银行和非银行金融机构对中国经济增长的影响【外文翻译】

1、外文翻译原文TheImpactofBankandNon-BankFinancialInstitutionsonLocalEconomicGrowthinChinaMaterialSource:SAuthor:XiaoqiangCheng&HansDegryseRecentdebateonfinanceandgrowthinChinaboilsdowntothequestiononhowChinesefirmsarefinancedandmonitored.OnestrandofliteraturereasonsthattheChineselegalsystemandformalfina

2、ncialsectoraretooweaktoenforcesoundgovernanceandthusthelaw,financeandgrowthnexusdoesnotholdinChina(e.g.,Allenetal.(2005)andBoyreau-Debray(2003).Chinesegrowththenstemsfrominformalfinancingchannelsandinstitutions.TheotherstrandreasonsthatformalfinanceinChinacontributestogrowth,despitetherelativeweakne

3、ssofthelegalsystem(e.g.Hasanetal.(2006),Ayyagarietal.(2007),RousseauandXiao(2007),or(Demitriadesetal.2008).1Informalfinanceservesfirmswhocannottapformalfinance.However,informalfinancecannotservetheneedsofthehigherendofthemarketsincetheirmonitoringandenforcementmechanismsareinsufficientlydeveloped(Ay

4、yagarietal.(2007).WefindthatbankingdevelopmentplaysanimportantroleinChineseeconomicgrowth.Ourevidencetakentogetherwiththatfromotherrecentpapers(e.g.Hasanetal.(2006),Ayyagarietal.(2007),RousseauandXiao(2007),andDemetriadesetal.(2008),whoalsosupporttheroleofformalfinanceinChinausingdifferentdatasetsan

5、dmethods,showthattheAllenetal.(2005)conjecturesarebecomingverymuchaminorityview.OurpaperthereforeshiftsthebalanceofevidenceawayfromtheviewthatformalfinanceplayedlittleroleinfinancingChineseeconomicgrowth.InChina,mostnon-bankfinancialinstitutionsonlyoperatewithinaprovince.Whilebanks,especiallystate-o

6、wnedbanks,havetheirnational-levelheadquarters,cross-provincebanklendingseldomhappensduetotherestrictionimposedbythecentralbankofChina.Thereforeitissafeforustocomparetheperformanceofthosetwotypesoffinancialinstitutionsatprovinciallevel.Financialdevelopmentofthosefinancialinstitutionsineachprovinceism

7、easured,inaconventionalway,bytheratiosoflocalsavingsandloanstoGDP.Thepaneldatasetweemploycoverstheperiod1995-2003,rightafterthemid-1990sfinancialreformstookplace.Choosingsuchaperiodalsohelpsusalleviatingthereverseimpactfromgrowthtofinancialreforms.Forinstance,theconcernthatfinancialreformswereinitia

8、tedexactlyatthetimethattheeconomywasexpectedtoboomshouldthenbelessofaconcern.Thegrowthrateshaveshownadecreasingtrendduringoursampleperiod,astheChinesegovernmenthasmanagedto“softland"theeconomysincethemid-1990s.Ourresultsshowthatacleardifferenceexistsbetweentheimpactoffinancialdevelopmentofbanks

9、andnon-bankfinancialinstitutionsongrowth.Whilehavingextendedmostoftheirloanstothelargeandmediumsizedfirms,bankscontributesignificantlytolocalgrowth.Thiseffectismorepronouncedinprovinceswithforeignentry.Asacomparison,non-bankfinancialinstitutions,whilegrantingmostoftheirloanstosmallerfirmsinChina,see

10、mtobenotimportantforlocalgrowth.Suchresultsarerobustacrossdifferentspecificationscontrollingforomittedvariablesorreversecausality.Weattributethisdifferencetothefactthatbanks,relativetonon-bankfinancialinstitutions,havebenefitedmuchmorefromtheChineseongoingfinancialreforms.Inparticular,thereformsincl

11、udecommercializationofstate-ownedbanks,marketentryderegulation,andliberalizationofinterestrates.Ourresultssuggestthat,despitetherelativelyweakChinesefinancialsector,atmarginbanksplayedanimportantroleintheallocationoffunds,andinturnspurredgrowth.OurfindingsharpenstheinsightsofAllenetal.(2005)ontheone

