外文翻译--公司的股权结构、公司治理和资本结构决策——来自加纳的实证研究

1、外文翻译一公司的股权结构、公司治理和资本结构决策一一来自加纳的实证研究本科毕业论文（设计）文翻译外原文：Ownership structure, corporate governance and capital structure decisions of firmsEmpirical evidence from Ghana1. IntroductionThe relevance of capital structure to firm value remains fairly established following the seminal article by Modigliani an

2、d Miller, 1958 (Grabowski and Mueller, 1972; McCabe, 1979; Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Several theories including the pecking order theory, the free cash flow, the capital signaling, the trade-off, and market timing theories (windows of opportunities) and the fact that capital structure is voluntarily

3、 chosen by managers (Zwiebel, 1996) have been propounded to explain the choice of capital structure. Also, considerable research attention has been paid to the impact of agency costs on corporate financing since Jensen and Meckling (1976) published their paper.Crutchley and Hansen (1989) maintain th

4、at managers' choice of stock ownershipin the firm, the firm' s mixture of outside debt and equity financing, and dividends aremeant to reduce the costs of agency conflicts. Bajaj et al. (1998) suggest that ownership is positively correlated with various measures of the debt-equity ratio (lev

5、erage), implying that ownership structure has a correlation with financial structure of firms (Kim and Sorensen, 1986; Mehran, 1992; Brailsford et al., 2002). Friend and Lang (1988) find that debt ratio is negatively related to managerial ownership. Brailsford et al. (2002) suggest that the relation

6、ship between managerial share ownership and leverage may in fact be inverted u-shaped.In addition, Berglo?f (1990) suggests that in countries in which firms are typically closely held, debt finance plays a more prominent role than in countries characterized by more dispersed ownership structures sug

7、gesting the impact of insider system of corporate governance on financing structure of firms. Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) report empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that the identity of large owners - family, bank, and institutional investors - has important implications for financialstruct

8、ure. In particular, they show that a more risk averse or a more patient entrepreneur issues less debt and more equity. Given that insider system of corporate governance is practiced among listed companies in Ghana (Bokpin, 2008), this study seeks to document the impact of ownership structure on corp

9、orate financing, a mark departure from Abor (2007).Claessens et al. (2002) maintain that better corporate governance frameworks benefit firms through greater access to financing, lower cost of capital, better performance and more favourable treatment of all stakeholders. Corporate governance affects

10、 the development and functioning of capital markets and exerts a strong influence on resource allocation. Corporate governance correlates with the financing decisions and the capital structure of firms (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Litov, 2005; Abor, 2007). However, management incentives that include st

11、ock options introduces issues for the alignment of managerial and shareholder interests. The question is which way does managerial ownership affect capital structure decisions of firms? How does the form of governance affect the choice of financing? The empirical evidence observed in the literature

12、is inconclusive with much focus on developed capital markets.Unlike Abor (2007), this present study considers a much broader corporate governance index of the impact of ownership structure, managerial share ownership and other corporate governance variables on capital structure decisions of firms on

13、 the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE). Earlier studies on the GSE have failed to consider the impact of these factors on corporate financing decisions of firms (Aboagye, 1996; Boateng, 2004; Abor and Biekpe, 2005; Abor, 2007) implying that, these studies invariably ignores a gamut of other relevant variab

14、les that are central to understandingthe relationship among ownership structure, corporate governance, and firms'financing decisions from a developing country perspective Aside, the study uses more recent data from 2002 to 2007 whilst employing a panel data analysis. The rest of the paper is div

15、ided into four sections. Section 2 considers the literature review; Section 3 discusses data used in the study and also details the model specifications used for the empirical analysis. Section 4 contains the discussion of the results and Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.2. Literature re

16、view3. 1 Ownership structure and capital structureThe relationship between ownership and capital structures has attracted a considerable research attention over the last couple of decades. Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined ownership structure in terms of capital contributions. Thus, the authors saw

17、 ownership structure to comprise of inside equity (managers), outside equity and debt, thus proposing an extension of the form of ownership structure beyond the debt-holder and equity-holder view. Zheka (2005) unlike the above authors constructs ownership structure using variables including proporti

