chinglish pragmatics-广西师范大学尊师重道-notes on

1、Notes on PragmaticsGXNU Graduate Program in Linguistics & Applied LinguisticsEdited by Shaozhong Liu Vol.1 Issue No. 2005(5)Address: College of Foreign Studies, Guangxi Normal University, Guilin, 541004, ChinaWebsite: Email: szliu l From the Editor.2l Understanding Speech ActsChen Huai2He Ning3Jing

2、An Dian4Lai Tao.5Li Handong.5Liao Jinchao.6Liu Bin.7Liu Taomei7Liu Tingting.8Meng Jieqin.9Ou Lianfen9Song Yuge.10Sun Yan.11Tang Wensheng.12Tang Xia.13Wang Kaiwen.14Wang Liyuan.15Wang Wenbo.15Wei Yunhui16Xu Hui.17Xu Zhaojuan.18Zhou Yanqiong.19Zhou Yuping.20From the EditorThe Speech Acts Theory (SAT)

3、was a basic pragmatic theory. Chapter 5 (Mey, 2001, pp.92-133) provides a systematic account of the theory, and a gateway into the pragmatic terrain for students of pragmatics. Here are the outline of the chapter:5.1 History and introduction.925.1.1 Why speech acts?925.1.2 Language is use.935.1.3 Ho

4、w speech acts function.955.2 Promises975.2.1 A speech acts physiognomy: promising985.2.1.1 Introduction: the problem985.2.1.2 Promises: conditions and rules995.2.1.3 The pragmatics of rules.1015.3 Speech act verbs.1055.3.1 The number of speech acts.1055.3.2 Speech acts, speech act verbs and performa

5、tivity1065.3.3 Speech acts without SAVs1095.4 Indirect Speech Acts1115.4.1 Recognizing indirect speech acts.1115.4.2 The ten steps of Searle.1135.4.3 The pragmatic view.1145.5 Classifying Speech Acts.1175.5.1 The illocutionary verb fallacy.1175.5.2 Searles classification of speech acts1195.5.2.1 Rep

6、resentatives.1205.5.2.2 Directives.1205.5.2.3 Commissives.1205.5.2.4 Expressives1215.5.2.5 Declaratives.1225.5.3 Austin and Searle.124 Liu, SZ, UNCGUnderstanding Speech ActsChen Huai(jesschenh; Sun, 17 Apr 2005 16:46:27 +0800 (CST) Chapter Five Speech Act is concerned with one of the basic ingredien

7、ts of pragmatics. The concept was introduced by the Oxford philosopher John Austin. First of all, the author makes a brief introduction of the history of Speech Act. In his own search for ways of coping with language as a form of action, Austin first made a distinction between constative and perform

8、ative utterances. His conclusion was simple: all utterances contain both constative and performative elements; they are all sayings and doings at the same time (Verschueren 2000:22). And Searle followed his footstep, further developed Austins idea and became the main proponent and defender of the fo

9、rmers idea. As Searle notes that “The unit of linguistic communication is not, as has generally been supposed, the symbol, word of sentence, but rather the production of the symbol or word or sentence in the performance of the speech act”. Moreover, speech acts are produced in actual situations of l

10、anguage use, by people having something in mind: the language they use, and in particular the speech acts they utter, are entirely dependent on the context of the situation in which such acts are produced. Mey points out: “All speech is situated speech; a speech act is never just an act of speech, i

11、t is always a pragmatic act.” Thus, it reminds us of not only taking the circumstances of individual utterance into consideration, but also widening our net by incorporating the general conditions of a particular act of speaking. While how does speech acts function? Austin made a distinction of diff

12、erent aspects of speech acting: locutionary aspect, illocutionary force/point and perlocutionary effect, among which the perlocutionary effect perhaps is the most interesting aspect of speech acting, from a pragmatic point of view. Then, examples are given to analyze the word promise and the speech

13、act promise. By listing the nine conditions that Searle proposed for successful promising, Mey examines his five rules. The following conditions should hold our attention: Propositional content condition: specification of a future state of affairs. Preparatory condition: the speaker/writer has adequ

14、ate information to form a valid opinion about the future state of affairs. Sincerity condition: the speaker/writer believes that the future state of affairs will indeed be as described. Essential condition: the utterance counts as an act committing the speaker/writer to the likelihood of the future

15、state of affairs to be as described. (Verschueren 2000:23) From these, the five rules, including the content rule, the preparatory rule, the sincerity rule and the essential rule, correspond to these conditions. But the five rules does not weight the same: the former four termed regulative while the