12、hand,andAyyagarietal.(2007),Demetriadesetal.(2008),andRousseauandXiao(2007),ontheotherhand,whichmainlyarguethatonlytheinformalandformalfinancialsectordrivegrowth,respectively.Before1994,thefourstate-ownedbanks7weredominatingthewholebankingsector.In1994,threepolicybankswerecreatedtoundertakepolicylen

13、dingpreviouslyassignedtothefourstate-ownedbanks.Thelatterthenbecamethestate-ownedcommercialbanks(SOCBshereinafter)forcommercialfinancialbusinessonly.Atthesametime,aseriesoffinancialreformshavebeencarriedoutinordertoimprovetheinternalmanagementandrisk-controloftheSOCBs,andtodelinkthemfromtheirnon-ban

14、kingarms(Li(2001).In1998,theChinesecentralbank(thePeople'sBankofChina(PBOChereinafter),allowedtheSOCBstomaketheirownlendingdecisionsonacommercialbasis.Incontrast,thenon-bankfinancialsectorhasreceivedfewreforms.Thesehavebeendeterredsincethereisnoconsensusontheownershipandfunctionsofthenon-bankfin

15、ancialinstitutions,especiallyoftheruralcreditcooperatives(RCCshereinafter)(He(2006)andXie(1998).Thedevelopmentoflegislationforthetrustandinvestmentcompanies(TICshereinafter)lagsbehindthatofbanks.WhiletheTrustLawdidn'tenadtheendof2001,theCommercialBankingLawenactedalreadyin1995providingalegalfram

16、eworkforstandardizingtheoperationsofthecommercialbanks.Figure1presentsanoverviewofChina'fsnancialinstitutionsattheendof1994,rightafterthecommercialization.Thebankingsectorentailsthreepolicybanksandfifteencommercialbanks,ofwhichthefourSOCBsarebyfarthemostimportantintermsofassets.Oneshouldnoticeth

17、ateachstate-ownedbankhasalargenumberofbranchesinalmosteverycityinChina.Amongtheelevenjointstockbanks,BankofCommunications(BoCom)isthelargestwithChina'sfinancministryitsmainshareholder.ResearchersoftenrefertothefourSOCBsandBoComas“thfivebiggeststate-ownedbanks"Thenon-bankfinancialsectorconsi

18、stsofurbancreditcooperatives(UCCshereinafter),RCCs,TICs,financialcompanies(FCs),andotherinstitutions.TherearemanyUCCsandRCCsinChina,buttheyareisolatedfromeachotheranddonothavecountry-wideheadquartersasbanks.Insum,bankandnon-bankfinancialinstitutionsaretheonlytwotypesoffinancialinstitutionsinChina,ac

19、cordingtotheAlmanacofChina'FinanceandBanking.Commercializationhasseveraleffects.First,theSOCBsgraduallyreducedtheirexposuretothestate-ownedsector,astheproportionofloanstothestate-ownedsectordecreasedfrom82.4%in1994towards64.4%in2002.Overtheperiod1994-2002,theshort-termloansextendedtothenon-state

20、-ownedsectorgrewfaster,especiallystemmingfromSOCBs,suggestingthattheSOCBsweremakinggreatereffortstosupportthenonstate-ownedsectorthannon-bankfinancialinstitutions.8Second,SOCBshadbeenabletoattracthighqualitypersonnel,whicharecrucialtoselectandmonitorprojects.Theevolutionofnon-performingloans(NPLsher

21、einafter)ofSOCBsandnon-bankfinancialinstitutionsillustratesthatcommercializationimprovedtheefficiencyoflending.Table1showsthattheNPLratiointhebankingsectorhadbeencontinuouslydecreasingbetween2000and2003.NexttothefactthattheChinesegovernmenthasinjectedcapitaltoSOCBs,mostoftheNPLswereactuallyduetothep

22、olicylendingduringthepre-reformperiodandlittlehadbeennewlygeneratedaftercommercialization(Zhang(2003a,b)andXu(2005).ThefewavailabledataontheNPLratioofnon-bankfinancialinstitutionssuggestthatthisratiowasmuchhigher(50%)andpossiblyatanincreasingtrend.ChinahasmadeanefforttostimulatecompetitionamongtheSO

