信用评级机构文献翻译

1、一、 外文原文The Credit Rating Agencies: How Did We Get Here? Where Should We Go? Lawrence J. White* an insured state savings associationmay not acquire or retain any corporate debt securities not of investment grade. 12 Code of Federal Regulations 362.11 any user of the information contained herein shoul

2、d not rely on any credit rating or other opinion contained herein in making any investment decision. The usual disclaimer that is printed at the bottom of Standard & Poors credit ratings The U.S. subprime residential mortgage debacle of 2007-2008, and the world financial crisis that has followed, wi

3、ll surely be seen as a defining event for the U.S. economy - and for much of the world economy as well - for many decades in the future. Among the central players in that debacle were the three large U.S.-based credit rating agencies: Moodys, Standard & Poors (S&P), and Fitch. These three agencies i

4、nitially favorable ratings were crucial for the successful sale of the bonds that were securitized from subprime residential mortgages and other debt obligations. The sale of these bonds, in turn, were an important underpinning for the U.S. housing boom of 1998-2006 - with a self-reinforcing price-r

5、ise bubble. When house prices ceased rising in mid 2006 and then began to decline, the default rates on the mortgages underlying these bonds rose sharply, and those initial ratings proved to be excessively optimistic - especially for the bonds that were based on mortgages that were originated in 200

6、5 and 2006. The mortgage bonds collapsed, bringing down the U.S. financial system and many other countries financial systems as well. The role of the major rating agencies has received a considerable amount of attention in Congressional hearings and in the media. Less attention has been paid to the

7、specifics of the financial regulatory structure that propelled these companies to the center of the U.S. bond markets and that thereby virtually guaranteed that when they did make mistakes, those mistakes would have serious consequences for the financial sector. But an understanding of that structur

8、e is essential for any reasoned debate about the future course of public policy with respect to the rating agencies. This paper will begin by reviewing the role that credit rating agencies play in the bond markets. We then review the relevant history of the industry, including the crucial role that

9、the regulation of other financial institutions has played in promoting the centrality of the major credit rating agencies with respect to bond information. In the discussion of this history, distinctions among types of financial regulation especially between the prudential regulation of financial in

10、stitutions (which, as we will see, required them to use the specific bond creditworthiness information that was provided by the major rating agencies) and the regulation of the rating agencies themselves are important. We next offer an assessment of the role that regulation played in enhancing the i

11、mportance of the three major rating agencies and their role in the subprime debacle. We then consider the possible prospective routes for public policy with respect to the credit rating industry. One route that has been widely discussed and that is embodied in legislation that the Obama Administrati

12、on proposed in July 2009 would tighten the regulation of the rating agencies, in efforts to prevent the reoccurrence of those disastrous judgmental errors. A second route would reduce the required centrality of the rating agencies and thereby open up the bond information process in way that has not

13、been possible since the 1930s.Why Credit Rating Agencies? A central concern of any lender - including the lender/investors in bonds - is whether a potential or actual borrower is likely to repay the loan. This is, of course, a standard problem of asymmetric information: The borrower is likely to kno

14、w more about its repaying proclivities than is the lender. There are also standard solutions to the problem: Lenders usually spend considerable amounts of time and effort in gathering information about the likely creditworthiness of prospective borrowers (including their history of loan repayments a

15、nd their current and prospective financial capabilities) and also in gathering information about the actions of borrowers after loans have been made.The credit rating agencies (arguably) help pierce the fog of asymmetric information by offering judgments - they prefer the word opinions - about the c

16、redit quality of bonds that are issued by corporations, governments (including U.S. state and local governments, as well as sovereign issuers abroad), and (most recently) mortgage securitizers. These judgments come in the form of “ratings”, which are usually a letter grade. The best known scale is t

17、hat used by S&P and some other rating agencies: AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, etc., with pluses and minuses as well.4Credit rating agencies are thus one potential source of such information for bond investors; but they are far from the only potential source. There are smaller financial services firms that of