18、on of foreign share ownership, managerial ownership percentage, largest institutional shareholder ownership, largest individual ownership, and government share ownership. Bajaj et al. (1998) suggest that ownership is positively correlated with various measures of the debt-equity ratio (leverage), im

19、plying that ownership structure has a correlation with financial structure of firms.Friend and Lang (1988) find that debt ratio is negatively related to managerial ownership. Brailsford et al. (2002) suggest that the relationship between managerial share ownership and leverage may in fact be inverte

20、d u-shaped. Thus, debt first increases with an increase in managerial share ownership; but beyond a critical level of managerial share ownership debt may fall because there could be only a few agency related benefits by increasing debt further as the interests of managers and owners get very strongl

21、y aligned. Pindado and de la Torre (2005) conclude that insider ownership does not affect debt when the interest of managers and owners are aligned. Jensen and Meckling (1976), in relating capital structure to the level ofcompensation for CEOs came out with the findings that there is a positive corr

22、elation between the two and this was supported by Leland and Pyle (1977) and Berger et al. (1997) who assert the claim that the correlation between CEO compensation and capital structure is a positive one. However, Friend and Lang (1988), Friend and Hasbrouck (1988) and Wen et al. (2002) found a neg

23、ative correlation between CEO compensation and the financial leverage of firms.Morck et al. (1988) argue that family ownership may give rise to greater leverage than in the case of disperse ownership, because of the non-dilution of entrenchment effects. Mishra and McConaughy (1999) document empirica

24、l evidence that funding family-controlled firms use less debt than non-funding family controlled firms. Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) report empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that theidentity of large owners - family, bank, and institutional investors hasimportant implications for financial

25、 structure. In particular, they show that a more risk averse or a more patient entrepreneur issues less debt and more equity. Anderson and Reeb (2003) further argue that family ownership reduces the cost of debt financing.Berglo?f (1990) suggests that in countries in which firms are typically closel

26、y held, debt finance plays a more prominent role than in countries characterized by more dispersed ownership structures. Berger et al. (1997) found less leverage in firms with no major stakeholder. Lefort and Walker (2000) conclude that groups are effective in obtaining external finance and that the

27、re are no significant differences in the capital structure of groups of different sizes. Brailsford et al. (2002) suggest that firms with external block holders have low-debt ratios consistent with Friend and Lang (1988), who earlier on had indicated that firms with large non-managerial investors ha

28、ve significantly higher debt ratios than those without non-managerial investors. Cheng et al. (2005) also indicates that the leverage increases as ownership concentration increases following rights issuance. Driffield et al. (2005) argue that, higher ownership concentration is associated with higher

29、 leverage irrespective of whether a firm is family owned or not. Pindado and de la Torre (2005) suggest that there is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and debt thus, all things being equal, ownership concentration encourages debt financing. However,they find the positive effec

30、t of ownership concentration on debt to be smaller in cases of high free cash flow. They also find that ownership concentration does not moderate the relationship between insider ownership and debt; in contrast, the relationship between ownership concentration and debt is affected by insider ownersh

31、ip. Thus, the debt increments promoted by outside owners are larger when managers are entrenched.2. 2 Corporate governance and capital structureCorporate governance correlates with the financing decisions and the capital structure of firms (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Litov, 2005). Jensen (1986) postul

32、ates that large debt is associated with larger boards. Though Berger et al. (1997) concludes on a later date that larger board size is associated with low leverage; several other studies conducted in recent times have refuted this conclusion. Wen et al. (2002) posit that larger board size is associa

33、ted with higher debt, either to improve the firm' s value or because the larger size prevents the board from reaching a consensus on decisions, indicating a weak corporate governance system. Anderson et al. (2004) further indicate that larger board size results in lower cost of debt, which serve

34、s as a motivation for using more debt, and this has been confirmed by Abor (2007) who concludes that capital structure positively correlates with board size, among Ghanaian listed firms.In relation to the presence of external directors on the board, Wen et al. (2002) conclude that the presence of ex

35、ternal directors on the board leads to lower leverage, used by the firm, due to their superior control. However, Abor (2007) concludes that capital structure positively correlates with Board composition among Ghanaian listed firms. And this is consistent with Jensen (1986) and Berger et al. (1997) w

