职业健康安全管理体系和安全文化英文翻译

1、OHSMS and Safety CultureWhat is an occupational health and safety management system(OHSMS)?One difficultly in evaluating the effectiveness of OHSMS lies in the different meanings given to the team .Finding agreement upon criteria for effectiveness, or methods of measure-ment and evaluation is especi

2、ally hard where basic disagreement exists upon what an OHSMS .1、The General Characteristics Of an OHSMSAll OHSMS owe something to the legacy of general system theory. Systems theory suggests that there should be four general requirements for an OHSMSa, lthough how there requirements are met in pract

3、ice allows for considerable diversity.The four general requirements are as follows.1System objectives.2 Specificationof system elements and their inter-relationship; notall systems need have the same elements.3 Determining the relationship of the OHSMSto other systems (including the general manageme

4、ntsystem, and the regulatory system , but also technology and work organization ).4 Requirements for system maintenance (which maybe internal, linked to a review phase , or external , linked for example to industry policies that support OHS best practice; system maintenance may vary between systems)

5、.Several Australian authorities upon OHSMS have given definitions broadly consistent with these general system requirements. Thus Bottomley notes what makes an OHSMSa system “is the deliberate linking and sequencing of processes to achieve specific objectives and to create arepeatable and ide ntifia

6、ble way of managin g OHS. Corrective acti ons(are also )central to a systematic approach .Warwick Pearse also emphasises systemic linkages, defining an OHSMS as “distinct elements which cover the key range of activities requiredto manageoccupational health and safety. These are inter-linked, and the

7、 whole thing is driven by feedback loops. Similarly, Gallagher defi nes an OHSMS as“a bin ati on of theplanning and review, the management organization arrangements, the consultative arrangements, and the specific program elements that work together in an integrated way to improve health and safety

8、performance. 2、Voluntary Or Mandatory Implementation MethodsOne way that OHSMSdiffer arises from the various methods of implementation. Frick and Wren distinguish three types voluntary, mandatory and hybird. Voluntary systems exist where enterprises adopt OHSMSon their owe volition. Often this is to

9、 implement strategic objectives relating to employee welfare or good corporate citizenship, although there may be other motives such as reducing insurance costs. In contrast, mandatory systems have evolved in a number of European countries where legislation requires adoption of a risk assessment sys

10、tem. Quasimandatory methods may also exist where external mercial pressures take the place of legislative requirements. Thus many businesses adopt OHSMSto ply with the requirements of customers and suppliers, principal contractors and other mercial bodies. Hybrid methods are said to entail a mixture

11、 of voluntary motives and legislative requirements.3. Management Systems or Systematic ManagementFollowing from their distinction between voluntary and mandatory OHSMS,Frick and Wren also separate occupational health and safety “management systems, and the“management systems of occupationalhealth an

12、d safety. Specifically ,the former have been characterized as: market-based, promoted typically by consulting firms, and with usually highly formalized prescriptions on how to integrate OHSMwithin large and plex organizations and also prehensive demands on documentation.This “management systems from

13、 must meet stringent criteria.Where these requirements of a“systemsare not met, then the term issaid to be inapplicable.On the other hand, “systematic management isdescribed as "a limited number of mandated principles for a systematic management of OHS, applicable to all types of employers incl

14、uding the small ones .This approach stems from methods of regulation found in Europe as well as Australia, where businesses, including smaller ones, are encouraged or required to ply with a less demanding framework than“managementsystems. One example of this simpler regulatory framework might be the

15、 risk assessment principles within the 1989/391 European Union Framework Directive.Support for such a loose approach to OHSM also exists in Australia.One employer expert on OHS defined systems simply as“just a word forwhat you do to manage safety . Consistent with this is Bottomley'sall- enpassi

16、ng approach which allows that“an OHSMS can be simple orplex, it can be highly documented or sparingly described, and it can be home grown or based on an available model . An example of a relatively simple “systematic approach to the management of occupational health and safety is to be found in “Sma

17、ll Business Safety Solutions -a booklet for small business published by the Australian Chamber of merce and Industry.This advocates a four step process as follows:Step1: mitment to a Safe Workplace(framing a policy based on consultation).Step2: Recognising and Removing Dangers(using a danger identif

18、ication list)Step3:Maintaining a Safe Workplace (including safety checks, maintenance, reporting dangers, information and training, supervision ,accident investigation, and emergency planning).Step4: Safety Records and Information (including records and standards required to be kept by law)It is deb

19、atable whether such a framework for “systematic management in a small business can include all the elements of planning and accountab ility that are essential to a“management system in alarge business.4 . System Characteristics : managerialist and Participative ModelsWithin “management systems two d