16、 fifth one constitutive the regulative and the constitutive rules are not as easily separable as what we may perceive: the regulative rules define what the constitutive rules say they do; but the constitutive rules determine the weight that is given those rules in the daily exercise of them. It stil

17、l leaves much room for us to investigate the aspects of pragmatic acts of the speech acts. Third, speech act verbs are presented. The expressions which contain with SAV and those without SAV, can lead to the same speech act. As a result, speech acts, as well as speech act verbs, only make sense when

18、 used in their proper contexts. In section 4 and 5, the author goes in detail on indirect speech acts and the classification of speech acts. As the surface of a particular expression does not always and necessarily tell the truth about what it is doing, wed better look for the implied meaning in ord

19、er to observe its pragmatic act. What we should bear in mind is that : “A truly pragmatic approach would, in any case, concentrate on what users do; Users are part of a world of usage: they are never alone in their use of language, but use their language as members of a speech community that reflect

20、s the conditions of the community at large.” At last, though criticisms are offered to Austins original theory of speech acts, his discovery, that language is an instrument of action, not just of speaking, should not be devalued over time. However, both Austin and Searle carry on the one sentence, o

21、ne case principle. This kind of case approach does not take the contextual factor into account. When we describe speech acts and peoples use of language, one thing we should take it seriously is the contextual conditions. (To the top)He Ning(elvahening; 16 May 2005 03:27:45 +0800)In chapter 5, Mey i

22、ntroduces speech acts to us, which is a very important theory in Pragmatics. Austin and Searls contribution to speech acts are the major concern of this chapter.Firstly, Mey give a brief account of the history and some characteristics of speech acts. Speech acts theory was firstly proposed by Oxford

23、 philosopher John L. Austin in his famous work How to Do Things with Words. His student, the American philosopher John R. Searle, further developed his theory. Although speech acts are proposed by a philosopher, they are produced in actual situation of language use, which is very different from non-

24、use-oriented examples of most grammarians and philosophers. “All speech is situated speech; a speech act is never just an act of speech, but should be considered in the total situation of activity of which it is a part(cf. Levinson 1979), and therefore, it is always a pragmatic act, rather than a me

25、re speech act.” (P94 Chapter5) Austin made a distinction between the different aspects of speech acting: locutionary aspect, illocutionary aspect and perlocutionary act. A valid speech act need to fulfill two conditions. First, we have to be certain that the person annunciating these words actually

26、has the power to do so. Second, we have right circumstance for the uttering. Secondly, Mey talks about the conditions and rules of Promises. As for the conditions for a speech act to count as a promise, nine conditions are mentioned. What the words I promise mean is determined by the pragmatic condi

27、tions governing the use of the language in the particular context of a certain family. Generally speaking, it is society that determines the validity of a particular speech act. As to rules govern a successful use of the speech act, five rules are mentioned. These rules and conditions mentioned abov

28、e are clearly stated from P99 to P101, so I dont write them down here. Thirdly, Mey discusses the speech act verbs. According to the different classificatory criteria, we have answers as to the number of speech acts. Whatever the number, languages have shown their preferences for certain exemplars o

29、f the species, and expressed this preference by bestowing the honors of specific, linguistic expressions; such expressions go by the name of speech act verbs. In fact, even if one observe an SAV in some linguistic connection, one cant believe a speech act to be taking place. The more important facto

30、r is the proper context. “The surface form of a particular linguistic expression doesnt always and necessarily tell the truth about what is doing.”(P111 Chapter5) Fourthly, Mey mentions the indirect speech acts. The occurrence of the imperative in orders or requests is dispreferrred in many language

31、s. People tend to use the indirect expressions to express the same meaning. We may perform things with words in many ways, and the performative verbs arent even a major tool. “Indirect speech can be a much more effective way of getting ones act together than using a regular SA.”(P117 Chapter5) Searl

32、e regards indirect speech as a combination of two acts, a primary illocutionary act and a secondary one., where the primary act operates through, and in force of, the secondary one. Fifthly, the author reviews the research of Austin and Searle. Undoubtedly, Austins theory of speech act and Searles f

33、urther development made a great contribution to the pragmatics. However, there are flaws in the theory, such as Austins classification and Austin and Searles “case approach”. What is of my special interest is various criticism about Austins original theory of speech acts. I think his main deficiency

34、 lies in that he tried to use the form of the language to explain its function. However, without the consideration of actual communicative context, we cant arrive at the satisfactory conclusion. (To the top)Jing Andian(robertbai2003; Mon, 18 Apr 2005 21:12:23 +0800 (CST) Chapter 5 is basically about