18、fer advice to bond investors. Some bond mutual funds do their own research, as do some hedge funds. There are “fixed income analysts” at many financial services firms who offer recommendations to those firms clients with respect to bondinvestments. Although there appear to be well over 100 credit ra

19、ting agencies worldwide,6 the three major U.S.-based agencies are clearly the dominant entities. All three operate on a worldwide basis, with offices on all six continents; each has ratings outstanding on tens of trillions of dollars of securities. Only Moodys is a free-standing company, so the most

20、 information is known about Moodys: Its 2008 annual report listed the companys total revenues at $1.8 billion, its net revenues at $458 million, and its total assets at year-end at $1.8 billion.7 Slightly more than half (52%) of its total revenue came from the U.S.; as recently as 2006 that fraction

21、 was two-thirds. Over two-thirds (69%) of the companys revenues comes from ratings; the rest comes from related services. At year-end 2008 the company had approximately 3,900 employees, with slightly more than half located in the U.S. Because S&Ps and Fitchs ratings operations are components of larg

22、er enterprises (that report on a consolidated basis), comparable revenue and asset figures are not possible. But S&P is roughly the same size as Moodys, while Fitch is somewhat smaller. Table 1 provides a set of roughly comparable data on each companys analytical employees and numbers of issues rate

23、d. As can be seen, all three companies employ about the same numbers of analysts; however, Moodys and S&P rate appreciably more corporate and asset-backed securities than does Fitch. The history of the credit rating agencies and their interactions with financial regulators is crucial for an understa

24、nding of how the agencies attained their current central position in the market for bond information. It is to that history that we now turn.What Is to Be Done? In response to the growing criticism (in the media and in Congressional hearings) of the three large bond raters errors in their initial, e

25、xcessively optimistic ratings of the complex mortgage-related securities (especially for the securities that were issued and rated in 2005 and 2006) and their subsequent tardiness in downgrading those securities, the SEC in December 2008 promulgated NRSRO regulations that placed mild restrictions on

26、 the conflicts of interest that can arise under the rating agencies issuer pays business model (e.g., requiring that the agencies not rate debt issues that they have helped structure, not allowing analysts to be involved in fee negotiations, etc.) and that required greater transparency (e.g., requir

27、ing that the rating agencies reveal details on their methodologies and assumptions and track records) in the construction of ratings. Political pressures to do more - possibly even to ban legislatively the issuer pays model have remained strong. In July 2009 the Obama Administration, as part of its

28、larger package of proposed financial reforms, offered legislation that would require further, more stringent efforts on the part of the rating agencies to deal with the conflicts and enhance transparency. This regulatory response the credit rating agencies made mistakes; lets try to make sure that t

29、hey dont make such mistakes in the future is understandable. But it ignores the history of the other kind of financial regulation the prudential regulation of banks and other financial institutions - that pushed the rating agencies into the center of the bond information process and that thereby gre

30、atly exacerbated the consequences for the bond markets when the rating agencies did make those mistakes. It also overlooks the stultifying consequences for innovation in the development and assessment ofinformation for judging the creditworthiness of bonds. Regulatory efforts to fix problems, by pre

31、scribing specified structures and processes, unavoidably restrict flexibility, raise costs, and discourage entry. Further, although efforts to increase transparency may help reduce problems of asymmetric information, they also have the potential for eroding a rating firms intellectual property and,

32、over the longer run, discouraging the creation of future intellectual property. There is another, quite different direction in which public policy might proceed in the wake of the credit rating agencies mistakes. Rather than trying to fix them through regulation, it would provide a more markets-orie

33、nted approach that would likely reduce the importance of the incumbent rating agencies and thus reduce the importance (and consequences) of any future mistakes that they might make. This approach would call for the withdrawal of all of those delegations of safety judgments by financial regulators to

34、 the rating agencies. The rating agencies judgments would no longer have the force of law. Those financial regulators should persist in their goals of having safe bonds in the portfolios of their regulated institutions (or that, as in the case of insurance companies and broker-dealers, an institutio

35、ns capital requirement would be geared to the risk ness of the bonds that it held); but those safety judgments should remain the responsibility of the regulated institutions themselves, with oversight by regulators.Under this alternative public policy approach, banks (and insurance companies, etc.)