20、ifferent models can be found . The first variant stems from what Nielsen terms “rati onal organisation theory ( Taylorist and bureaucratic models of organisation ) . Rational organisation theory is associated with top down managerialist models of OHSMS such as Du Pont . Some authorities now consider

21、 most voluntary systems to be managerial ist . Thus Frick. et al . observe that“ . . .most voluntary OHSMsystems define top managementas the ( one and only ) actor . Conversely, an alternative participativemodel of “managementsystems can be traced to socio-technical systems theory, which emphasises

22、organisational interventions based on analysis of the inter-relationships of technology , the orientation of participants , and organisational structure .The strengths of this typology are two-fold . First , it is grounded in the literature that discusses alternative approaches to managing OHS and d

23、ifferent control strategies , and it reflects the principal debates in that literature . Second , it can be operationalised through empirical tests to see which type of OHSMS performs best .The typo logy also faces a difficulty in the fact that the “ safe place control strategy“ is mandatory in Aust

24、raliaand should be found in allworkplaces . There in not , therefore . a clear choice between two mutually exclusive control strategies ; the workplace with dominant safe person characteristics should also be implementing safe place characteristics .5 . Degree of Implementation: Quality LevelsFrick

25、and Wren expand upon their distinction between mandatory and voluntary OHSMtSo further identify three levels of systems objectives , drawn from the literature on product quality control , that represent different levels of achievement and measures of OHSM performance.6 . degree of Implementation: In

26、troductory and Advanced SystemsThe idea that there may be different levels of OHSM has beeninterpreted another way in Australia where performance levers in some programs are explicitly developmental ( the business graduating up an ascending ladder as it demonstratespliance with the requirements of e

27、achsuccessivelever ) .One example of Australian program with developmental steps is the South Australian Safety Achiever Business System ( SABS ) ( formerly known as the Safety Achiever Bonus Scheme) . The program specifies five standards ( mitment and policy , planning implementation , measurement

28、and management systems review and implementation ) linked in a continuous improvement cycle . Three “levels of implementation are then prescribed cumulatively introducing all five standards from a basic or introductory program to a continuous improvement system . Different evaluation standards are p

29、rescribed for each level .7. OHSMS Diversity and Evaluation : A SummaryWhile, in general, this Report advocates care in defining OHSMS with respect to the problems outlined above , for the purpose of thisprojectan inclusive approach to the phenomena is to be adopted .In particular , the term OHSMSwi

30、ll be used broadly to enpass both the highly plex formal systems adopted voluntarily by some businesses as well as the more rudimentary mandatory or advisory frameworks offered to and implemented by small business.So far , we have shown that OHSMcSan vary upon a number of dimensionsrelating to metho

31、d of implementation , system characteristics , and degree of implementation . Such varianee is importantbecause it affectsevaluati on and measureme nt of OHSMS performa nee . Measures appropriate for one dime nsion of a system will be irreleva nt to ano ther. Evaluati onof OHSMS effective ness may n

32、 eed to take acco unt of what systems are expected to do . Are they to meet plex system or simple design standards ? Are they implemented at the behest of management or external OHS authorities ? Are objectives the simple ones such as reduci ng direct lost-timein juriesor do they in clude satisfy in

33、g multiple stakeholders ?Are they at an early or established stage of developme nt ; and which ofseveral differentconfigurationsof controlstrategy and managementstructure/style is adopted ? Drawing upon the review above , the diagram below sets out five key dime nsions on which OHSMS vary that n eed

34、 to be con sidered in evaluati on and measureme nt .8. OHSMS Diversity : 5 Key Dimensions for Evaluation While all systemsmust meet the general requirements for an OHSMS diversitymayoccur alongfive key dime nsions as follows :Implementation method (voluntary , mandatory or hybrid);Con trol strategy

35、(safe pers on /safe place);Man ageme nt structure and style (inno vative or traditi on al);Degree of impleme ntati on (from meeti ng basic specificati ons tomeeti ng stakeholder n eeds);Degree of impleme ntatio n( formin troductory stage to fullyoperati on al).OHSMS is a process of continu ous devel

36、opme nt of inno vatio n, is a process of continuous improvement. In the process, the enterprisecultureconstantly adjust the original managementdea, realize enterprise safety culture ree ngin eeri ng.1. What Is Safety Culture?The UKHealth and Safety Executive defines safety culture asthe product of t

37、he individual and group values, attitudes, petencies and patterns of behavior that determine the mitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization's health and safety programs. A moresuccinct definition has been suggested:“Safety cultureis how theorganization behaves when no one is w

38、atching.Every organization has a safety culture, operating at one level or another. The challenges to the leadership of an organization are to: 1) determine the level at which the safety culture currently functions; 2) decide where they wish to take the culture; and 3) chart and navigate a path from

39、 here to there.2. Why Is Safety Culture Important?Management systems and their associated policies and procedures depend upon the actions of individuals and groups for their successful implementation. For example, a procedure may properly reflect the desired intent and be adequately detailed in its