23、CBsandalsotointroducecompetitionfromotherbankswithdifferentownershipstructures.In1986and1996,thefirstjointstockcommercialbank(BankofCommunication)andthefirstprivatejointstockcommercialbank(ChinaMinshengBankingCorp.,LTD.(CMBC)werecreated,respectively.Moreover,foreignfinancialinstitutionswereallowedto

24、setuprepresentativeofficesinChinain1981.Foreignbankswereallowedtosetupbranchesinmostimportantcoastalcitiesin1994andwereallowedtoconductRMBbusinessinShanghaiandShenzhentwoyearslater.HowtoreconciletheseresultswithAllenetal.(2005),whoarguethattheChinesefinancialsystemisweakandthatinformalfinanceandinfo

25、rmalinstitutionspromotegrowth,andAyyagarietal.(2007),(Demitriadesetal.2008),andRousseauandXiao(2007),whofindthatformalfinanceleadstogreaterfirmgrowth?Wefindthatonlybankingdevelopmentleadstogreatergrowth,inlinewithsomeofthefindingsofAyyagarietal.(2007),(Demitriadesetal.2008),andRousseauandXiao(2007),

26、whereasthedevelopmentofnon-bankfinancialinstitutionsseemsnottocausegrowth.ItisclearthattheChinesefinancialinstitutionsdohaveinefficienciescomparedtotheirinternationalcounterparts.Butcomparedtootherdomesticfinancialinstitutions,theChinesebankshavebenefitedgreatlyfromfinancialreformsandthuschangeddram

27、aticallyfromonlygrantingpolicyloanstostartingallocatingcapitalandmonitoringprojectsaccordingtocommercialstandards.ThispapercontributestotherecentdebateontheroleofformalandinformalfinanceforgrowthinChinausingsomenewperspectives.Inparticular,wearguethatnon-bankfinancialinstitutionsinChinahavecharacter

28、isticsofbothinformalandformalfinanceanddeservespecialattention.ThereforecomparisonoftheheterogeneitybetweenthosetwotypesoffinancialinstitutionsallowsgainingfurtherinsightsonwhethertheformalortheinformalfinancialsectorleadstogrowthinChina.Non-bankfinancialinstitutions,whichhavelongbeenignoredbythefin

29、anceandgrowthliterature,arethusbroughtunderthespotforthefirsttime.Inaddition,wearethefirsttolinkfinancialreforms,financialdevelopmentandgrowth.Banksandnon-bankfinancialinstitutionsthusserveasthe"referencegroup"foreachotherinidentifyingtherefor-finance-growthnexus.Usingaprovince-levelpaneld

30、atasetovertheperiod1995-2003,wefindthatbankdevelopment,inparticularbankcredit,greatlycontributestoprovincegrowth.Forinstance,anincreaseofbankloanstoGDPratiofromthelowesttothehighestinoursampleincreasesfutureannualgrowthby8.5percentagepoints.Incontrast,inmostspecifications,thedevelopmentofnon-bankfin

31、ancialinstitutionsisnotcorrelatedwithgrowth.Weattributethisdifferencetobankshavingbenefitedmorefromthereformprocesssuchascommercialization,entryderegulationandliberalizationthannon-bankfinancialinstitutions.Banksmayhavebeenabletograduallybuildupacommercialculture,gettingridoftheinterventionfromthelo

32、calgovernment,attractbetterqualitypersonnel,andimprovetheirviabilityduringopening-upforforeigninstitutions.Comparedtobanks,non-bankfinancialinstitutionswerelargelyunderdeveloped.ThisargumentisalsoconfirmedbyChina'gecentattemptstoreformurbanandruralcreditcooperativesbytransformingthemintolocalcom

33、mercialbanks.Thedifferentfindingsonthedevelopmentofbanksandnonbankfinancialinstitutionsshowthatthereform-finance-growthnexusalsoapplieswithintheformalfinancialsectorinChina.译文银行和非银行金融机构对中国经济增长的影响资料来源：斯普林格数据库作者：陈晓强和汉斯迪格瑞斯在最近一次的辩论中，中国的经济增长归结为中国的企业是如何资助和监督的问题。原因之一是中国法律制度和正规金融部门的执行和治理太弱并且不够健全，从而在法律、金融和增