36、would have a far wider choice as to where and from whom they could seek advice as to the safety of bonds that they might hold in their portfolios. Some institutions might choose to do the necessary research on bonds themselves, or rely primarily on the information yielded by the credit default swap

37、(CDS) market. Or they might turn to outside advisors that they considered to be reliable - based on the track record of the advisor, the business model of the advisor (including the possibilities of conflicts of interest), the other activities of the advisor (which might pose potential conflicts), a

38、nd anything else that the institution considered relevant. Such advisors might include the incumbent credit rating agencies. But the category of advisors might also expand to include the fixed income analysts at investment banks (if they could erect credible Chinese walls) or industry analysts or up

39、start advisory firms that are currently unknown. The end-result - the safety of the institutions bond portfolio - would continue to be subject to review by the institutions regulator. That review might also include a review of the institutions choice of bond-information advisor (or the choice to do

40、the research in-house) - although that choice is (at best) a secondary matter, since the safety of the bond portfolio itself (regardless of where the information comes from) is the primary goal of the regulator. Nevertheless, it seems highly likely that the bond information market would be opened to

41、 new ideas - about ratings business models, methodologies, and technologies - and to new entry in ways that have not actually been possible since the 1930s. It is also worth asking whether, under this approach, the issuer pays business model could survive. The answer rests on whether bond buyers are

42、 able to ascertain which advisors do provide reliable advice (as does any model short of relying on government regulation to ensure accurate ratings). If the bond buyers can so ascertain, then they would be willing to pay higher prices (and thus accept lower interest yields) on the bonds of any give

43、n underlying quality that are rated by these reliable advisors. In turn, issuers - even in an issuer pays framework - would seek to hire these recognized-to-be-reliable advisers, since the issuers would thereby be able to pay lower interest rates on the bonds that they issue. That the issuer pays bu

44、siness model could survive in this counter-factual world is no guarantee that it would survive. That outcome would be determined by the competitive process.Conclusion Whither the credit rating industry and its regulation? The central role - forced by seven decades of financial regulation - that the

45、three major credit rating agencies played in the subprime debacle has brought extensive public attention to the industry and its practices. The Securities and Exchange Commission has recently (in December 2008) taken modest steps to expand its regulation of the industry. The Obama Administration has

46、 proposed further efforts. There is, however, another direction in which public policy could proceed: Financial regulators could withdraw their delegation of safety judgments to the credit rating agencies. The policy goal of safe bond portfolios for regulated financial institutions would remain. But

47、 the financial institutions would bear the burden of justifying the safety of their bond portfolios to their regulators. The bond information market would be opened to new ideas about rating methodologies, technologies, and business models and to new entry in ways that have not been possible since t

48、he 1930s. Those who are interested in this public policy debate should ask themselves the following questions: Is a regulatory system that delegates important safety judgments about bonds to third parties in the best interests of the regulated financial institutions and of the bond markets more gene

49、rally? Will more extensive regulation of the rating agencies actually succeed in forcing the rating agencies to make better judgments in the future? Would such regulation have consequences for flexibility, innovation, and entry in the bond information market? Or instead, could the financial institut

50、ions be trusted to seek their own sources of information about the creditworthiness of bonds, so long as financial regulators oversee the safety of those bond portfolios?二、翻译文章信用评级机构:我们怎么会在这里?我们到哪去?劳伦斯 J 怀特美国联邦法规法典第362章11节12条指出：“任何已投保的国家储蓄机构不得取得或者保留任何公司债券投资级别的债券。”通常的免责声明：“任何读者不应该依赖于任何文章中包含的信用评级或其他见解

51、作出任何投资决定。”印在标准普尔的信用评级的底部。在未来的几十年，2007-2008年美国次级贷款住房抵押灾难事件和随之而来的世界金融危机,一定会被看作是美国经济和世界上大部分经济的一个定义事件。这次灾难的中心是美国的三大信用评级机构:穆迪,标普和惠誉。这三个机构的最初的良好评级对成功销售证券化的次级住房抵押贷款和其他债务债券是至关重要的。反过来,这些债券的出售是支撑美国房地产市场1998-2006年的自我增强繁荣的价格泡沫的重要因素。当房价在2006年中期停止上升,然后开始下降,这些债券所代表的贷款的违约率急剧上涨,而那些最初的收视率证明是一个过分乐观,特别是对于社会的联系,是根据抵押贷款起