36、ho had earlier on concluded that firms with higher percentage of external directors utilize more debt as compared to equity.Berger et al. (1997) found less leverage in firms run by CEOs with long tenure and this was confirmed by Wen et al. (2002), who conclude that the tenure of CEO is negatively re

37、lated to leverage, to reduce the pressures associate with leverage. Kayhan (2003) finds that entrenched managers achieve lower leverage through retaining moreprofits and issuing equity more opportunistically. Further, Litov (2005) supports this claim that entrenched managers adopt lower levels of de

38、bt. Abor (2007) also asserts that entrenched CEOs employ lower debt in order to reduce the performance pressures associated with high-debt capital. However, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) refuted this fact by showing in their study that entrenched managers uenjoy the quiet life” by engaging in ris

39、k-reducing projects, indicating a positive relationship between managerial entrenchment and leverage.Fosberg (2004) relates that firms with a two-tier leadership structure have high-debt/equity ratios. This was supported by Abor (2007), who concludes that capital structure positively correlates with

40、 CEO duality, which shows that firms on the GSE use more debt as the CEO duality increases.3. Research methodologyIn order to gain the maximum possible observations, pooled panel crossed-section regression data are used. Panel data analysis involves analysis with a spatial and temporal dimension and

41、 facilitates identification of effects that are simply not detectable in pure crosssection or pure time series studies. Thus, degrees of freedom are increased and collinearity among the explanatory variables is reduced and the efficiency of economic estimates is improved. The study is therefore base

42、d on the official data published by the cross-sectional firms for the various years covering a period from 2002 to 2007.Analytical frameworkThe general form of the panel regression model is stated as:'ititity= Q +XB + u i=l, , N;t=l,，Twhere subscript i and t represent the firm and time, respecti

43、vely. In this case, i represents the cross-section dimension and t represents the time-series component. Y is the dependable variable which is a measure of capital structure. Q is a scalar, B isitK *1 and Xit is the observation on K explanatory variables. We assume that the ufollow a one-way error c

44、omponent model:itiit u = u + viwhere u is time-invariant and accounts for any unobservable itindividual-specific effect that is not included in the regressionmodel. The term vrepresents the remaining disturbance, and varies with the individual firms and time.Source: Godfred A. Bokpin and Anastacia C

45、. Arko, 2009. “Ownership structure,corporate governance and capital structure decisions of firmsEmpirical evidence from Ghanan . Studies in Economics and Finance . Vol. 26 No. 4. pp. 246-256.译文：公司的股权结构、公司治理和资本结构决策一一来自加纳的实证研究一、引 3L-.继利亚和米勒1958年开创性的文章（格拉博夫斯基和米勒，1972年；迈克， 1979年;安德森和力波，2003年）之后，公司价值与资本结

46、构相关性依然得到较大 的认可。一些理论，包括啄食顺序理论、自由现金流、资本信号、权衡理论、市 场预测理论（窗口的机会），和经理所选择的资本结构（茨威贝尔，1996年）的这一 事实已经针对性地解释了资本结构的选择问题。此外，自詹森和梅克林（1976年） 发表他们的文章以来，相当多的研究关注已经支付的代理成本对企业筹资的影响。克鲁奇利和汉森（1989年）主张经理人选择在这家公司中的股权，或公司的外部 债务、股权融资和股息的结合，都是为了减少代理成本的冲突。布雷斯福德等 （1998年）认为所有权与负债率（杠杆）的各项措施正相关，意味着股权结构与财务 结构有关联（金和瑟恩森，1986年，金融结构的关系

47、;迈赫兰，1992年;布雷斯福德 等人，2002年）。弗兰德和拉姆（1988）发现，负债率与管理所有权负相关。布雷斯 福德等人（2002年）认为股权管理与杠杆之间的关系实际上可能是倒U型的。另外，贝格尔夫（1990年）表示比起在一些所有权结构越来越分散的国家的公司 里，在一些封闭国家的公司中债务融资发挥着更显著的作用，这意味着对公司内部 系统的治理在企业的融资结构方面更具影响力。汤姆森和彼得森（2000年）的实证 证据支持这一假设:大业主、家庭、银行和机构投资者已经对融资结构产生重要影 响。特别是，他们表明一个更好的风险规避者或更具耐心的企业家，发行更少的债 务和更多的权益。鉴于公司治理的内幕