35、 the theory of speech acts in the language understanding pragmatically. From the functional view, the language has the functions of can say, can mean, and can do. If we take these functions to measure the theory of speech acts, then we can say that the speech acts are the language function of can do

36、. Of course, the difference just lies in whether the context is under the consideration, since in pragmatics the context is the most important element while understanding the language. Through the reading of chapter 5, we find that the language can not only make the speaker do, but the hearer, direc

37、tly or indirectly. Specifically, there are 4 things addressed in this chapter as the following: First, the history and introduction of speech acts. In the first part, the author provides us with the history of speech acts. In the actual language use, the language user not only tells the truth of the

38、 physical world, but also expresses his feelings of his mind. Therefore when we analyze the language just from the perspective of truth-condition, it is not enough. On the contrary we must apply to pragmatics, especially from the view of the language user in particular context. In fact when we talk

39、about the theory of speech acts, we can explore it from the communicative principle, which is proposed in the previous chapter. Once the language user utters he is certain to intend to do something either for the hearer or for himself. Second, the relation between speech acts and speech act verbs. T

40、raditionally, the speech acts are expressed by the means of speech act verbs in language. But the fact is that there is , however, and has always been, a certain asymmetry in the relationship between speech act verbs and speech acts proper. As the author argues, not all speech acts are expresses by

41、a specific speech act verbs, they may be represented by several. Conversely, not every speech act has a corresponding, custom-made speech act verbs of its own. Extremely, sometimes, particular speech act may be expressed without using speech act verb. In other words, speech acts and their verbs only

42、 make sense in their proper contexts. If the proper contexts are not considered, the speech act does not take place even if there is certain speech act verb in the utterance. Third, the author discusses the indirect speech acts in language. In the actual communication the speaker dose not always exp

43、ress what he wants to directly, he intends to express it indirectly. This phenomenon give rise to the question of indirect speech acts. In my opinion, the reason why the speaker expresses what he wants indirectly can be explained from the cooperative principle, politeness principle and relevance the

44、ory, which are introduced in the previous chapter. From the view of hearer, he should consider the speaker is cooperative while communicating, whatever the speaker addresses, it is relevant to what he expects. From the view of the speaker, the reason why he does not express what he wants is he obser

45、ves the politeness principle while communicating, and considering if the hearer observes the relevance theory he should understand what he wants to express. As to the interpretation of the indirect speech act, the author suggests the hearer should infer from the view of logic. Fourth, the classifica

46、tion of speech acts. In the last part of this chapter the author introduces the classification of speech acts proposed by Austin and Searle. Even though the classification proposed by Austin is controversial, Searle follows it with certain modification. In Searles opinion, the speech acts could be c

47、lassified as representatives, directives, commissives, expressives and declarations. In the end of this part the author gives his comments on the classification made by Austin and Searle and argues that when we describe the speech act we must pay serious attention to contextual conditions. (To the t

48、op)Lai Tao(byyourside; Tue, 19 Apr 2005 08:58:59 +0800) This chapter mainly deals with “speech acts” theory in pragmatic view, and introduces systematically the theory developed by J. L. Austin and J. R. Searle. First, this chapter analyzes the distinction between performatives and constatives by Au

49、stin (1962). Such “stating” verbs as merely describing situations, which were used to produce true or false “statements” about those situations, were called by Austin “constatives”. While the verbs denoting “real” speech acts seemed to do something, rather than merely producing candidates for “truth

50、” or “falsehood”, were called “performatives” by Austin (1962). (5.3.2: 106) Second, the author pays special attention to Searles indirect speech act (Searle, 1975) and his classification of speech acts (Searle, 1977). Searle views indirect speech acting as a combination of two acts, a primary illoc

51、utionary act and a secondary one, where the primary act operates through, and in the force of, the secondary one. (5.4.2: 113). Then, Searles classification of speech acts is introduced with his applying criteria. The five speech acts categories that Searle end up establishing are: representatives (

52、or assertives), directives, commissives, expressives and declarations. (Searle, 1977: 34) Fourth, it is about Meys own view on indirect speech act. There are two ways of approaching indirect speech acts. One way is based on reasoning and certain basic principles of logic (5.4.1: 112). The ten steps

53、of Searle demonstrate this very well. The other, pragmatic way of looking at the problem takes its point of departure in what people actually say, and “do with their words”. Users are part of a world of usage: they are never alone in their use of language, but use their language as members of a speech community that reflects the conditions of the community at large. (5.4