52、源于2005年和2006年。抵押债券的坍塌,破坏了美国金融系统和其他许多国家的金融系统。主要评级机构在危机中扮演的角色,在国会听证会和媒体中备受关注，而很少注意到推动这些公司到美国债券市场的金融监管体制的特征。债券市场终于承认当他们犯错时,这些错误将会给金融体系带来严重后果。要做一个关于评级机构的公共政策的理性争论需要对金融监管结构有一个初步的了解。本文将首先回顾信用评级机构在债券市场扮演的作用。然后，我们检讨有关行业资料，包括其他金融机构的监管起到了促进债券方面的信息，主要的信贷评级机构的核心地位。在这个历史的讨论，分清金融监管方式的区别是非常重要的，特别是金融机构之间的审慎监管（正如我们看

53、到的，要求他们使用特定债券的信用信息，是由主要评级机构提供）和对评级机构本身的规例。 我们接下来的作用提供了一个评估监管在加强三大评级机构的重要性及其在次贷风波起中扮演的角色的测试。然后，我们就考虑向信用评级行业的政策可能对公众预期的路线的影响。2009年7月奥巴马政府提出的收紧对评级机构的监管的立法，努力防止再次发生的灾难性的判断错误。第二个途径会降低对评级机构所需的核心地位，从而开辟了信息化进程债券的方式。为什么信用评级机构会这样？贷款人（包括贷款/债券的投资者）的关注的核心问题是一个潜在的或实际借款人是否会按时偿还贷款。当然，这是一个标准的信息不对称问题：借款人有可能比贷款人了解其更多的

54、偿还倾向。解决该问题的办法有：贷款人通过花费时间和精力去收集有关潜在借款人的信用信息（包括其偿还贷款的历史及其当前和未来的财政能力）和有关信息和贷款的借款人的贷后行为。 可以说，信用评级机构通过对企业、政府和资产证券化者发行的债券的信用质量进行判断帮助投资者穿过信息不对称的迷雾。这些判断通常以字母的形式来表示其“等级”。最有名的是标准普尔和一些其他评级机构使用的：AAA级，AA级，A级，BBB级，BB级等。之一，因此信用评级机构是债券投资者的潜在信息源之一，但他们远不是唯一的潜在根源。有规模较小的金融服务公司，为债券投资者提供意见，。一些债券共同基金做自己的研究，如做一些对冲基金。许多金融服务

55、公司有“固定收益分析师”为公司的客户提供投资建议。虽然似乎有超过100个全球信用评级机构，三大美国机构显然是占主导地位的实体。这三大机构都在全球运作，在六大洲设有办事处，每个机构都负责着超过10兆美元以上的证券评级。只有穆迪是一个独立的公司，因此大多数信息是关于穆迪众所周知：2008年年度报告中列出今年该公司总收入是18亿美元，净收入是4.58亿美元，年末总资产为18亿美元.总收入中的52%来自美国，而在2006年该比例为三分之二。69的收入来自评级;其余则来自相关的服务业。2008年底该公司拥有约3,900名员工，一半以上位于美国。 由于标准普尔和惠誉都是规模较大的企业的分支机构（即在综合基础上的报告），所以无法比较收入和资产结构。标准普尔和穆迪的规模差不多，而惠誉要小一些。通过对三家机构的比较研究发现，这三家公司雇用了大约相同数量的分析师，但是，穆迪和标普比惠誉评级了明显更多的企业和资产担保证券。 信用评级机构与金融监管的互动历史，对了解一个机构如何达到其目前在债券信息市场上的中心地位是至关重要的。我们该怎么办？面对越来越多的人对三个大型债券评价机构的错误提出质疑，在初期，对于复杂