合作博弈理论的基础（参见 Peleg 和 Sudholter20_进行调查）并且在非合作博弈和合作博弈的交叉点上激发了一些既小却已确立的文献（例如参见 Ambrus20_； Aumann1959； Bernheim等 1987； Konishi 和 Ray20_）。然