34、长之间的关系不成立，中国经济的增长来自于非正规的融资渠道和机构(Allen,2005和Boyreau-Debray,2003)。另一条链的原因，在中国，正规金融对经济增长的贡献是不可忽视的，尽管法律制度相对疲软。非正规金融服务公司也有挖掘正规金融的潜力。然而，非正规金融无法满足的一些东西，比如他们的监督和执行机制是不够发达的，满足不了市场的需要(Ayyagari,2007)。我们发现，银行业的发展在中国经济增长中的重要作用。我们的证据是其他一些最新的论文，如Hasan(2006),Ayyagari(2007),RousseauandXiao(2007年)和Demetriades(2008)表明

35、支持作用正规金融在中国用不同的数据集和方法，以及Allen(2005)的猜测正在成为一个非常少数人的观点。因此，从平衡的证据视角认为，正规金融融资中发挥了经济增长作用不大。在中国，大多数非银行金融机构的经营范围内只有一个省。尽管银行，特别是国有银行，有其国家一级总部，由于银行贷款跨省的情况很少见，因为中国央行施加的限制。因此，这是我们比较安全的省级金融机构的两种类型的性能。在每个省的金融机构的发展衡量的传统的方式是财政，由当地的储蓄和贷款占GDP勺比率。我们采用的面板数据集包括1995-2003年期间，右后90年代中期发生的金融改革。选择这样一个时期也帮助我们从经济增长减缓的影响，相对金融改革

36、来说。例如，该金融改革始于当时正是担心经济有望进一步升温然后应是一个关注较少的增长率都表现出在我们的样本期间下降的趋势，研究中政府所达到的“软土地”自90年代中期的经济。我们的研究结果表明，一个明显的差异对银行和非银行金融机构的金融发展对经济增长的影响是存在的。虽然能延长贷款一般是最大的大中型企业，银行对当地经济增长作出重大贡献是不可忽视的。这种效应与国外入境的省份更加明显。作为比较，非银行金融机构，同时给予他们的贷款在中国的大部分小公司，似乎是不适合当地的重要发展。这样的结果是在对省略变量或相反的因果关系控制不同规格。我们认为这对银行，相对于非银行金融机构，都是由于中国正在进行的金融改革很好

37、。特别是，改革包括国有银行，市场准入自由化，利率自由化和商业化。我们的研究结果表明，尽管中国的金融业相对较弱，但在银行的保证金中发挥了资金分配的重要作用，并反过来刺激经济增长。1994年以前，四大国有银行占据了整个银行部门。1994年，三家政策性银行的建立是为了进行政策性贷款以前分配给四家国有银行。后者则成为商业性金融业务只国有（国有商业银行）的商业银行。与此同时，金融改革已进行了一系列以完善内部管理和风险控制的国有商业银行，并从他们的脱钩非银行部门他们（Li,2001）。1998年，中国央行（人民银行）银行，允许国有商业银行要在商业基础上自行作出贷款决定。相比之下，非银行金融机构已收到一些改

38、革。这些已经却步因为没有对所有权和非银行金融机构职能的共识，特别是农村信用社（Xie,1998）。培养对信托投资公司立法的发展（国际信托）落后于银行。虽然没有制定信托法，直到2001年底，商业银行法颁布于1995年已提供了一个规范的商业银行业务的法律框架。银行业需要三家政策性银行和商业银行十五，其中四个国有商业银行目前最重要的是在资产方面。每个人都应该注意，每个国有银行在中国几乎每个城市的分行多。其中十一股份制银行，交通银行（交行）与中国银行是财政部的主要股东最大。研究者经常提到的四个国有商业银行和“五大国有银行的”交银。非银行金融机构包括城市信用社（以下简称信用社），农村信用社，抽动，财务公司（FCS）的，和其他机构。有许多城市信用社和农村信用社在中国，但他们相互隔离，不具备在全国范围内为银行总部。总之，银行和非银行金融机构是仅有的两个在中国金融机构类型，根据中国的金融年鉴得出。商业化已经有很多影响了。首先，国有商业银行逐步减少他们暴露在国有部门，作为贷款的比例，国有经济在1994年下降64.4%,对从2002年的82.4%。在1994-2002年期