40、instructions. However, the successful execution of the procedure requires the actions of properly trained individuals who understand the importance of the underlying intent, who accept their responsibility for the task, and who appreciate that taking an obviously simplifying but potentially unsafe s

41、hortcut would be, quite simply, wrong.The values of the group (e.g., corporation, plant, shift team) help shape the beliefs and attitudes of the individual, which in turn, play a significant role in determining individual behaviors. A weak safety culture can be (and likely will be) evidenced by the

42、actions and inactions of personnel at all levels of the organization. For example, the failure of a critical interlock might have been caused by the mechanic who failed to calibrate the pressure switch and falsified the maintenance records. Alternatively, it might have been caused by the plant manag

43、er who denied the funding requested to address staffing shortages in the instrument department.Audits too frequently reveal ostensibly plete, sometimes sophisticated, management systems within which one or more elements are falling well short of achieving their desired intent. Previously, we might h

44、ave attributed such failures to a general concept of“lack ofoperating discipline. Certainly, the failure to maintain high standards of performance might be a contributor to the problem. However, deficiencies in other safety culture features likely contributed to the situation.Industry has gradually

45、accepted the importance of identifying the managementsystem failures that lead to incidents and near misses (i.e., identifying root causes). For example, let us suppose that an incident occurred because a control room operator, leaving at the end of the shift, failed to alert the oning operator of a

46、 serious, off-standard condition in the process. This problem might be diagnosed generally as a munications problem, with a specific root cause identified as “munications between shifts less than adequate. Perhaps, however,perfunctory shift turnovers are the rule rather than the exception, and this

47、circumstance is generally known to supervision. In this circumstance, another root cause related to supervisory practices, “Improper performance not corrected, might be identified.This analysis so far leaves a number of questions unanswered, such as “Why do operators shortcut the turnoverprocess and

48、 why do they feelfortable in doing so? or “Whydo supervisors tolerate a practice that jeopardizes the safety of the facility? We can attempt to answer these questions by seeking to understand the values, beliefs and attitudes that shape individual actions and inactions (i.e., by seeking to understan

49、d the safety culture). By identifying and addressing the pathologieswithin the safety culture (or, more appropriately, by proactively seeking to maintain a culture free of such weaknesses), we are effectively addressing the root causes of what we typically regard to be the root causes of safety perf

50、ormance problems.Regardless of whether one is seeking to establish a new safety management system, repair an existing underperforming system, or fine-tune a basically sound system to achieve higher performance, it is the actions or inactions of the individual working within the system that can ultim

51、ately be the limiting performance factor. Creating and sustaining a sound safety culture can be a decisive factor in determining the performance of the individual and the system.3. Who Is Responsible for Safety Culture?It has bee n suggested that“the only thing of real importa neethat leaders do is

52、to create and man age culture-"The leadership of anorganization has the primary responsibility for identifying the need for, and fostering, cultural change and for sustaining a sound safety culture once it is established.However, not unlike the concept of “safety as a line responsibility, "

53、; the responsibility for fostering and maintaining a sound safety culture cascades down through the organization. Every individual in the organization has a role to play.Cultures are based upon shared values, beliefs, and perceptions that determine what es to be regarded as the norms for the organiz

54、ation;i. e., cultures develop from societal agreements about what constitutes appropriate attitudes and behaviors. If the organization feels strongly about a particular behavior, there will be little tolerance for deviation, and there will be strong societal pressures for conformance. Each individua

55、l in the organization has a role in reinforcing the behavioral norms.TheThus, in the broadest sense for a sound safety culture,organization and each individual is the most appropriate answer to the question “Whoi s responsible? In a sound safety culture, an individual would be expected to intercede

56、if they saw a co-worker about to mit an unsafe act. In a sound safety culture, leadership would be expected to monitor the heath of the safety culture and reinforce and nurture it whenrequired. In a sound safety culture, individuals and groups would be expected to speak out if they perceived managem

57、entacting in a fashion inconsistent with the organization's values.4. What Are the Key Attributes Of A Sound Safety Culture?A review of the literature on the topics of organizational effectiveness and safety culture, reinforced by learning from numerous chemical facility audits and incident inve

58、stigations, has led to the identification 11 key attributes for a sound safety culture. These attributes, which are described in further detail in Table 1.Table 1. Key Attributes Of A Sound Safety Culture?Espouse safety as a core value?Provide strong leadership?Establish and enforce high standards o

59、f performance?Maintain a sense of vulnerability?Empower individuals to successfully fulfill their safety responsibilities?Provide deference to expertise?Ensure open and effective munications?Establish a questioning/learning environment?Foster mutual trust?Provide timely response to safety issues and concerns?Provide contin