48、交易系统是在加纳上市公司实行的（博宾， 2008年），这项研究旨在从奥博（2007年）的文献出发，研究所有权结构对企业融 资的影响。克拉森等人（2002年）主张通过获取更多资金、降低更多资本成本、以更好的 性能和更佳的待遇对待所有者，使公司拥有更好的公司治理框架。公司治理影响资 本市场的发展和运作，从而发挥着对资源配置的强大影响力。公司治理、公司决策 和企业的资本结构相联系（格拉汉姆和哈维，2001年，资本结构与融资决策;利托 夫，2005年;奥博，2007年）。然而，包括股票期权在内的管理层激励措施引入了管理人员和股东利益的调整问题。现在的问题是管理层持股 方式是否会影响公司资本结构的决定，

49、治理的形式是怎样影响融资选择的。实证结 果发现，文献是以很多发达的资本市场为中心来定论的。与奥博（2007年）的研究不同的是:本研究认为在加纳联合交易所（GSE）公司治 理指数更广泛地受所有制结构、管理层持股和其他在公司资本结构决定方面的公司 治理变量的影响。较早对加纳联合交易所的研究没有考虑到这些因素对企业融资决 策的影响（阿贝格，1996年;博阿滕,2004年;奥博和伯克,2005年；奥博,2007年）, 那些研究总是忽略其他相关的变量，而这些变量对从发展中国家的角度以外来理解 股权结构、公司治理和企业融资决策之间的关系具有重要作用，该研究使用2002 到2007年面板数据分析中的最新数据

50、。本文的其余部分分为四个部分。第二部分 为综述;第三部分讨论研究中使用的数据，并详细介绍了用于实证分析的规格型 号。第四部分是对结果的讨论，第五部分概括了这份文件的结论。二、文献综述（一）股权结构和资本结构所有权与资本结构之间的关系，已吸引了过去几十年中相当多的研究的关注。詹森和梅克林（1976年）从出资方面定义股权结构。因此，作者认为股权结构是由 内部（经理）股权、外部股票及债券构成，从而提出了债券持有者和股票持有者角度 以外的股权结构形式的延伸。契卡（2005年）与上述作者不同，他采用外国共享所 有权、管理所有权、最大的机构股东拥有、最大的个人所有制，和政府共享所有权 的变量的比例组成所有

51、权结构。巴贾杰等人（1998年）认为所有权与债权比例（杠 杆）的各项措施正相关，并暗示股权结构与公司的融资结构有关联。弗兰德和拉姆（1988年）发现，负债比率与管理所有权负相关。布莱斯福德等人 （2002年）表明管理层股权和杠杆之间的关系实际上可能为倒U型。因此，当管理 层持股增加时.，债务首先增加;但超出了股权债务的管理水平后可能下降。因为可 能只有几个机构相关利益者通过增加债务的方式进一步使管理人员和业主的利益得 到对齐。平达多和德拉托雷（2005年）得出的结论是当管理人员和股东的利益是一 致时，内部人持股不影响债务水平。詹姆和梅克林（1977年）联系资本结构知识， 针对首席执行官的补偿水

52、平这一问题得出结论，承认了由利兰、派尔（1977年）和伯杰等人（1997年）关于资本结构和CEO报酬是正相关的 主张的事实。莫瑞可等人（1988年）认为比在分散的所有权情况下，家庭制的所有权可能会有 更大的影响力，因为非稀释的壕沟效应。米什拉和麦康瑙希（1999年）的文章实证 证据表明，资金由家族控制的公司使用债务方式融资少于资金由非家族控制的公 司。汤姆森和彼得森（2000年）报告中的实证支持这一假设:家族、银行、机构投 资者已对融资结构产生重要影响。特别是他们认为一个更好的风险规避者和更具耐 心的企业家发行较少的债券和更多的股票。安德森和力波（2003年）进一步认为家 族所有权减少债务融资的成本。贝格尔夫（1990年）表明比起在一些所有权结构分散的国家的公司里，在一些封 闭国家的公司中债务融资发挥更显著的作用，这意味着企业的融资结构对公司内部 系统的治理更具影响力。伯杰等人（1997年）发现在没有主要利益相关者的公司中 杠杆率较低。莱福特和沃克（2000年）的结论是